Role Of The Judiciary In Shaping Juvenile Justice System In India

1. Foundational Rulings before the 1986 Act

Even before the advent of the first Juvenile Justice Act of 1986 in India, the Indian Courts have resorted to rehabilitative and reformative justice when it comes to juvenile crimes. In Smt. Prabhati v. Emperor^[1], it was observed that young children should be given immunity from imprisonment to the most possible extent and rather be released under the care and supervision of their parents or guardians. This view of not sending juveniles to prison was approbated by the rulings of various Courts even before our independence^[2]. In Nawab Dheru Gul v Emperor^[3], a 12-year-old was found guilty under Section 324 I.P.C., but the Magistrate did not record a formal conviction, instead recommending a Reformatory School. Upon review, the court emphasized that a conviction and sentence must be recorded first, ensuring the juvenile's right to appeal before any reformatory action is taken. In Emperor v. Wall Mohd. & Anr^[4], the Court had given immunity to juveniles under Sections 83 & 84 IPC by observing their acts as not an offense.

In Harnam v. Stale of U. P.^[5], the Supreme Court referring to the 35^th and 42^nd Law Commission Report held that when the murderer is below 18 years of age, the clemency of penal justice helps him and such person must not be sentenced to death. This view was again upheld in Raisul v State of UP^[6]. It is pertinent to note that this concept of clemency to juveniles has been upheld by the Indian courts even before the prohibition of death penalty to juveniles laid down by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Child, 1989.

Before the passing of a Central Act on Juvenile Justice in 1986, each State Government in India had their own form of Children's Act which led to numerous cases being heard in relation to juvenile justice. One such case is Dilip Saha v State of West Bengal^[7] where the full bench of Calcutta High Court, while determining the question of the age of a child within the meaning of Section 28 of the West Bengal Children Act 1959, held that interpreting the section to mean that it prohibits a joint trial of a child and an adult only when the child is a 'child' at the time of trial, that interpretation would go against the provisions of Article 20(1) of the Constitution which prescribes that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. Similarly, in Rothas v. State of Haryana^[8], the Supreme Court ruled that the accused should be tried under the Haryana Children Act, 1974, and not under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as the Haryana Act was still valid and protected by Section 5 of the Code. In Umesh Chandra v State of Rajasthan^[9], the Supreme Court after perusing Sections 3 & 26 of the Rajasthan Children's Act held that the relevant date for applicability of the Act is the date of the occurrence and not the date of the trial.

Furthermore, aligning with the criminal theory of differential association, the Hon'ble Court in Munna and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others^[10] opined that the social objective of reformation fails when a juvenile is sent to prison as they would come into contact with hardened criminals and thus have a likelihood to further recidivist. Thus, the Court held that the provisions for children homes or place of safety provided under the Uttar Pradesh Children's Act be properly implemented by the State Government to detain offenders under 16 years of age. Likewise, in Sheo Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar^[11], the Court set aside the order of sentence against a juvenile and remitted the case to a children's court as per the Bihar Children Third Ordinance, 1979.

Ultimately, in the landmark judgment of the Supreme Court in Sheela Barse & Ors vs Union Of India & Ors^[12], while pointing out its concern over the poor implementation of Children's Act in various states, suggested that a Central legislation may be enacted by the Parliament to bring uniformity in juvenile laws in India, thereby setting the stage for the passing of Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. The Court also noted that such an Act must also provide for the social, psychological and economic rehabilitation of the juvenile offenders.

2. Judicial Framework for the Age of Juveniles

Though there was a legislative instrument specifying the age of juvenility in India, the Courts have gone to great lengths in addressing various tributary issues that branch out of the age of juveniles in conflict with the law. In Salil Bali vs. Union of India^[13], the Court clarified that turning 18 during a juvenile's sentence doesn't exempt them from completing it. Also, the age of 18 has been decided based on scientific and psychological analysis that until such age a person can be easily reformed. Importantly in Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Raju, Thr. Member Juvenile Justice Board^[14], the Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Juvenile Justice Act 2000 by observing that the classification of persons under 18 years of age under the Act was based on intelligible differentia and have a rational nexus to the objective of the Act i.e., reformation. Also, in Pratap Singh v. State Of Jharkhand^[15], the Supreme Court upholding its judgment in Umesh Chandra^[16], reiterated that the date on which the alleged incident happened should be considered as the appropriate date for determining the age of the child and not the date of production or trial.

Another crucial aspect in this regard is the produced adduced to prove the age of a juvenile in conflict with the law. There was legislative lacunae to establish a proper standard of proof for the same. The Courts have settled this ambiguity through a catena of judgments. In Parag Bhati (Juvenile) through Legal Guardian - Smt. Rajni Bhati vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.^[17], it was ruled that when any of the documents listed under Rule 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 are presented to prove juvenility, they should be treated as conclusive evidence of the accused's birth date. However, if doubts arise and the accused takes a contradictory stand, the Court may initiate an inquiry, including a medical examination, to verify the age. In Gopinath Ghosh v, State of West Bengal^[18], the Court emphasized that if an accused seems to be 21 years old or younger, the Magistrate is obligated to verify their age at the time of the offense before moving forward with the case. The Court opined that by adhering to this procedure, unnecessary appeals to higher courts can be avoided. Likewise, in Rahul Kumar Yadav v. The State of Bihar^[19], the Court observed that where the plea of juvenility is raised at a belated stage, medical tests could be resorted to for determining the age in the absence of the documents enumerated in Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. In Arnit Das v. State of Bihar^[20], the Supreme Court, after reviewing past rulings, held that in determining whether an accused is a juvenile, courts should avoid an overly technical approach when evaluating evidence supporting the plea of juvenility. Also, if such evidence as to the juvenility allows for two interpretations, the court should favor classifying the accused as a juvenile, especially in borderline cases.

