Complete Supreme Court Quarterly Digest 2024- [July To September]

Advocate

All miscellaneous amounts charged by Bar Councils for enrolment are 'enrolment fees'. Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 519

Bar Councils can't collect any amount exceeding fee specified under Section 24 of advocates act for enrolment. Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 519

Every advocate is expected to come to the Court in proper attire as per the Rules and behave in the Court. (Para 7) Bijon Kumar Mahajan v. State of Assam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 449

Exorbitant enrolment fees charged by state bar councils violate the right to profession, dignity and equality. Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 519

Social capital and networks play an important role in legal career; lawyers from marginalised sections face difficulties. Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 519

Advocates-on-Record can mark the appearances of only those advocates who are authorized to appear and argue the case on a particular day of hearing. Bhagwan Singh v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 722

Legal professionals are not immune from prosecution for criminal misdeeds. Bhagwan Singh v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 722

Strict compliance with online appearance marking protocols for advocates - Certain respondents were found absent both in person and online, despite having marked his presence through the online portal. The Court criticized this practice, emphasizing that marking presence without actual participation undermines the integrity of proceedings. The Court referenced a Supreme Court Registry circular dated 30th December 2022, which allows online presence marking only for advocates genuinely participating in hearings. To uphold procedural sanctity, the Court ordered that only advocates who are present in person or through video conferencing should be marked as attending. The Supreme Court Bar Association and the Advocates-on-Record Association were requested to ensure compliance and inform their members of this directive. Baidya Nath Choudhary v. Dr. Sree Surendra Kumar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 645

The Court expressed its concern over the increasing number of false statements in cases involving premature release, urging the legal community to uphold the integrity of the judicial process. Virender Singh v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 695

The Court underscored the duty of Public Prosecutors handling cases involving Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assembly in Special Courts, stating that these Prosecutors should fully recognize the responsibilities of their role, which includes acting as officers of the Court. The Court found no basis, as of the present date, to question the competence of the appointed Public Prosecutor and thus denied the request to appoint a special Public Prosecutor. Y. Balaji v. Assistant Commissioner of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 652

The legal profession has an important role to play in the process. Any proceeding or application which prima facie lacks merit should not be instituted in a court. We are constrained to observe this because of late we notice that pleadings/petitions with outrageous and ex facie unbelievable averments are made with no inhibition whatsoever. This is especially so in some family law proceedings, both civil and criminal. Reading some of the averments therein, we are left to wonder whether at all the deponents were conscious of what has been written purportedly on their behalf, before appending their signatures. These misadventures directly impinge on the rule of law, because they add to the pendency and the consequential delay in the disposal of other cases which are crying for justice. It is time that such frivolous and vexatious proceedings are met with due sanctions in the form of exemplary costs to dissuade parties from resorting to such tactics. (Para 46) K. Vadivel v. K. Shanthi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 757

The Supreme Court allows all final year law students to appear in All India Bar Exam 2024. Nilay Rai v. Bar Council of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 734

The Supreme Court ordered the Central Bureau of Investigation to carry out a probe into a case where the petitioner denied filing any special leave petition and claimed ignorance of advocates who represented him. Bhagwan Singh v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 722

All India Tourist Vehicles (Permit) Rules, 2023

Object – The 2023 Rules have primarily two objects: Firstly, to make the movement of such tourist vehicles across the country through different States seamless and smooth; and secondly, the revenue to be generated by the Centre to be proportionately shared with the State Governments, also taking into account their previous revenue generation, and also, keeping in mind that their earlier revenue income was not reduced in any manner. The Rules, 2023 superseded the All-India Tourists Vehicles (Authorization/Permit) Rules, 2021. After the coming into of the Rules, 2023, the power of levying/collecting Border Tax/Authorization Fee by the State Governments at various border check posts from vehicles carrying All India Tourists Permit was to be done away with. (Para 4) Muthyala Sunil Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : AIR 2024 SC 3496

Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958

Monument of national importance - Protection of a structure known as the Gumti - The petitioner challenged the dismissal of his writ petition by the Delhi High Court, which followed the Archaeological Survey of India's (ASI) report that changes made by the Defence Colony Welfare Association (DCWA) to the Gumti resulted in its loss of originality, thereby negating its protected status. The Court expressed concerns regarding the decision-making process of the ASI and the Central Government in initially recommending the Gumti's protection and later opposing it based on modifications made by the DCWA. In light of these findings, the Court ordered the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to conduct a preliminary inquiry into various aspects related to the Gumti's status, including the circumstances surrounding its occupation by the DCWA, the authority behind the alterations made, and the lack of preventive measures against unauthorized changes. The CBI was directed to report back within two months, while the Court prohibited any changes to the Gumti until further orders, underscoring the need for protecting heritage sites. Rajeev Suri v. Archaeological Survey of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 627

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

An arbitration agreement is not necessarily non-binding on a non-signatory party. Such a party, though not a signatory, may have intended to be bound through its conduct or relationship with the signatory parties. A referral court must determine the issue from a prima facie perspective; although, ultimately, it is the arbitral tribunal which shall decide the same based on evidence. Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S. Patel, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 727 : AIR 2024 SC 4648

Arbitral Tribunal is not empowered to grant interest upon interest while passing an arbitral award as the Arbitration Act, 1940 does not specifically provide for the grant of interest on interest. D. Khosla and Company v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 558 : AIR 2024 SC 3937

Courts and arbitral tribunals have the duty to examine the contract clauses in proceedings concerning arbitration. Pam Developments v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 613

Courts at referral stage must not enter into contested questions involving complex facts. Cox & Kings Ltd. v. Sap India Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 676 : AIR 2024 SC 4520

Dispute regarding full and final settlement of contract is arbitrable. (Para 59) SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 489

How to determine conversion of arbitral award in foreign currency to indian currency - Explained. DLF Ltd. v. Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 565 : AIR 2024 SC 4165

Judge hearing Section 34 application must apply mind to grounds of challenge. Kalanithi Maran v. Ajay Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 520

Section 11(6) - While deciding a Section 11(6) petition for an appointment of an arbitrator, the referral courts must not conduct an intricate evidentiary enquiry into the question of whether the claims raised by the applicant are time-barred and should leave that question for determination by the arbitrator. The referral court should limit its enquiry to examining whether the Section 11(6) application has been filed within the period of limitation of three years or not. (Para 131) SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 489

Section 19(1) – Applicability of Civil procedure Code, 1908 in arbitral proceedings – The legislature's intention is reflected in Section 19(1) of the Arbitration Act, which provides that an Arbitral Tribunal is not bound by the provision of the CPC. Hence, the provisions of the CPC have not been made applicable to the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37(1)(c). (Para 18) Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation v. Samir Narain Bhojwani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : AIR 2024 SC 3427 : (2024) 7 SCC 218

Section 29A (4) r/w. (5) - Application for extending the time for passing of an arbitral award can be filed even after the expiry of the twelve-month or the extended six-month period. Rohan Builders v. Berger Paints, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 693 : AIR 2024 SC 4369

Section 31(7) and 34 - Award of interest - Arbitrator awarded pre-reference interest at 12% per annum from the date of breach to the date of the Award), and post-award interest at 9.25% per annum. The District Judge upheld this decision under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. However, the High Court modified the Award, disallowing pre-reference interest based on its interpretation that the contract prohibited it, and allowed interest only for the pendente lite and post-award periods. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court reinstated the Arbitrator's award of pre-reference interest, holding that the Arbitrator had the discretion to award interest under Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and that the contract between the parties did not explicitly prohibit such an award. Interference with an arbitrator's decision on interest is unwarranted unless there is a clear violation of the contract or statutory provisions. (Para 9) Pam Developments v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 613

Section 34(3) and Limitation Act of 1963; Section 2(j) & 4 – Bar of limitation – Three months from the date of receiving the arbitral award – Held, the prescribed period of limitation started from 1st July, 2022 and ended on 30th September. The three months provided by way of limitation expired a day before the commencement of the pooja vacation, which commenced on 1st October 2022. Therefore, the appellants were not entitled to take benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act which states that if the 'prescribed period' of limitation expires on the day court is closed, the limitation period can be extended to the day the court re-opens. Further, as per Section 34(3), the period of limitation was extended by a maximum period of 30 days which expired on 30th October, 2022 on which date the court was closed. The benefit of section 4 of Limitation Act is only applicable on the 'prescribed period' and not applicable on the extended 30 days. Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act makes it amply clear that the 'prescribed period' for making an application for setting aside an arbitral award is three months. Hence, even when the period of extended limitation expired on 30th October when the court was closed, the benefit of Section 4 for the extension of limitation to the day the court re-opens is not applicable. Held, as the petition was filed on 31st October 2022, the High Court was right in holding that the petition filed was beyond the period specified under Section 34(3). Hence, there is no merit in the appeal, and it is, accordingly, dismissed. (Para 10 & 11) State of West Bengal v. Rajpath Contractors and Engineers Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 454 : AIR 2024 SC 3252 : (2024) 7 SCC 257

Section 34 - Mere violation of law won't make arbitral award invalid - fundamental policy of law must be violated. OPG Power Generation v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 738

Section 34 and 37 - Unless the arbitral award suffers from the illegality mentioned under Section 34 of the Act, no award can be interfered with or set aside by the Appellate Courts under Section 37 of the Act. The award cannot be set aside merely for the reason that the view of the Appellate Court is a better view than the one taken by the arbitral tribunal. The award as such cannot be touched unless it is contrary to the substantive provision of law; any provision of the Act or the terms of the agreement. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Sanman Rice Mills, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 754

Section 34 and 37 – Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court dealing with an appeal under Section 37 – Jurisdiction during appeal under Section 37 against the judgment in a petition under Section 34 is more constrained than the jurisdiction of the Court dealing with a petition under Section 34. It is the duty of the Appellate Court to consider whether Section 34 Court has remained confined to the grounds of challenge that are available in a petition under Section 34. The ultimate function of the Appellate Court under Section 37 is to decide whether the jurisdiction under Section 34 has been exercised rightly or wrongly. While doing so, the Appellate Court can exercise the same power and jurisdiction that Section 34 Court possesses with the same constraints. (Para 16) Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation v. Samir Narain Bhojwani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : AIR 2024 SC 3427 : (2024) 7 SCC 218

Section 34 and 37 – Object of arbitral proceedings – The court directed the members of the Bar to show restraint by incorporating only legally permissible grounds in petitions under Section 34 and the appeals under Section 37. Held, arbitration must become a tool for expeditious, effective, and cost-effective dispute resolution. When members of the bar take up so many grounds in petitions under Section 34, which are not covered by Section 34, there is a tendency to urge all those grounds which are not available in law and waste the Court's time. The proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 are being treated as if the same are appeals under Section 96 of the CPC, making the arbitral procedure inefficient and unfair. Further held, everyone associated with the arbitral proceedings must remember that brevity will make the arbitral proceedings and the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 more effective. (Para 23) Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation v. Samir Narain Bhojwani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : AIR 2024 SC 3427 : (2024) 7 SCC 218

Section 34 and 37 – Power of the Appellate Court dealing with the appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act to pass an order of remand to Section 34 Court. Order of remand passed directing the learned Single Judge to hear the petition under Section 34 afresh is challenged – The remedy of an appeal will not be effective unless there is a power of remand vesting in the appellate authority. In the Arbitration Act, there is no statutory embargo on the power of the Appellate Court under Section 37(1)(c) to pass an order of remand. However, looking at the scheme of the Arbitration Act, the Appellate Court can exercise the power of remand only when exceptional circumstances make an order of remand unavoidable. Held, while deciding the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the learned Single Judge has made a very elaborate consideration of the submissions made across the Bar. Hence, the finding of the Appellate Bench that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge does not address several issues raised by the parties cannot be sustained at all. Further held, the remand was completely unwarranted, as the learned Single Judge has elaborately dealt with the merits of the challenge in the Section 34 petition. (Para 7, 17, 18 & 20) Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation v. Samir Narain Bhojwani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : AIR 2024 SC 3427 : (2024) 7 SCC 218

Section 34 and 37 - Loss due to idle labor, machinery, etc. - Arbitrator awarded Rs. 5,80,500 to the appellant, relying on the Hudson's formula for on-site establishment expenses. The District Court, under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, upheld the award, stating that the Arbitrator's findings were not irrational or in conflict with public policy. However, the High Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Section 37, examined the contractual provisions and found that the claim was impermissible under the "Special Terms and Conditions" of the contract, which explicitly prohibited claims for idle labor or machinery. The High Court overruled the Arbitrator's decision, stating that the contract terms should have been properly considered, and its conclusions were upheld by the higher court. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's decision, affirming that the contract terms must guide the award and that no amount can be granted for idle labor or machinery in violation of the contract. (Para 7) Pam Developments v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 613

Section 37 - Interest on delayed payments of running account (RA) bills - Arbitrator awarded Rs. 54,84,024 with an interest rate of 12% p.a. to the appellant, holding that the delay in payments led to "blocked capital," entitling the claimant to compensation. The District Court upheld the Award. However, the High Court, under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, set aside the Award, questioning the Arbitrator's analysis of the payment timelines and contract terms. The High Court held that the Arbitrator failed to address key issues such as the timing of bill preparation and entitlement to interest. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court restored the Arbitrator's Award, finding no fault in the Arbitrator's reasoning and ruling that the High Court's interference was unwarranted. The Court reiterated that the scope of interference under Section 37 is limited and found that the Award was neither perverse nor in conflict with public policy. (Para 8) Pam Developments v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 613

The initiation of arbitration and criminal proceedings under Section 138 are separate and independent proceedings that arise from two separate causes of action. Therefore, the institution of the proceedings under Section 138 does not imply a 'continuing cause of action' for the purpose of initiating arbitration. (Para 9) Elfit Arabia v. Concept Hotel BARONS Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 494

Armed Forces

Civilian Killings - FIR and subsequent proceedings quashed due to absence of mandatory sanction under Section 6 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), 1958. Rabina Ghale v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 707 : AIR 2024 SC 4547

Atomic Energy Act, 1962

The petitioner, a physicist and Indian citizen residing in the US, sought a license for his technology designed to trigger nuclear fission for clean energy production with reduced radioactive waste compared to traditional fusion reactors. The petitioner contended that the Atomic Energy Act, 1962, unduly restricts the involvement of private entities in the licensing process for nuclear power. The relevant provision, Section 14 of the Act, prohibits the acquisition, production, possession, use, or disposal of prescribed substances and equipment related to atomic energy without a license, which is generally granted only to government bodies or institutions. Held, the provisions of the 1962 Act were enacted for the welfare of the people of India and to ensure strict control over nuclear energy to prevent misuse and accidents. These provisions were not arbitrary and did not infringe upon the petitioner's fundamental rights. Sandeep T.S. v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 711

Auction

Blacklisting of an entity amounts to 'civil death', must be justifiable and proportionate. Blue Dreamz Advertising Pvt. Ltd. v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 559 : AIR 2024 SC 4183

Transferring public property at nominal price arbitrary; states' right can be sold only by auction/transparent process. City Montessori School v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 545

Bail

Accused in custody can seek anticipatory bail for another case. Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 675

Accused need not furnish multiple sureties against multiple bail orders - Courts can do away with the condition of local surety if its insistence delays the release of the accused from jail and renders the bail order ineffective. Girish Gandhi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : AIR 2024 SC 4396

An order granting a stay to the operation of the order granting bail during the pendency of the application for cancellation of bail should be passed in very rare cases. (Para 11) Parvinder Singh Khurana v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : AIR 2024 SC 3572 : 2024 CriLJ 3652

Bail cannot be denied on the ground that trial is expedited. Rup Bahadur Magar @ Sanki @ Rabin v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 656

Higher thresholds for granting bail in stringent penal statutes like the PMLA, UAPA, and NDPS Act cannot be a tool to keep an accused incarcerated without trial. V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 750

If an accused approaches the High Court directly without first seeking relief from the Trial Court, it is generally appropriate for the High Court to redirect them to the Trial Court at the threshold. Nevertheless, if there are significant delays following notice, it may not be prudent to relegate the matter to the Trial Court at a later stage. Bail being closely tied to personal liberty, such claims should be adjudicated promptly on their merits, rather than oscillating between courts on mere procedural technicalities. (Para 45) Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 694

Imposition of a condition for the petitioner to close his YouTube channel as a prerequisite for bail which involved allegations under the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 2002, and the Information Technology Act, 2000. The Court found this condition to be unwarranted and extraneous to the bail decision. Felix Jerald v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 761

Liberty granted to an accused under the order granting bail cannot be lightly and causally interfered with by mechanically granting an ex­parte order of stay of the bail order. (Para 13) Parvinder Singh Khurana v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : AIR 2024 SC 3572 : 2024 CriLJ 3652

Long custody will enure to benefit of accused for bail when delay in trial isn't his fault. Modh. Enamul Haque v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 740

Matrimonial Disputes - Condition that the husband must fulfill all the physical and financial requirements of the wife. Held, Such an impracticable requirement infringes on personal liberty and the right to dignity. Bail conditions should be reasonable and proportionate, particularly in matrimonial disputes, to allow the accused to comply and foster reconciliation between the parties. (Para 8) Sudeep Chatterjee v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 540

Once a court concludes that an accused is entitled to bail, the implementation of the bail order cannot be postponed. Such a postponement would violate the accused's fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Jitendra Paswan Satya Mitra v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 655

