Section 27 Of The Evidence Act Re-Visited In The Wake Of Supreme Court Judgement In “Ramanand @ Nandlal Bharti”

“27: How much of information received from accused may be proved: Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police-officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved”.

2. Recently, it has been held by the Apex Court that Section 27 is an exception to Sections 24 to 26 of the Evidence Act. (Vide Jafarudheen v. State of Kerala AIR 2022 SC 3627 (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, M.M. Sundresh – JJ). We will shortly see that this Section does not say that the police officer in whose custody the accused person gives an “information” should prepare a “panchanama” or a “mahazar” at all or that the investigating officer should call two independent persons to witness the giving of the “information” (disclosure statement) by the accused or to witness the actual recovery of the incriminating article. It is only a rule of caution possibly evolved through Judge-made procedure. The very fact that the interdict under Section 162 (1) Cr.P.C against the user of any statement made by a person (including a suspect) to a police officer during the course of investigation is expressly taken away by Section 162 (2) Cr.P.C in the case of a recovery falling under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, itself shows that the police officer should be able to depose before Court the “fact” disclosed by the accused resulting in the recovery of the incriminating article. A police officer, during his official career, may have to conduct innumerable investigations. It is humanly impossible for him to remember the facts and circumstances of each and every investigation conducted by him. That is the reason why police officers, by way of abundant caution, prepare contemporaneous documents called “recovery panchanama” or “seizure mahazar” incorporating the various steps taken by them to unearth the “fact discovered” in each and every case. Since such recovery is not the result of a search and seizure falling under Sections 100 and 165 Cr.P.C, the mandate of those provisions requiring “independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality” to witness such search and seizure, does not apply.

3. The ingredients of Section 27 are –

1. A “fact” has been discovered in consequence of “information” received from an “accused person”.
2. The accused person was in “police custody” when he gave the information.
3. The discovery of the above fact is “deposed to”.
4. What can be proved is only so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered.
5. This is irrespective of the question whether such “information” amounts to a confession or not.

(Vide para 434 of Mukesh v. State of NCT of Delhi AIR 2017 SC 2161 (Dipak Misra, R. Banumathi, Ashok Bhushan – JJ).

4. The conditions necessary for the applicability of Section 27, as explained by the Privy Council in the celebrated Pulukuri Kottaya’s case and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of India, are –

(a) A “fact” (about the “place” from where the concealed object was produced and the exclusive knowledge of the accused about that “place”) has been discovered.

(Thus, the “fact discovered” is not the weapon or object discovered, but –

• the place from where the concealed weapon or object was recovered.

      AND

• the exclusive knowledge of the accused person regarding the said place of concealment. (Vide para 10 of Pulukuri Kottaya).

Again, in para 12 of Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash AIR 1972 SC 975 (P. Jaganmohan Reddy, D. G. Palekar-JJ), it was held that the expression “fact discovered” is not the “dagger” but the “dagger hidden by the accused under a stone which fact was not known to the police”.

(b) The “fact” (about the place of concealment of the object and the exclusive knowledge of the accused regarding that “place”) was discovered in consequence of “information” received from the accused person.

(c) The accused person at the time of giving the said “information”, was in the custody of a police officer.

(To constitute “custody”, formal arrest of the accused is not necessary. It is enough that the accused is in the “custodial surveillance” of the police. The word “custody” in Section 27 should be understood in a pragmatic sense so as to bring the accused within the ken of surveillance of the police when his movements are restricted. (vide para 19 of State of A.P. v. Gangula S. Murthy AIR 1997 SC 1588 (A.S. Anand, K.T. Thomas – JJ).

Even in a case where, after committing a brutal murder, if the person voluntarily goes to the police and offers to furnish information against himself, he is said to submit himself to police custody without any formal accusation against him. It is enough, for the applicability of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, that he is subsequently made an accused. (Vide paras 12 and 18 of State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya AIR 1960 SC 1125 – 5 Judges (S. K. Das, J. L. Kapur, K. Subba Rao, M. Hidayatullah, J. C. Shah – JJ) – J. C. Shah – J giving the leading judgment with M. Hidayathullah – J concurring and K. Subba Rao – J dissenting on another aspect).

