Terms Of Invitation To Tender Are Not Open To Judicial Scrutiny Unless They Are Arbitrary, Discriminatory Or Mala Fide : Supreme Court Observing that the terms of invitation to tender are not open to judicial scrutiny, the Supreme Court set aside a Delhi High Court's order which had quashed the Airport Authority of India's tender conditions for selecting Ground Handling...
Observing that the terms of invitation to tender are not open to judicial scrutiny, the Supreme Court set aside a Delhi High Court's order which had quashed the Airport Authority of India's tender conditions for selecting Ground Handling Agencies(GHA) agencies at Group D Airports.
A bench comprising Justices MR Shah and Krishna Murari observed that the Delhi High Court committed a "serious error" by entertaining a writ petition at the instance of a third party- an advocacy group called Centre For Aviation Policy -when none of the GHAs challenged the tender conditions. Hence, the writ petition should have been dismissed on the ground of locus standi(Airports Authority of India versus Centre for Aviation Policy).
Highlighting this, a Bench of Justices MR Shah and Krishna Murari observed, "Once the order of termination was approved by the Industrial Tribunal on appreciation of evidence led before it, thereafter the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal were binding between the parties. No contrary view could have been taken by the Labour Court contrary to the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal."
A Bench of Justices MR Shah and Krishna Murari observed that the purpose of compassionate appointment is to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis, i.e., after the death of the sole bread-winner.
Even otherwise, the Court said that the respondent won't be entitled to appointment on compassionate ground that a number of years had passed from the death of the deceased employee.
"Even the averments and allegations in the plaint with respect to fraud are not supported by any further averments and allegations how the fraud has been committed/played. Mere stating in the plaint that a fraud has been played is not enough and the allegations of fraud must be specifically averred in the plaint, otherwise merely by using the word "fraud", the plaintiffs would try to get the suits within the limitation, which otherwise may be barred by limitation", a Bench of Justices MR Shah and Krishna Murari explained.
The bench of Justices M.R. Shah and Krishna Murari held that if any dispute falls within the 'excepted' category provided in the contract between the parties, then it falls outside the scope of arbitration, therefore, no arbitration can happen apropos those matters.
Highlighting this, a Bench of Chief Justice UU Lalit, Justices S Ravindra Bhat and Sudhanshu Dhulia observed, "In a case of circumstantial evidence, the Court has to scrutinize each and every circumstantial possibility, which is placed before it in the form of an evidence and the evidence must point towards only one conclusion, which is the guilt of the accused. In other words, a very heavy duty is cast upon the prosecution to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt."
The Supreme Court observed that a writ of quo warranto can be issued where an appointment has not been made in accordance with the law.
The bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and Hima Kohli observed thus while dismissing the appeals filed by the State of West Bengal and Sonali Chakravarti Banerjee challenging the order of the Calcutta High Court which had set aside the decision of the State to re-appoint Banerjee as Vice-Chancellor (VC) of Calcutta University. The High Court had allowed the writ petition filed by Anindya Sundar Das, an alumnus of Calcutta University and a practicing advocate seeking a writ of quo warranto against the Vice-Chancellor of Calcutta University.
The Supreme Court observed that an order of issuance of process is liable to be set aside if no reasons are given while coming to the conclusion that there is a prima facie case against the accused. The court made this observation while setting aside a summoning order of a magistrate in a complaint filed under Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940.
"The Magistrate is required to apply his mind as to whether sufficient ground for proceeding exists in the case or not. The formation of such an opinion is required to be stated in the order itself.", the bench of Justices BR Gavai and CT Ravikumar observed. The court clarified that such an order need not contain detailed reason.
The Supreme Court held that, the period of three months (extendable by one more month for legal consultation) under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act for the Appointing Authority to decide upon a request for sanction is mandatory.
However, the consequence of non-compliance with this mandatory requirement shall not be quashing of the criminal proceeding for that very reason, the bench of Justices BR Gavai and PS Narasimha clarified.
The Supreme Court bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and Hima Kohli has held that when a part- payment of the debt is made after the cheque was drawn but before the cheque is encashed, such payment must be endorsed on the cheque under Section 56 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The cheque cannot be presented for encashment without recording the part payment. If the unendorsed cheque is dishonoured on presentation, the offence under Section 138 NI Act would not be attracted since the cheque does not represent a legally enforceable debt at the time of encashment.
The Supreme Court reiterated that positive action proximate to the time of suicide on the part of the accused which led or compelled the deceased to commit suicide should be established for conviction under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code.
In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide, the bench of Justices MR Shah and Krishna Murari observed.
The Supreme Court observed that the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC can be exercised by a High Court to direct further investigation or even reinvestigation in an appropriate case.
