Pune Porsche Car Accident : Supreme Court Court Denies Anticipatory Bail To Father Of Minor Passenger

Update: 2024-11-05 10:21 GMT
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The Supreme Court today (November 5) denied bail to Arunkumar Devnath Singh, father of a minor co-accused sitting next to the main accused - a Child in Conflict with Law (CCL), who allegedly was driving the car on May 19, 2024, in a high speed and killed two youth after mowing them down in Pune's Kalyani Nagar Porsche accident.A bench of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah...

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The Supreme Court today (November 5) denied bail to Arunkumar Devnath Singh, father of a minor co-accused sitting next to the main accused - a Child in Conflict with Law (CCL), who allegedly was driving the car on May 19, 2024, in a high speed and killed two youth after mowing them down in Pune's Kalyani Nagar Porsche accident.

A bench of Justices Sudhanshu Dhulia and Ahsanuddin Amanullah upheld the October 23 order of the Bombay High Court which dismissed Singh's anticipatory bail application.

At the outset, Senior Advocate Vibha Datta Makhija submitted that there is "prejudice" against the petitioner as he continues to face a "media trial".

To this, Justice Dhulia said: "It happens". Whereas, Justice Amanullah stated that the Court does not go by the prejudice surrounding a case.

Justice Dhulia sought clarification if the petitioner was related to the driver-CCL. To this, Makhija responded: "No, I am the father of the friend who was sitting at back, who had nothing to do with the [alleged incident]. They were only partying together. He wasn't driving."

Senior Advocate Siddharth Luthra also appeared for the petitioner. He took the Court through para.26 of the bail order, which reads: "The applicant has failed to make out a case in his favour for this Court to exercise discretion for granting anticipatory bail to him. The question of law raised on behalf of the applicant with regard to the very applicability of Section 467 read with Section 464 of the IPC, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, is answered against the applicant. This Court finds that the ingredients of the offences are prima facie made out against the applicant."

Luthra submitted that even in the worst-case scenario, Section 201 (Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false information to screen offender) of the Indian Penal Code would be attracted. Section 464 and other sections have no application. 

Makhija also requested for the Court to add that the observations made under para.26 are only for the purpose of bail. She said: "[Then], I am doomed in the trial." However, the Court refused to interfere with the High Court's order. 

The Court said that whatever is being argued is a matter of trial. Justice Dhulia said: "You may have unshakingly case in the trial."

Luthra pressed for withdrawing the SLP. But the Court dismissed it.

Justice Amanullah added: "Law is common to everyone. Can't make a distinction. For these types of facts, we would not have [given] 20 seconds..."

Background

Justice Manish Pitale of the High Court noted that the applicant Arunkumar Singh had bribed the doctors at the Sassoon Hospital in Pune just after the accident to get his son's blood samples changed with another co-accused, only to ensure that the medical reports do not indicate the presence of any alcohol in his son's blood.

"A perusal of the material that has come on record during the course of investigation prima facie indicates that blood sample of the minor son of the applicant was replaced with the blood sample of co-accused Ashish Mittal. This was at the behest of the applicant himself, in order to create a document that would ensure that the minor son of the applicant goes scot free," Justice Pitale noted.

The co-accused persons i.e. the parents of the child in conflict with law, who was driving the Porsche car, also undertook identical action by replacing the blood sample of the said child with that of his mother, again in order to create a document that would ensure that the said child also goes scot free, the judge noted further.

In his defence, Singh argued on merits that the provisions of section 464 (making false document by deception) will not apply to him. He contended that Alcohol Examination Certificate (AEC) cannot be said to be a document prepared under 'deception' as the Doctor and also the Assistant Chemical Analyser were party to the conspiracy of changing the blood samples and that they were very much aware of the blood samples being exchanged.
Taking note of the contention, Justice Pitale noted that the deception here was practised by labelling the subject blood sample as that of the minor son of the applicant, while in reality it was the blood sample of co-accused Ashish Mittal.

"The applicant, being the father of the said minor son, was part of the conspiracy under Section 120-B of the IPC to bring about such deception by affixing of label to show the blood sample to be that of the minor son while it was the blood sample of co-accused Ashish Mittal. It is the said label affixed on the blood sample that was the basis of deception, read with the documents created in conspiracy with co-accused Dr. Halnor. Hence, the contention raised on behalf of the applicant that blood sample is not a 'document' pales into insignificance," the bench noted.

It is due to this deception practised on the Assistant Chemical Analyzer that he had no knowledge of the nature of alteration, resulting in the said Alcohol Examination Certificate, being signed, sealed and executed, the judge added.

"Viewed from this angle, the contention raised on behalf of the State that the applicant was very much part of the conspiracy in committing the offence under Section 464 of the IPC, holds good. There is a strong prima facie case made out against the applicant for offence committed under Section 467 of the IPC read with Section 464 thereof. The said document clearly answers the definition of 'valuable security' under Section 30 of the IPC, as it certainly created a right in the accused minor son of the applicant of portraying innocence," the bench held.

The bench pointed out that the main contention of the prosecution is that all the occupants of the Porsche car, including the applicant's son and the others including the child in conflict with law driving the car were in a drunken state and in that situation the car was driven in such a high speed that it hit the motorcycle from behind on which the victims were riding, causing their death.

"There is substance in the contention raised by the Special Public Prosecutor that the applicant remaining absconding has created an impediment for the investigating authority to fully and effectively investigate into the matter, including the angle of conspiracy and the constituents thereof, hatched by the applicant with the co-accused persons, including the doctors who were bribed for replacing the blood samples," the bench observed, while denying anticipatory bail to Singh.

Case Title: Arunkumar Devnath Singh vs State of Maharashtra SLP(Crl) No. 15128/2024

Appearances: Senior advocates Siddharth Luthra and Vibha Datta Makhija (for petitioner)

Background was taken from Narsi Benwal's report here

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