Pre-trial process itself shall not become a punishment - the Supreme Court set aside a bail condition to the effect that the bail bonds be furnished by the accused after completion of 6 months in custody from the date of the order. The condition in effect put on hold the implementation of the bail order for six months. Vikash Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 688

Special courts power to grant bail in cases of inordinate delay – If a bail application is made to the Special Court with a grievance regarding inordinate delay in the disposal of pending cases, the Special Court will be empowered to exercise power to grant bail. (Para 11.1) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : AIR 2024 SC 3418 : (2024) 8 SCC 415 : 2024 CriLJ 3297

The Court dealing with the application for cancellation of bail can always ensure that notice is served on the accused as soon as possible and that the application is heard expeditiously. An order granting bail can be stayed by the Court only in exceptional cases when a very strong prima facie case of the existence of the grounds for cancellation of bail is made out. The prima facie case must be of a very high standard. (Para 12) Parvinder Singh Khurana v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : AIR 2024 SC 3572 : 2024 CriLJ 3652

The High Court took notice of the fact that the petitioner had been in custody since 11th May 2022, and only one witness had been examined so far. In such circumstances, the High Court deemed it fit to order the release of the petitioner on bail, but only for a period of two months. Held, it is an incorrect order. If the High Court was of the view that the petitioner's right to a speedy trial had been infringed, then the High Court should have ordered the release of the petitioner on bail pending the final disposal of the trial itself. There was no good reason for the High Court to limit the period of bail. (2 - 5) Kishor Karmakar v. State of Odisha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 436

The High Court ordered the release of the petitioner on bail, but subject to the condition that the surety shall be the victim. It is the case of the petitioner that it was practically impossible to ask the victim to stand as a surety. In such circumstances, the petitioner preferred an application seeking modification of the condition. The modification application was rejected by the High Court. In such circumstances, the petitioner is before the Supreme Court. Held, it is very unfortunate to note that because of such an absurd condition imposed by the High Court, the petitioner, although ordered to be released on bail way back in July 2023, is still languishing in jail. The condition imposed by the High Court requiring the victim to stand as a surety is stayed from its operation. The petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to the terms and conditions that the trial court may deem fit to impose. (Para 2 - 9) Sharwan Kumar Yadav @ Sharwan Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 435

The maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel a person to do the impossible) emphasized in relation to onerous bail conditions. A court should not impose conditions that are impracticable or impossible for the accused to comply with, particularly in cases of anticipatory bail. (Para 1) Sudeep Chatterjee v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 540

The Supreme Court granted bail to Trinamool Congress (TMC) leader Anubrata Mondal in the case registered by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in relation to an alleged India-Bangladesh border cattle smuggling scam stating that the "trial is unlikely to commence soon". However, Mondal will remain in jail as he was arrested by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) which is also investigating the matter along with CBI. Anubrata Mondal @ Kesto v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 528

Travesty of justice if a prisoner can't get benefit of bail order due to inability to furnish local surety. Ramchandra Thangappan Aachari v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 715

To avoid trial process itself being the punishment' : Supreme Court grants bail to undertrial; reaffirms right to speedy trial. Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 680

When an application for cancellation of bail is filed, the High Court or Sessions Court should be very slow in granting drastic interim relief of stay of the order granting bail. (Para 10) Parvinder Singh Khurana v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : AIR 2024 SC 3572 : 2024 CriLJ 3652

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

Section 72(1) - Unauthorized dissemination of the identity and graphic content related to a murder and alleged rape case - The Court reiterated its directives established in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703 emphasizing the necessity to protect the identity of victims of sexual violence and the prohibition against media exposure of such identities. In light of these violations, the Court issued an injunction ordering the immediate removal of all references, photographs, and video clips of the deceased from social media and electronic platforms. Kinnori Ghosh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 590

Section 479 - Maximum period for detaining undertrial prisoners - Implementation of - Inhuman conditions in prisons - The Court directed that this provision, which allows for the release of first-time offenders who have served one-third of the maximum imprisonment period, shall apply to all undertrials regardless of when their cases were registered. The Court mandated the Superintendents of Jails across India to expedite the processing of applications for bail based on this new legislation within two months. Additionally, it ordered State Governments and Union Territories to submit comprehensive affidavits detailing the number of undertrials eligible for release, applications made, and actual releases. Re-Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons v. Director General of Prisons, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 632

Section 483(3) - Bail - Cancellation of - As a normal rule, the ex-­parte stay of the bail order should not be granted. The said power can be exercised only in rare and very exceptional cases where the situation demands the passing of such drastic order. Where such a drastic ex­-parte order of stay is passed, it is the duty of the Court to immediately hear the accused on the prayer for continuation of the interim relief. When the Court exercises the power of granting ex-­parte ad interim stay of an order granting bail, the Court is duty bound to record reasons why it came to the conclusion that it was a very rare and exceptional case where a drastic order of ex-­parte interim stay was warranted. (Para 20) Parvinder Singh Khurana v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : AIR 2024 SC 3572 : 2024 CriLJ 3652

Section 483(3) - Bail - Cancellation of - In an application made under Section 439(2) of the CrPC or Section 483(3) of the BNSS or other proceedings filed seeking cancellation of bail, the power to grant an interim stay of operation of order to bail can be exercised only in exceptional cases when a very strong prima facie case of the existence of the grounds for cancellation of bail is made out. While granting a stay of an order of grant of bail, the Court must record brief reasons for coming to a conclusion that the case was an exceptional one and a strong prima facie case is made out. (Para 20) Parvinder Singh Khurana v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : AIR 2024 SC 3572 : 2024 CriLJ 3652

Bifurcation

Employees of the Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC), who were appointed at regional levels in areas which formed part of the State of Telangana, will continue as employees of the Telangana State Road Transport Corporation (TSRTC), which is the successor corporation following the bifurcation of the State of AP. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. V.V. Bramha Reddy, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 665

Building

Recover compensation from officers who demolished buildings ignoring status quo order. Ajay Kumar Yadav @ Ajay Rai v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 572

CBI Investigation

The High Court while exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution can entrust investigation to the CBI. However, for doing so, it has to come to a reasoning as to why it finds that investigation by State police is not fair or is partisan. Merely, on the basis of some letters, such exercise is not warranted. Such an exercise of entrusting the investigation by the High Court has to be done in very rare cases. A perusal of the order passed by the learned single judge would reveal that there is not even a whisper as to why it finds the investigation by the state to be unfair or impartial so as to find it necessary to direct an enquiry to be conducted by CBI. For the very same reasons, the order passed by the learned Division Bench is also not sustainable in law. State of West Bengal v. Jashimuddin Mondal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 759

The petitioners, mother and brother of the deceased, who died in 2016 under suspicious circumstances, contended that her death was not a simple case of suicide, as initially reported by the local police. They alleged that respondent No. 7, her husband and a senior judicial officer, influenced the investigation to avoid the registration of an FIR. The appellants sought a fresh investigation, citing six ante-mortem injuries on the deceased's body and suggesting the respondent's influence compromised the initial inquiry. The High Court had dismissed their plea, directing them to pursue alternate remedies under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. However, the appellants argued that, given respondent No. 7's judicial position, they had no hope of an impartial inquiry if overseen by a subordinate magistrate. The Supreme Court, recognizing the serious nature of the allegations and the need to maintain public confidence in judicial impartiality, allowed the appeal. It ordered the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to conduct an independent and thorough investigation, including filing an FIR if warranted, and to submit its report expeditiously. The Court clarified that it had not commented on the merits but emphasized that its observations should not influence the CBI's investigation. The appeal was allowed. Mandakini Diwan v. High Court of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 672

Citizenship Act, 1955

Bail for non-citizens - Supreme Court finds fault with view that accused can be denied bail merely on account of being a foreigner. Onyeka Samuel v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 630

Section 7A - Whether the physical or virtual presence of the estranged husband is mandatory for processing an application for an Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) card. The respondent, an Iranian citizen, applied for an OCI card based on her marriage to an Indian citizen. Due to the estranged relationship between the couple, the husband refused to appear for the required personal interview during the OCI application process. The Delhi High Court, both at the Single Judge and Division Bench levels, dispensed with the need for the husband's presence for the processing of the OCI application. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the Union of India, setting aside the High Court's orders. Held, the physical or virtual presence of the Indian spouse is mandatory for the personal interview as per Clause 21.2.5(vi) of the Visa Manual and the checklist for processing OCI card applications. This requirement was necessary to ascertain the genuineness of the marriage and compliance with statutory provisions under Section 7A of the Citizenship Act. The application must be processed in accordance with the notified procedures, and the High Court's order to dispense with the requirement was legally unsustainable. However, the Court left it open for the Central Government to consider whether the respondent's case fell under "special circumstances" under Section 7A(3) of the Citizenship Act, which could allow the government discretion to waive the requirement. The appeals were allowed, and the High Court's judgments were set aside. Union of India v. Bahareh Bakshi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 638

Section 7A(1)(d) - Physical or virtual presence of the Indian spouse is mandatory to process the application of a foreign national for an Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) card. Union of India v. Bahareh Bakshi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 638

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Courts cannot prepone the date of hearing without giving notice to the other party. Ranjit Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 737

Defendant can cross-examine plaintiff even if suit is proceeding ex-parte against him and written statement isn't filed. Ranjit Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 737

Section 11 – Bar of res judicata – Object of the principle of res judicata is to avoid parties to litigate on the same issue which has already been adjudicated upon and settled. The matter which is directly and substantially in issue in the previous litigation ought not to be permitted to be raised and adjudicated upon in the subsequent suit. Title and possession over the disputed land is claimed – Held, the judgment and order of the previous suit which is final and conclusive, in no specific terms adjudicates upon the right, title and interest of the suit land. The suit, was dismissed simpliciter without adjudication of any rights of the plaintiff-appellant over the suit land vis-à-vis the Cantonment Board. Hence, the principle of res judicata would not be attracted as the issue in the present suit was neither directly or indirectly in issue in the previous suit. The suit is not barred by res judicata. (Para 21, 23, 25) Har Narayan Tewari v. Cantonment Board, Ramgarh Cantonment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 446

Section 11 – Applicability of res judicata between co-defendants – It is a settled law that the principle of res judicata is applicable not only between the plaintiff and the defendants but also between the co-defendants. In applying the principle of res judicata between the co-defendants, primarily three conditions are necessary to be fulfilled, namely, (i) there must be a conflict of interest between the co-defendants; (ii) there is necessity to decide the said conflict in order to give relief to plaintiff; and (iii) there is final decision adjudicating the said conflict. Once all these conditions are satisfied, the principle of res judicata can be applied inter se the co-defendants. Held, there was no conflict of interest between the co-defendants in the earlier Suit. None of the above stated conditions between co-defendants stood fulfilled for applying res judicata. Hence, the principle of res judicata would not be attracted as the there was no conflict of interest between the co-defendants in the said previous suit which if any never came to be adjudicated upon. The suit is not barred under Section 11 CPC. (Para 23 & 25) Har Narayan Tewari v. Cantonment Board, Ramgarh Cantonment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 446

Section 100 – Second appeal – Whether substantial question of law is involved? – Held, the substantial question of law arising in the second appeal was - Whether the suit as setup by the plaintiff-appellant was barred by principle of res judicata in view of the decision in the earlier Suit. (Para 17) Har Narayan Tewari v. Cantonment Board, Ramgarh Cantonment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 446

Order 2 Rule 2 – Bar to subsequent suit on same cause of action – Observing that the suit for recovery of possession is different from the suit for arrears of rent and damages, the Supreme Court held that there's no bar to file a separate suit for arrears of rent and damages after a suit for possession. Held, a plea of a bar under 0. 2. R. 2, Civil Procedure Code can be established only if the defendant files in evidence the pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the Court the identity of the cause of action in the two suits. Hence, both the causes of action being separate, the second suit was clearly maintainable. (Para 17) Uniworld Logistics Pvt. Ltd. V. Indev Logistics Pvt. Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 469

Order 6 - Delay of 17 Years in filing Written Statement – The respondent delayed filing the Written Statement, which led to procedural complications, including the suit being mistakenly marked as disposed of on the High Court's website - Held, Procedural rules should not obstruct substantive justice, particularly when confusion caused by the court's own administrative errors contributed to the delay. (Para 15) PIC Departmentals Pvt. Ltd. v. Sreeleathers Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 580

Order 6 Rule 1 and 2 - Written Statement - A party whose right to file a written statement in a case has been forfeited cannot introduce his case indirectly through evidence or written submission. Such a party can still participate in the proceedings and cross-examine the complainant, but cannot indirectly introduce his case. (Para 18) Kaushik Narsinhbhai Patel v. S.J.R. Prime Corporation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 497 : AIR 2024 SC 3854

Order 6 Rule 17 - By way of an amendment to the Plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC, the plaintiff can introduce certain aspects that are necessary to determine the issues between the parties. Delay occurred in preferring the application to amend the plaint post-commencement of the trial would not have an effect if due diligence was taken. If the aspect introduced by the plaintiff remained undecided, which ought to be decided to determine the issues between the parties, then the delay that occurred in filing an amendment application would not have much relevance. Dinesh Goyal @ Pappu Versus Suman Agarwal (Bindal), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 739

Order 21 Rule 90 - A person aggrieved by an auction sale conducted by the public functionary in gross violations of the mandatory provisions of law cannot be called upon to establish the dual conditions stipulated in Order XXI Rule 90 CPC for setting aside the auction sale. Al-Can Export Pvt. Ltd. v. Prestige H.M. Polycontainers Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 453 : AIR 2024 SC 3907

Order 23 Rule 3 - Compromise of Suit - For a valid compromise in a suit there has to be a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties which would then require it to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. In the present case, neither the compromise deed has been reduced to writing, nor it is recorded by the court. Mere statements of the parties before court about such said compromise, cannot satisfy the requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC. Therefore, the compromise decree is not valid. (Para 20 & 23) Amro Devi v. Julfi Ram, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 482

Order 41 Rule 25 and 27 - Courts at the Appellate stage of civil suits cannot create a new case for the parties while framing such additional issues that were never raised in the pleadings of the parties. Rama Kt. Barman v. Md. Mahim Ali, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 637

Order 41 Rule 25 and 27 - Recovery of Possession - Whether the High Court erred in framing new substantial questions of law at the appellate stage without providing the parties an opportunity to lead evidence on the new issues. Held, the High Court, in allowing the respondents' appeal, had framed additional substantial questions of law, which were neither raised in the lower courts nor supported by evidence. The High Court cannot create a new case for the parties at the appellate stage. As per Order XLI Rule 25 and Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, new issues or evidence may be introduced only after following due procedure. Consequently, the matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The parties were directed to maintain status quo regarding possession of the suit land until the appeal is re-decided by the High Court. Appeal allowed. Rama Kt. Barman v. Md. Mahim Ali, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 637

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Age of the convict at the time of the commission of an offence would be of relevance along with other mitigating circumstances while commuting the sentence of the death penalty. Rabbu @ Sarvesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 730

Court cannot convict one accused and acquit another when similar or identical evidence is pitted against two accused persons. Yogarani v. State by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 731 : AIR 2024 SC 4641

Courts should refrain from ordering further investigation when the party requesting further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC has not whispered about anything new in its evidence and has based its application for further investigation without averring fresh materials. K. Vadivel v. K. Shanthi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 757

Criminal cases cannot be allowed to proceed based on vague and obscure complaints. Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 753

Framing of charge – Requirements – The standard of test and judgment which is finally applied before recording a finding of conviction against an accused is not to be applied at the stage of framing the charge and just a very strong suspicion, based on the material on record, would be sufficient to frame a charge. The strong suspicion should be the one emerging from the materials on record brought by the prosecution. It is within the jurisdiction of the Court concerned to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused concerned has been made out. Held, the question of framing the charge would arise only in a case where the court upon such exercise satisfies itself about the prima facie case revealing from “the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith” against the accused concerned. Hence, the intention embedded is to ensure that an accused will be made to stand the ordeal of trial only if 'the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith' discloses ground for proceeding against him. Further held, there is no ground for a prima facie case revealed from the materials produced by the prosecution. (Para 14, 15, 19 & 32) Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 475 : AIR 2024 SC 3540 : 2024 Cri LJ 3639

Section 41 and 41A - Supreme Court asks Police Chiefs to take action against erring officials for arrests in violation of Section 41/41A Cr.P.C. and Supreme Court guidelines. Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 600

Section 125 – A divorced Muslim woman is entitled to file a petition for maintenance against her ex-husband under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This right of a Muslim woman is in addition to the right under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986. Mohd Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 452 : AIR 2024 SC 3665 : 2024 CriLJ 3460

Section 160 - The proceedings arose from remarks made by the petitioner on social media regarding her exclusion from a decision-making process despite being invited by the Manipur State Transgender Welfare Board. Upon the petitioner expressing regret for her remarks and undertaking not to make similar comments in the future, the Court encouraged the respondent State to show leniency. The Advocate General for Manipur agreed to quash the proceedings, acknowledging the incident as a one-time, bona fide mistake. Consequently, the Court quashed the notice issued under Section 160 Cr.P.C. and all subsequent proceedings. The Writ Petition was disposed of accordingly, with the Court appreciating the State's magnanimity. Thangjam Santa Singh @ Santa Khurai v. State of Manipur, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 752

