Kamat : When I was in school and college I used to wear rudraksha. It was not to display my religious identity. It was a practice of faith because it gave me security. We see many judges and senior lawyers wearing such customary things.
Kamat : The essence of Article 25 is that it protects the practise of faith but not a mere display of religious identity or jingoism.
Kamat: What flows from this judgment is that the guidance to state in stopping religious practise is it should be which is abhorrent having a deleterious effect on society. In this case, it is an innocuous practice of wearing head scarf.
Kamat reads from the "Sardar Syedna" judgment.
Kamat: Some amount of guidance is there in the judgment regarding how the power of the state is to be exercised. State can regulate "deleterious practices". Here, in this case, it (hijab) is an innocuous practice.
Kamat says the SCR reports do not give paragraphs.
Justice Dixit : SCR is the only authoritative publication.
Kamat : Yes milord, though we refer to SCC as a matter of practice.
Kamat : If it is the essence of the religion, neither under Articles 25(2)(a) or (b) it can be curtailed. Subject to of course public order, morality or health.
Kamat quotes from the judgment - "laws providing for social welfare and reform not intended to enable the legislature to reform a religion out of existence or identity"
Kamat is referring to "Sardar Syedna Taher" case in which the Supreme Court struck down a Bombay law which prohibited ex-communication from a community on petitions by Bohra members. SC said, if this is an essential practice, it must be upheld.
Kamat : Yesterday I was asked whether reform in Article 25(2) can apply to an essential religious practice. That is answered by the Supreme Court (1962) 2 SCR 496.
Kamat reads Article 25 in Kannada. Points out the use of "sarvajanik suvyavasthe" in that Article for "public order".
Kamat : Very categorically sarvajyanik suvyavasthe means public order and it cannot have a different meaning. I rest my case there.