"The provisions of Section 173(8) CrPC do not limit or affect such powers of the High Court to pass an order under Section 482 CrPC for further investigation or reinvestigation, if the High Court is satisfied that such a course is necessary to secure the ends of justice.". the bench of Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Aniruddha Bose observed.
The Supreme Court Bench comprising Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Aniruddha Bose observed that there is no bar in taking on record a counter claim filed long after filing of written statement but before framing of issues.
In this case, the counter-claim in question was filed nearly 13 years after filing of the written statement. Single Judge of the Bombay High Court dealing with the trial of suit in question, had accepted the notice of motion moved by the defendant-appellant so as to take the belatedly filed counter-claim on record. The Division Bench of the High Court later set aside the said order and remitted the matter for consideration afresh, essentially on the ground that the plaintiffs were not afforded adequate opportunity to file reply and to contest the said notice of motion.
The Supreme Court today passed a split verdict on a batch of appeals challenging restriction on Muslim girl students wearing Hijab in educational institutions in Karnataka.
Justice Hemant Gupta dismissed the 26 appeals filed against the judgment of the Karnataka High Court which held that hijab was not an essential practice of Islam and allowed the ban on wearing headscarf in educational institutions in the State.
Expressing the divergence in his opinion, Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia set aside the Karnataka High Court judgment and held that the entire concept of essential religious practice was not essential to the dispute.
A two-judge bench of the Supreme Court on Thursday delivered a split verdict in the hijab ban case.
While Justice Hemant Gupta upheld the Karnataka High Court verdict, Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia proposed to set aside the controversial Government Order passed by the State of Karnataka that effectively allowed college development committees to place a ban on the hijab in government colleges in the State. A batch of 23 petitions was filed in this connection, some of which were writ petitions placed directly before the Supreme Court, while others were appeals by special leave preferred against the judgement of the Karnataka High Court upholding the impugned order. However, the matter has been placed before the Chief Justice of India since the Division Bench, comprising Justices Hemant Gupta and Sudhanshu Dhulia, delivered a split verdict, with Justice Gupta moving to dismiss the appeals.
"Secularism is applicable to all citizens, therefore, permitting one religious community to wear their religious symbols would be antithesis to secularism", the Supreme Court judge Justice Hemant Gupta observed in his judgment in Hijab case.
The judge observed that the accommodation sought would result in different treatment of students in secular schools who may be following varied religions beliefs.
In the judgment in the Karnataka hijab ban case, Supreme Court judge Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia observed that "asking a pre university schoolgirl to take off her hijab at her school gate, is an invasion on her privacy and dignity".
Justice Dhulia opined that asking the girl student to remove the hijab at the school gate "is clearly violative of the Fundamental Right given to her under Article 19(1)(a) and 21 of the Constitution of India.
Departments Of Union Of India Should Not Take Contradictory Stands , Says Supreme Court
The Supreme Court observed that the departments of the Union of India should not take contradictory stands. It does not augur well for the Union of India to speak in two contradictory voices, the bench of Justices BR Gavai and CT Ravikumar said.
The court suggested the Union of India to evolve a mechanism to ensure that whenever such conflicting stands are taken by different departments, they should be resolved at the governmental level itself.
Both Judges Of SC Bench Did Not Decide Whether Hijab Is An Essential Religious Practice
Though the Supreme Court delivered a split verdict in Hijab ban case, both the judges of the bench did not decide the question whether the wearing of hijab is considered as an essential religious practice. The Karnataka High Court had held that hijab was not an essential religious practice of Islam and hence the petitioners could not claim protection under Article 25 of the Constitution.
The essential religious practices of the followers of Sikh faith cannot be made basis of wearing of hijab/headscarf by the believers of Islamic faith, Justice Hemant Gupta observed in his judgment in the Karnataka Hijab Ban Case.
Before the Apex Court bench, it was argued that since Kirpan is allowed in terms of Explanation I to Article 25 of the Constitution of India, therefore, the students who want to wear headscarf should be equally protected as in the case of the followers of the Sikh students. They also relied on a judgment of Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Gurleen Kaur & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. that held that the essential religious practice of the followers of Sikh faith includes retaining hair unshorn, which is one of the most important and fundamental tenets of the Sikh religion.
The Supreme Court observed that employers have to deposit the employee's contribution towards EPF/ESI on or before the due date for availing deduction under Sections 36(1)(va) and 43B of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
The court observed that there is a marked distinction between the nature and character of the two amounts viz. the employers' contribution and employees' contribution required to be deposited by the employer. The first one is the employer's liability is to be paid out of its income whereas the second is deemed an income, by definition, since it is the deduction from the employees' income and held in trust by the employer, the bench of CJI UU Lalit, Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and Sudhanshu Dhulia said.
The Supreme Court observed that provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 shall not be applicable with respect to the acquisition under the Jammu and Kashmir - State Land Acquisition Act, 1990.