Section 162 - FIR Manipulation – Investigation Tainted by Delay in FIR Recording – Reiterated that when the police deliberately delay recording the First Information Report (FIR) after receiving information about a cognizable offense, and the FIR is prepared after on-site deliberation, consultation, and discussion, such an FIR cannot be considered the actual FIR but a statement made during the investigation, thereby falling under Section 162 Cr.P.C. Failure to promptly record the FIR raises doubts about the authenticity of the investigation, as it leaves room for fabrication of evidence and false clues. Deliberate delay in FIR registration taints the investigation. FIR prepared after consultation and deliberation is inadmissible as it is hit by Section 162 CrPC. Non-production of the Daily Diary (Roznamcha) can suggest fabrication and concealment of material facts. FIR delayed and investigation tainted. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : AIR 2024 SC 4201

Section 162 - Obligation to Record FIRs - The Court emphasized that police officers must record information about cognizable offenses, regardless of territorial jurisdiction. Refusing to do so constitutes a dereliction of duty. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : AIR 2024 SC 4201

Section 195 Cr.P.C. bar not applicable when forgery was committed on document before it was given as evidence in Court. Arockiasamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 717

Section 202 - Scope of Inquiry - At the stage of the issuing process under Section 202 Cr.P.C., the court is not required to determine whether the accused will ultimately be convicted or acquitted. The inquiry is limited to ascertaining whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding with the case. The Magistrate must focus on the existence of a prima facie case, based on the allegations in the complaint and the evidence presented, without engaging in detailed evaluation of the merits. The accused has no right to be heard at this stage, and the Magistrate's discretion must be judicially exercised. Grounds for quashing the issuance of process include: lack of essential ingredients of the offence, patently absurd allegations, capricious exercise of discretion, or fundamental legal defects in the complaint. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531

Section 202 and 482 - Issuance of Process and Application of Mind by Magistrate - The issuance of summons in a criminal case is a serious matter and cannot be done mechanically. The Magistrate must apply their mind to the facts alleged in the complaint, consider the evidence, and ensure that sufficient grounds exist for proceeding further. This requires a careful evaluation of whether the complaint discloses an offense and whether the accused is prima facie answerable. Vicarious liability of corporate office bearers cannot be assumed unless explicitly provided for in the statute, and direct allegations against them must be demonstrated. The process of summoning can be challenged under Section 482 of CrPC if it is shown that the Magistrate failed to exercise due discretion and formed an opinion without sufficient material. The Magistrate's order must reflect a subjective satisfaction based on proper scrutiny. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531

Section 216 does not give any right to the accused to file a fresh application seeking his discharge after the charge is framed by the court, more particularly when his application seeking discharge under Section 227 has already been dismissed. Unfortunately, such applications are being filed in the trial courts sometimes in ignorance of law and sometimes deliberately to delay the proceedings. Once such applications, though untenable, are filed, the trial courts have no alternative but to decide them, and then again such orders would be challenged before the higher courts, and the whole criminal trial would get derailed. Suffice it to say that such practice is highly deplorable, and if followed, should be dealt with sternly by the courts. (Para 11) K. Ravi v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : AIR 2024 SC 4074

Section 227 - Application of judicial mind at the stage of considering discharge - A judge is required to sift through the evidence presented by the prosecution to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused. The judge must not act merely as a post office for the prosecution but must exercise judicial discretion to determine whether a prima facie case exists. (Para 20) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606

Section 227 - Principles - The judge has the power to sift and weigh evidence to determine if a prima facie case is made out. If the materials disclose a grave suspicion, a charge can be framed; however, mere suspicion or weak evidence would justify a discharge. The judge must avoid conducting a mini-trial and should focus on whether the evidence, taken at face value, presumes an offense has been committed. (Para 20) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606

Section 227 – Discharge of accused in criminal cases – When an application for discharge is filed under Section 227, Cr.PC, the Court concerned is bound to disclose the reason(s), though, not in detail, for finding sufficient ground for rejecting the application or in other words, for finding prima facie case, as it will enable the superior Court to examine the challenge against the order of rejection. (Para 22) Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 475 : AIR 2024 SC 3540

Section 294 - Calling upon the accused to admit or deny the genuineness of the documents produced by the prosecution alongwith the list under Section 294 of Cr.P.C., could not be said to be in any way prejudicial to the right of the accused, nor could it be said to be compelling him to be a witness against himself as contemplated under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. However, the Court deleted the observations made in paragraph 56 of the impugned order, which suggested that deliberate denial of a document's genuineness could be considered an aggravating circumstance during sentencing. The petitioner is allowed to raise all legally permissible contentions during the trial. (Para 2 - 4) Ashok Daga v. Directorate Of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 480

Section 311 - A conjoint reading of Section 311 CrPC and Section 165 of the Evidence Act makes it clear that the trial Court is under an obligation not to act as a mere spectator and should proactively participate in the trial proceedings, so as to ensure that neither any extraneous material is permitted to be brought on record nor any relevant fact is left out. It is the duty of the trial Court to ensure that all such evidence which is essential for the just decision of the case is brought on record irrespective of the fact that the party concerned omits to do so. (Para 48) Gaurav Maini v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 471 : AIR 2024 SC 3601

Section 313 – Conviction of accused challenged on grounds of violation of Section 313 – Section 313 embodies principle of natural justice viz., audi alteram partem, empowering the Court to examine the accused thereunder to give the accused concerned an opportunity to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence. Questioning under Section 313(1)(a), Cr.PC, is discretionary but the questioning under Section 313(1)(b) thereof is mandatory. Held, if a fatal non-compliance in the matter of questioning resulted in 'material prejudice' to any convict in a criminal case, the trial concerning that convict should stand vitiated. The examination of the appellant under Section 313, Cr.PC, reveals that both the incriminating circumstances were not directly or even indirectly put to the appellant while being examined under Section 313, Cr.PC. Held, the twin incriminating circumstances were not put to the appellant while he was being questioned under Section 313, Cr.PC, and they ultimately culminated in his conviction, it is clear that the appellant was 'materially prejudiced' and it had resulted in blatant miscarriage of justice. The failure as above is not a curable defect and it is nothing but a patent illegality vitiating the trial qua the appellant. Hence, the conviction of the appellant could not be sustained. (Para 19, 20, 24 & 26) Naresh Kumar v. State of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : AIR 2024 SC 3233 : 2024 CriLJ 3224

Section 319 - Order to summon additional accused passed after acquittal/conviction of co-accused is unsustainable. Devendra Kumar Pal v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 687

Section 321 – Permission for withdrawal of the prosecution against an accused is challenged – Held, the Trial Court's has taken a casual approach towards the accusations against the then sitting Member of Legislative Assembly in allowing withdrawal of his prosecution and merely because an accused person is elected to the Legislative Assembly cannot be a testament to their image among the general public. Matters of a gruesome crime akin to the double murder in the present case do not warrant withdrawal of prosecution merely on the ground of good public image of an accused named in the charge sheet after thorough investigation. Contrary to the Trial Court's view, such withdrawal cannot be said to be allowed in public interest in cases of involvement of influential people. Hence, it is of paramount importance to ensure progression of the trial without further delay. (Para 12) Shailendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : AIR 2024 SC 3727

Section 357 - The appellant, convicted under Sections 409 and 201 of the IPC and sentenced to four years and six months of rigorous imprisonment, was ordered by the High Court to deposit 50% of the Rs. 2.86 crore compensation to obtain bail and suspension of sentence. The Supreme Court, referencing the principles of Section 357 Cr.P.C. and the case of Dilip S. Dahanukar v. Mahindra Co. Ltd. (2007), found the High Court's condition unjustified and allowed the appeal, removing the requirement to deposit 50% of the compensation. Nikhil v State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 478

Section 374 - When a Court deals with an appeal against an order of conviction, the judgment must contain (i) a concise statement of the facts of the case, (ii) the nature of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defence, if any, (iii) the submissions made by the parties, (iv) the analysis based on the reappreciation of evidence, and (v) the reasons for either confirming the guilt of the accused or for acquitting the accused. The appellate court must scan through the evidence, both oral and documentary, and reappreciate it. (Para 13) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004

Section 374 - After reappreciating the evidence, the appellate court must record reasons for either accepting the evidence of the prosecution or for disbelieving the evidence of the prosecution. The Court must record reasons for deciding whether the charges against the accused have been proved. In a given case, if the conviction is confirmed, the Court will have to deal with the legality and adequacy of the sentence. In such a case, there must be a finding recorded on the legality and adequacy of the sentence with reasons. (Para 13) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004

Section 389 – Suspension of substantive order of sentence of life imprisonment – Held, if a sentence imposed by trial court is for a fixed term, ordinarily, the appellate court may exercise its discretion to suspend the operation of the same liberally unless there are any exceptional circumstances emerging from the record to decline. However, when it is a case of life imprisonment, the only legal test which the Court should apply is to ascertain whether there is anything 'palpable' or 'apparent on the face of the record' on the basis of which the court can come to the conclusion that the conviction is 'not sustainable in law' and that the convict has very fair chances of succeeding in his appeal. Further held, the offence is prima facie established against the appellant before the trial court. Hence, the High Court is at no fault in declining to suspend the substantive order of sentence of life imprisonment. (Para 7 & 8) Bhupatji Sartajji Jabraji Thakor v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 438

Section 401 - Under Section 401 (3) Cr.P.C., the High Court lacks the authority to convert an acquittal into a conviction in revision proceedings. Instead, the High Court should have remitted the matter to the appellate court for re-evaluation. C.N. Shantha Kumar v. M.S. Srinivas, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 660

Section 418 (1) – Proportionality of sentence with respect to the offence committed – To claim enhancement of punishment for conviction for the offence – Held, it is the solemn duty of the Court to strike a proper balance awarding sentence proportionate to the gravity of the offence committed by the accused concerned upon his conviction for serious offence(s). The offence under Section 494 I.P.C., has to be treated as a serious offence, hence, the imposition of 'imprisonment till the rising of the court' is not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule of proportionality. Further held, imposition of sentence of 'imprisonment till the rising of the court' upon conviction for an offence under Section 494 I.P.C., on them was unconscionably lenient or a flea-bite sentence. Hence, it appropriate to use our judicial discretion to modify the sentence imposed under the impugned judgment to six months each, making the nature of the sentence as simple imprisonment for the said period. (Para 14, 15, 17 & 19) Baba Natarajan Prasad v. M. Revathi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : AIR 2024 SC 3348 : (2024) 7 SCC 531 : 2024 Cri LJ 3281

Section 437(3) and Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37 & 52 – Applicability of Section 437(3) in cases of NDPS Act – Once a case is made out for a grant of bail in accordance with Section 37, the conditions of bail will have to be in terms of Section 437(3) of the CrPC. The reason is that because of Section 52 of the NDPS Act, the provisions of the CrPC apply to the arrests made under the NDPS Act insofar as they are not inconsistent with the NDPS Act. (Para 4) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : AIR 2024 SC 3418 : (2024) 8 SCC 415 : 2024 CriLJ 3297

Section 437(3) – Bail – Object of imposing conditions of bail – It is to ensure that the accused does not interfere or obstruct the investigation in any manner, remains available for the investigation, does not tamper with or destroy evidence, does not commit any offence, remains regularly present before the Trial Court, and does not create obstacles in the expeditious conclusion of the trial. (Para 7) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : AIR 2024 SC 3418 : (2024) 8 SCC 415 : 2024 CriLJ 3297

Section 437(3) – Bail conditions – Held, bail conditions cannot be fanciful, arbitrary or freakish and must be within the four corners of Section 437(3). The bail conditions must be consistent with the object of imposing conditions. While imposing bail conditions, the Constitutional rights of an accused, who is ordered to be released on bail, can be curtailed only to the minimum extent required. In case of the accused whose guilt is yet to be established, the presumption of innocence is applicable and such person cannot be deprived of all his rights guaranteed under Article 21. Further held, Courts must show restraint while imposing bail conditions. Hence, while granting bail, the Courts can curtail the freedom of the accused only to the extent required for imposing the bail conditions warranted by law and cannot be so onerous as to frustrate the order of bail itself. (Para 7 & 7.1) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : AIR 2024 SC 3418 : (2024) 8 SCC 415 : 2024 CriLJ 3297

Section 437(3) – Constitution of India; Article 21 – Validity of bail condition – The condition of dropping pin on google map – Bail condition of dropping a PIN on Google Map gives an impression that the condition will enable to monitor the movements of the accused on a real­time basis, which will be violative of the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Held, this cannot be a condition of bail and deserves to be deleted and ordered accordingly. (10, 10.2) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : AIR 2024 SC 3418 : (2024) 8 SCC 415 : 2024 CriLJ 3297

Section 437(3) – Validity of Bail condition – The condition of furnishing certificate of the embassy – It is not necessary that in every case where bail is granted to an accused in an NDPS case who is a foreign national on the ground of long incarceration of more than 50% of the minimum sentence, the condition of obtaining a 'certificate of assurance' from the Embassy/High Commission should be incorporated. It will depend on the facts of each case. Held, grant of such a certificate by the Embassy/High Commission is beyond the control of the accused to whom bail is granted. Therefore, when the Embassy/High Commission does not grant such a certificate within a reasonable time, the accused, who is otherwise held entitled to bail, cannot be denied bail on the ground that such a condition, which is impossible for the accused to comply with, has not been complied with. Hence the condition is deleted. (Para 11.1 & 12) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : AIR 2024 SC 3418 : (2024) 8 SCC 415 : 2024 CriLJ 3297

Section 439 - Bail decisions must consider relevant factors such as the nature of accusations, the accused's role, potential tampering of evidence, and risk of flight. It was held that the learned Single Judge erred by not adequately addressing these factors. Moreover, despite the respondent's six-month incarceration, the economic offense's gravity, involving the siphoning of Society funds affecting numerous individuals, justified canceling bail. The Court underscored that bail orders based on irrelevant or insufficient material are open to interference. Although bail was revoked, the Court granted liberty to the respondent to reapply for bail if circumstances change, ensuring the trial court remains uninfluenced by the present judgment. Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 619 : AIR 2024 SC 4078

Section 439 – To set aside Bail order – Grant of bail in serious offences like murder – The power to grant bail under Section 439 CrPC although is discretionary power of the court, it has to be exercised in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Where a court considering an application for bail fails to consider relevant factors, an appellate court may justifiably set aside the order granting bail. An appellate court is thus required to consider whether the order granting bail suffers from a non-application of mind or is not borne out from a prima facie view of the evidence on record. Held, it is evident that the High Court failed to assign any reasons for the exercise of its discretion in favour of the accused, knowing fully well that he is involved in a serious offence like murder and was absconding for a couple of years. Further held, here an order refusing or granting bail does not furnish the reasons that inform the decision, there is a presumption of the non-application of mind which may require the intervention of this Court. Hence, bail order is set aside. (Para 14 & 16) State of Jharkhand v. Anil Ganjhu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 459

Section 451 - Mines and Minerals Act, 1957 - Proceedings for confiscation - Release of seized vehicle - Keeping a vehicle like a Tipper Lorry idle is not serving anybody's interest. It is resulting in damage to the stationary vehicle which is kept within the Magistrate Court complex. Public spaced is also occupied. (Para 6) Perichi Gounder v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 498

Section 464 - Conviction cannot be challenged based on conversion of charges unless 'failure of justice' is proved. Baljinder Singh @ Ladoo v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 748

Section 482 - FIRs can be quashed even after a charge-sheet is filed if continuing the proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law. Shaileshbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 635

Section 482 - Inherent Jurisdiction of High Court – Scope of Powers - This provision enables the court to quash criminal proceedings at various stages—whether at the stage of issuing process, committal, or framing of charges—prior to the commencement of trial. Quashing should only be exercised with caution. The High Court must ensure that the material produced by the accused is of "sterling and impeccable quality," ruling out the prosecution's case without needing to conduct a trial. This power may be exercised even when a discharge application is pending before a trial court. Further, the court reiterated that the inherent powers under Section 482 can be used by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law or secure the ends of justice. Specifically, criminal proceedings may be quashed if the allegations are absurd, inherently improbable, or based on mala fides. (Para 18) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606

Supreme Court orders CBI inquiry into alleged illegalities in Chandigarh police's arrest of dentist. Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Mohit Dhawan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 601

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed a Transfer Petition seeking to transfer certain criminal proceedings from the State of West Bengal. During the hearing, it was observed that the petition contained disparaging allegations against the judiciary of West Bengal, suggesting a hostile environment in the state's courts. The Court expressed disapproval of such remarks from a central investigative agency. Central Bureau of Investigation v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 732

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order declaring the appellant's petition to quash the First Information Report (FIR) as infructuous following the appellant's arrest. The Court criticized the High Court's approach, stating that the writ petition for quashing the FIR should have been addressed on its merits, regardless of the appellant's detention status. Vidhu Gupta v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 735

There is no prohibition against quashing criminal proceedings even after the charge sheet has been filed. Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 753

While deciding an appeal against the acquittal, it would be impermissible for the Appellate Courts to reverse a well-reasoned judgment rendered by the trial court. A clear finding ought to be recorded by the Appellate Court while reversing the trial court's judgment. Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 718

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974

Section 3 - The High Court had previously dismissed the appellant's writ petition, which claimed that relevant documents were not supplied, impairing the detenue's right to make an effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Held, the grounds for detention were nearly identical to those in a prior case where the High Court quashed the detention orders due to the non-supply of similar documents, particularly WhatsApp chats. The Court emphasized the necessity for judicial discipline and adherence to precedent within the same High Court, ruling that the second Division Bench should have followed the earlier decision. Quashed the detention order and its confirmation, reinstating the rights of the detenue. Shabna Abdulla v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 588

