One Nation One Election

'One Nation, One Election' is much talked about these days and there are efforts to seek to translate the idea into a reality. The idea, and even more the slogan, sounds quite attractive and appealing. It is allright as an ideal and an aspiration to be looked forward to. But it may not stand closer scrutiny both practically and constitutionally.

The Constitution of India has adopted a parliamentary system of government. One of the essential tenets of the system is the accountability of the executive branch- the government- to the lower House of the legislature. Further, it is a federal polity. This essentially involves a division of powers between the Centre and the States. It is a unique model: While there is a bias in favour of the Union, the States are not vassals of the Union. The Constitution pursues a vision of fulfilling the constitutional values through a democratic polity and prescribes government by democratic legislatures with the executive accountable to them and resting ultimately on public opinion. Fundamental to democracy, said Pericles, is obedience to “those unwritten laws, which it is an acknowledged shame to break”. Elections are the heartbeats of democracy. They are the only recognized mode of expression of people's will and of bringing about a smooth and peaceful change of government.

After the Constitution came into force, the first election to both Parliament and the State legislatures was held in 1952. The second and the third elections took place again simultaneously for both Union and State legislatures in 1957 and 1962. Thus the legislatures functioned for the full term of 5 years. The governments enjoyed the confidence of the lower Houses and the need for any elections except at the end of 5 years on the completion of the term of the legislatures did not arise. However, quite unfortunately, things began to change thereafter for various reasons including defections and dismissal of State governments invoking Art 356.

When a government ceases to enjoy the confidence of the legislature (which is a cardinal feature and requirement of parliamentary democracy) for whatever reason and there can be many, and has to bow out and an alternative government is not feasible, fresh election becomes necessary and inevitable. This has been the scenario in India for the last over half a century. The Anti-Defection law enacted in 1985 while it penalizes defectors cannot prevent governments from being voted out. Governments in different States and sometimes at the Centre too, for various reasons, lose their majority/are voted out and there being no possibility of a new government which can command the confidence of the majority of the existing legislature, appeal to the electorate becomes the only option. Another reason for the inevitability of an election is the misuse of powers under Art 356, a provision that is to be sparingly used when there is a breakdown of the constitutional machinery in a State. Frequent elections and the nation being in the election mood almost always with elections taking place somewhere or the other act as a damper for better work in the larger interests of the people and good governance. More importantly it means huge expenditure of time, money and other resources which may be avoided and may be channelized for better purposes.

Views have been expressed in different fora and there have been demands to see how this could be tackled. After the present government took office the Prime Minister gave a clarion call of One Nation, One Election: to have simultaneous elections everywhere and thus reduce expenditure and concentrate on more useful work.

The working of a modern parliamentary democracy is complex. The area of inter se relationship between the electoral constituencies and their elected representatives has many complex features and overtones. The citizenry as the electorate is the political sovereign. As long as regular elections take place, the electorate remains the arbiter of the ultimate composition of the representative legislative body to which the government of the day is responsible. This is important and is of the essence.

It is against the backdrop of all this that we would have to understand and examine the issue and the debate objectively.

Assuming hypothetically that we may for once synchronize elections at both the Centre and the States, it would be almost impossible to keep them synchcronized always. There can be a myriad situations incapable of being foreseen which would necessitate a legitimate dissolution of the lower House and calling for fresh election. Apart from the constitutional conventional right of a Prime Minister/Chief Minister to seek dissolution and call for an election, there are situations where it would be constitutionally mandatory and inevitable to have an election.