(d) The “fact” (about the place of concealment of the object and the exclusive knowledge of the accused regarding that “place”) so discovered, has been deposed to. (i.e, testified before a Court either by the police officer himself or by any person who witnessed the same).

(e) When once, the “fact” has been discovered, then what is admissible in evidence or what can be proved before Court, is only “so much of the information which distinctly relates to the fact” (about the place of concealment of the object and the exclusive knowledge of the accused regarding that place and which was until then unknown to the police) thereby discovered.

(This excludes any statement by the accused about the “previous user” or the “past history” of the object, which is not related to its discovery, i.e, the accused is not expected to say that he had previously used the object for committing the offence or that the object was the subject-matter of any offence committed by him etc.). (Vide paras 10 and 14 of Pulukuri Kottaya).

Accordingly, if the accused were to say “The dagger (with which I killed Rahman) has been hidden by me in the cowshed of my neighbour, Antony”, the words “with which I killed Rahman” are inadmissible being indicative of “previous user” or “past history” of the weapon, namely, dagger.

Similarly, in the statement of the accused “if I am taken there, I will show the spot where we committed murder…….” “where we committed murder” was held to be outside the purview of Section 27. (Vide Venkatesh @ Chandra v. State of Karnataka 2022 KHC 6440 (SC) (Uday U. Lalit, P.S. Narasimha – JJ ).

The tendency on the part of prosecuting agencies getting recorded the entire statement including the inadmissible portion, deprecated and directed that such a practice must immediately be stopped. (Vide Venkatesh @ Chandra v. State of Karnataka 2022 KHC 6440 (SC) (Uday U. Lalit, P.S. Narasimha – JJ ).

(f) The words “whether it (information) amounts to a confession or not” occurring in Section 27 can apply only to those cases where “possession of the object” or “concealment of the object” itself is an offence and not to any other act of the accused confessing the commission of the offence. (See towards the end of para 11 of Pulukuri Kottaya)

(Thus, in a case where the accused says that he has hidden “an unlicensed firearm” or a “narcotic drug” at a place revealed by him, then even though his admission of his possession of the firearm or the contraband substance itself may amount to an offence, such admission cannot be excluded from the disclosure of the place of concealment of the same.

Likewise, merely because the property is described as “looted property” in the confessional statement, it would not render the statement inadmissible. (vide para 14 of Sanjay @ Kaka v. State (NCT of Delhi) AIR 2001 SC 979 (K. T. Thomas, R. P. Sethi – JJ).