Constitutional Conduct

The Court emphasized the responsibility of all Constitutional functionaries to respect each other's roles and discouraged unwarranted comments, stressing the importance of mutual respect among the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary. Guntakandla Jagadish Reddy v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 733

Constitution of India

Appointment of Vice Chancellors (VC) – Power to decide on dispute regarding appointment of (VC) – Held, in case(s) where the Chief Minister of the State has objected to the inclusion of any name in the panel and such objection is not acceptable to the Chancellor or where the Chancellor has an objection against empanelment of any particular name for which he has assigned his own reasons, all such files shall be put up before the Supreme Court. The final decision in this regard shall be taken by the Supreme Court after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the objectors. (Para 22) State of West Bengal v. Dr. Sanat Kumar Ghosh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 440 : AIR 2024 SC 3319 : (2024) 8 SCC 369

Article 12 and 13 - The Army Welfare Education Society cannot be considered as "State" under Article 13 of the Constitution. The High Court committed an egregious error in entertaining the writ petition filed by the respondents herein holding that the appellant society is a “State” within Article 12 of the Constitution. Undoubtedly, the school run by the Appellant Society imparts education. Imparting education involves public duty and therefore a public law element could also be said to be involved. However, the relationship between the respondents herein and the appellant society is that of an employee and a private employer arising out of a private contract. If there is a breach of a covenant of a private contract, the same does not touch any public law element. The school cannot be said to be discharging any public duty in connection with the employment of the respondents. (Para 42) Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 464

Article 14, 16, and 21 - Reservation for persons with benchmark disabilities, - Fixation of cut-off marks - Horizontal vs. Vertical Reservations - The appellants challenged the recruitment process of 120 posts of Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate initiated by the Rajasthan High Court, contending that the respondents failed to publish cut-off marks for the category of persons with benchmark disabilities in the preliminary examination results. The appellants claimed this omission was discriminatory and violated their fundamental rights and the applicable state rules regarding reservation for persons with disabilities. Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the reservation for persons with benchmark disabilities is treated as an "overall horizontal reservation" and not compartmentalized into specific vertical categories such as SC, ST, or OBC. Candidates with disabilities were required to meet the cut-off marks for the vertical category they applied under. The Court found no statutory mandate requiring separate cut-off marks for the persons with benchmark disabilities in the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010, or the Rajasthan Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2018. The Court reaffirmed that those who participate in a selection process cannot challenge its methodology post-facto upon failing to succeed. Hence, the action of the respondents was not discriminatory or violative of the appellants' fundamental rights. Appeals dismissed. Rekha Sharma v. High Court of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 592 : AIR 2024 SC 4241

Article 14 and 341 - Issue of sub-classification within Scheduled Castes - Sub-classification of Scheduled Castes Permissible - Article 14 allows sub-classification within a class that is not homogenous, provided it meets the intelligible differentia standard. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Article 15(4) and 16(4) - Indra Sawhney Case - Applicability - The principle of sub-classification applies beyond Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and extends to beneficiary classes under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) - In Indra Sawhney, the Court did not restrict sub-classification to Other Backward Classes, but extended it to other beneficiary classes under Articles 15(4) and 16(4). State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Article 16(1), 16(4) and 335 - Efficiency of Administration - Article 335 does not limit sub-classification; rather, it reinforces the importance of inclusion and equality in public services in line with Article 16(1). State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - If the alleged offence is a serious one, it is all the more necessary for the prosecution to ensure that the trial is concluded expeditiously. When a trial gets prolonged, it is not open to the prosecution to oppose bail of the accused-undertrial on the ground that the charges are very serious. Bail cannot be denied only on the ground that the charges are very serious though there is no end in sight for the trial to conclude. (Para 22) Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : AIR 2024 SC 3579 : (2024) 8 SCC 293

Article 21 and Criminal procedure Code, 1973 – Right to a speedy trial – Application for bail on grounds of delay in trial of 4 years – Held, bail is not to be withheld as a punishment – If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime. Further held, the court is inclined to exercise the discretion in favour of the appellant for reasons: (i) The appellant is in jail as an under-trial prisoner past four years; (ii) Till this date, the trial court has not been able to even proceed to frame charge; and (iii) As pointed out by the counsel appearing for the State as well as NIA, the prosecution intends to examine not less than eighty witnesses. As it cannot be assumed by what time the trial will ultimately conclude, howsoever serious a crime may be, an accused has a right to speedy trial as enshrined under the Constitution of India. The appellant is ordered to be released on bail subject to the terms and conditions. (Para 7, 8, 9, 19 & 23) Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 437

Article 32 – Writ petition – Double taxation challenged – Legality of different State Governments levying and collecting Authorization Fee/Border Tax in violation of All India Tourist Vehicles (Permit) Rules, 2023 in question – Held, the State enactments, rules and regulations being not under challenge, it cannot be said that the demand of Border Tax/Authorization Fee at the borders by the respective State Governments is bad under law. The petitioners, in order to succeed, have to first consider challenging the State provision contained in the Act. (Para 10) Muthyala Sunil Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : AIR 2024 SC 3496

Article 32 & 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition in Supreme Court – Held, the petitioners ought to have first approached their jurisdictional High Courts to challenge their respective State enactments. Court is not inclined to enter into the merits of the matter at the present stage. (Para 9 & 10) Muthyala Sunil Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : AIR 2024 SC 3496

Article 131 - Scope of - Explained - CBI under administrative control and superintendence of Union Govt. - The State's suit against the Union over the registration of cases by the CBI despite revocation of its general consent is maintainable. State of West Bengal v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 451

Article 136 - Extraordinary Powers of the Supreme Court - Article 136 of the Constitution confers plenary and extraordinary powers upon the Supreme Court, enabling it to interfere in any judgment, decree, or order passed by any court or tribunal in India. Unlike statutory appellate powers, Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal but provides discretionary authority to address exceptional cases where substantial injustice or a significant question of law arises. These powers are not bound by procedural limitations. This jurisdiction, though wide, is sparingly exercised, especially in matters where grave miscarriage of justice is evident. Article 136 acts as a corrective and protective jurisdiction, with the Court exercising its discretion to uphold justice, maintain legal consistency, and safeguard fundamental rights. (Para 19) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606

Article 136 - The Supreme Court's powers under Article 136 are plenary and extraordinary, unfettered by statutory provisions and distinct from ordinary appellate powers. The jurisdiction under Article 136 is invoked in cases of grave injustice or substantial legal questions of public importance, even extending to the correction of factual errors where lower courts have acted perversely or improperly. This discretionary power, exercisable by special leave, is not restricted by procedural limitations and can be invoked by private parties as well as the State. (Para 19) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606

Article 136 - The Court has emphasized the need for this power to be exercised sparingly, only in exceptional circumstances, to ensure justice is upheld and miscarriage of justice is prevented. It is a corrective and supervisory jurisdiction aimed at maintaining consistency in legal precedents and safeguarding the rights and liberties of individuals. The inherent limitations are self-imposed and exercised with judicial discretion to avoid arbitrary decisions. (Para 19) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606

Article 142 – Action of forfeiture of security deposit is challenged to be punitive – Claiming re-commencement of the e-auction process on grounds of bona fide mistake – Held, the system pop-up gives only one option to the bidder to submit the bid with the digital signature with no scope of rectification or retraction. There was no opportunity available on the platform for the appellant to rectify the error in the bid, having once entered it. Even if the bidder had realized that the bid amount requires to be rectified, it could not have done so because of the system not permitting such a course. Further held, it can be inferred from the circumstances that the mistake in entering the bid was committed inadvertently and the appellant on discovery of the error or mistake acted promptly in informing the authority concerned for rectification of the bid. Held, applying the balancing test to the factual matrix of the present case, it is clear that the forfeiture of entire security deposit of the appellant as against evident human error is punitive. (Para 10, 14, 21) Omsairam Steels & Alloys Pvt. Ltd. v. Director of Mines and Geology, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 477

Article 142 – Negligence in competitive bidding process – E-auction in process was a competitive bidding process which demanded a high degree of caution and care on the part of the appellants. The human error envinces a degree of remiss and carelessness the result of which is bound to cost the public exchequer heavily in terms of time, effort and expense. Held, on account of the appellant's failure to act with the required degree of care, the liberty granted to conduct fresh e-auction is confirmed. Hence, the appellant id directed to pay to the first respondent Rs 3,00,00,000/- (Rupees three crore only) within a month from date. (Para 25) Omsairam Steels & Alloys Pvt. Ltd. v. Director of Mines and Geology, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 477

Article 142 – Power to constitute Search­cum­Selection Committee for selection of VC– Held, to do complete justice the Supreme Court may pass a common order for constitution of Search­cum­Selection Committee for all the subject Universities. Further held, the court resolves to constitute Search­cum­Selection Committee(s) of the same composition so as to avoid any confusion, irrespective of the fact that the relevant provision of the Statute of the concerned University may contain slight variations. While shortlisting the experts for composition of the Search­cmSelection Committee, the nature of subjects and disciplines in which education is being imparted in different Universities can be focused on. (Para 10 & 11) State of West Bengal v. Dr. Sanat Kumar Ghosh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 440 : AIR 2024 SC 3319 : (2024) 8 SCC 369

Article 163 and 239AA(4) - Delhi Lt. Governor position not akin to that of a State's Governor - There is a clear distinction between the discretionary power of the Governor under Article 163 and that of the Lt. Governor under Article 239AA(4). While Article 163 requires Governor of a State to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, 'except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion', the exception in so far as the Lt. Governor, under Article 239AA(4) is concerned, he will act in his discretion, 'in so far as he is required by or under any law'. Article 239AA of the Constitution takes into account the unique position of NCTD and therefore adopts the mandate of 'law' as a distinct feature for exercise of discretion". Govt of NCT of Delhi v. Office of Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 551

Article 225 and 329(a) - Judicial review in delimitation matters is not completely barred by Article 329(a) of the Constitution. Constitutional courts can intervene under Article 226 if the delimitation process is found to be arbitrary or unconstitutional. Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 556

Article 341 – Power to amend list of schedule caste – The list of scheduled caste can be amended, altered only by law made by Parliament. The Resolution extending benefit of Scheduled Castes to the members of the “Tanti-Tantwa” community by merging it with 'Pan, Sawasi, Panr' community under Entry 20 of the list of Scheduled Castes, was patently illegal, erroneous as the State Government had no competence/ authority/power to tinker with the lists of Scheduled Castes published under Article 341 of the Constitution. “TantiTantwa” Caste, which does not appear in the list of Scheduled Castes of Bihar cannot be issued Scheduled Castes Certificates treating them to be 'Pan, Sawasi, Panr'. Hence, whether synonymous or not, any inclusion or exclusion of any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within the castes, races or tribes has to be, by law made by the Parliament, and not by any other mode or manner. Further held, that that such posts of the Scheduled Castes Quota which had been filled up by members of “Tanti-Tantwa” community availing benefit on the basis of Resolution may be returned to the Scheduled Castes category and such candidates of “Tanti-Tantwa” community be accommodated by the State in their original category of Extremely Backward Classes by taking appropriate measures. (Para 2, 3, 36 & 42) Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar Vichar Manch v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 472 : AIR 2024 SC 3531

Article 341 intends to only give 'constitutional identity' to scheduled castes; not to hold them as 'homogenous class'. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Article 341 (1) - Interpretation of - Article 341(1) does not create an integrated homogenous class, as the castes notified by the President are "deemed" to be Scheduled Castes but can be further classified. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Article 341 (2) - Sub-classification within Scheduled Castes does not violate Article 341(2), unless it results in a preference or exclusive benefit to certain castes over all the seats reserved for the class. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Articles 341 and 342 - Validity of Scheduled Caste Certificates - While the appellants had obtained their certificates through lawful processes, subsequent circulars issued by the Government of Karnataka, effectively revoked those certificates and classified the appellants as General Merit category candidates. The court emphasized that only Parliament has the authority to amend the list of Scheduled Castes as stipulated under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution of India. The court acknowledged the pragmatic decision by the State to protect the employment of individuals who obtained their certificates under earlier erroneous inclusions but clarified that they would not be entitled to future benefits from the reserved category. Ultimately, the court quashed the notices issued by respondent banks to terminate the appellants' services, upheld their entitlement to protection based on prior government circulars, and allowed the appeals. K. Nirmala v. Canara Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 618 : AIR 2024 SC 4503

Electoral Bond Scheme - Constitutionality and Investigations - The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the grievances regarding quid pro quo or criminality must be addressed through available legal remedies under the law, such as invoking criminal procedure or approaching the High Courts under Article 226. The Court further declined to order the constitution of an SIT, emphasizing that existing statutory mechanisms, such as the Income Tax Act, must be followed. The Court ruled that premature invocation of its jurisdiction under Article 32 was not warranted when statutory remedies had not yet been exhausted, reiterating that judicial review was reserved for constitutional challenges, not ordinary criminal investigations. Common Cause v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 567

Reserved category candidate can claim general category seat of horizontal reservation based on merit. Ramnaresh @ Rinku Kushwah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : AIR 2024 SC 4252

Social Heterogeneity of Scheduled Castes - Historical and empirical evidence shows that Scheduled Castes are socially heterogeneous. Therefore, the State can classify them further if there is a rational principle with a clear nexus to the purpose of sub-classification. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Sub-classification within Scheduled Castes is permissible to ensure substantive equality of opportunity, provided it is based on backwardness and inadequate representation. The decision in Chinnaiah that barred sub-classification within Scheduled Castes is overruled. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Sub-classification within Scheduled Castes - Data Collection and Representation - The State can sub-classify based on inadequate representation, provided backwardness is established through data. The State must collect data on inadequate representation in public services, which can serve as an indicator of backwardness. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Consumer

Flat possession offered without completion and firefighting certificates - Supreme Court asks developer to compensate buyer. Dharmendra Sharma v. Agra Development Authority, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 703

Revocation of power of attorney executed between landowners and builder for developing their land would not absolve the landowners from being jointly and severally liable along with the builder in a consumer case for deficiency of service. Akshay v. Aditya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 658

Right to file written statement couldn't be foreclosed if the complaint's copy wasn't supplied to the opposite party. Ricardo Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Ravi Kuckian, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 744

Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Section 2(1)(d) – Purchase for “commercial purpose” – Ordinarily “commercial purpose” is understood to include manufacturing/industrial activity or business-to-business transactions between commercial entities. Further, the purchase of the goods should have a close and direct nexus with a profit generating activity. If it is found that the dominant purpose behind purchasing the goods was for the personal use and consumption of the purchaser and/or their beneficiary, or was otherwise not linked to any commercial activity, the question of whether such a purchase was for the purpose of “generating livelihood by means of self-employment” need not be looked into. Held, the appellants had failed to prove that the dominant purpose or dominant use of the car in question was for commercial purpose or that the purchase of the car had any nexus or was linked with any profit generating activity of the respondent company. (Para 16 & 29) Daimler Chrysler India Pvt. Ltd. v. Controls & Switchgear Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 447 : AIR 2024 SC 3619

Section 2(1)(r) – “Unfair trade practice” – A trade practice which for the purpose of promoting the sale of any goods by adopting deceptive practice like falsely representing that the goods are of a particular standard, quality, style or model, would amount to “unfair trade practice”. Held, incomplete disclosure or non-disclosure of the complete details with regard to the functioning of the airbags at the time of promotion of the car, has rightly been considered by the National Commission as the “unfair trade practice” on the part of the appellants, and awarded compensation towards it. The National Commission also rightly awarded compensation towards the deficiency in service on account of the frontal airbags of the car having not deployed at the time of accident. Further held, since the National Commission has considered in detail the evidence and the material on record adduced by the both the parties, the judgment passed does not warrant any interference. (Para 37, 38 & 39) Daimler Chrysler India Pvt. Ltd. v. Controls & Switchgear Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 447 : AIR 2024 SC 3619

Section 13 – Applications to condone delay in filing written statements filed before New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (P) Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 757 decision cannot be summarily rejected. Dr. Vijay Dixit v. Pagadal Krishna Mohan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 625

Consumer Protection Act, 2019

Section 2 (7) of the Act defines “consumer” to mean any person who buys any goods for a consideration but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose. Therefore, purchase and sale of goods for resale or for commercial purpose is excluded from the purview of the definition of “consumer”. (Para 14) Omkar Realtors and Developers v. Kushalraj Land Developers, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : AIR 2024 SC 4024

Section 2 (7) - A company purchasing a flat for residential use of its director and family can be a "consumer". Omkar Realtors and Developers v. Kushalraj Land Developers, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : AIR 2024 SC 4024

Section 2(7), Section 67 — Definition of "Consumer" — Real estate purchase for residential use — Double allotment — Deficiency in service — Refund with compensation - The respondent, a real estate company, booked a flat in the appellant's project for residential use by one of its directors. Due to double allotment of the same flat and failure to arrange necessary funds, the respondent declined possession, leading to the appellant's cancellation of the allotment and forfeiture of the deposited amount. The respondent sought a refund, alleging deficiency in service and unfair trade practices. The NCDRC held that the respondent was a "consumer" under Section 2(7) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, as the purchase was for personal residential use and not for commercial purposes. Held, the NCDRC's decision, finding that the appellant's actions, including the double allotment and cancellation of the booking before resolving the dispute, amounted to a deficiency in service. The Court also confirmed the order directing the appellant to refund the deposited amount with compensation, and dismissed the appeal. Omkar Realtors and Developers v. Kushalraj Land Developers, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : AIR 2024 SC 4024