It is not superfluous to assert that the juveniles who fall under the ambit of the Juvenile Justice Act are often very poor or illiterate and because of that they cannot be expected to know their rights under the Act and to claim the defense of juvenility at the earliest. This flexibility in claiming the defense of juvenility was given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain v. State of West Bengal^[21] - wherein ruled that a claim of juvenility can be made at any point, even after a conviction, and that any delay in raising this plea is not a valid reason for dismissal. It also emphasized that the protections offered under the 2000 Act should not be undermined by any hyper-technical approach. Further, taking note of the pathetic implementation of juvenile justice law and the plight of the alleged juvenile offenders, the Supreme Court in Sampurna Behura v. Union of India^[22], directed state governments to ensure proper implementation of the 2015 Act for child welfare including effective functioning of national and state child protection commissions, regular sessions for swift justice, and child-friendly court environments. The Court also mandated the registration of all child institutions, provision of essential services, and proper training for officers handling juvenile cases.

3. Jurisdiction Issues with respect to Juvenile Justice Acts

In a catena of cases, the courts have pointed out that the Juvenile Justice Act generally has an overriding effect to any other statutes in relation to the trial and sentencing of juveniles, unless otherwise provided. In Ramachandran v. The Inspector of Police, Madras^[23], the Court ruled that a person who is under the age of 18 years cannot be tried as a goonda but only as a juvenile as per the Juvenile Justice Act. Likewise, in Raj Singh v. State of Haryana^[24], where the appellant who was under 16 had been convicted under Section 20 of the NDPS Act, the Supreme Court set aside his conviction and ordered him to be dealt with as a juvenile since only the juvenile court has jurisdiction. In Prabakaran v. State of Tamilnadu^[25]¸ it was held that since the petitioner is a juvenile in conflict with law, the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act prevail over the Prevention Of Terrorism Act, 2002. Furthermore, in Sant Das v. State of U.P, and others^[26], it was observed that where the Board is yet to be constituted for conducting trial of the juveniles, the proper forum that can exercise the powers of the Board would be the Magistrate having jurisdiction under section 437 Cr.P.C. and not the Sessions Court.

4. Bail Jurisprudence of Juveniles

In two decisions namely, Rajinder Chandra v. State Of Chhattisgarh and Anr^[27]. and Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand and Anr^[28]. the Supreme Court declared JJ (C&PC) Act, 2000 to be a beneficial legislation for the benefit of the juvenile and the Act must be construed as such. The rightly interpreted that the underlying idea behind Section 12 is that the juvenile must be released on bail unless releasing him on bail would be detrimental to him or entirely defeat the ends of justice. Therefore, as far as a juvenile is concerned, bail is the rule, and detention is an exception in all cases. In Devesh v. The State (NCT of Delhi)^[29], the Delhi High Court criticized the Additional Sessions Judge's assumption that releasing the petitioner may expose him to unknown criminal influences as unfounded, as it relies on speculative associations rather than concrete links to 'known criminals,' as stipulated in Section 12 of the JJ (C & PC) Act, 2000. It ruled that the expression “known criminals” must be interpreted in its literal sense, requiring direct connections to established criminal entities. Similarly, in Vikky alias Vikram Singh v. State of UP. and Ors^[30] and Manmohan Singh v. State of Punjab^[31], it was held that while declining bail to a juvenile, it must not be based on subjective satisfaction but rather be based on an objective assessment of the reasonable grounds that his release is likely to associate him with any known criminal or expose him to moral, physical or psychological danger or it would defeat the ends of justice. Simply citing the few lines from the Act without substantial reasoning is not sufficient for refusal of bail to a juvenile.

5. Trial of Juveniles as Adult

In Shilpa Mittal v. State Of NCT Of Delhi & Anr^[32], the Supreme Court rightly interpreted that for offenses for which a minimum sentence is not specified but the maximum sentence is more than 7 years, these offenses will fall within the ambit of “serious offense” as defined under Section 2(54) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015 until the Parliament makes any amendments. Therefore, the judgment reduced the scope of the trial of juveniles between 16 – 18 years of age as adults, since the word 'heinous offenses' was held to include only those offenses which have a minimum punishment of 7 years imprisonment. Importantly, in Barun Chandra Thakur v. Bholu^[33], the Supreme Court held that where the Board is not comprised of a practicing professional with a degree in child psychology or child psychiatry, the expression “may” in the proviso to section 15(1) would operate in mandatory form and the Board would be obliged to take assistance of experienced psychologists or psychosocial workers or other experts. Also recently in Child in Conflict with Law v. State of Karnataka^[34], the Supreme Court held that the time limit of three months prescribed under Section 14(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection) Act, 2015 for ascertaining the mental and physical capacity of a child below the age of sixteen years to commit a serious offense is not mandatory but directory. This view was taken by the Court in consideration of the fact that there are numerous parties involved in a preliminary assessment that may cause delay and also that delay in determining if a juvenile has committed a heinous offense would not be prejudicial as opposed to a case involving a 'petty offense'.

Conclusively, as held in Jyoti Prakash Rai v. State of Bihar^[35], to give the same benefit to a person who in fact is not a juvenile may cause injustice to the victim. Therefore, determining the juvenility of an offender is a crucial aspect both in the criminal justice and juvenile justice system and the Courts in India will continue to ensure that proper justice is done to both the juveniles in conflict with law as well as the victims of juvenile offenders.

Views are personal.