Important MCQs Based On Latest Supreme Court Judgments For Law Examinations
Q 1. The prosecution has registered a case against the Police Officer for filing a false case and fabricating the evidence. However, the accused police officer sought exemption from prosecution as no prior sanction was obtained under Section 197 Cr.P.C. before prosecuting him. Decide.a. No Sanction is required to prosecute a public servant for acts committed by him that are not part of...
Q 1. The prosecution has registered a case against the Police Officer for filing a false case and fabricating the evidence. However, the accused police officer sought exemption from prosecution as no prior sanction was obtained under Section 197 Cr.P.C. before prosecuting him. Decide.
a. No Sanction is required to prosecute a public servant for acts committed by him that are not part of the official duties.
b. Filing false cases and fabricating evidence are not part of the official duties of the police officer.
c. The protection of Section 197 CrPC is available only for acts discharged in the course of official duties.
d. All of the above
Answer: Option (d)
Case Title: OM PRAKASH YADAV VERSUS NIRANJAN KUMAR UPADHYAY & ORS, Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 989
Explanation: The Supreme Court held that a police official who is accused of lodging a false case cannot claim that he cannot be prosecuted without sanction under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since fabrication of evidence and filing bogus cases are not part of the official duties of a police official, the protection under Section 197 CrPC is not applicable to such acts, the Court explained.
Q 2. A compromise decree was passed by the High Court as per Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC. However, one of the parties sought to restore the compromise proceedings upon filing a recall application before the High Court alleging breach of compromise terms recorded between the parties. Decide.
a. Once compromise is recorded between the parties then it cannot be recalled.
b. There's a complete bar on the filing of an appeal against the compromise decree.
c. Filing a recall application would be the only remedy available against the compromise decree.
d. Both (b) and (c)
Answer: Option (d)
Case Title: NAVRATAN LAL SHARMA VERSUS RADHA MOHAN SHARMA & ORS, Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 985
The Supreme Court ruled that if the compromise entered between the parties was not adhered to, there is no bar to filing a recall application seeking restoration of the proceedings under Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”). The Court emphasized that the validity and legality of a compromise agreement can be challenged even after a decree is passed.
Q 3. A specific performance of an agreement to sell was decreed in favor of the plaintiff. However, the Executing Court refused to grant the possessory rights to the plaintiff because a separate application under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 seeking possession of the suit property was not filed. Decide the validity of the Executing Court's decision.
a.There's no need to file a separate suit under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 for transfer of possession when a transfer of possession is implicit upon execution of the sale deed.
b. The decree-holder of the suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell need not be required to file a suit seeking possession of the suit property under Section 22 of the Act.
c. Both (a) and (b)
d. Execution of the sale deed in favor of the plaintiff would not grant possessory rights to the plaintiff unless claimed by the plaintiff under Section 22 of SRA.
Answer: Option (c)
Case Title: BIRMA DEVI & ORS. VERSUS SUBHASH & ANR., Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 976
Explanation: The Supreme Court reiterated that it would not be necessary for the decree-holder seeking specific performance of an agreement to sell simpliciter to file a separate application under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1962 (“SRA”) for claiming possession of suit property.
Q 4. A mortgagor mortgaged property to the mortgagee, retaining possession, with a condition that failure to redeem within three months would result in transfer to the mortgagee as a "mortgage by conditional sale" under Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1992. The mortgagor failed to redeem and argued that since possession remained with them, it was a simple mortgage, not a conditional sale. Decide.
a. The mortgage would be a 'simple mortgage' as the possession of the property remained with the mortgagor.
b. It was the mortgage by 'conditional sale' as the property was mortgaged with a condition that the property would transfer to the mortgagee upon the mortgagor's failure to redeem the mortgage within the stipulated time frame.
c. Mortgagor remaining in possession of the mortgaged property would not make a difference when there was a condition associated with the mortgage deed that upon failure to redeem the mortgaged property within the stipulated time frame would make the sale of mortgage property absolute in the mortgagee's favor.
d. Both (b) and (c)
Answer: Option (d)
Case Title: LEELA AGRAWAL VERSUS SARKAR & ANR., Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 967
The Supreme Court observed that allowing a mortgagor to stay in possession does not make the transaction a 'simple mortgage' if the deed specifies that the mortgagor's default in redeeming the property within the stipulated time would lead to transfer of the mortgage property to the mortgagee under 'mortgage by conditional sale' as per Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (“TPA”).
Q 5. A party sought to re-litigate the issues that were litigated in the previous suit proceedings, moreover, these were the issues that could have been raised in the earlier proceedings. Decide the maintainability of the subsequent suit in terms of Explanation IV to Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
a. The subsequent suit would not be maintainable as it would be barred by the doctrine of constructive res-judicata.
b. Re-litigation of issues arising out of the same subject-matter suit would be barred as it is incumbent upon the party to bring all issues in one suit.
c. Both (a) and (b)
d. Party can file a separate suit seeking adjudication of those issued which didn't form part of the previous suit, though it could have been raised in the previous proceedings.
Answer: Option (c)
CELIR LLP VERSUS MR. SUMATI PRASAD BAFNA & ORS., Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 991
Explanation: In a recent case, the Supreme Court explained the Henderson doctrine, a natural corollary of the Indian doctrine of constructive Res-judicata codified in Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). Propounded in the English case of Henderson versus Henderson, 1843, the doctrine suggests that all the issues arising in the litigation out of the same subject matter must be addressed in a single suit. The doctrine bars re-litigating issues that could or should have been raised in prior proceedings.