Double allotment of a flat constitutes a deficiency in service, and the cancellation of the allotment without resolving such issues is unjustified. The appellant was directed to refund the amount along with compensation, with a timeline for repayment. Omkar Realtors and Developers v. Kushalraj Land Developers, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : AIR 2024 SC 4024

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

A Police Inspector and a Chief Judicial Magistrate from Gujarat guilty of Contempt of Court for arresting and remanding an accused ignoring an interim anticipatory bail order passed by the Supreme Court. Tusharbhai Rajnikantbhai Shah v. Kamal Dayani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 557

Appeal under Section 19 maintainable against directions regarding merits of dispute even if there is no punishment order. Ajay Kumar Bhalla v. Prakash Kumar dixit, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 550

Enforcement of Judicial Orders - Willful Disobedience - Deliberate non-compliance with a judicial directive to vacate premises following an eviction order. The petitioner, landlord of the premises, had secured a decree for eviction on grounds of bona fide need and non-payment of rent, which was upheld at the appellate levels. Despite the Supreme Court granting nine months' time for compliance upon dismissal of the respondent's Special Leave Petition, the respondent failed to vacate or submit an undertaking as ordered. The Court observed repeated attempts by the contemnor to delay compliance, including filing unwarranted review petitions and obstructing warrant service through misleading conduct. The Court held that willful non-compliance erodes judicial authority, diminishes public confidence, and undermines the rule of law. Recognizing the respondent's deliberate disregard for its order, the Court found him guilty of contempt but, in the interest of justice, allowed a final extension of one week to vacate the premises. Sitaram Enterprises v. Prithviraj Vardichand Jain, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 702

Section 20 - the action for contempt should be brought within a year, and not beyond, from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. (Para 56) S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : AIR 2024 SC 3738

Supreme Court accepts Magistrate's apology for remanding accused violating sc order - Imposes Rs. 25k fine on police officer. Tusharbhai Rajnikantbhai Shah v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 673

Supreme Court “showing magnanimity” closes contempt proceedings against an official for false affidavit, imposes Rs. 5 lakh cost on State. Ashok Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 768

The compliance of an order under threat of contempt cannot take away the right of the party to challenge the same order. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kopparla Santhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 516

The power of contempt should be applied cautiously and sparingly, ensuring that it is invoked only when actions obstruct justice, undermine the law's majesty, or diminish public confidence in the judicial system. The judgment reiterates that contempt proceedings are sui generis, not governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure or strict rules of evidence, yet must adhere to principles of fairness, allowing the alleged contemnor an opportunity to present their case. The court cites various precedents stressing that contempt jurisdiction exists to protect the integrity of the judiciary rather than individual judges and must be exercised judiciously, demanding a high standard of proof akin to criminal proceedings. (Para 22 - 29) In Re: Patanjali Ayurved Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 573 : AIR 2024 SC 3978

The expression "wilful disobedience," as defined in Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, pertains to civil contempt, which involves (1) a judgment, decree, order, writ, or other court process, and (2) intentional disobedience of such court mandates. This definition delineates two categories of contempt: (a) wilful disobedience to court orders, which encompasses any order without distinction between adjudicated and consent orders, and (b) wilful breach of an undertaking given to the court, which is treated distinctly from compromises between parties. Courts have emphasized that "wilfulness" denotes intentional, voluntary actions done with bad purpose, excluding involuntary or negligent actions. Therefore, to establish civil contempt, it must be shown that the disobedience or breach was intentional, reflecting a conscious disregard of the law, thus upholding the sanctity of judicial proceedings and the rule of law. The court must also consider the specific circumstances surrounding the alleged contempt to determine the presence of wilfulness. (Para 30 - 39) In Re: Patanjali Ayurved Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 573 : AIR 2024 SC 3978

The term "undertaking," while not explicitly defined in the relevant Act, carries significant weight in contempt proceedings. It is understood as a promise or engagement, often made by a party or their counsel in the context of legal proceedings, that can be enforced similarly to an injunction. Definitions from legal dictionaries highlight that an undertaking does not require consideration and represents a commitment made to secure concessions from the court or the opposing party. Importantly, courts have asserted that if a party's actions convey the impression of providing an undertaking, they will be bound by it, irrespective of any subjective belief that they were not giving one or that their intentions were misunderstood. This underscores the seriousness and enforceability of undertakings within legal contexts. (Para 40 - 42) In Re: Patanjali Ayurved Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 573 : AIR 2024 SC 3978

The distinction between qualified and unconditional apologies in contempt proceedings is critical. A proper apology must be unconditional, demonstrating genuine contrition rather than serving as a tactical maneuver to evade consequences. The court emphasizes that apologies cannot coexist with justifications; they must reflect true remorse. The court assesses the sincerity of an apology based on the contemnor's behavior before and after the apology, the timing of its presentation, and whether it serves to uphold or undermine judicial authority. Apologies lacking genuine contrition or offered at a late stage—often as a strategy to avoid punishment—are typically rejected. Ultimately, the court retains discretion to refuse any apology that does not meet these stringent criteria, emphasizing that an apology is not a blanket excuse for contemptuous actions. (Para 43 - 50) In Re: Patanjali Ayurved Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 573 : AIR 2024 SC 3978

Contract

The sanctity of contracts is a fundamental principle that underpins the stability and predictability of legal and commercial relationships. When public authorities enter into contracts, they create legitimate expectations that the State will honour its obligations. Arbitrary or unreasonable terminations undermine these expectations and erode the trust of private players from the public procurement processes and tenders. Once a contract is entered, there is a legitimate expectation that the obligations arising from the contract will be honoured and that the rights arising from it will not be arbitrarily divested except for a breach or non-compliance of the terms agreed thereunder. (Para 127) Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour v. Chief Executive Officer, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 455 : AIR 2024 SC 3784

Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005

A statutory body like the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) cannot invoke Article 32 to seek a writ petition for enforcement of fundamental rights, as Article 32 is primarily intended for citizens. Reliefs sought by the petitioner were dismissed as they were deemed vague and beyond the scope of the statutory functions of the NCPCR under the 2005 Act. National Commission for Protection of Child Rights v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 763

Companies Act, 2013

Company Law Tribunals can exercise powers of rectification of the register of members under Companies Act 2013 if the applicant was a victim of an 'open-and-shut' case of fraud by his opponents. Chalasani Udaya Shankar v. Lexus Technologies, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 681

Court Martial

When reasons aren't recorded to appoint a junior officer as judge advocate, court martial proceedings stand invalidated. Union of India v. Lt. Col. Rahul Arora, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 677 : AIR 2024 SC 4427

Criminal Jurisprudence

Howsoever stringent the penal law may be, the over-arching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly. (Para 20) Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 437

The presumption of innocence comes to an end when an accused is put to trial and is held guilty of the offence with which he is charged. (Para 6) Bhupatji Sartajji Jabraji Thakor v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 438

Criminal Trial

The Supreme Court expressed concern that despite the decision of the Constitution Bench in High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P. & Ors. 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177, High Courts were issuing directions for expeditious trials without considering the existing pendency of criminal cases in the State of Bihar. Santosh Kumar @ Santosh v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 505

Custodial Death

Supreme Court delivers split verdict on police officers' convictions in decades-old custodial death case. Manik v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 747

Customs Act, 1962

Importer would be liable to pay customs duty in addition to fines and other charges upon redeeming the confiscated goods. Navayuga Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 504 : AIR 2024 SC 4470

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) alleged that between 2001 and 2004, the Appellant-Company colluded with Kandla Special Economic Zone (KASEZ) officials to evade countervailing duty (CVD) by declaring the invoice value instead of the maximum retail price (MRP), causing an alleged loss of 8 crore to the government. The Appellant-Company contended it had complied with legal requirements, paid refundable amounts, and received immunity from the Settlement Commission. However, the Special Judge (CBI) and the High Court rejected the company's discharge applications. The company appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing immunity and lack of fiscal liability. The Supreme Court ruled in the company's favor, stating that the prosecution was improper since immunity had been granted and no fiscal liability was established. The Court noted that the Customs Appeals Commissioner had already confirmed CVD on invoice value, not MRP, entitling the company to a refund. Consequently, the Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings, labeling further prosecution as an abuse of process. Baccarose Perfumes and Beauty Products v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 667

Debts Recovery

Supreme Court criticizes finance ministry for treating debts recovery tribunal as “subordinate department”, seeks explanation. Superwhizz Professionals Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 764

Defamation

Supreme Court sets aside Delhi High Court Order quashing summons to 'the Wire' in ex-JNU Professor's criminal defamation case. Amita Singh v. Wire, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 534

Delay

Delay in filing an application should be condoned if it has been sufficiently explained, regardless of the length of the delay. Mool Chandra v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 552 : AIR 2024 SC 4046

Demolition

Alleged involvement in crime no ground to demolish legally constructed property, such demolitions against rule of law. Javedali Mahebubmiya Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 691

Disability

Persons With Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection Of Rights And Full Participation) Act, 1995; Section 33 – Exemption of posts from application of reservation - IRS (C&E) and IRS (IT) posts were excluded from the reservation for the VI category – Held, a notification excluding these two categories for VI category candidates has not been issued in terms of the proviso to Section 33 of the PWD Act, 1995. Therefore, in absence of such a notification, the reservation will have to be provided to the VI category candidates in these two categories as well. (Para 10) Union of India v. Pankaj Kumar Srivastava, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 444

Persons With Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection Of Rights And Full Participation) Act, 1995; Section 36 – Vacancies not filled up to be carried forward –Respondent no.1 has been made to run from pillar to post to get an appointment, though there is a large backlog of vacancies in various PWD categories. The appellant has taken a stand which defeats the very object of enacting laws for the benefit of persons with disability. Held, by applying the principles governing Section 36 of the PWD Act, 1995, the cases of respondent no.1 and the other 10 candidates who are above him in merit could have been considered, especially when there is a gross default on the part of the appellant (Union of India) in promptly implementing the provisions of the PWD Act, 1995. Hence, it is a fit case to exercise jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Respondent shall be considered for appointment against the backlog vacancies of PWD candidates either in IRS (IT) or in other service/branch. (Para 9, 14 & 15) Union of India v. Pankaj Kumar Srivastava, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 444

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - Need for inclusive and respectful portrayal of persons with disabilities in visual media - Language Sensitivity: Terms that perpetuate negative stereotypes or devalue persons with disabilities, such as "cripple" and "spastic," should be avoided as they contribute to societal discrimination and negative self-image. Accurate Representation: Creators must avoid misleading portrayals of medical conditions, as such representations can perpetuate misinformation and stereotypes. Inclusivity in Representation: Media should portray persons with disabilities as multidimensional individuals with diverse realities, challenges, and successes, moving away from simplistic or "ableist" characterizations. Avoiding Stereotypes: Stereotypical portrayals, such as depicting persons with disabilities as "super cripples" with extraordinary abilities, should be avoided, as they do not reflect the varied experiences of individuals. Participation and Consultation: The principle "nothing about us, without us" should be followed, meaning that persons with disabilities should be actively involved in decision-making processes and consulted in matters affecting them, including the portrayal in visual media. Training and Sensitization: The Court recommended implementing training programs for media professionals to ensure accurate, empathetic, and respectful portrayals of persons with disabilities. Nipun Malhotra v. Sony Pictures Films India Private Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 439 : AIR 2024 SC 3878

Supreme Court directs centre to pay interest on arrears of disability pension to 1971 indo-pak war veteran who lost his right leg. Colonel Mahinder Kumar Engrs (Retd.) v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 769

Doctrines

Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation - Features of - a. First, legitimate expectation must be based on a right as opposed to a mere hope, wish or anticipation; b. Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise either from an express or implied promise; or a consistent past practice or custom followed by an authority in its dealings; c. Thirdly, expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be treated as a legitimate expectation; d. Fourthly, legitimate expectation operates in relation to both substantive and procedural matters; e. Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in the realm of public law, that is, a plea of legitimate action can be taken only when a public authority breaches a promise or deviates from a consistent past practice, without any reasonable basis. f. Sixthly, a plea of legitimate expectation based on past practice can only be taken by someone who has dealings, or negotiations with a public authority. It cannot be invoked by a total stranger to the authority merely on the ground that the authority has a duty to act fairly generally. (Para 48) Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 464

Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation / Promissory Estoppel - In situations, if the previous executive decision is withdrawn, modified or amended in any manner in exercise of legislative power in larger public interest, then the earlier promise upon which the party acts, cannot be enforced as a right and neither can the authorities be estopped from withdrawing its promise, as such an expectation does not give any enforceable right to the party. (Para 27) Rewa Tollway P. Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : AIR 2024 SC 3868

Doctrine of Merger - If Special Leave was not granted and the petition was dismissed by a reasoned or unreasoned order, the order against which such Special Leave Petition is filed would not merge with the order of dismissal. However, once leave has been granted in a Special Leave Petition, regardless of whether such appeal is subsequently dismissed with or without reasons, the doctrine of merger comes into play resulting in merger of the order under challenge with that of the appellate forum, and only the latter would hold the field. Consequently, it is the decision of the superior court which remains effective, enforceable, and binding in the eyes of the law, whether the appeal is dismissed by a speaking order or not. (Para 43) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 481

When can the doctrine of prospective overruling be applied - Explained. Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 577

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961

Section 6 - Stridhan is the exclusive property of the woman, and her father cannot claim recovery of Stridhan from in-laws without explicit authorisation from her. Mulakala Malleshwara Rao v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 621 : AIR 2024 SC 4067

Section 6 - The Supreme Court reiterated that it cannot be assumed that dowry and traditional presents given at the time of marriage are entrusted to the parents-in-law of the bride and would attract the ingredients of Section 6 of the Act. Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act provides that any dowry received by a person other than the woman in connection with her marriage must be transferred to her within the specified period. It further states that such dowry, until transferred, is to be held in trust for the benefit of the woman. Failure to transfer is punishable with imprisonment and/or fine. (Para 15, Referred : Bobbili Ramakrishna Raja Yadad v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2016) 3 SCC 309). Mulakala Malleshwara Rao v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 621

Section 6 - Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 406 - Allegations that the appellants, former in-laws of the complainant's daughter, had not returned the "stridhan" (gifts, including gold ornaments) given at the time of marriage. Key facts include the unsuccessful marriage of the complainant's daughter, her divorce in the U.S. in 2016, and subsequent remarriage in 2018. The complaint, filed in 2021, alleged the failure of the appellants to return the "stridhan." The Supreme Court found no evidence supporting the claim of "stridhan" possession by the appellants, emphasizing that the complainant had no locus standi to initiate proceedings on behalf of his daughter without her express authorization. The Court reiterated established jurisprudence on the absolute ownership of "stridhan" by a married woman and highlighted that delay in filing the FIR raised questions about the complainant's motives. The appeal was allowed, and the proceedings were quashed on the grounds of insufficient evidence, unexplained delay, and abuse of the legal process. Mulakala Malleshwara Rao v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 621

Drugs (Price Control) Order (DPCO), 1995

The intent and purpose thereof are to control the prices at which medicinal drug formulations are made available to the common man by holding out the threat of recovery of the higher prices charged for such drug formulations by those involved in their manufacture and marketing. Given the laudable objective underlying the provision, it cannot be subjected to a restricted or hidebound interpretation. (Para 11) Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 487 : AIR 2024 SC 4317

Education

Even if the function being performed by a private educational institution in imparting education may be considered as a public function, the relationship between the administration of such an institution and its employees remains a contractual one, falling within the ambit of private law. (Para 50) Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 464

Court can't declare equivalence of qualification' - Supreme Court affirms view that B.Sc (Polymer Chemistry) isn't equal to B.Sc (Chemistry). Shifana P.S. v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 553 : AIR 2024 SC 3724 : (2024) 8 SCC 309

New Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC) would not be liable for absorption and payment of benefits to the excess staff of the school run by the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee (DSGMC) on account of the closure of the school done by the DSGMC without the prior approval of the NDMC. As per Rule 46 of the Delhi Education Rules (Rules), it was incumbent upon the DSGMC to get approval from the NDMC before closing the school when the NDMC contributes 95% of the fund amount used for the management of the school. DSGMC's failure to take necessary approval under Rule 46 doesn't shift the responsibility upon the NDMC under Rule 47 to absorb and provide the salary and other benefits of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school run by the DSGMC. New Delhi Municipal Council v. Manju Tomar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 620

MBBS - Supreme Court asks medical students to make deposit towards fee arrears to get original certificates from college. Sahil Bhargava v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 712

MBBS - Supreme Court allows candidate with speech and language disability to pursue medical education. Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770

'National Medical Commission expected to act fairly' - Supreme Court imposes Rs.10 lakh cost on NMC for challenge to medical college's approval. National Medical Commission v. Principal KMCT Medical College, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 704

NEET-UG 24 - Supreme Court rejects plea for retest by candidate suffering from hyper sweating who wasn't allowed handkerchief in exam. Talluri Srikar v. National Testing Agency, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 696

Primary School Teachers - The Supreme Court affirmed the Chhattisgarh High Court's ruling which quashed the appointments of B.Ed. degree holders as primary school teachers, reiterating that the essential qualification is a Diploma in Elementary Education (D.El.Ed). (Para 11) Navin Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 653