The bench of Justices MR Shah and Krishna Murari observed thus while allowing appeals filed by Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (BPCL) against the judgment of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, at Jammu which directed to determine the compensation of the acquired lands in accordance with the provisions of the RFCTLARR 2013. The lands in question were sought to be acquired under the provisions of the State Land Acquisition Act, 1990.
The Supreme Court held that a stock broker should obtain a certificate of registration from SEBI for each of the stock exchange where he operates.
The bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and BV Nagarathna disagreed with the Delhi High Court judgment that a single registration with Securities and Exchange Board of India( "SEBI") is sufficient even if the stock broker has various memberships and functions from several stock exchanges.
Hijab Verdict : Judges Express Contrasting Views Regarding Fraternity & Discipline
An interesting aspect of the hijab case judgment of the Supreme Court is the contrasting, if not diametrically opposite, views expressed by Justices Hemant Gupta and Sudhanshu Dhulia regarding the concepts of fraternity, diversity and discipline. While Justice Gupta is of the opinion that allowing religious headscarf in the classroom will fragment the concept of fraternity, Justice Dhulia expressed that it can expose students to diversity and enable them to inculcate tolerance towards religious and cultural differences.
Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia, while proposing to overturn the controversial ban on the hijab in government colleges in Karnataka, held that the doctrine of essential religious practice did not have to be invoked at all to put the matter to rest. Justice Dhulia explained on Thursday while giving a conspectus of his dissenting opinion –
"The main thrust of my judgement is that this entire concept of essential religious practices, in my opinion, was not essential for the disposal of this dispute. The High Court took the wrong path there…This was simply a question of Article 19(1)(a), its applicability, and Article 25(1) primarily. And it's ultimately a matter of choice. Nothing more, nothing less."
The Supreme Court observed that 'just compensation' exceeding claimed amount can be awarded in motor accident compensation claim cases.
The Tribunal/Court ought to award 'just' compensation which is reasonable in the facts relying upon the evidence produced on record, the bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and JK Maheshwari observed.
The Supreme Court acquitted a man who was sentenced to death for alleged murder of his wife and his four kids.Without any hesitation and with disappointment, we state that the case on hand is one of most perfunctory investigation, the CJI UU Lalit, Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and JB Pardiwala remarked.
Project 39A of the National Law University Delhi gave legal assistance to the appellant in the matter and briefed Senior Advocate Niranjan Reddy who appeared for the appellant.
The Supreme Court observed that mere abusive, humiliating or defamative words by itself cannot attract an offence under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code.
To prove the offence under Section 294 of IPC mere utterance of obscence words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others, the bench of Justices S.Abdul Nazeer and JB Pardiwala observed.
The Supreme Court bench of Justices Surya Kant and MM Sundresh observed that, where there are more than one plaintiffs, the entire suit cannot be held to be abated on the death of one of the plaintiffs.
In this case, the Trial Court decreed a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession filed by the plaintiffs. The First Appellate Court allowed the appeal solely on the ground that one of the plaintiffs having died and as her legal representatives were not brought on record, the suit qua her stood abated and since it was a joint claim, the decree is a nullity. The High Court also dismissed the second appeal on the same ground.
The Supreme Court has directed the state of Andhra Pradesh to transfer to Jharkhand the amount of central sales tax deposited by Tata Motors with respect to the sale of buses to the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC).
The division bench of Justice M.R. Shah and Justice Krishna Murari has observed that after due verification, the amount of central sales tax paid by Tata Motors with respect to the transaction be transferred to Jharkhand immediately on verification. The State of Jharkhand was directed to adjust it towards the central sales tax liability of Tata Motors on sales effected through RSO, Vijayawada with respect to vehicles/buses sold to APSRTC, which were found to be in the nature of inter-state sales.
In a significant judgment, the Supreme Court bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and Hima Kohli held that no offence for dishonour of cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is made out if the cheque is presented for the full amount without endorsing the part-payment made by the borrower after the issuance of the cheque.
The Court held that the sum reflected on the cheque will not be the "legally enforceable debt" as per Section 138 NI Act, when it has been presented for encashment without endorsing the part-payment. Part-payments must be endorsed on the cheque as per Section 56 of the NI Act. If such endorsement is made, the cheque can be presented for the balance amount, and the offence under Section 138 NI Act will be attracted if such a cheque with endorsement of the part-payment gets dishonoured, explained the Court.
Early Conclusion Of Trial Would Enhance People's Faith In Justice Delivery System : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has observed that early conclusion of criminal trials would enhance the faith of people in justice delivery system.
The bench of Justices MR Shah and Krishna Murari observed thus while disposing an application filed by former Karnataka Minister Gali Janardhan Reddy seeking modification of bail condition to enter, stay and function in the Districts of Bellary in Karnataka and District of Ananthapuram and Cuddapah in Andhra Pradesh.
