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Krishna Janmabhumi Case | Its 'Religious Character' To Be Determined In Trial; Govt's 1920 Notification Indicates Pre-Aurangzeb Temple Existence: Allahabad HC
Sparsh Upadhyay
1 Aug 2024 8:13 PM IST
In a significant verdict, the Allahabad High Court today DISMISSED the Order 7 Rule 11 CPC petition filed by the Mathura-based Shahi Eidgah (mosque) committee challenging the maintainability of 18 suits filed by Hindu worshipers and deity Shri Krishna Virajman, in connection with the Krishna Janmabhoomi-Shahi Eidgah Mosque dispute in Mathura. A bench of Justice Mayank Kumar Jain...
In a significant verdict, the Allahabad High Court today DISMISSED the Order 7 Rule 11 CPC petition filed by the Mathura-based Shahi Eidgah (mosque) committee challenging the maintainability of 18 suits filed by Hindu worshipers and deity Shri Krishna Virajman, in connection with the Krishna Janmabhoomi-Shahi Eidgah Mosque dispute in Mathura.
A bench of Justice Mayank Kumar Jain found the 18 suits, primarily seeking the removal of the mosque from the 13.37-acre disputed complex, to be MAINTAINABLE, paving the way for them to be heard on their merits.
In its 155-page Judgment, released at around 6 PM today, the Court categorically rejected the Masjid Committee's primary contention that the suits pending before the HC are barred by the Places of Worship Act 1991, Limitation Act 1963, and Specific Relief Act 1963.
Regarding the Places of Worship Act 1991, the Judge observed that the Act does not define 'religious character' and that to apply this Act, the religious character of a place of worship must be determined, which is not barred by the Act.
The Court emphasised that religious character is crucial for deciding the Act's applicability, and it can be decided by considering the Plaintiffs' claims and supporting documents (during the trial).
“In the present proceedings, the question of religious character is a mixed question of facts and law. This Court is of the opinion that the religious character of the suit property cannot be determined, at this stage. It can only be decided by framing issues on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and after taking oral and documentary evidence to be led during the trial.”
Significantly, the Court also considered the Notification of November 1920 issued by the Lt. Governor, United Province, Agra and Oudh, declaring the place of the temple at Katra Keshav as a 'protected monument'.
Here it may be noted that the said notification records that the temple of Keshav Dev existed there and was dismantled to be utilized as a mosque of Aurangzeb. The said notification declared the portion of the Katra mound, on which, formerly stood a temple of Keshav Dev, which was dismantled and the site utilized for the mosque of Aurangzeb, to be a protected monument.
Based on this notification, the Court took a prima facie view that “the above notification indicates the existence of a temple of Keshav Dev prior to its demolition. After the demolition, the site was utilized as the mosque of Aurangzeb”
In this regard, the Court also found substance in the plaintiffs' argument regarding the principle of 'first in existence' or 'prior in existence' being the determinative factor for deciding the applicability of the provisions of the Act of 1991.
“The arguments of learned Senior Counsel, Sri C. S. Vaidyanathan, that 'once a temple, always a temple' is a judicially recognized principle of law and learned Counsel, Sri Satyaveer Singh, that 'resolution always stays alive' (संकल्प हमेशा जिंदा रहता है, और यह कभी मरता नहीं है)) are also indicative of the religious character of the property as temple,” the Court noted (emphasis supplied).
Against this backdrop and considering the averments made in the plaints, the documents brought on record, and the arguments advanced on behalf of the rival parties, the Court opined that at this stage, the plaintiffs' suits do not appear to be barred under any provision of the Act of 1991.
Regarding the applicability of the Waqf Act, 1995 as a bar to the suits, the Court noted that the defendants claimed that the property in question had been declared as waqf property as per the Government Gazette Notification dated 26.02.1944, Part VIII (issued by the Secretary, Sunni Central Board of Waqfs, United Provinces, Lucknow).
However, the Court observed that the defendants could not bring on record any information to corroborate that the suit property was ever called 'Idgah Masjid Aalmgiri', and even in their application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, the defendants did not mention the waqf number of the property.
The Court also noted that the present superstructure came into existence on the basis of the compromise dated October 12, 1968, and during several rounds of litigation prior to the institution of Suit No. 43 of 1967, nowhere was it pleaded that the suit property was a waqf property.
In view of the foregoing observation and the averments made in the plaint, the Court, prima facie, determined that the Notification of 1944 does not relate to the suit property.
Thus, the court held that, at this stage, it cannot be assumed that the suit property was notified as a 'waqf property' under this Notification.
“In view of the above, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, averments made in the plaint and the legal proposition referred by the rival parties, it cannot be assumed that the suit property is a waqf property. All the facts and circumstances of the case are subject to appreciation of oral and documentary evidence to be led by the parties during the trial. Therefore, at this stage I am of the view that the suits are not barred under any provision of the Act of 1995,” the Court further held.
On the question of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, operating as a bar to the suits, the Court noted that the primary argument of the Masjid Committee was that since the plaintiffs had, in their complaint, not sought possession of the property in question, indicating they do not possess the suit property, hence, their suits filed for granting a decree for declaration and injunction (based on mere declaration of title), cannot be allowed.