The Supreme Court directs IIT to admit dalit student who lost admission due to delay in paying fee. Atul Kumar v. Chairman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 760

The Supreme Court directed all State Governments and Union Territories to implement the “Guidelines on School Safety and Security, 2021” issued by the Union Government to fix responsibility of school management to protect children from natural disasters, health hazards, abuse, violence, and accidents. Bachpan Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 765

Election

Candidate duly elected in democratic process can't be stopped from assuming office. Sandeep Kumar v. Vinod, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 708

Election petition should not be rejected at threshold where there is “substantial compliance” of Representation of the People Act, 1951 provisions. Kimneo Haokip Hangshing v. Kenn Raikhan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 698

Enemy Property Act, 1968

The petitioner challenged an order of the High Court, which had directed that no coercive action be taken until the Municipal Building Tribunal was constituted. The Supreme Court stayed this order and directed the Municipal Corporation and Custodian of Enemy Property to proceed with the identification and demolition of unauthorized constructions. Custodian of Enemy Property for India v. Md. Yakub @ Md. Yakub Ansari, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 719

Environment

Every State organ, especially the ones associated with environment protection such as Chhattisgarh Environment Conservation Board (CECB) must diligently ensure timely compliance with the directions of the National Green Tribunal. P. Arun Prasad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 597

Issues relating to the regulation and oversight of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in India - Judicial Review - Permissibility - The Bench reached a consensus that the decision-making processes of bodies concerned with GMOs are subject to judicial review - Directions Issued. Gene Campaign v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 501

If a Government Department fails to comply with an order of the National Green Tribunal (NGT), the Head of the Department shall be deemed liable for such failure as per section 28 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010. Katiya Haidarali Ahmadbhai v. Sanjeev Kumar IAS, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 713

Issues relating to the regulation and oversight of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in India - Directions - National Policy on GM Crops: The Union of India is directed to formulate a comprehensive National Policy on GM crops concerning research, cultivation, trade, and commerce. This policy must be developed in consultation with relevant stakeholders, including experts in agriculture and biotechnology, state governments, and representatives of farmers. National Consultation: The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC) is instructed to conduct a national consultation within four months to facilitate the development of the National Policy. State governments are to be involved in this process. Verification of Experts: The Union of India must verify the credentials of all experts involved in the decision-making process and address any potential conflicts of interest. Rules with statutory force may be developed for this purpose. Compliance with FSSA, 2006: The Respondent must comply with Section 23 of the Food Safety and Standards Act (FSSA), 2006, regarding the packaging and labeling of GM food, especially GM edible oil. Difference of Opinion on DMH-11 Approval: Given the differing opinions on the conditional approval for the environmental release of GM mustard (DMH-11) by the Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC) and the MoEF, the matter is to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for the constitution of an appropriate Bench for further consideration. Gene Campaign v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 501

NGT has duty to ensure environmental clearance is lawfully granted. Santosh Kumar Singh v. State Level Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 526

Public authorities should take best efforts to reduce trees required to be cut for public projects. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 561

Pollution Control Board - Instead of making an effort to regularly appoint the staff members, the Government seems to have adopted a short cut method of appointing contractual employees. This practice needs to be deprecated. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 510

Supreme Court sets aside NGT orders allowing construction of Tiracol bridge in Goa's querim beach. Goa Foundation v. Goa State Environment Impact Assessment Authority, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 535

The State has the constitutional duty to not only protect water bodies within the state but also to restore those water bodies which have been illegally filled in. Mirza Abid Beg v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 488

The Supreme Court directs NGT to monitor silicosis-prone industries and orders NHRC to oversee compensation processes for affected workers. Peoples Rights and Social Research Centre (PRASAR) v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 560 : AIR 2024 SC 4513

The Supreme Court quashed the National Green Tribunal's order to shut down a Garbage Processing Plant observing that shutting it down will be detrimental to public interest. Pune Municipal Corporation v. Sus Road Baner Vikas Manch, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 692 : AIR 2024 SC 4452

Evidence Act, 1872

A witness who gives an incriminating statement cannot take a shield under proviso of Section 132 of the Evidence Act to claim immunity from prosecution if there exists other substantial evidence or material against him proving his prima facie involvement in the crime. Raghuveer Sharan v. District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 686 : AIR 2024 SC 4390

Credibility of a witness – Statement of witness has substantial variations with his testimony in court, giving rise to doubts as to the veracity of his testimony. Held, the threshold for disbelieving a witness must not be mere discrepancy or inconsistency but material discrepancy and inconsistency, which renders the account narrated by the witnesses so highly improbable that the same may safely be discarded altogether from consideration. Further held, it cannot be expected that all the witnesses, when under attack by the accused persons, possess stellar memories with an accurate recollection of the events. Although, there are a few inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses, they are minor and not substantial, so as to erode the credibility of such witnesses. Hence, the credibility and reliability of the witnesses is unshaken. (Para 13, 15 & 16) Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 448

Confessional statements recorded by the Police Officers which are part of the charge-sheet cannot remain a part thereof and the same must be ignored. Sanju Bansal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 467

Dock Identification – It is an identification made by witness in Court during trial. (Para 12) P. Sasikumar v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 460

Don't accept black and white photographs without permission of court - Supreme court directs registry. Savita Rasiklal Mandan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 682

Eyewitness Testimony – Credibility of Prosecution Witness – FIR Registration Discrepancies – Independent Witness and Police Conduct - The absence of a timestamp on the FIR and its delayed entry into the court record further fueled suspicions that the FIR was a post-investigation document, undermining its credibility. Possible manipulation or concealment of the original complaint by the prosecution. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : AIR 2024 SC 4201

Hostile Witness – A witness cannot be disbelieved on the sole ground of him turning hostile, the hostility of such witness does not particularly dent the prosecution's case. Held, merely because a witness resiled from his statement given to the police, the entire case presented by the prosecution cannot be unreliable. (Para 18) Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 448

Murder Trial - Eyewitness Testimony – Role of Independent Witness in corroborating the prosecution's version of the events - Discussed. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : AIR 2024 SC 4201

Onus of proof – Held, the onus to establish the prejudice or miscarriage on account of non-questioning or inadequate questioning on any incriminating circumstance(s), during the examination under Section 313, Cr.PC, is on the convict concerned. (Para 21) Naresh Kumar v. State of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : AIR 2024 SC 3233 : 2024 CriLJ 3224

Recovery of a bloodstained weapon without connecting evidence is insufficient for conviction. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : AIR 2024 SC 4201

Section 9 – Conviction challenged – On grounds that identification of accused is not correct as the test identification parade (TIP) is not conducted – Where accused is a stranger to a witness and there has been no Test Identification Parade (TIP), the trial court should be very cautious while accepting the dock identification by such a witness. Held, not conducting a TIP was a fatal flaw in the police investigation and in the absence of TIP, the dock identification of the present appellant remains doubtful. The prosecution has not been able to prove the identity of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the appellant could not have been convicted on the basis of a doubtful evidence as to the appellant's identity. Conviction is set aside. (Para 12, 13, 16) P. Sasikumar v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 460

Section 26 - Confessions made by the accused to the medical officer were inadmissible, as they were made while in police custody. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : AIR 2024 SC 4201

Section 27 - Disclosure Statements and Link Evidence – Acquittal – Prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act were not proved as per law, and no credible discovery resulted from them, as the link evidence ensuring safe custody of the recovered articles from seizure until reaching the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) was absent. The investigating officer's testimony on disclosure statements was vague and unacceptable, and the FSL reports were rendered insignificant. The Court set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts due to improper appreciation of evidence and perverse findings. The appellants were acquitted, and their convictions by the Trial Court and High Court were quashed. Appeals allowed. Convictions set aside. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562

Section 106 - Accused can't be asked to discharge burden of proof when prima facie case wasn't established by prosecution. Manharan Rajwade v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 531

Section 106 of the Evidence Act also put burden on the husband who went to sleep with her in the same room, but escaped unscathed to explain as to how the death had occurred as it was within the special knowledge within the meaning of said Section. (Para 8) Damodar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 607

Section 134 – Sole witness – Conviction on grounds of sole witness testimony is challenged – Held, no particular number of witnesses is required, in any case, to prove a fact. It is the quality of evidence and not the quantity that matters. If the evidence of a solitary witness appeals to the court to be wholly reliable, the same can form the foundation for recording a conviction. Hence, the conviction of the appellant does not call for interference based on the sole testimony which is found to be reliable. (Para 17) Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 448

The investigating officer had inspected the house and found no direct material, except some make-up articles. Admittedly, another woman was also residing in the same portion of the house. The High Court did take note of this fact but explained it away by observing that since that woman was a widow, the make-up articles could not have belonged to her as there was no need for her to put on make-up being a widow. In our opinion, the observation of the High Court is not only legally untenable but also highly objectionable. A sweeping observation of this nature is not commensurate with the sensitivity and neutrality expected from a court of law, specifically when the same is not made out from any evidence on record. Be that as it may, mere presence of certain make-up articles cannot be a conclusive proof of the fact that the deceased was residing in the said house, especially when another woman was admittedly residing there. (Para 27 & 28) Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 746

Usually in matters involving criminality, discrepancies are bound to be there in the account given by a witness, especially when there is a conspicuous disparity between the date of the incident and the time of deposition. However, if the discrepancies are such that they create serious doubt on the veracity of a witness, then the Court may deduce and decline to rely on such evidence. This is especially true when there are variations in the evidence tendered by prosecution witnesses regarding the sequence of events as they have occurred. Courts must exercise all the more care and conscientiousness when such oral evidence may lean towards falsely implicating innocent persons. (Para 13, Referred : Andhra Pradesh v. Pullagummi Kasi Reddy Krishna Reddy, (2018) 7 SCC 623. Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 622

Family

Irretrievable breakdown of marriage can't be used to the advantage of the party responsible for collapse of marriage. Prabhavathi @ Prabhamani v. Lakshmeesha M.C., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 643

Maintenance or permanent alimony should not be penal but should be for the purposes of ensuring a decent living standard for the wife. (Para 32) Kiran Jyot Maini v. Anish Pramod Patel, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 485

Natural guardian's right to custody of a child is not lost just because temporary custody was given to a relative. Gautam Kumar Das v. NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 586 : AIR 2024 SC 4029

Supreme Court urges advocates not to file baseless petitions, flags outrageous averments in family law cases. K. Vadivel v. K. Shanthi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 757

Farmer

Shambhu Border Blockade - Supreme Court forms committee to negotiate with protesting farmers. State of Haryana v. Uday Pratap Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 642

Foreigners Act, 1946

Authorities cannot randomly ask people to prove Indian citizenship on mere suspicion without sharing any material. Md. Rahim Ali @ Abdur Rahim v. State of Assam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 462 : AIR 2024 SC 3551

Indian citizenship should not be doubted due to minor variations in name spellings in electoral rolls or govt records. Md. Rahim Ali @ Abdur Rahim v. State of Assam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 462 : AIR 2024 SC 3551

Foreign Judgment

Foreign Judgment that goes against Indian law is not conclusive between parties involved and not binding on the Indian Courts. Rohan Rajesh Kothari v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 579

Foreign Policy

The Supreme Court dismissed a petition seeking the suspension of military exports from India to Israel amidst the ongoing war against Gaza. The Court said that it was beyond its jurisdiction to direct the Government of India to not export materials to any country, as it was a matter which was completely within the domain of foreign policy. Ashok Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 678

Guardians and Wards Act, 1890

'Parties' rights can't override child's welfare' : Supreme Court sets aside High Court Order giving father toddler's custody from maternal relatives. Somprabha Rana v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 666

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Section 13(1)(ib) and 13(1A)(ii) – Divorce petition – A divorce petition can be presented on the ground that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year and more after passing the decree for restitution of conjugal rights – Held, the desertion of the appellant at least from 2008 till the date of filing the divorce petition in 2013 continued without any reasonable cause. Therefore, a decree for divorce on the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) ought to have been passed. It is a case of a complete breakdown of marriage for the last 16 years and more. (Para 14) X v. Y, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 458 : AIR 2024 SC 3228

Sections 24 and 25 - Whether alimony can be granted under Sections 24 and 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, in cases where the marriage has been declared void. The Court noted that different High Court and Supreme Court rulings provided divergent interpretations on the issue, citing several precedents both in favor of and against granting alimony in such circumstances. The matter was referred to a three-judge bench to resolve the conflict and provide clarity on the applicability of Sections 24 and 25 in cases involving void marriages. Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 605

Section 25 – Alimony – Held, the appellant has offered to pay the respondent a lump sum alimony of Rs. 30 lakhs which can be accepted as a one time lump sum alimony. (Para 15) X v. Y, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 458 : AIR 2024 SC 3228

Hospital

Ensure basic safety conditions for doctors pending receipt of National Task Force (NTF) report : Supreme Court to States. In Re : Alleged Rape and Murder of Trainee Doctor, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 594

The Supreme Court holds hospital liable for handing over dead body to the wrong family, allows Rs. 25 lakh compensation. Ernakulam Medical Centre v. Dr. P.R. Jayasree, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 583

Vandalism at the Hospital - Unsafe working conditions of medical professionals, particularly women, in healthcare institutions - Lack of safety protocols in medical institutions, leading to vulnerability of healthcare professionals to violence, including gender-based violence. Unregulated access to sensitive areas of hospitals and insufficient security measures. Insufficient infrastructure, resting spaces, and basic amenities for medical professionals during long shifts. Absence of effective legislation addressing systemic and institutional issues in healthcare safety. The Court constituted a National Task Force (NTF) comprising healthcare professionals and government officials to address the safety and working conditions of medical professionals. The NTF was tasked with formulating recommendations for improving institutional safety, preventing violence, and creating enforceable protocols for the dignified treatment of medical workers. The Court emphasized the need for a national consensus and set guidelines for hospital safety measures, including the installation of security systems, provision of adequate restrooms, and monitoring access to sensitive hospital areas. The Court stressed the urgency of protecting healthcare workers and ensuring safe working conditions in medical institutions. It flagged the systemic failures in safety standards, particularly the vulnerability of women professionals to violence and harassment, and called for immediate remedial actions. In Re : Alleged Rape and Murder of Trainee Doctor, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 585 : AIR 2024 SC 3957

Income Tax Act, 1961

Section 80DD - Deduction in respect of maintenance including medical treatment of a dependent who is a person with disability - Recent amendment to Section 80DD effective from April 1, 2023, which allows for the discontinuation of certain payments to dependents with disabilities upon the attainment of 60 years by the subscriber, as per the provisions outlined in the Finance Act, 2022. The petitioner argued for retrospective application of this amendment to benefit existing policyholders. However, the Court denied this request, stating that the amendment's intent aligns with ensuring benefits posthumously for disabled persons, thus upholding the integrity of the insurance contract. The Court concluded that the concerns of the petitioner had been adequately addressed through legislative action, and the writ petition was disposed of without further relief. Ravi Agrawal v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 650

Section 206C - Any vendor who buys liquor from state manufacturers without obtaining it through auction and sells in retail at a fixed price would be excluded from the definition of 'buyer' under Section 206C of the Income Tax Act. Such a trade would be exempted from TCS (Tax Collected at Source). (Para 14.5) Excise Commissioner Karnataka v. Mysore Sales International Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 496

Section 206C - Before an order is passed under Section 206C of the Income Tax Act, it is incumbent upon the assessing officer to put the person concerned to notice and afford him an adequate and reasonable opportunity of hearing, including a personal hearing. (Para 19) Excise Commissioner Karnataka v. Mysore Sales International Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 496

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Sections 29 and 34 - Penalty for breach of settlement or award - Section 29 is applicable when any person commits a breach of any term of any settlement or award binding on him under the ID Act. Therefore, in the complaint alleging the commission of an offence punishable under Section 29 of the ID Act, there must be a specific averment regarding the existence of a settlement or award binding on the accused under the ID Act and how the same has been breached. (Para 5 & 6) Yugal Sikri v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 537

Industrial Policy, 2003

'Market fees' collected under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 and the 'Rural Development fees' collected under the Punjab Rural Development Act are distinct. Market Fees could not be equated with Rural Development Fees for the purposes of exemption under the 2003 Policy. (Para 29) State of Punjab v. Punjab Spintex Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 484 : AIR 2024 SC 4347

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Auction-purchaser entitled to benefit of Covid limitation extension. V.S. Palanivel v. P. Sriram CS Liquidator, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 662

Free copy of NCLT Order and copy of Order obtained on paying cost are 'certified copies' for filing NCLAT appeal. State Bank of India v. India Power Corporation Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 766

In relation to the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) of Coastal Energen Private Limited, the Supreme Court directed that the status quo which existed when the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) passed the order on September 6 will continue to operate till the NCLAT finally decided the appeal. Dickey Alternative Investment Trust v. Ahmed Buhari, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 709

Timeline to pay balance sale consideration by auction purchaser in liquidation proceedings mandatory. V.S. Palanivel v. P. Sriram CS Liquidator, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 662

Section 7 - Indian Contract Act, 1872; Section 140 - Subrogation – Liability and Rights of Surety - Section 140 grants the surety the right to be subrogated to the creditor's rights upon payment or performance of all that he is liable for under a guarantee. The Court emphasized that when the surety fulfills his liability, he acquires the right to recover from the principal debtor to the extent of the payment made. In this case, where the appellant had paid a sum of Rs.38.87 crores under the corporate guarantee in the CIRP (Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process) of the guarantor (ACIL), the Court held that the subrogation rights of the appellant extend only to the amount actually paid. The financial creditor's right to recover the balance debt from the principal debtor remains unaffected. Additionally, the Court reiterated that the assets of a subsidiary company cannot form part of the CIRP process of its holding company, and a financial creditor can file separate applications under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code against both the corporate debtor and the corporate guarantor. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the view taken by the NCLAT (National Company Law Appellate Tribunal). (Para 24 - 29) BRS Ventures Investments Ltd. v. SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 508 : AIR 2024 SC 4139

Interpretation

Where the language used in an instrument/document is clear and unambiguous, only that clear expression of words is to be considered for the interpretation of the instrument, not the surrounding circumstances. Kamal Kishore Sehgal v. Murti Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 721

Judgment

A judgment of the Court cannot contain the Judge's personal opinions on various subjects. Similarly, advisory jurisdiction cannot be exercised by the Court by incorporating advice to the parties or advice in general. The Judge has to decide a case and not preach. (Para 14) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004

No doubt, the Court can always comment upon the conduct of the parties. However, the findings regarding the conduct of the parties must be confined only to such conduct which has a bearing on the decision-making.