The Supreme Court has held that the valuation of shares for the purpose of gift tax must take into consideration the limitations and restrictions.
The division bench of Justice Sanjiv Khanna and Justice J.K. Maheshwari has observed that the equity shares under the lock-in period were not "quoted shares", for the simple reason that the shares in the lock-in period were not quoted on any recognised stock exchange regularity from time to time. There are no current transactions relating to these shares made in the ordinary course of business. The equity shares, being under the lock-in period, could not be traded and, therefore, remained unquoted on any recognised stock exchange.
The Supreme Court transferred all writ petitions which have been filed before various High Courts challenging the validity of the Banking Regulation (Amendment) Act 2020 to the Madras High Court.
"Since the petitions which are transferred have been instituted before diverse High Courts in the country, it would be appropriate if the Division Bench hearing the petitions permits such of the parties, who desire to appear through a virtual platform, to participate in the course of the hearing on that basis", the bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and Hima Kohli observed in the order allowing Transfer Petitions filed by the Reserve Bank of India.
Courts Should Not Sit Over Commercial Wisdom Of General Body Of Cooperative Society : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court observed that the Courts should not sit over the commercial wisdom of the General Body of the Cooperative Society as an Appellate Authority.
The bench of CJI UU Lalit, Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and JB Pardiwala observed that the Co-operative Society is to function democratically and the internal democracy of a society, including resolutions passed in accordance with the Act, the Rules, and the bye-laws have to be respected and implemented.
The Supreme Court bench of Justices MR Shah and Krishna Murari reiterated that the recovery of the weapon used by the accused to commit the offence is not a sine qua non for conviction.
In this case, the accused were tried and convicted in a murder case. It was the prosecution case that owing to animosity between the friend of the accused, they had killed the deceased. The Madras High Court later acquitted the accused by allowing the appeal.
The Supreme Court bench of Justices BR Gavai and BV Nagarathna observed that the doctrine of promissory estoppel would not apply against the exercise of legislative powers of the State.
In this case, the High Court of Delhi, dismissed writ petitions filed by Hero Motocorp and Sun Pharma Laboratories Ltd. who claimed 100% budgetary support in lieu of the pre-existing 100% outright excise duty exemption for ten years from the date of the commencement of commercial production, as provided for by the said O.M. of 2003 issued by the Government of India.
The Supreme Court observed that a minister or public servant (a person covered by Section 199(2)) can file a private complaint alleging defamation and need not follow the special procedure prescribed by Section 199(2) & (4) CrPC.
"The special procedure is in addition to and not in derogation of the right that a public servant always has as an individual. He never lost his right merely because he became a public servant and merely because the allegations related to official discharge of his duties", the bench of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and V. Ramasubramanian said.
The statements such as "I will expose you", "I will expose your corrupt practices" and "I will expose the scam in which you are involved, etc." are not by themselves defamatory unless there is something more, the Supreme Court observed while quashing defamation complaint filed by Delhi Minister Manish Sisodia against BJP leader Vijender Gupta.
The bench of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and V. Ramasubramanian observed that defamatory statement should be specific and not very vague and general.
In a judgment, the Supreme Court explained the impact of reduction of the number of convicts below five pending an appeal against conviction under Section 149 IPC owing to the death of co-convicts.
The bench of Justices CT Ravikumar and Sudhanshu Dhulia observed that 'abatement' is certainly different from 'acquittal' and therefore "the effect and impact of reduction of the number of convicts pending an appeal owing to the death of co-convicts is bound to be different from the effect and impact of reduction of the number of accused/convicts on account of acquittal".
The Supreme Court, in a judgment delivered in an appeal against Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, explained the test for determining whether a case involves substantial question of law.
The bench of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari said that the appropriate test for determining whether the question of law raised in the case is substantial would be to see whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties.
The Supreme Court a bench comprising Chief Justice of India UU Lalit, Justice S Ravindra Bhat and Justice JB Pardiwala held that Part IX B inserted by the Constitution (97th Amendment) Act, 2011 would not be applicable to the local co-operative societies and the same would be applicable to the multi-State co-operative societies and the societies within the Union territories.
The 97th Amendment granted a Constitutional status to cooperative societies and inserted Part IXB in the Constitution which specified several conditions for state laws relating to cooperative societies. In 2021, the Supreme Court( in the case Union of India vs Rajendra Shah and others) had upheld a judgment of the Gujarat High Court which struck down Part IXB on the ground that the amendment was passed without the requisite ratification by the States. However, the majority of the bench saved Part IXB to the extent it applied to multi-state co-operative societies.
Electricity Act - Not Permissible To Amend Tariff Order During 'Truing Up' Excercise : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court held that it is not permissible to amend the tariff order made under Section 64 of the Electricity Act, 2003, during the 'truing up' exercise.
