Jharkhand HC Rejects Claim Over Protected Forest Land, Says Title Plea Insufficient For Immunity From Prosecution Sans Substantiated Document Evidence

Justice Gautam Kumar Choudhary observed, “The proprietary title can devolve by a method known to law such as inheritance, testamentary succession, registered sale deed or gift deed which needs to be specifically pleaded and proved. The source of title along with the chain of title needs to be disclosed with certainty. It is a trite law that no one transfers a better title than he himself has.”

“Unless the person from whom one claims to acquire title had valid title over it, there cannot be any devolution of title. Mutation and issuance of rent receipts will be of no avail, as mutation neither creates nor extinguishes his title. Mere raising of a plea of title cannot grant immunity from prosecution, unless such plea is founded on a document of title from which a prima facie inference can be drawn regarding the colour of right of the petitioner over such property,” the Court added.

The aforementioned decision was rendered in three criminal miscellaneous petitions that pertained to identical issues of fact and law, and were being heard collectively.

All three criminal miscellaneous petitions were filed with the aim of quashing the entire criminal proceedings, including the summoning order issued in the C.P. Case, where a prima facie case had been established under Sections 33 and 63(c) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927.

The central question addressed in these petitions was whether a case involving a protected forest, as notified under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, allegedly encroached and seized by private individuals claiming ownership over the forest area, could have its cognizance quashed.

In two of these petitions, the forest guard's offense report served as the foundation for the forest cases. Cognizance was taken based on the prosecution report submitted by the forest range officer. The prosecution's argument was that a land area comprising 6 Plots measuring 71.83 acres in Mouza Siyaljori had been declared a protected forest by Notification C/F-17014/58-1429R dated 24.05.1958. The petitioners were accused of encroaching upon this protected forest area, constructing boundary walls, and establishing various units of Electro-steel Integrated Limited and Electro-steel Steels Limited.

In the third petition, the case involved the encroachment by the same company onto 2 plots through the construction of a road, which was claimed to be within the protected forest area designated by the same notification.

In reference to Notification No. C/F-17014/58-1429R dated 24.05.1958, the counsel for the petitioners argued that this notification was not final. They contended that before the final notification, both the government's rights and those of private individuals needed to be examined. The petitioners further asserted that no such inquiry had been conducted to date, and no Forest Settlement Officer had been appointed by the State to carry out such an examination. Without such an inquiry, the notification could not be considered final, and it could not affect the private rights of the involved parties. Sub-section (3) of Section 29 mandates an inquiry into the rights of the local people.

The same notification was also cited in relation to 44 criminal cases filed against the company and its officials. These cases were subsequently dismissed by this Court, as detailed on pages 15 to 17, and some of them were subject to Special Leave Petitions (SLPs).

The petitioners further contended that they were not specifically implicated in these offenses. Allegations were made against the company, not against the individual petitioners. The lands in question were legally acquired by the company through registered sale deeds and were duly transferred in the company's name.

The State's argument, on the other hand, was that M/s Electrosteel Steels Ltd. had encroached upon approximately 220 acres of notified and demarcated forest land in villages Bhagabandh, Siyaljori, Hutupathar, and Bandhdih under the jurisdiction of Bokaro Forest Division. This encroachment occurred when the company attempted to establish a steel plant at a site different from the permitted one, i.e., Village Parbatpur, Block Chandankiyari, District Bokaro. The State contended that this action violated the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, the Indian Forest Act, 1927, and the Forest Conservation Act, 1980.

Furthermore, the Forest Department took legal action against M/s Electrosteel Steels Ltd. under Sections 33 and 63 of the Indian Forest Act for encroaching upon 220.88 acres of forest land. Forest officials found evidence of non-forestry activities, such as dozering, leveling, digging, and construction work, carried out by the company's employees on the notified and demarcated forest land.

The State emphasized that the land in question was government land, duly notified as forest land in 1958 under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act. The inquiry contemplated under Section 29 pertained not to proprietary rights over the land, as it was government property, but to ancillary rights such as cutting grass, pasture, and the right to forest produce, for which rules were outlined under Section 32 of the Act.

Court’s Findings

The Court's first consideration was the Petitioners' argument that the notification was a proviso to Section 29(3) of the 1927 Act, whereby they claimed that no inquiry, as required by Section 29(3), had been conducted, making the forest department's claim based on the notification legally invalid.

The Court observed that the plea stemmed from a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of Reserved and Protected Forests and the type of inquiry required for their notification.

The Court clarified that the inquiry specified in Chapter II and IV of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, was not related to property rights over the land in question. Both categories of forests could only be declared on government-owned land or land where the government had proprietary rights. The inquiry was meant to focus on the forest rights of individuals or communities over forest products like grazing, forest wood, etc., as outlined in Sections 12 and 32 of the Indian Forest Act. Protected Forests allowed for such rights, while Reserved Forests excluded them.

The Court elaborated on the provisions contained between Chapter II and Chapter IV of the Indian forest Act, while explaining the differences between the two.

The Court rejected the Petitioner's argument that Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927, was comparable to Section 30 of the Bihar Private Forest Act, 1947.

The Court pointed out that unlike Section 29, neither Section 30 nor any other provision of the Bihar Private Forest Act applied to government-owned land. The Bihar Private Forest Act mainly pertained to privately owned forests recorded in the names of landlords. Section 4 explicitly prohibited landlords and others from cutting, collecting, or removing trees in contravention of the Act.

The Court noted that Section 13 outlined the establishment of private protected forests, which could not be equated with Protected Forests designated under the Indian Forest Act. The provisions of the Bihar Private Forest Act primarily applied to the private lands of landlords recorded as jungle Jhari in the records of rights, as per the Act's definition of a forest in Section 3.

The Court mentioned that these private forests were protected by the state before independence and were subsequently regulated by the Bihar Act of 1947. Section 2 clarified that the Bihar Private Forest Act, did not apply to land vested in the government or land for which notifications and orders were issued under the Indian Forests Act.

Referring to the ruling in the case of Guru Datta Sharma v. State of Bihar case (1962) 2 SCR 292, the Court noted that the Petitioners, representing Electrosteel Steels Ltd., had encroached upon and occupied a significant portion of the Protected Forest Area designated under Section 29 of the Indian Forest Act. They sought the quashing of criminal charges by contesting the validity of the 1958 notification. The Court highlighted a presumption in favor of the long-standing notification.

The Court further delved into the question of whether this was a genuine dispute over title, justifying criminal prosecution.

The Court stated, “Here in the present case title is being claimed in teeth of lands duly notified as protected forest. The said notification remained unchallenged and now after long lapse of time title over forest lands are being claimed by private parties on wrong interpretation of the provisions of the Forest Acts.”

“As discussed above, the claim of title is made over a large tracts of government land which had been duly notified as protected forest area way back in 1958 which is prima facie not sustainable. Materials prima facie go to show that Petitioners representing the company had encroached upon and grabbed more than 200 acres forest land and are now claiming immunity from criminal prosecution by quashing of the case. Any such order of quashing will legitimize illegal encroachment of forest land,” the Court added.

Accordingly, the Court did not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order, and all three criminal miscellaneous petitions were dismissed.

Counsel/s For the Petitioners : M/s Indrajit Sinha & Bibhash Sinha, Advocates

Counsel/s For the State : M/s Priya Shresha & Nehla Sharmin, S.P.P.

LL Citation: 2023 LiveLaw (Jha) 63

Case Title: P.N. Pathak @ Pradip Narayan Pathak and Another vs. The State of Jharkhand and Another

Case No.: Cr. M. P. No. 1751 of 2022

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