Q 6. The company's authorized officer challenged the High Court's decision approving the trial court's direction to him to deposit 20% of the compensation/fine amount for suspension of sentence in a cheque dishonor case under Section 148(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1882. Decide the liability of the authorized officer of the company, who merely signed the cheque on behalf of the company.
a. The authorized signatory of the company who merely signs the cheque would not be considered as a 'drawer of the cheque'.
b. Liability to pay compensation for suspension of a sentence does not lie on the company's authorized signatory as he cannot be considered as a drawer of a cheque.
c. Liability to pay compensation for suspension of the sentence lies only on the 'drawer of cheque'.
d. All of the above
Answer: Option (d)
Case Title: Bijay Agarwal Versus M/s Medilines, Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 948
The Supreme Court recently reiterated that the official signatory of the company does not assume the status of a 'drawer of a cheque' to attract the liability for payment of compensation under Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (“N.I. Act”). The Court clarified that liability for payment of compensation as well as deposit to suspend the sentence pending the appeal could only be fastened upon the drawer of the cheque, and not on the company's official who acted as an authorized signatory of the company.
Q 7. Out of a scuffle, the accused with a lethal weapon caused severe injuries to the vital organs of the victim causing his death. The accused claimed that the act was neither premeditated nor intentional, and therefore sought a reversal of conviction for an offence of murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Decide.
a. Lacking the intention to commit murder is irrelevant, and the accused would still be held guilty of murdering if he causes a bodily injury to the deceased as is likely to result in death in the ordinary course of nature.
b. Causing injury with lethal weapons in vital parts of the deceased body is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
c. Accused would be held guilty for the offence of murder under Section 300(3), as he inflicted such an injury to the deceased which in an ordinary sense sufficient to cause death.
d. All of the above
Answer: Option (d)
Case Title: KUNHIMUHAMMED@ KUNHEETHU VERSUS THE STATE OF KERALA, Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 964
Explanation: The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of an individual for committing murder who, out of a scuffle, inflicted serious injury on vital parts of the deceased body with lethal weapons. The Court rejected the accused-appellant's argument that his act to commit murder was not intentional and premeditated, hence he cannot be punished for committing culpable homicide amounting to murder.
Q 8. An employee appealed to the Supreme Court against the High Court's decision allowing the Respondent's application to appoint an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. The employee argued that disputes over non-payment of wages and wrongful termination fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of statutory authorities under the Payment of Wages Act and Industrial Disputes Act and are thus non-arbitrable. Decide.
a. The High Court committed an error in allowing the Section 11(6) application, as the disputes about non-payment of wages and wrongful termination are not arbitrable and would be decided under the statutory authority designated by the statute to adjudicate the disputes.
b. The High Court didn't commit an error, as nothing bars the arbitral tribunal from adjudicating the disputes.
c. When the subject matter of the dispute is expressly or by necessary implication non-arbitrable as per mandatory statute, then such disputes become arbitrable under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.
d. Both (b) and (c)
Answer: Option (a)
Case Title: Dushyant Janbandhu v. M/s Hyundai AutoEver India Pvt. Ltd., Citation : 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 981
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that disputes falling exclusively within the jurisdiction of statutory authorities are not arbitrable. While holding so, the bench comprising Justices PS Narasimha and Sandeep Mehta ruled that the dispute related to wages and termination of an employee were non-arbitrable and would be exclusively dealt with by the statutory authorities established under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (“PW Act”) and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (“ID Act”).
Q 9. The conviction of an accused was based on the disclosure statements made to the police while en route to the police station. The accused challenged his conviction, contending that incriminating evidence was discovered before his disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was recorded. He claimed the evidence was collected while en route to the police station, making the disclosure statement inadmissible as it did not lead to the discovery. Decide.
a. The discovery made based on the disclosure statements cannot be considered a discovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
b. Statements given to police en route to police statements leading to discovery cannot be considered disclosure statements.
c. Both (a) and (b)
d. None of the above
Answer: Option (c)
Case Title: SURESH CHANDRA TIWARI & ANR. VERSUS STATE OF UTTARAKHAND, Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 932
Explanation: The Supreme Court held that an alleged recovery of incriminating materials based on a statement given by the accused en route to the police station before the recording of the statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act at the police station is not admissible. The Court set aside the conviction of an accused in a murder case after noting that the discovery of the incriminating circumstances against the accused was not based on the disclosure statements made under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (“Act”), but based on the statement recorded by the police when he was en route to the police station.
Q 10. The accused was aggrieved by the High Court's decision to uphold the complainant's summoning application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. which was based on the prosecution's witness chief examination without considering their cross-examination. The appellant argued that prosecution witnesses gave incriminating evidence in chief examination but admitted omissions during cross-examination. Since both were on record when the application to summon an additional accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was filed, the appellant contended it was improper to decide the application without considering the cross-examination. Decide.
a. The High Court erred in allowing the summoning application without taking into account the cross-examination of the prosecution.
b. The High Court committed no error as only the examination-in-chief of the prosecution witness is required to be looked upon while deciding the summoning application.
c. Section 319 CrPC application would be maintainable only when there exists a prima facie case against the person sought to be summoned. A Prima facie case is determined after taking into account both examination in chief and cross-examination of the prosecution witness.
d. Both (a) and (c)
Answer: Option (d)
Case Title: HETRAM @ BABLI VS. STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR., Citation : 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 930
Explanation: The Supreme Court observed that the summoning of an additional accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. should not be only based on the examination in chief of the prosecution witnesses. The Court said that due credence must be also given to the prosecution witness cross-examination, if exists, before the filing of the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
(For feedback/suggestions, the author can be reached at yash@livelaw.in)