Trial Courts' Obligation To Compute And Award Victim Compensation Can't Be Delegated To DSLSA U/S 357 CrPC: Delhi HC 5 Judge Bench

A five judge bench of the Delhi High Court has ruled that the obligation and duty casted upon the trial courts to compute and award quantum of victim compensation cannot be delegated to the Delhi State Legal Services Authority Statutory Authority (DSLSA) as the same would run contrary to the scheme of Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The full bench comprised Justice Rekha Palli, Justice Prathiba M Singh, Justice Subramonium Prasad, Justice Saurabh Banerjee and Justice Manoj Jain.

The larger bench was constituted after a single judge in 2021 took note of the inordinate delay in passing of orders on sentence as a result of the implementation of the directions issued by a Full Bench in Karan v. State of NCT of Delhi.

Vide the said judgment, the full bench issued directions laying down the detailed procedure to be followed by Trial Courts for assessing the quantum of victim compensation payable under Section 357 of Cr.P.C. It also laid down the timeframe within which each steps must be completed before an order on sentence is passed.

The five judge bench was constituted by then Chief Justice to consider modification of the guidelines issued in the judgment in question.

DSLSA Cannot Compute or Pass Orders on Awarding Victim Compensation

The five judge bench held that under the CrPC, while DSLSA is required to step in for awarding compensation, it has no role in passing of orders awarding victim compensation and it is the sole prerogative of the Trial Courts to compute and award victim compensation.

“The legislature having explicitly conferred the discretion to assess and award victim compensation under Section 357, Cr.P.C. only on the Trial Courts, the DSLSA could not be asked to make recommendations in this regard and that too by simply borrowing the mechanism envisaged under Section 357A, Cr.P.C., which provision operates in an entirely different field,” the Court said.

It added that the directions in the ruling requiring the DSLSA to conduct a summary inquiry for determination of victim compensation after conviction of the accused would amount to “clothing the DSLSA with a power which the legislature does not envisage.”

“This delegation would, therefore, be contrary to the very scheme of Section 357, Cr.P.C., which unambiguously vests the Trial Courts with the discretion to determine what would be fair and equitable under the circumstances, for which purpose the Court is required to take into account the peculiar facts of each case,” the Court ruled.

It also held that the direction issued in the ruling virtually amounted to rewriting the legislative provisions of Section 357 of Cr.P.C. which do not envisage any recommendations from the State Legal Services Authority.

Convict's Affidavit Disclosing Financial Capacity to Pay Compensation to Victim Violates Constitutional Rights

The Court observed that the requirement of an accused or convict to furnish an affidavit detailing his assets and liabilities indicating the financial capacity to pay compensation to the victim is violative of his constitutional and statutory rights.

It said that the information provided by the accused regarding his financial status may sought to be used by other investigating agencies such as the Enforcement Directorate which may amount to self-incrimination.

“We, therefore, have no hesitation in agreeing with the learned counsel for the parties that the direction to the accused/convict to furnish an affidavit detailing his assets and liabilities would be violative of both his constitutional and statutory rights,” the Court said.

Inordinate Delay in Passing Orders on Sentence

The Court was informed that even though specific timelines were set down in the guidelines for furnishing of affidavits both by the accused and the prosecution as also for furnishing of VIR by the DSLSA, they were not being followed in practice.

The Bench ruled that inordinate delay was being caused in passing of orders on sentence and consequently, convicts all across Delhi are made to languish in jail to await the orders on sentence after their conviction.

“This prolonged detention of the accused, during which he is disabled from exercising his right to file an appeal under Section 374 of the Cr.P.C. (Section 415 of the BNSS) would certainly be unjust, unfair and unreasonable. We are, therefore, inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the parties that on account of the mandatory procedure set down under the guidelines, the statutory as well as the fundamental rights of the accused for speedy trial are being violated,” it said.

Conclusion

The five judge bench set aside the guidelines issued in the ruling and clarified that they would no longer be enforceable.

It directed the Trial Courts in the national capital to adopt a “victim centric approach” while passing orders of victim compensation.

In determining the compensation, the Bench asked the Trial Courts to take into account the income and assets of the accused and any other factors as may be deemed appropriate, for which purpose information may be elicited not only from the I.O. or prosecuting agency but also from the accused, who will not be asked to make any statement on oath or by way of an affidavit.

“We however make it clear that this order will not preclude the learned Trial Courts from seeking assistance of the DSLSA, as and when deemed necessary. Needless to state, these directions will have also no effect on the manner in which compensation is required to be awarded under Section 357A, Cr.P.C. (Section 396 BNSS) after consultation with the DSLSA,” it said.

The Bench appreciated the valuable assistance rendered by the Amicus Curiae- Senior Advocate Vikas Pahwa and all the parties.

Title: SAIF ALI @ SOHAN v. THE STATE GNCT OF DELHI and other connected matters

Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 93

Click here to read order