(vide –

• Pulikuri Kottayya v. Emperor – AIR 1947 P.C. 67 (Sir John Beaumont - J);
• Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma v. State of Bombay AIR 1955 SC 105 = 1955 Cri.L.J. 196 – 3 Judges (N. H. Bhagwati; B. Jagannadhadas, T. L. Venkatarama Ayyar – JJ );
• K. Chinnaswami Reddy v. State of A.P AIR 1962 SC 1788 – 3 judges (B. P. Sinha, CJI , K. N. Wanchoo; J. C. Shah. – JJ );
• Prabhoo v. State of U.P AIR 1963 SC 1113 – 3 Judges (S. K. Das, A. K. Sarkar, M. Hidayatullah – JJ );
• Jaffer Hussain Dastagir v. State of Maharashtra - 1969 (2) SCC 872 = AIR 1970 SC 1934 – 3 Judges (Sikri, Mitter, Reddy – JJ ). (The principle has been lucidly explained in this decision);
• Paras 12 & 13 of Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash – AIR 1972 SC 975 (P. Jaganmohan Reddy, D. G. Palekar – JJ ). (Held that the “fact discovered” is not the dagger but the dagger hidden under a stone which was not known to the Police);
• Mohd Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra – AIR 1976 SC 483 (P. N. Bhagwati, R. S. Sarkaria– JJ );
• Dhananjoy Chatterjee v. State of W.B (1994) 2 SCC 220 (Dr. A. S. Anand, N. P. Singh – JJ );
• Shamshuk Kanwar v. State of U.P. - 1995 (4) SCC 430 (M. M. Punchhi, K. Jayachandra Reddy – JJ );
• State of Maharashtra v. Damu (2000) 6 SCC 269 (K. T. Thomas, D. P. Mohapatra – JJ );
• Swamy Shradhananda v. State of Karnataka - AIR 2007 S.C. 2531 (Markandey Katju, S. B. Sinha – JJ );
• Amitsingh Bhikamsingh Thakur v. State of Maharashtra - (2007) 2 SCC 310 (Arijit Pasayat, Lokeshwar Singh Panta – JJ );
• Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan - (2004) 10 SCC 657 = AIR 2004 SC 2865 (Doraiswamy Raju, Arijit Pasayat – JJ );
• Mustkeem v. State of Rajasthan (2011) 11 SCC 724 (Asok Kumar Ganguly, Deepak Verma – JJ );
• Para 30 of Pawan Kumar v. State of U.P. (2015) 7 SCC 148 = AIR 2015 SC 2050 (S. J. Mukhopadhaya, N. V. Ramana – JJ )
• Raja @ Rajinder v. State of Haryana (2015) 11 SCC 43 (Dipak Misra, N. V. Ramana – JJ )
• Harpal Singh @ Chhota v. State of Punjab AIR 2016 SC 5389 (A. K. Sikri, Amitawa Roy – JJ )
• Brij Lal v. State of Rajasthan AIR 2016 SC 3875 (J.S. Khehar, Arun Mishra – JJ )
• Manoj v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2022 SCC OnLine SC 677 = 2022 KHC 6597 (Uday U. Lalit, S. Raveendra Bhat – JJ ) ).

Other settled legal propositions regarding Section 27

5. The following propositions of law are well settled: -

1. Section 27 does not lay down that the statement made to a police officer should be in the presence of “independent witnesses”. (vide para 21 of Praveen Kumar v. State of Karnataka (2003) 12 SCC 199 (N. Santosh Hegde; B. P. Singh – JJ).
2. It is not necessary that witnesses should be present when the accused is interrogated by the investigation officer. Disclosure statement of the accused need not be made in the presence of witnesses who need not also overhear the same. (vide para 25 of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jeet Singh (1999) 4 SCC 370 = AIR 1999 SC 1293 (K. T. Thomas, S. S. Mohammed Quadri – JJ).

In para 438 of Mukesh v. State of NCT of Delhi AIR 2017 SC 2161 (Dipak Misra, R. Banumathi, Ashok Bhushan – JJ) it was observed as follows:-

“need of examining independent witnesses, while making recoveries pursuant to the disclosure statement of the accused is a rule of caution evolved by the Judiciary, which aims at protecting the right of the accused by ensuring transparency and credibility in the investigation of a criminal case”.

             3. Even failure to record the information given by the accused and failure to examine public witnesses, are not fatal to the prosecution. (vide paras 71                  and 72 of Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar AIR 1994 SC 2420 (Dr. A. S. Anand, Faizan Uddin – JJ ).

What is really important is the credibility of the evidence of the investigating officer. (Vide para 69 of Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2011) 13 SCC 621 (V. S. Sirpurkar, T. S. Thakur – JJ ); para 9 of Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash – AIR 1972 SC 975 (P. Jaganmohan Reddy, D. G. Palekar – JJ )

              4. It is not a requirement of law that the accused should himself lead the police party to the spot and take out the weapon. It is enough if the accused                  discloses to the investigating officer such information which leads to the discovery of the thing sold or hidden or kept with him which the police did                   not know until then. (vide –

• Reveendran and Others v. State – 1989 (2) KLJ 534 (DB) (S. Padmanabhan, P. K. Shamsuddin – JJ );
• Para 24 of Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Om Prakash - AIR 1972 SC 975 = 1972 SCC (Crl.) 88 (P. Jaganmohan Reddy, D. G. Palekar – JJ );
• Bahadul v. State of Orissa - 1979 (4) SCC 346 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 982 : AIR 1979 SC 1262 : 1979 Cri.L.J 1075 (S. Murtaza Fazl Ali, A. D. Koshal – JJ );
• Prakash Chand v. State (Delhi Admn.) - 1979 (3) SCC 90 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 656 : AIR 1979 SC 400 : 1979 Cri.L.J 329 (R. S. Sarkaria, O. Chinnappa Reddy – JJ );
• Para 142 of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu (2005) 11 SCC 600 (P. Venkatarama Reddi, P. P. Naolekar – JJ ).