The immaculate major premise of a parliamentary system is that the government has to enjoy the confidence of the lower House. A no-confidence motion can be moved any time and it may be carried through. That would require the government to resign. If the Finance Bill is defeated, the government will have to step down. Defeat of any measure involving substantial issues of governmental policy would also entail resignation. In all these situations if it is not possible to have an alternative government, and it may not be in many situations, then a fresh election would be unavoidable. Even if an amendment on the lines of the German Constitution is in place: that the leader of the House should be elected by the House along with the Speaker in like manner and the person so elected be appointed the Prime Minister and that a motion of no-confidence against the government should be accompanied by a proposal of an alternative leader to be simultaneously elected, that would not meet and answer every contingency. There can arise situations where parties are not able to agree on an alternative leader/government and you cannot impose on the country a defeated government till the term of the House expires and there has to be a fresh election. Giving effect to the people's mandate for a particular term of office may also be scuttled, if that term is curtailed for whatever reason to sychronise the elections. This is the problem at each level-Centre or State.

Interestingly, U.K. had enacted the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act, 2011 under which the term of Parliament was fixed and the dates of successive future elections were determined. This Act has since been repealed in 2022. An early election would have been possible only if the House of Commons with a two-thirds majority voted for it or if it did not within fourteen days reverse a vote of no-confidence in the government. If that statute created almost insurmountable problems for a small, unitary State like the U.K, what then to say of a country like India with its vastness, its great diversities and federal structure! One Nation, One Election would make a mockery of our democracy.

A Committee was appointed by the Union Government to examine the issue. The States which are crucial in the federal architecture and other stake holders were not part of the Committee. Pursuant to the recommendations of that Committee, the Constitution 129th Amendment Bill, 2024 and the Union Territories Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2024 have been introduced in Parliament in that regard. The matter is being seriously examined now, having been referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee. The Opposition, however, has expressed serious apprehensions about the whole idea, that it threatens the federal principle and parliamentary democracy.

That election expenditure should be minimised and the country should not be in election gear most of the time thus missing out on more substantial work for the good of the people may not be debatable. The question is: at what cost is this to be achieved? One Nation, One Election is said to be an exercise to better serve the people. But does it achieve that? The answer has to be in the negative. For, it may eat into the very vitals of our parliamentary democracy and in the process work against the good of the people. Of all the different forms of government, democratic government with a bill of rights comes closest to the ideal for attaining the objectives of good government, viz, the security, welfare and happiness of the people. It may proudly be said that the largest experiment ever undertaken in human history in the art of democratic living has been carried on in India since 1950. Never before and nowhere else has more than one-sixth of the human race lived together in conditions of freedom as one political entity.

The idea of One Nation, One Election, however laudable its object, is beset with many practical and legal hurdles. Every ideal cannot be made into a reality. This idea and ideal, seemingly inviting, apart from not being feasible, appears to be of doubtful validity and may strike at the heart of the Constitution and bury its spirit fathoms deep. Democracy and the parliamentary system of government constitute, and have been held to be, basic features of the Constitution and therefore immutable and not amendable. With One Nation, One Election, these basic features are likely to be damaged; only the husk of democracy- the one person, one vote rite- may survive.

Democracy, it is said, ensures that we do not get a better government than we deserve. But it is equally true that democracy is the least harmful system of government. In the Indian constitutional scheme, the structure of government is so designed that each organ is a sentinel on the qui vive against the other two, lest they become too powerful or autocratic. And therefore, wisdom lies in making our democracy and the Constitution work. Constitutional conventions are as important as the constitutional provisions and our Westminster model has borrowed and adopted many British constitutional conventions.

The Constitution 129th Amendment Bill proposes to insert a new article 82 A to provide for simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha and the State Legislative Assemblies and to amend Articles 83 and 172 (Duration of the Houses). It provides, inter alia, that the date of the first sitting of the Lok Sabha constituted after the first general election after the enactment of this Constitution amendment will be the 'appointed date' and the tenure of the Lok Sabha will be five years from that appointed date; the tenure of all Legislative Assemblies constituted by elections after the appointed date and before the expiry of the full term of the Lok Sabha (5 years) shall come to an end on the expiry of the full term of the Lok Sabha; thereafter all general elections to the Lok Sabha and all Legislative Assemblies shall be held simultaneously; in case of dissolution of the Lok Sabha or a Legislative Assembly sooner than the full term, the term of the Lok Sabha or a Legislative Assembly constituted pursuant to mid-term elections shall be the unexpired term of the Lok Sabha or the Legislative Assembly. The Union Territories Laws (Amendment) Bill seeks to make similar consequential amendments to the laws governing Union Territories to align elections across Union Territories with the simultaneous elections to the Lok Sabha and all Legislative Assemblies.