The bench of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari held thus while disposing appeals filed by BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. and BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. against the judgment of the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity. One of the substantial questions raised in the appeal was whether it is permissible to amend the tariff order made under Section 64 of the 2003 Act during the 'truing up' exercise? The appellants (who are are Distribution Licensees) challenged certain findings of the Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission ('DERC') in the Tariff Order dated 26.08.2012 for Truing Up of financials for FY 2008-09 and FY 2009-10 and Aggregate Revenue Requirement ('ARR') for FY 2011 -12.
The Supreme Court held that educational trust or societies, which seek exemption under Section 10 (23C) of Income Tax Act, should solely be concerned with education, or education related activities.
Where the objective of the institution appears to be profit-oriented, such institutions would not be entitled to approval, the bench of CJI Uday Umesh Lalit, Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and P S Narasimha observed.
The Supreme Court observed that Commercial Courts which are subordinate to the rank of the Principal Civil Judge in the District has jurisdiction to hear applications/appeals under Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996.
The bench of Justices MR Shah and Krishna Murari rejected the contention that all applications/appeals arising out of arbitration (other than the international commercial arbitration) shall only lie before the Principal Civil Court of a district.
The Supreme Court observed that the doctrine of res judicata is attracted not only in separate subsequent proceedings but also at subsequent stage of the same proceedings.
A binding decision cannot be ignored even on the principle of per incuriam because that principle applies to the precedents and not to the doctrine of res judicata, the bench of Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Aniruddha Bose observed.
The Supreme Court observed that the supply of illegible or blurred copies of the documents relied upon by the detaining authority amounts to violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution.
The detenu is always entitled to be supplied with the legible copies of the documents relied upon by the detaining authority and such information made in the grounds of detention enables him to make an effective representation, the bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and CT Ravikumar observed.
The Supreme Court of India bench of Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Sudhanshu Dhulia recently urged to take a view that advances the cause of justice rather than a technical view while dealing with matters on payment of compensation to land losers.
Land Loser means a person whose land has been acquired by the Government for public interest and who possesses a proper certificate.
The Supreme Court held that the age of the deceased and not the age of the dependents in case of the death of a bachelor is to be the basis for multiplier. The order was passed by a bench comprising Justice Ravindra Bhat and Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia.
The issue at hand concerned a High Court judgement which had reduced the compensation payable to the appellant(s)–claimants whose son had suffered fatal injuries and passed away on account of a motorcycle accident. In the first instance, the tribunal had arrived at the figure of Rs. 3,683/- per month, on the basis of which, compensation was directed, after holding that the appropriate multiplier was 18. However, against this order of the tribunal, the Insurer had approached the High Court, which in its impugned Judgment, reduced the multiplier to 9 having regarding the age of the surviving mother, who was the deceased's dependent.
The Supreme Court bench of Justices MR Shah and Krishna Murari observed that the qualification prevailing on the date of applying for compassionate appointment is to be considered and not the date on which the application for compassionate appointment is considered.
In this case, the Central Administrative Tribunal directed the Delhi Jal Board to consider the candidature of an applicant for the post of Lower Division Clerk (LDC). The High Court of Delhi dismissed the writ petition filed by the Board challenging this order of CAT and therefore it approached the Apex Court.
A Supreme court bench comprising Justice Dinesh Maheshwari and Justice Aniruddha Bose observed that Section 32 Of the Advocates Act, 1961 does not create a bar for a General Power of Attorney holder to appear on behalf of a plaintiff, simply because the GPA was enrolled as an advocate.
When the witnesses are related/interested, their testimonies have to be scrutinized with greater care and circumspection, the Supreme Court observed while acquitting accused in a murder case.
Jabbar Ali and others were convicted by the Trial Court under Section 302 IPC and the Gauhati High Court had dismissed their appeals.
Before the Apex Court bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and BV Nagarathna the appellants mainly contended that the prosecution failed to examine any independent witnesses in the present case and that the witnesses were related to each other and that all the witnesses have given contradictory versions as to who gave the fatal blow to deceased.
The Supreme Court bench of Justices Surya Kant and Aniruddha Bose observed that 'minimum wages notification' can be considered to determine the notional income of deceased in motor accident claim cases.
As per the claimants, the Deceased was a fish vendor cum driver and was earning at least Rs. 25,000/ per month. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal found that the Deceased was a driver and fixed his monthly income at Rs.14,000/. Additionally, assuming that the Deceased received at least Rs.3,500/ as rent, the Tribunal calculated his final notional income as Rs.17,500/-. In appeal, the High Court observed that the maximum monthly income that could have been reckoned is Rs. 10,000/-. In view of this, the High Court substantially reduced the compensation granted by the Tribunal from Rs. 32,39,000/ to Rs. 19,70,000/-.
The Supreme Court set aside an Allahabad High Court order that dismissed a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution merely on is not maintainable as remedy by way of revision under Section 115 CPC is available.