NOTE BY VRK:- This is the reason why it has been held that the person who recovered the incriminating object need not be the identical person to whom the disclosure statement was made. (vide Sekharan v. State of Kerala - 1979 KLT 337 = 1979 (1) ILR (Kerala) 156 (Narayana Pillai, Kader – JJ ) and Para 57 of Rijo v. State of Kerala - 2009 (2) KLD 803 (K. Balakrishnan Nair, P. Bhavadasan – JJ ).

But there may be cases like Karan Singh v. State of U.P (1973) 3 SCC 662 = AIR 1973 SC 1385 (A. Alagiriswami, I. D. Dua, C. A. Vaidialingam – JJ ) where the accused merely says that he will show the place where the knife is hidden and then take the police party to that place. Again in paragraph 11 Lachhman Singh v. State AIR 1952 SC 167 = 1952 Cri.L.J. 863 (Saiyid Fazl Ali, Vivian Bose – JJ), after 3 of the accused persons made a confession to the police to the effect that the dead bodies of the two brothers could be recovered from Sakhinala, a stream running through several miles, one of them had led the police party to the spot from where bloodstained earth and the trunk of one of the dead persons were recovered, it was held that it would fall under Section 27.

 5. Even in a case where the accused made a confessional statement about the place of concealment of the object, either antecedent or contemporaneous to the recovery of the object admissible under Section 27, his conduct in taking the police to place of concealment and pointing out the weapon will fall under Section 8 of the Evidence Act as a conduct. (vide –

• Prakash Chand v. State - (Delhi Administration) - AIR 1979 SC 400 (R. S. Sarkaria, O. Chinnappa Reddy – JJ );
• Zwinglee Ariel v. State of M.P AIR 1954 SC 15 – 3 Judges (Mehr Chand Mahajan, S. R. Das, N. H. Bhagwati – JJ );
• Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322 - 3 Judges (N. H. Bhagwati, B. Jagannadhadas, T. L. Venkatarama Ayyar – JJ );
• State of Madras v. Vaidyanatha Iyer AIR 1958 SC 61 – 3 Judges (B. P. Sinha, P. Govinda Menon, J. L. Kapur – JJ );
• State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil and Another - 2001 Cri.L.J. 504, 2000 (7) SCALE 692 (K. T. Thomas, R. P. Sethi – JJ );
• H. P. Administration v. Om Prakash - 1972 (1)SCC 249 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 88 : AIR 1972 SC 975 (P. Jaganmohan Reddy, D. G. Palekar – JJ );
• Ghanashyam Das v. State of Assam (2005) 13 SCC 387 (P. Venkatarama Reddi, D. M. Dharmadhikari – JJ );
• Bahadul v. State of Orissa - AIR 1979 SC 1262 (S. Murtaza Fazl Ali, A. D. Koshal – JJ );
• Reveendran & Others v. State - 1989 (2) KLJ 534 (S. Padmanabhan, P. K. Shamsuddin – JJ ).