Thus on a premature dissolution of a House and fresh election, i.e. a mid- term election, the consequent term of the House will then be the remainder of the full term of 5 years. Where election to a State Legislative Assembly is deferred, for whatever reason, to after simultaneous election, its term will end with the end of the term of the Lok Sabha constituted in that simultaneous election.

It is submitted that this whole scheme appears to be incomprehensible and futile. Take for instance, if the first simultaneous election is held for the Lok Sabha and all Legislative Assemblies, say, in January 2026 and the Houses are constituted pursuant thereto in February 2026, the full term will be till February 2031. If a State Assembly is dissolved and a new House is constituted in April 2028, pursuant to a fresh election, the term of that House will be for 2 years, 11 months only till February 2031. If another Assembly is dissolved and following a fresh election a new House is constituted in July 2029, the term of that House will be 1 year, 8 months only. Similarly if the Lok Sabha is prematurely dissolved and after a fresh election the new House is constituted, say, in May 2028, the term of that House will be 2 years, 10 months. As per the amended provisions, the next general election to the Lok Sabha and all Legislative Assemblies will be in 2031 and the new Houses will be constituted in February 2031. It is therefore likely that we will have more elections than at present.

The only net result of all this exercise is that elections to the Lok Sabha and all State Legislative Assemblies will be held simultaneously every five years so that the entire country is in election mood at the same time. But even according to the new scheme mid-term elections cannot be wished away, and are not. Hence, apart from the simultaneous election every five tears, some part of the country or the other in case of elections to Legislative Assemblies, and the whole country in case of election to the Lok Sabha, will be in election gear with the Model Code in force and developmental work on standstill. So that problem is not addressed. More importantly, the problem of cutting down on election expenditure with a lesser number of elections also is not solved. On the other hand with the proposed amendments there is every possibility of more number of elections with greater frequency. This means deployment of more personnel and security forces for election and making available more infrastructure. Consequently it would involve spending more time and money. This exercise is then only a cosmetic change with nothing substantial. One Nation One Election will remain only a slogan.

The Legislative Assemblies in the States are sovereign in their own sphere. They are not subordinate to the Lok Sabha. To tailor their term to the term of Lok Sabha certainly goes against the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution. It also means it goes against the people's mandate: when the electorate has elected a House, it is for the full term unless reasons constitutionally germane to that term being shortened exist. Shortening the term only for the reason of synchronizing elections does not seem to be one such constitutionally valid reason. It is one thing to alter the term of the Lok Sabha or the Legislative Assemblies and fix it at 4 years or 6 years. That by itself would not violate the basic structure. But what is proposed now is to trim the terms as and when occasion arises to enable simultaneous elections. This can happen at any interval. The term would go on fluctuating. Every time you could end with a truncated term for the Houses. Parliamentary system of government has been held to be a basic feature. Aspects incidental to that such as the term of the Houses will impact on the basic feature: the consequences of this change on the integrity of the Constitution as the fundamental instrument of the country's governance may be profound and that may infringe the basic feature and violate the basic structure. Constitutionality and wisdom are not synonymous, as Frankfurter J perceptively pointed out. The present measure, apart from its doubtful constitutionality, cannot be said to be wise or prudent. It does not address itself or solve the problems, and they are genuine, which gave rise to the debate and a search for a solution.

We are poignantly reminded of Palkhivala's insightful remark: The cardinal error of our times is to mistake amendment for improvement and change for progress. The present scenario also is just that. Benjamin Franklin's response when asked what kind of government the Constitutional Convention of 1787 had created, “A republic, Madam, if you can keep it”, is the challenge to all citizens to maintain the workable democratic Constitution.

Author is a Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India. Views Are Personal.