There is a difference and distinction between the entertainability and maintainability, the bench of Justices MR Shah and Krishna Murari observed.
In a significant judgment, the Supreme Court bench of Chief Justice of India Lalit, Justice S Ravindra Bhat and Justice PS Narasimha has held that entities created with the object of advancing general public utility cannot seek exemption under the Income Tax Act 1961 under the head "charitable purposes" if they are engaging in any trade, business, commerce or providing any service for any consideration.
However, in the course of carrying out the general public utility, the assessee can engage in incidental trade or business or provide services for consideration and can generate profits. If the receipts generated out of such incidental activities are within the quantified limits, the trusts are entitled to seek income tax exemption.
Once a Chemical Examiner establishes that the seized 'poppy straw' indicates a positive test for the contents of 'morphine' and 'meconic acid', it is sufficient to establish that it is covered by the Section 2(xvii)(a) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Supreme Court held in a judgment delivered today.
The bench comprising Justices BR Gavai and CT Ravikumar observed that no further test would be necessary for establishing that the seized material is a part of 'papaver somniferum L'.
The Supreme Court bench of Chief Justice of India Lalit, Justice S Ravindra Bhat and Justice PS Narasimha has pronounced a significant judgment on the scope of exemption for "charitable purposes" under Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act 1961 in relation to statutory authorities and professional bodies.
With effect from 01.04.2009, after the Finance Act 2009, a proviso was added to the section to state : "Provided that the advancement of any other object of general public utility shall not be a charitable purpose, if it involves the carrying on of any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business, or any activity of rendering any service in relation to any trade, commerce or business, for a cess or fee or any other consideration, irrespective of the nature of use or application, or retention, of the income from such activity".
In a significant judgment, the Supreme Court bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and Hima Kohli held that no offence for dishonour of cheque under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is made out if the cheque is presented for the full amount without endorsing the part-payment made by the borrower after the issuance of the cheque.
The Court held that the sum reflected on the cheque will not be the "legally enforceable debt" as per Section 138 NI Act, when it has been presented for encashment without endorsing the part-payment. Part-payments must be endorsed on the cheque as per Section 56 of the NI Act. If such endorsement is made, the cheque can be presented for the balance amount, and the offence under Section 138 NI Act will be attracted if such a cheque with endorsement of the part-payment gets dishonoured, explained the Court.
The Supreme Court observed that the National Green Tribunal should test the bonafides and credentials of applicants before permitting them to seek orders which have far reaching effects.
Before a litigant is permitted to knock the doors of justice and seek orders which have far reaching effects of affecting the employment of thousands of persons, stopping investment in the State, prejudicing the interests of the farmers; the credentials and bonafides of the applicants must be tested, the bench of Justices BR Gavai and BV Nagarathna observed.
Setting aside the orders passed by National Green Tribunal, the Supreme Court upheld the Uttar Pradesh Government decision granting licences to new wood-based industries.
The bench comprising Justices BR Gavai and BV Nagarathna observed that the State and its authorities should ensure that environmental concerns are duly attended to.
The Supreme Court has observed that the claim of State Cricket Associations for income tax exemption on the ground of "charitable purposes" require deeper scrutiny as their activities are run on business lines.
A bench comprising Chief Justice of India UU Lalit, Justice S Ravindra Bhat and Justice PS Narasimha allowed the appeals filed by the revenue department and directed the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to re-examine the claims made by Gujarat Cricket Association, the Saurashtra Cricket Association, Baroda, Rajkot and Rajkot Cricket Associations for income tax exemption.
The Supreme Court observed that an anticipatory bail cannot be granted merely because custodial interrogation is not required.
The first and foremost thing that the court hearing an anticipatory bail application should consider is the prima facie case put up against the accused, the bench of Justices Surya Kant and JB Pardiwala observed.
The court was considering an appeal filed by mother of a victim in a POCSO case against the Kerala High Court order that granted anticipatory bail to the accused.
The Supreme Court bench comprising of Justices MR Shah and MM Sundresh observed that any dispute with respect to mutation entry can only be before the revenue authorities only.
This observation is in the context of Section 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.
In this case, the plaintiff challenged a mutation entry of 1955 by filing a suit before a civil court. The High Court allowed the second appeal holding that the suit before the Civil Court challenging the mutation entry was not maintainable at all and there was a bar of filing the civil suit.
When the witnesses are related/interested, their testimonies have to be scrutinized with greater care and circumspection, the Supreme Court bench comprising of Justices Ajay Rastogi and BV Nagarathna observed while acquitting accused in a murder case.
Jabbar Ali and others were convicted by the Trial Court under Section 302 IPC and the Gauhati High Court had dismissed their appeals.
The Supreme Court, in a judgment delivered in an appeal against Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, explained the test for determining whether a case involves substantial question of law.