The judgment cannot contain irrelevant and unnecessary material. A judgment must be in simple language and should not be verbose. Brevity is the hallmark of quality judgment. We must remember that judgment is neither a thesis nor a piece of literature. However, we find that the impugned judgment contains personal opinion of the Judges advice to the younger generation and advice to the legislature. (Para 14) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004

The ultimate object of writing a judgment is to ensure that the parties before the Court know why the case is decided in their favour or against them. Therefore, judgment must be in a simple language. The conclusions recorded by the Court in the judgment on legal or factual issues must be supported by cogent reasons. (Para 13) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004

Judicial Service

National Pension Scheme - Compliance with payment of judicial officers' arrears and allowances - Proceedings against various states - General directions were issued for resolving any subsisting grievances of judicial officers and ensuring the establishment of Standard Operating Procedures. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 634

Requirement that judicial officers must be adept at local language is valid. Legal Attorneys and Barristers Law Firm v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 529

Seventh National Judicial Pay Commission (SNJPC) recommendations - Implementation of. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 536

Statutory rules and executive instructions in the recruitment process - The issue concerns the application of unamended Schedule 'B' of the Manipur Judicial Service Rules, 2005 (MJS Rules) in the recruitment process, particularly regarding the evaluation criteria for written and viva voce examinations. The unamended rules provided that the final selection would be based on the cumulative grade value obtained in both the written and viva voce examinations, without prescribing any minimum cut-off for the viva voce segment. Held, amendments made to the rules after the recruitment process commenced, introducing a minimum of 40% qualifying marks for the viva voce, could not be retrospectively applied. The petitioner, having secured a cumulative 50.6% as per the unamended rules, would have qualified under the original scheme. Executive resolutions, such as the Full Court's resolution prescribing a viva voce cut-off, cannot override statutory rules unless those rules are properly amended. Reliance on decisions such as Kavita Kamboj v. High Court of P & H, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 174 and Abhimeet Sinha v. High Court of Patna, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 350 was found inapplicable in this case, as those judgments addressed the legality of prescribing minimum interview marks where the rules were silent or ambiguous. However, in the present case, the unamended MJS Rules explicitly provided the method of final selection. Therefore, the petitioner's evaluation should have been conducted under the unamended rules, and the executive resolution imposing a viva voce cut-off was invalid as it substituted rather than supplemented the statutory rules. Salam Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur at Imphal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 636

Substantive legitimate expectation and fairness in recruitment process - Whether the High Court's decision violated the substantive legitimate expectation of the petitioner. Held, for a public authority to frustrate a claim of legitimate expectation, it must objectively demonstrate an overriding public interest. The petitioner claimed a legitimate expectation under the unamended MJS Rules, 2005, that the merit list would be based on the aggregate marks of the written examination and viva voce. However, a minimum 40% cut-off for the viva voce was introduced after the recruitment process had begun, without prior notice to the candidates. Such a post-hoc imposition violated the petitioner's substantive legitimate expectation, rendering the process arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioner's participation in the recruitment process did not preclude him from challenging the process's illegality, reaffirming the principle that the doctrine of estoppel cannot override the law. In conclusion, the Court ordered that the petitioner, having secured over 50% in aggregate marks, be declared successful in the recruitment test. The petitioner was granted appointment with notional seniority from 2015 for superannuation purposes but without retrospective monetary benefits. The directions were to be implemented within four weeks. Salam Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur at Imphal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 636

Supreme Court refuses to entertain plea to include Tribunals in national judicial data grid. Kishan Chand Jain v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 530

Necessary for judges to exercise restraint on remarks in the age of live-streaming and wide reporting. In Re : Order of Punjab and Haryana High Court, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 566

Judiciary

High Court Chief Justice cannot individually reconsider judges' appointment, must be collectively done by collegium. Chirag Bhanu Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 664

When a party is relegated to the High Court to pursue its remedies, it would not be proper, in the normal course, to bind the said High Court with directions in relation to the proceedings to be impugned before such Court. Ordinarily, this Court would leave all issues open for the party so relegated to raise and pursue before the High Court. Gagan Banga v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 736

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015

If a child is residing with a person who has injured, exploited or abused the child or has violated any other law for the time being in force meant for the protection of the child, the said child becomes a child in need of care and protection. Thus, if a child who is a victim of an offence under the POCSO Act is residing with the accused, the child becomes a child in need of care and protection. Even a child who has a parent or guardian and if such parent or guardian is found to be unfit to take care of the child, in such a case, the child is covered by the definition under sub-section (14) of Section 2 of the JJ Act. Therefore, the CWC has to exercise the power to provide basic needs and protection to such children in need of care and protection. (Para 28.2) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004

Juvenile cannot be denied bail without recording finding that proviso to Section 12(1) Juvenile Justice act is applicable. Juvenile in Conflict with Law V v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 582

Section 12(1) - The Supreme Court granted bail to a juvenile who had been in custody for over a year, criticizing the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB), trial court, and the Rajasthan High Court for failing to record a specific finding justifying the denial of bail under the proviso to Section 12(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act. The Court emphasized that, absent such a finding, bail could not be denied. Citing a Psychological Assessment Report indicating the juvenile was not high-risk, the Court set aside previous orders and directed the juvenile's immediate release on bail without surety, with supervision instructions to be issued to the Probation Officer. Juvenile in Conflict with Law V v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 582

Section 30 - The Child Welfare Committee (CWC) cannot wait till the children in need of care and protection are produced before it. (Para 29.1) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004

Sections 36, 39, and 46 - Inquiry, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare - Section 36 mandates the Child Welfare Committee (CWC) to conduct a social investigation and pass orders for the child's placement in a children's home, fit facility, or foster care. Section 39 emphasizes the process of rehabilitation and social reintegration based on individual care plans, aiming for family-based care or institutional placement. Section 46, supported by Rule 25, provides financial support to children leaving institutional care upon reaching 18 years to ensure their reintegration into society. The Court underscored the importance of these provisions in ensuring that children receive necessary support and opportunities for education, vocational training, and self-sufficiency. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004

Section 46 r/w. Rule 25 - The failure to implement these provisions, particularly Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act, denies victims the fundamental right to dignity and protection guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It directed strict implementation of these provisions to prevent victims from facing situations where their right to make informed choices about their future is compromised. The State is duty-bound to provide shelter, support, and financial assistance to victims, ensuring their reintegration into society and protecting their right to lead a dignified life. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004

Labour

In this case, the Court examined whether employees in the Public Works Department, categorized under the Converted Temporary Establishment (CTE) as per the Kalelkar Award, are entitled to public holidays, including holidays on the second and fourth Saturdays of each month. The Court observed that the Kalelkar Award clearly entitles non-daily-wage employees, including CTE employees, to the government-sanctioned public holidays. Additionally, they are eligible for overtime allowances as stipulated. The appellants (employers) argued that a government circular from May 27, 1996, restricted these benefits. However, the Court found this argument baseless, noting that the circular did not apply to employees under the CTE status granted by the Kalelkar Award. The Court affirmed the Industrial Court's and High Court's rulings, which had granted the respondent-employees these benefits. Consequently, the Court dismissed the employer's appeal, directing compliance with the Industrial Court's order within eight weeks. Public Works Department v. Tukaram Pandurang Saraf, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 725 : AIR 2024 SC 4618

Land

Compensation for surrendering land for public purpose once determined is payable without formal request, failure violates Article 300-A. Kukreja Construction Company v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 701

State must ensure timely payment of land acquisition compensation even if a private company is ultimately liable - Delay violates Article 300A. Ultra Tech Cement LTd v.Mast Ram, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 724

The Supreme Court set aside a judgment of the Karnataka High Court which directed HMT Ltd. and Union of India to either return land in Bangalore's Jarakabande Kaval village to heirs of a previous owner from whom it was requisitioned in 1941 or to compensate them by paying the present market value. The Court noted that the writ petition filed in the Karnataka High Court in 2006 was barred by delay and laches. The Court also noted that the petitioner had suppressed several crucial facts. HMT Ltd. v. Rukmini, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 743 : AIR 2024 SC 4677

The Supreme Court sets aside the grant of land acquisition compensation share to persons who purchased sites from party having no title. Lakshmesh M. v. P. Rajalakshmi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : AIR 2024 SC 4281

The Supreme Court set aside the interim order passed by the High Court, which had directed the maintenance of status quo regarding the land acquisition and rehabilitation process for the proposed expansion of an Airport. The High Court's order had imposed a blanket stay, halting the acquisition of land and demolition of structures, pending the disposal of a writ petition filed by families affected by the expansion project. The Court vacated the interim order, taking into account the potential delays and cost overruns caused by such blanket stays on infrastructural projects. Principal Secretary v. Gaggal Airport Expansion Affected Social Welfare Committee, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 684

Land Acquisition

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 23(1) – Land acquisition – Quantum of compensation granted to the landowners is challenged to be inadequate – Held, there exists no direct piece of evidence to determine fair and just compensation in the instant cases hence, courts must resort to the settled principle of guesstimation. While the Court can use the principle of guesstimation in reasonably estimating the value of land in the absence of direct evidence, the Court must embrace a holistic view and consider all 'relevant factors' and existing evidence, even if not directly comparable, to arrive at a fair determination of compensation. Such relevant factors can be divided into three categories: (i). Characteristics of the land, (ii). Future potentiality of the land, (iii). Factors denoting market sentiment. Further held, compensation could be determined applying the principle of guesstimation, based on the circle rate after granting a marginal increase over the same. It would be appropriate to apply a 15% escalation for one year to the price fixed at INR 350 per sq. yd., bringing the total guesstimate to INR 403 per sq. yd.. It stands conclusively surmised that the landowners are entitled to an enhancement in the compensation awarded. (Para 32, 33, 34, 42 & 43) New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Harnand Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 456

Is interest on solatium payable from date of land acquisition or date of 'sunder' judgment? The supreme court refers to a 3-judge bench. Executive Engineer, Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. V. Saraswathiammal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 523

Principle of guesstimation – It is a heuristic device that enables the court, in the absence of direct evidence and relevant sale exemplars, to make a reasonable and informed guess or estimation of the market value of the land under acquisition, and concomitantly the compensation payable by the appropriate Government. This principle accentuates the fundamental understanding that determining compensation for land is not a matter of exact science but involves a significant element of estimation. Indeed, this holds true for valuation of land in general, which is affected by a multitude of factors such as its location, surrounding market conditions, feasible uses etc. Accordingly, while evidence and calculations can aid in estimating the land value, they ultimately serve as tools for approximation rather than precision. (Para 31 & 32) New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Harnand Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 456

Seeking parity with Bir Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh where compensation was enhanced to INR 449 per sq. yd – Held, enhanced compensation was awarded relying on the sale deed which noted the value of land as INR 400 per sq. yd which was founded on a bona fide factual error. The figure of 400 actually denoted the area and size of the plot and not its sale value. Further held, the decision was not revisited by this Court likely on account of the practical difficulties in recovering the excess compensation amount already paid to the expropriated land owners and given the larger interest of justice. Hence, the judgement would not be binding and market value of land in question is to be determined independently. (Para 21) New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Harnand Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 456

Limitation Act, 1963

Article 65 - Suit for Possession - Land was donated to the State in 1958 for the construction of a veterinary hospital. The Court criticized the plaintiff for filing a vague plaint, lacking essential details, and attempting to circumvent the law of limitation through clever drafting. The suit was barred by limitation under Article 65, as it was filed more than 40 years after the hospital's construction and well beyond the 12-year period from when the plaintiff had knowledge of the hospital's existence. The burden of proof in a possession suit lies on the plaintiff, and mere entries in revenue records do not confer title. The lethargy of the State in not updating revenue records did not diminish its rights under the gift deed. The appeal by the State was allowed. (Para 18 - 32) State of Punjab v. Bhagwantpal Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 479

Section 12(1) – Exclusion of the day from which the limitation period is to be reckoned – The period of limitation under Section 34 will have to be reckoned from 30th June 2022, when the appellants received the award. Held, in view of Section 12(1), 30th June, 2022 will have to be excluded while computing the limitation period. Hence, the period of limitation starts from 1st July, 2022. (Para 7) State of West Bengal v. Rajpath Contractors and Engineers Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 454 : AIR 2024 SC 3252 : (2024) 7 SCC 257

Maternity Benefit Act, 1961

Menstrual Leave Policy - Petition seeking direction to the Union and State Governments to implement policies for granting menstrual leave under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 - Petitioner had previously submitted a representation to the Union Ministry of Women and Child Development, which was not responded to - Court observed that the issue raised involved multiple policy considerations and should be attended to by the Union and the States - Petitioner permitted to make another representation to the Secretary, Union Ministry of Women and Child Development - Court requested the Secretary to examine the matter at a policy level in consultation with all stakeholders, and consider framing a model policy - Writ Petition disposed of with liberty to the States to independently take appropriate action. Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 509

Mesne Profit

Inquiry about mesne profits continuation of original suit; application for such inquiry not barred by limitation. Choudappa v. Choudappa, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 671

Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006

Banks are not empowered to classify the loan accounts of the MSMEs, as Non-Performing Assets (NPA), without following the mandatory procedure laid down in the Instructions for Framework for Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs issued by the Ministry of MSME. Pro Knits v. Board of Directors of Canara Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 548

Mines and Minerals

States have the power to levy tax on mineral rights and that the Union law - Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act 1957 - do not limit such power of the States. Mineral Area Development v. Steel Authority of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 512

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

Emoluments and benefits such as house rent allowance, flexible benefit plan, contribution to provident fund, etc. accrued to the deceased ought to be included while computing the loss of dependency to determine the compensation. Meenakshi v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 549

Guidelines issued by the Legal Services Authority for deciding the disability compensation in motor accident claims ought not to be made applicable for determining just and reasonable compensation in the cases where the proof of earning has been brought on record. The guidelines would be made applicable where the proof of earning is not available and to settle such disputes in Lok Adalat. Even in the absence of evidence regarding earning, the guidelines of the Legal Services Authority are not binding on the High Court and the Supreme Court and can be used only for guidance. Hans Raj v. Oriental Insurance Company, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 714

Legal heirs of the deceased who died in the road accident can't be denied their rightful compensation on the ground that the driver of the car contributed to the accident. Sushma v. Nitin Ganapati Rangole, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 720 : AIR 2024 SC 4627

'Ownership' is determined by control and possession of the vehicle, especially at the time of an accident. Vaibhav Jain v. Hindustan Motors Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 649 : AIR 2024 SC 4219

Section 136A - Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989; Rule 167A - Implementation of - Electronic Monitoring and Enforcement of Road Safety - Section 136A requires State Governments to implement technologies like speed cameras, closed-circuit television cameras, and wearable body cameras on national and state highways, and in urban areas with populations prescribed by the Central Government. Rule 167A of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, further specifies operational standards for these devices, defining "electronic enforcement devices" and setting conditions for issuing electronic challans. The Court highlighted the innovative potential of Section 136A for enhancing road safety and ensuring compliance with traffic laws. It emphasized the utility of electronic monitoring devices for real-time data collection, which aids in prosecuting traffic violators and maintaining road discipline. Effective implementation of these provisions would provide a streamlined mechanism for capturing and penalizing traffic offenses, reducing the dependency on police observations alone. The Court directed relevant authorities to ensure compliance with the statutory requirements, including the installation of electronic monitoring devices in high-risk areas, as specified in Rule 167A. It underscored the need for visible signage, physical road markings, and adherence to procedural requirements for issuing electronic challans. S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 669

It is for the Tribunal in a given case to make a decision as to whether the entire amount has to be released or if it is to be released in part. Law Association v. Director General of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 499

The High Court had limited the compensation awarded to the claimants to Rs. 4,00,000/- in addition to the amount awarded by the Tribunal based on the court fees paid. Held, courts are duty-bound to award “just compensation” based on the evidence, irrespective of the amount claimed in the appeal. The appellants were held entitled to Rs. 28,00,375/-, the compensation determined by the court, despite initially claiming only an additional Rs. 4,00,000/-. The Court permitted the appellants to amend the memo of appeal and pay the deficient court fee within four weeks. Kavita Balothiya v. Santosh Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 546

Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Delhi)