In response to this contention, the Court noted that the plaintiffs sought a mandatory injunction in their suits to remove the defendants' constructions and hand over possession to the Janmabhoomi Trust. While praying thus, they claimed possession of the property in question since time immemorial, arguing that Aurangzeb's demolition did not oust them.
The Court further noted that the Defendants claim the mosque has existed only since 1669, with no prior possession claim, while Plaintiffs assert a temple was built by Brijnabha, Krishna's great-grandson, 5000 years ago and in view of this, the Court opined, it can't be assumed that the plaintiffs have admitted the lawful possession of the defendants over the suit property.
"The constructive possession of the deity over the land from the time immemorial and the legality and validity of the compromise dated 12.10.1968 are questions of fact that can only be proved by the evidence to be led during the trial. The question that the suits of the plaintiffs are 152 barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act,1963 can only be decided after framing a proper issues on the basis of the pleadings of the parties during the trial after taking and appreciating evidence led by the parties," the Court further said as it held that the question whether the suit is barred by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act,1963 cannot be decided at this stage without taking and appreciating the evidence of the parties to be led during the trial.
Further, on the contention regarding the Limitation Act, 1963 acting as a bar to the Suit, the Court opined thus:
"The plea of limitation can be decided based on the pleadings of the parties after framing an issue under Order VI Rule 13 of the CPC. On the basis of the chain of events as averred in the plaints, at this stage, when the maintainability of the suit is challenged by the defendants, the question of limitation cannot be determined without framing an issue and taking the evidence of the parties. Since the question of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law, therefore, on the question of limitation, the plaints cannot be rejected at the threshold."
In view of this, the Court CONCLUDED that on the reading of the plaints as a whole and in a meaningful manner, a perusal of the material placed on records, consideration of the arguments advanced by the rival parties, and settled legal propositions, the plaints in all the suits of the plaintiffs disclose a cause of action and they do not appear to be barred by any provisions of the Waqf Act, 1995; the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991; the Specific Relief Act, 1963; the Limitation Act, 1963 and Order XIII Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
The dispute in brief
The entire controversy relates to Mughal emperor Aurangazeb-era Shahi Eidgah mosque at Mathura, which is alleged to have been built after demolishing a temple at the birthplace of Lord Krishna.
In 1968, a 'compromise agreement' was brokered between the Shri Krishna Janmasthan Seva Sansthan, the temple management authority, and the Trust Shahi Masjid Eidgah, allowing both places of worship to operate simultaneously. However, the validity of this agreement has now been doubted by parties seeking various forms of relief in courts with respect to Krishna Janmabhoomi.
The litigants contend that the compromise agreement was fraudulent and invalid in law. Many of them claim a right to worship at the disputed site and have sought the removal of the Shahi Eidgah mosque.
In May last year, the Allahabad High Court transferred to itself all the suits pending before the Mathura court, praying for various reliefs pertaining to the Krishna Janmabhoomi-Shahi Eidgah Mosque dispute, allowing the transfer application filed by Bhagwan Shrikrishna Virajman and seven others.
Appearances
Counsels for Plaintiffs: Senior Counsel C.S. Vaidyanathan, Hari Shanker Jain, Vishnu Shanker Jain, assisted by Mani Munjal and Parth Yadav, Rahul Sahai, Senior Counsel Anil Kumar Airi, Senior Counsel Mahendra Pratap Singh, Saurabh Tiwari, Ajay Kumar Singh, Hare Ram Tripathi, Prabhash Pandey, Pradeep Kumar Sharma, Vinay Sharma, Gaurav Kumar, Siddharth Srivastava, Anil Kumar Singh, Ashish Kumar Srivastava, Ashvanee Kumar Srivastava, Satyaveer Singh, Dr. Dharmesh Chaturvedi, Arya Suman Pandey, Rama Nand Gupta, Harshit Gupta, Saurabh Basu, Gopal Srivastava, Anil Kumar Bisen, Ajay Pratap Singh, Rana Singh, Amit Kumar, Naman Kishore Sharma, Jawahar Yadav, Kumar Beenu Singh, Aniruddh Tiwari, Ugrasen Kumar Pandey, Radhey Shyam Yadav, Brahm Kumar Tiwari, Mayank Singh, Tejas Singh, Alok Dubey, Kumar Anish, A. K. Malviya, Amitabh Trivedi, Rajesh Kumar Shukla, Mrs. Rama Goyal Bansal and Mrs. Reena N Singh, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs. S/Sri Rajendra Maheshwari, Advocate and Ashutosh Pandey, appearing in person
Counsels for Defendants: Tasneem Ahmadi, Mehmood Pracha, Nasiruzzaman, Pranav Ojha, Hare Ram Tripathi, Manoj Kumar Singh, Afzal Ahmad, Tanveer Ahmad and Imran
Case title - Bhagwan Shrikrishna Virajman At Katra Keshav Dev Khewat No. 255 And 7 Others vs. U.P. Sunni Central Waqf Board And 3 Others and connected matters 2024 LiveLaw (AB) 477
Case citation: 2024 LiveLaw (AB) 477