The bench of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari said that the appropriate test for determining whether the question of law raised in the case is substantial would be to see whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties.
The Supreme Court bench comprising of Justices Ajay Rastogi and C.T. Ravikumar has recently set aside a decision of the Jharkhand High Court to impose a precondition for anticipatory bail that the accused would have to deposit a Demand Draft of Rs. 10 lakhs as ad interim victim compensation in favour of his wife. This appeal arose out of a dowry harassment case in which the complainant had instituted a criminal complaint against her husband before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, which was later converted into a first information report, for offences under Section 498A and other ancillary provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
The Supreme Court bench comprising of Justices Aniruddha Bose and Vikram Nath recently set aside a decision of a High Court allowing DNA testing to determine the paternity of two children to verify a claim made by their mother that she had been "forced to cohabit and develop a physical relationship" with her brother-in-law. This appeal had arisen out of a dowry harassment case in which the complainant had lodged a first information report against her husband and his brother under Sections 498A, 323, and 354 and other ancillary provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The Division Bench, allowing the appeal preferred by the accused, held that the trial court had accepted the application of the complainant "mechanically". By this order, which eventually came under the scanner of the apex court, the trial court had directed the appellants and the children "to give blood samples to a specified hospital for obtaining an expert opinion on DNA fingerprint test".
The Supreme Court observed that the question whether the cheque in question had been issued for a time barred debt or not cannot be decided in a petition under Section 482 CrPC.
The bench of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and J B Pardiwala observed that this question is a matter of evidence.
In this case, the Punjab and Haryana High Court quashed a complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Acts on the ground that on the date of summoning the accused the legally enforceable debt was time barred. The High Court observed that there is no averment in the entire complaint as regards any kind of acknowledgment of the said debt by the accused within the period of three years i.e. within the limitation period of recovering the debt.
The Supreme Court has held that the appointment of a Vice-Chancellor of a University will be illegal when the Search Committee recommended only one name instead of a panel of 3-5 names as mandated by the University Grants Commission Regulations 2013.
A bench comprising Justices MR Shah and CT Ravikumar, while setting aside the appointment of Rajasree M.S. as the Vice-Chancellor of A.P.J. Abdul Kalam University, held that the appointment of VC will be "void-abinitio" if it was not made as per the UGC Regulation
The Supreme Court bench comprising of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and V. Ramasubramanian recently set aside the conviction of a Bengal sweetmeat shop-owner for allegedly selling adulterated paneer on the ground that there was no "whisper in the complaint or in the evidence" as to whether the departure from prescribed standards or composition could be attributed only to inescapable natural causes.
In other words, to drive home a conviction for adulteration under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the Public Analyst, whose opinion formed the basis of the prosecution, had to examine whether the proviso to the definition of 'adulteration' in Section 2(ia)(m) would be attracted. This proviso engrafted an exception for 'primary food' inasmuch as where their quality or purity fell below the prescribed standards or where their constituents were present in quantities beyond the prescribed limit of variability "solely due to natural causes" and this departure was beyond "the control of human agency", such articles of food would not be deemed to be adulterated.
A party faced the ire of the Supreme Court bench comprising of Justices Ajay Rastogi and CT Ravikumar for taking a cheque dishonour dispute to the level of apex level before agreeing to settle the matter with the complainant. The appellant had approached the Supreme Court challenging the concurrent orders of conviction passed by three courts against him for the offence of cheque dishonour under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Before the Supreme Court, the appellant finally agreed to settle the matter by paying the complainant Rs 69 lakhs. However, the Court was not impressed with the settlement made after 10 years of litigation, and termed it a "tyranny of justice" as far as the complainant is concerned, as he had had no option but to compromise now.
The Supreme Court bench comprising of Justices MR Shah and MM Sundresh observed that any dispute with respect to mutation entry can only be before the revenue authorities only.
This observation is in the context of Section 13 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961.
In this case, the plaintiff challenged a mutation entry of 1955 by filing a suit before a civil court. The High Court allowed the second appeal holding that the suit before the Civil Court challenging the mutation entry was not maintainable at all and there was a bar of filing the civil suit.
In a recent order, the Supreme Court of India has reiterated the importance of conducting a psychological evaluation of convicts who have been awarded death sentences.
"However, we are of the view that the assessment as regards conduct of the accused, if made before the final submissions are advanced, will go a long way in rendering assistance……In series of death sentence cases, this Court has been passing certain directions so that psychological evaluation of the concerned convict can be ascertained", a Bench of Chief Justice UU Lalit, Ravindra Bhat and Bela M Trivedi observed.
Cheque Bounce Complaint Cannot Be Transferred As Per Convenience Of Accused: Supreme Court
The Supreme Court observed that a complaint under Section 138 cannot be transferred as per the convenience of the accused.