6. Even if the authorship of concealment may not be a condition precedent to bring the disclosure statement of the accused within the ambit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act, the fact that it was the accused himself who had hidden the object thereby becoming the author of concealment, is definitely an important circumstance to connect him with the offence. See Pohalya Motya Valvi v. State of Maharashtra - 1980 (1) SCC 530 (D. A. Desai, R. S. Pathak – JJ ). See also –

• Jaffer Husain Dastagir v. The State of Maharashtra - 1970 SC 1934 (3 Judges) (Sikri, Mitter, Reddy – JJ );
• Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P. - 1983 (2) SCC 305 = AIR 1981 SC 911 (Y. V. Chandrachud CJI , A. P. Sen – JJ ) and
• Sankara Narayanan v. State of Kerala - 2006 (3) KLT 429 = 2006 (2) ILR Kerala 603 (V. K. Bali, CJI, J. B. Koshy – JJ );
• Mahabir Biswas and Another v. State of West Bengal - 1995 (2) SCC 25 (3 Judges) (M. M. Punchhi, M. K. Mukherjee, K. Jayachandra Reddy – JJ );
• Golden Satheesan & Others v. State of Kerala - 2012 (1) KHC (SN) 27 (DB) (V. Ramkumar, P. Q. Barkath Ali – JJ );
• Paras 67 and 68 of Ramanand @ Nandlal Bharti 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 843 (Uday U. Lalit CJI, S. Raveendra Bhat, J. B. Pardiwala – JJ ).
  

7. There can be the recovery of an incriminating object during the course of investigation of another case. (See State of Rajasthan v. Bhup Singh – 1997 (10) SCC 675 (A. S. Anand, K. T. Thomas – JJ ); Para 37 of Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2015) 6 SCC 222 = AIR 2015 SC 2098 (Dipak Misra, S. A. Bobde – JJ ).

8. A confession by the accused revealing the place of concealment of the object resulting in the recovery of the object, does not become inadmissible merely for the reason that custody of the accused was obtained under an illegal order of remand. (Vide para 15 of State Rep. by Inspector of Police v. N. M. T. Joy Immaculate AIR 2004 SC 2282 (S. Rajendra Babu, CJI, Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, G. P. Mathur).

9. The witnesses to the recovery of a weapon effected consequent on the disclosure statement made by the accused, need not be “independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality” as enjoined by Section 100 (4) Cr.P.C, since the recovery of an object falling under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is not similar to a search contemplated by Sections 100 or 165 Cr.P.C. (Vide para 19 of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil (2001) 1 SCC 652 (K.T. Thomas, R.P. Sethi – JJ).

10. There cannot be “discovery of a fact” unless the object is produced. . See Vasudevan Pillai and Another v. State of Kerala - ILR 1968 (2) Kerala 303 = 1968 Cri.L.J. 1362 (DB) (Raghavan, Issac – JJ ); Charandas Swami v. State of Gujarat AIR 2017 SC 1761 (A. M. Khanwilkar – J ).

6. Let us now proceed to consider the decision dated 13-10-2022 in Ramanand @ Nandlal Bharti V. State of U.P. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1396 = 2022 KHC 7083 (Uday U. Lalit CJI, S. Raveendra Bhat, J. B. Pardiwala – JJ ). The facts of the case as are discernible from para 51 of the verdict, are as follows:-

“The accused while in police custody, out of his free will and volition, made a statement that he would like to point out the place where he had hidden the weapon of offence and his bloodstained clothes. Then the police party led by the accused set forth to the said place. (According to the Sub Inspector examined as PW 5, they had proceeded to the said place in the official jeep). On the way they took 2 independent witnesses. The accused led the police party to a coriander field and while there, he took out from a bush the weapon of offence and his bloodstained clothes in the presence of independent witnesses and Exhibit P5 “Panchanama” was accordingly drawn up”.

7. What has been held by the Supreme Court in para 53 of the verdict is as follows:-

“If the accused while in custody on his own free will and volition made a statement that he would lead the police to the place of concealment of the weapon of offence and his bloodstained clothes, then what the investigating officer should have done was –

• to first call 2 independent witness to the police station.
• after the 2 independent witnesses arrive at the police station, the accused should be asked to make an appropriate statement in the presence of the independent witnesses.
• then to incorporate the exact words uttered by the accused in the first part of the “panchanama” drawn up by the investigating officer.
• to always draw up the first part of the “panchanama” in the police station in the presence of independent witnesses.
• after completing the first part of the “panchanama” the accused will lead the police party and the independent witnesses to the place of concealment of the weapon or any other article.
• if any incriminating article is discovered, then that part of the process would be incorporated in the second part of the “panchanama”.
• this is how the investigating officer should draw up the “discovery panchanama” as contemplated under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

In fact, on 13-10-2022 itself two of the Judges of the very same Bench of the Supreme Court in Subramanya v. State of Karnataka 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1400 = 2022 KHC 7088 (Uday U. Lalit CJI, J. B. Pardiwala – JJ ) has taken the same view.