Justice Abhay S. Oka observed thus while dismissing a transfer petition filed by an accused seeking transfer of a cheque bounce complaint.
After noticing that the petitioner is a woman and a senior citizen, the judge observed that she can always seek exemption from personal appearance.
The Supreme Court observed that a Modified Vapour Absorption Chillers cannot be categorized as a Heat Pump to avail concessional tariff benefits under Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985.
Customers do not purchase MVAC because it produces hot water and in commercial parlance it is used for air conditioning and refrigeration and not at all for heating purpose, the bench of Justices KM Joseph and Hrishikesh Roy noted.
The Supreme Court recently set aside the bail granted to two persons accused in an NDPS case.
"In the face of the mandate of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, the High Court could not and ought not to have released the accused on bail", the bench of CJI UU Lalit and Justice Bela M. Trivedi observed.
As per the prosecution case, about 13 kgs of morphine was found in a car which was driven by Md. Jakir Hussain who, in a statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act also named his owner accused Abdul Hai. During the course of investigation, it was found that contraband material in question was to be handed-over to accused -Khalil Uddin, an owner of a tea shop. The Gauhati High Court granted bail to Abdul Hai and Khalil Uddin and aggreived with this, the State approached the Apex Court.
The Supreme Court bench comprising of Justices BR Gavai and BV Nagarathna observed that if a court restricts the anticipatory bail upto framing of charge, the order should discuss the peculiar facts and circumstances which warranted such restriction.
In this case, the Allahabad High Court restricted the anticipatory bail granted to the accused only till framing of the charge.
In response to the Special Leave Petition filed by the accused, ASG KM Nataraj justifying the order by relying on a decision in Nathu Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 2021 (6) SCC 64. In the said decision, it was held that though normally, the anticipatory bail should not be granted for a specific period, if the facts and circumstances are so made out, the Court can limit the tenure of the anticipatory bail. ASG requested time to file counter affidavit so as to substantiate the reasons for limiting the period of anticipatory bail.
The Supreme Court bench comprising of Justices Hemant Gupta and Vikram Nath observed that there Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board KIADB can acquire lands for a single company to set up an industry.
In this case, the land acquisition by KIADB was for two companies viz. M/s MSPL Ltd. and M/s AARESS Iron and Steel Ltd. [AISL is fully owned subsidiary of MSPL]. Allowing writ appeal filed by a land owner, the Karnataka High Court (Division Bench) quashed the notifications under Sections 3(1), 1(3) and 28(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966. One of the issues that were raised in appeal before the Apex Court was whether the acquisition for a single company could be said to be for public purpose and could be made under the 1966 Act? This issue arose since, in the impugned judgment, the High Court held that KIADB cannot acquire lands for a single company/private industrialist and the same is improper exercise of power and also not in public interest.
Statutes Are To Be Read In Their Plain Language : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court observed that the Courts should refrain from expressing value judgments and policy views in order to interpret statutes.
Statutes are to be read in their plain language and not otherwise, the bench of Justices Hemant Gupta and Vikram Nath observed.
In this case, the land acquisition by KIADB was quashed by Karnataka High Court (Division Bench). While considering the appeals, the Apex Court bench noted the following observations made in the judgment of the High court.
The Supreme Court on Monday prohibited "Two-Finger Test" in rape cases and warned that persons conducting such tests will be held guilty of misconduct. It is regrettable that "two-finger test" continues to be conducted even today, a bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and Hima Kohli lamented while restoring the conviction in a rape case.
"This court has time and again deprecated the use of two finger test in cases alleging rape and sexual assault. The so called test has no scientific basis. It instead re-victimises and re-traumatises women. The two finger test must not be conducted....The test is based on an incorrect assumption that a sexually active woman cannot be raped. Nothing can be further from the truth", the bench observed while pronouncing the judgment.
The Supreme Court observed that dying declaration does not become inadmissible merely because it was recorded by police personnel.
Although a dying declaration ought to ideally be recorded by a Magistrate if possible, it cannot be said that dying declarations recorded by police personnel are inadmissible for that reason alone, the bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and Hima Kohli said.
The court added that the issue of whether a dying declaration recorded by the police is admissible must be decided after considering the facts and circumstances of each case.
The Supreme Court observed that the Railway employees working in different Zones/Divisions are required to be treated similarly and equally and are entitled to similar benefits and are entitled to the same treatment.
The bench of Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna observed that Commission Vendors/bearers working in the Northern Railway are entitled to have 50% of their services rendered prior to their regularization to be counted for pensionary benefits.
The Supreme Court observed that, while computing motor accident compensation, the multiplier of victims upto the age group of 15 years should be taken as '15'.
There is certainly justification for selecting a lower multiplier of '15' in the case of victims belonging to the age group upto 15 years, the bench of Justices BR Gavai and CT Ravikumar observed.