NOTE BY VRK:- Going by the aforesaid verdicts, the accused has to be questioned first while in custody wherever it is. If the accused is inclined to volunteer a statement that he would lead the police party to the place of concealment of the incriminating substances, then he is to be taken to the police station. Two independent witnesses are also to be called to the police station. Then, in their presence the accused has to be questioned again. If the accused expresses his willingness to point out the place of concealment of the objects, then that has to be incorporated in the first part of the “panchanama” to be drawn up. Thereafter, the police party along with the accused should proceed to the place as led by the accused. If any incriminating article is discovered then that should be incorporated in the second part of the “panchanama”. Supposing the investigating officer was investigating some other case and it was while so that he stumbled upon the accused under suspicious circumstances resulting in an interrogation and the accused making a statement to the effect that he will point out the place of concealment of the weapon. If the investigating officer were to comply with the above direction, it can lead to untold confusion.

Coming to the facts of the verdict on hand, the accused had only expressed his willingness to point out the place of concealment of the incriminating articles. He did not disclose the exact place of concealment identifiable by the police officer. Subsequently, he led the police party in a jeep to the exact spot in the coriander field known exclusively to him and took out the articles from a bush. Until the accused pointed out the exact “place” and took out the incriminating articles, the said place continued to remain a top secret to the police officer.

No Judge and no practitioner of law, not to speak of any researcher or academician, can ever forget the fateful and prophetic elucidation of the expression “fact discovered” by Sir. John Beaumont in Pulukuri Kottaya. It reads –

"It is fallacious to treat the "fact discovered " within the section as equivalent to the object produced;".

“ the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact”.

There cannot be a more succinct illumination of the expression “fact discovered”. Tersely put, the “information” given by the accused should reveal the “place” where the object was concealed and the knowledge of the accused regarding that place. In other words, the accused, through the “information” furnished, should undoubtedly convey to the police officer the “place” which was hitherto unknown to the police. This information about the “place” cannot be kept a secret to be postponed till the accused himself takes the police party to the “place”, digs up the earth and takes out the incriminating articles.

If so, I fail to see as to how such a case can come under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. It would probably come only under Section 8 of the Evidence Act as amounting to a conduct of the accused. Of course, that by itself may not be sufficient to convict the accused. But, from that alone, in my humble opinion there was no justification for laying down a procedure for recording the disclosure statement of the accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, contrary to the settled legal position already holding the field.

C O N C L U S I O N

8. In the light of what has been stated above, my respectful opinion is that no “cut and dried” formula can be laid down while examining the question whether there has been “fact discovered” within the meaning of Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. Where there has been an unrecorded statement made by the accused disclosing the place of concealment of an incriminating article resulting in the recovery of such article and both the disclosure statement as well as the recovery, have been credibly deposed to by the investigating police officer, every endeavour should be made by the Courts to uphold such recovery as one falling under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. After all, evidence of such recovery is only a corroborative piece of evidence and cannot constitute the sole basis for a conviction. That apart, the distinction between a recovery falling under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and the “conduct” of the accused (without disclosing the place of concealment), pointing out the exact spot where the incriminating article is hidden, should be borne in mind by Courts dealing with such evidence. When a proposition of law contradictory to or at variance to settled propositions of law, is laid down, the Courts should consider the utter chaos and confusion which its verdict can create among the members of the legal fraternity, particularly the Courts at the lowest rung of the hierarchy. This is more so, when such verdicts are handed down by the Apex Court which is blessed with all technological expertise and advancements in addition to hardworking law clerks.

The author is a former Judge, High Court of Kerala.