Lieutenant Governor (LG) of Delhi has the power to nominate aldermen to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi without the aid and advice of the Delhi Government. The power was a statutory power flowing from the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and hence the Governor need not act as per the aid and advice of the Delhi Government. Since it was a statutory power given to the LG and not an executive power of the Government, the LG was expected to act as per the statutory mandate and not as per the aid and advice of the Delhi Government. The power to be exercised is a statutory duty of the LG and not the executive power of the State. Govt of NCT of Delhi v. Office of Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 551

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985

Section 20(b)(ii)(B) and Section 50 – The respondent was convicted by the Trial Court for possession of 2.05 kgs of Ganja. The High Court acquitted the respondent, holding the search and seizure illegal due to non-compliance with Section 50. The State appealed to the Supreme Court. Held: The Supreme Court restored the conviction, holding that Section 50 formalities do not apply to recoveries from a bag. The respondent, who had already served four years, four months, and 21 days in prison, was sentenced to the period already undergone. Judgment of acquittal set aside. Conviction restored with modification of sentence to the period already undergone. The fine of Rs. 50,000 was upheld with a default imprisonment clause. Appeal allowed. State of Kerala v. Prabhu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 640

Sections 20 and 29 - The appellant had been convicted by the Trial Court for possession of 1.25 kg of "charas" and sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. The appellant contested the conviction based on discrepancies in the police logbook, which showed that the police were at a different location at the time of the alleged seizure. Held, the High Court had erred in brushing aside crucial documentary evidence (the logbook) and statements of the police witnesses, which contradicted the prosecution's case. Given the absence of independent witnesses and the unreliability of the prosecution's evidence, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant of all charges. Prakash Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 616

Section 37(1)(b)(ii) - Bail - HIV positive - Legality of granting bail - The High Court granted bail considering HIV-positive status as the sole ground. Subsequently, the accused was granted bail again in connection with FIR involving a commercial quantity of heroin without due consideration of the stringent requirements under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. Held, In cases involving commercial quantities of narcotics, bail can only be granted if both conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act are met: reasonable grounds for believing the accused is not guilty and that they are unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. It reiterated that these conditions are cumulative, not alternative. The High Court's decision to grant bail solely based on the accused's HIV-positive status, without adherence to Section 37(1)(b)(ii), was erroneous and warranted interference. Consequently, the impugned bail order was set aside, directing the accused to surrender before the trial court within a week, with instructions to expedite the trial as per Section 34(2) of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (Prevention and Control) Act, 2017. State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 492

Section 50 – Whether recovery from a bag requires compliance with Section 50 - The Court reiterated that compliance with Section 50 is not mandatory when the recovery of contraband is made from a bag carried by the accused, not from the person of the accused. (Referred : Ranjan Kumar Chadha v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 856). State of Kerala v. Prabhu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 640

National Highways

Encroachments on National Highways and road safety measures - Proper mechanisms for inspection and removal of encroachments - The Supreme Court directed the Ministry of Road Transport & Highways to: Constitute inspection teams for regular and frequent inspections of National Highways to prevent and remove encroachments. Ensure each team is responsible for specific stretches of highways and immediately reports encroachments to the competent authority. Develop a public portal where citizens can report encroachments, upload photographs, and location details, and introduce a toll-free number for reporting. Ensure action taken reports are uploaded on the portal and give wide publicity to the portal and toll-free number. Additionally, the court indicated that similar mechanisms should be extended to State Highways and forwarded the matter to the Road Safety Committee chaired by Justice Abhay Sapre. The Amicus Curiae was asked to submit a note on other relevant issues. Gyan Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 633

National Housing Bank Act, 1987

Section 29A and 50 - Whether the complaint could proceed against all the accused, including the directors of the company, without specific averments regarding their roles in the commission of the offence. Held, In cases involving vicarious liability, it is necessary to make specific averments that the accused directors were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business at the time of the offence. Absent such averments, the complaint cannot proceed against the directors, except the Managing Director, who is presumed to be in charge of the company's operations by virtue of their position. National Housing Bank v. Bherudan Dugar Housing Finance Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 541

NEET

NEET-UG 2024 - Exam cancellation only when malpractice is systemic & separation of untainted candidates is impossible. Vanshika Yadav v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 539

NTA should avoid flip-flops which happened in NEET-UG case. Vanshika Yadav v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 539

Supreme Court asks expert committee to suggest reforms for better administration of NEET-UG Exam. Vanshika Yadav v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 539

Supreme Court highlights NTA's lapses, and says the manner in which NEET-UG 24 was conducted raises serious concerns. Vanshika Yadav v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 539

Supreme Court refuses to cancel NEET-UG 2024, says there's no material to show systemic breach. Vanshika Yadav v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 525

The petitioners, a group of doctors with postgraduate medical degrees, challenged the National Medical Commission's (NMC) decision to postpone the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test – Super Specialty (NEET-SS) 2024 examination, originally set for 2024. The NMC's decision, based on data showing a majority of candidates for NEET-SS are from prior batches, aims to prevent a competitive imbalance in future examinations. The Court, while acknowledging the petitioners' concerns, upheld the NMC's decision as reasonable and equitable, emphasizing the need to balance hardship against academic policy considerations. The Court directed the NMC to announce a schedule for the NEET-SS 2024 examination within thirty days, ensuring timely communication to students completing their postgraduate courses by January 2025. Rahul Balwan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 631

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Principles of compounding of offences - It is to be remembered that dishonour of cheques is a regulatory offence which was made an offence only in view of public interest so that the reliability of these instruments can be ensured. A large number of cases involving dishonour of cheques are pending before courts which is a serious concern for our judicial system. Keeping in mind that the 'compensatory aspect' of remedy shall have priority over the 'punitive aspect', courts should encourage compounding of offences under the NI Act if parties are willing to do so. (Para 6) New Win Export v. A. Subramaniam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 490

Section 138—Discrepancies in the interest rate were insufficient to discredit the principal amount due, especially when the respondent admitted to issuing the cheque. (Para 17 & 18) Sri Sujies Benefit Funds Ltd. v. M. Jaganathuan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : AIR 2024 SC 3827

Sections 138, 139, 118(a) - Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 391; Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2003 (Tamil Nadu) — Discrepancies in interest rates and the partial repayments did not sufficiently rebut the statutory presumption of liability—Respondent failed to demonstrate that the cheque was not for a legally enforceable debt—Even if the interest charged exceeded the rate allowed under the Tamil Nadu Act, this was not a ground to invalidate the entire debt. (Para 17 & 18) Sri Sujies Benefit Funds Ltd. v. M. Jaganathuan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : AIR 2024 SC 3827

Section 138 and 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 320 and 482 – Compounding of Offence – Consent of Complainant – Mandatory Requirement. A.S. Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. Nayati Medical Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 608

Section 143A - An authorized signatory of the company could not be considered as a 'drawer' of cheque, and therefore, could not be directed to pay the interim compensation to the complainant. (Para 30) Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 513

Notary

Notary's omission to make entry in notarial register misconduct. Bhagwan Singh v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 722

Notice

Notices sent to the residences of the accused while they were under custody cannot be proper service of notice. Saher Ali Mia v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 578

Partition

Chandigarh (Sale of Sites and Buildings) Rules, 1960 - There cannot be partition of property by metes and bounds at Chandigarh. Hence, the only resolution in a suit seeking partition of joint property is sale by way of auction. Rajinder Kaur v. Gurbhajan Kaur, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 514

Co-owner whose share in the joint property remained undetermined cannot transfer the entire suit property to another person without its partition being completed by metes and bounds. Golam Lalchand v. Nandu Lal Shaw, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : AIR 2024 SC 4193

Penal Code, 1860

Criminal Conspiracy – To constitute even an accusation of criminal conspiracy, first and foremost, there must at least be an accusation of meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act, which is not illegal in itself, by illegal means. (Para 27) Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 475 : AIR 2024 SC 3540

Section 120B, 409, 420, 468, 471 - Bail - Criminal Conspiracy - Misuse of Educational Funds - The appellants were involved in managing various educational institutions in Madhya Pradesh. FIRs were lodged against them for allegedly engaging in fraudulent activities related to the management of school funds, particularly in connection with the sale of textbooks and fee hikes. Whether the appellants' involvement in the sale of textbooks and fee hikes constitutes offenses under the IPC. Whether the rejection of bail by the Trial Court and High Court was justified. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and granted bail to the appellants. The allegations made against the appellants were almost identical and pertained to their educational activities, which included managing the sale of textbooks and raising fees. These activities, per se, could not constitute criminal offenses under the IPC. Further, the investigation was still incomplete, and the prolonged incarceration of the appellants was unwarranted. The Court directed the release of the appellants on bail, subject to conditions. Fr. Abraham Thazhathedathu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 591

Section 148, 302, and 324 - The case was based on the testimony of the deceased's widow who claimed to have identified the assailants in dim moonlight during a power cut. However, the Court found significant inconsistencies and contradictions in her deposition, particularly when compared to her earlier complaint. These contradictions raised reasonable doubts regarding the reliability of her testimony. The Court further noted that the assault occurred in a chaotic environment, complicating the identification of the attackers. Given the dubious nature of the evidence and the appellants' prolonged incarceration, the Court granted the benefit of doubt to the appellants and acquitted them of all charges. Saheb v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 716 : AIR 2024 SC 4466

Section 149 - Accused presence and active role within the assembly, despite a lack of direct assault or recovery of the weapon, was sufficient for his conviction. Constructive liability under Section 149 does not require personal commission of an offence; mere membership in an assembly with a shared unlawful intent suffices. Nitya Nand v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : AIR 2024 SC 4259

Section 193 - Mere denial of the complainant's allegations does not constitute perjury. Prosecution for perjury requires clear evidence of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and should only be initiated when expedient in the interest of justice. James Kunjwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : AIR 2024 SC 3965

Section 300 – Conviction for the offence of murder is challenged – Whether the nature of offensive act comes within the purview of section 300? – Held, the appellant caused such bodily injury, which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. The appellant participated in a premeditated attack on the victim, armed with a deadly weapon and stabbed the unarmed victim on a vital organ causing his death. The conduct of the appellant is covered by both clauses (1) and (3) of section 300, IPC. The intention to cause death can easily be discerned from the conduct of the appellant and the nature of fatal injury inflicted, which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. Fulfilment of any one condition of section 300, IPC is enough to convict the appellant under section 302 thereof, and in the present case not one but two conditions have clearly been shown to exist to nail the appellant for murder. Further held, prosecution has been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the person who stabbed the victim during the course of the attack by the accused persons leading to his death. Hence, conviction of appellant is affirmed. (Para 20, 24, 26 & 27) Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 448

Section 304 II - Conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC modified to the period already undergone, considering the emotional tension and spur-of-the-moment nature of the incident. Hussainbhai Asgarali Lokhandwala v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 584 : AIR 2024 SC 3832

Section 304B and 498A - Dowry death - The High Court reversed the acquittal passed by the trial court, holding that the death occurred within seven years of marriage due to 100% burn injuries at the matrimonial home. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's conviction, emphasizing the presumption of dowry death under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, and held that the appellants failed to discharge their burden of proof. The appeal was dismissed. Damodar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 607

Section 304A and 338 - For conviction under Section 304(A) and Section 338 of the IPC, there is no minimum sentence prescribed but the term of sentence may extend to 2 years. The sentence can also be limited to fine without any term of imprisonment. George v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 661

Section 304B - For a conviction under Section 304-B IPC, mere allegations of dowry demand are insufficient. There must be credible evidence of harassment or cruelty directly linked to dowry demands and occurring “soon before” the death, fulfilling the essential ingredients required to invoke Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Shoor Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 726 : AIR 2024 SC 4551

Section 304B - When dowry demand isn't established, conviction for dowry death under S.304B IPC is unsustainable. Chabi Karmakar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 679

Section 307 – Acquittal restored due to lack of convincing evidence - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction under Section 307 of the IPC, restoring the acquittal of the appellant by the Trial Court. The Court held that the High Court's decision to convict was based on weak and inconsistent evidence, including contradictory witness testimonies and absence of key eyewitnesses from the investigation. The prosecution's case was undermined by discrepancies in the roles attributed to the accused, the nature of injuries inflicted, and the medical evidence presented. The Court reiterated that an appellate court should not overturn a well-reasoned acquittal unless there is a manifest error in the trial court's findings. Accordingly, the conviction was deemed unsafe, and the appellant was acquitted. Appeal allowed, acquittal restored. Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 622

Section 307 – The appellants were charged under Section 307 IPC for an alleged knife attack on the victims. The trial court acquitted the appellants in 1995, but the High Court reversed the acquittal in 2009, sentencing them to seven years of rigorous imprisonment. Whether the conviction of the appellants under Section 307 IPC is justified in light of the inconsistencies in the prosecution's case. Held, the Supreme Court, upon reviewing the evidence, found significant contradictions between the FIR, witness testimonies, and medical reports. The absence of key eyewitnesses and discrepancies in the prosecution's narrative weakened the case. The court reiterated the principle that a conviction under Section 307 IPC requires clear intent and overt acts by the accused, which was not established beyond reasonable doubt in this case. The Court emphasized that an appellate court should not overturn an acquittal without compelling reasons. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the trial court's acquittal was restored. The appeal was allowed, and the appellants were acquitted. Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 622

Section 307 - When the sentencing court doesn't deem fit to impose a life sentence for committing an offence of attempt to murder, then the maximum sentence that can be imposed on the convict for committing an offence of attempt to murder could not extend beyond the period of 10 years. (Para 7) Amit Rana @ Koka v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 500 : AIR 2024 SC 3477

Section 308 and 354B - Bail - The petitioner, a former Private Secretary to the Chief Minister of Delhi, faced allegations of assault against a Member of Parliament. While noting the investigation's completion and the petitioner's 100-day custody, the Court addressed concerns over witness influence due to the petitioner's political standing. Balancing the right to liberty with a fair trial, the Court granted bail with specific conditions to ensure witness protection and trial integrity. Key conditions included restrictions on the petitioner's official assignments, entry into the Chief Minister's residence, and public commentary on the case. The petition was disposed of, with instructions for the trial court to expedite the examination of vulnerable witnesses. Bibhav Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 646

Section 353 - Mere jostling and pushing while resisting arrest did not amount to criminal use of force. Mahendra Kumar Sonker v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 570

Section 364, 302 r/w. 34 - Murder – Appeal Against Conviction – Reversal of Acquittal – Standard of Proof – Testimony of Eyewitnesses – Interested and Chance Witnesses – Circumstantial Evidence – High Court's Approach in Reversing Acquittal – Requirements for Sustaining Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence - The charge of abduction was based on direct evidence, while the charge of murder was based on circumstantial evidence. The Court scrutinized the credibility of the testimonies of eye witnesses (PW-2, PW-4, PW-5, and PW-18), who were challenged by the appellants as being interested and chance witnesses. It was observed that there was no satisfactory explanation for their presence at the crime scene, and inconsistencies were found in their accounts, particularly regarding crucial details such as the existence of a pistol allegedly used by the accused. The investigation conducted by PW-21 was found to be questionable, especially when considered against the statements of defence witnesses (DW-3 and DW-4), who were senior police officers supervising the investigation. The Court noted the non-examination of natural witnesses and the improbable conduct of the eye witnesses, which cast doubt on their testimonies. Additionally, the Court held that the High Court's approach in reversing the acquittal of A-6 and A-7 was flawed, as it did not identify any illegality, perversity, or complete unsustainability in the Trial Court's findings. The reversal of acquittal should meet a higher threshold, recognizing the presumption of innocence reinforced by the initial acquittal. The prosecution failed to provide convincing evidence of the residence of the deceased, and the post-mortem report raised doubts about the time of death, which was inconsistent with the prosecution's case. Held, the conviction by the High Court was unsustainable due to unreliable evidence and an improper approach in reversing the acquittal. The presumption of innocence in favor of the appellants was not displaced. Appeal allowed; acquittal restored. Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 746

Section 375 - In view of “sixthly” in Section 375 of the IPC, penetrative intercourse with a woman under eighteen years of age, with or without her consent, constitutes an offence of rape. Therefore, whether such offence arises from a romantic relationship is irrelevant. (Para 19) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004

Section 406 and 420 - Difference Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - In a criminal breach of trust, there is an entrustment of property, where the accused dishonestly misappropriates or uses the property in violation of the trust placed in him. In contrast, cheating involves a fraudulent or dishonest inducement from the beginning of the transaction, where the accused deceives the victim into delivering property or taking action they would not have otherwise taken. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531

Section 406 and 420 - Difference Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - Criminal breach of trust requires that the property entrusted must belong to someone other than the accused, who holds it in trust. Cheating, on the other hand, is based on false representations made at the inception of the transaction. Both offences, while involving dishonest intent, are mutually exclusive. The accused cannot be charged with both for the same transaction unless distinct elements of each offence are present. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531

Section 406 and 420 - Difference Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - Mere breach of contract does not give rise to a criminal offence unless fraudulent or dishonest intent at the inception is demonstrated. A civil remedy is appropriate where the dispute arises from non-payment after a sale of goods, as the sale transfers ownership to the buyer, eliminating the possibility of criminal breach of trust. Prosecution under criminal breach of trust cannot be sustained without the essential element of entrustment. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531

Section 406 and 420 - Judicial Oversight in Distinguishing Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - the Supreme Court expressed concern over the casual approach of the lower courts in distinguishing between the offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating. The Court emphasized the magistrates' duty to thoroughly examine complaints and ascertain whether the ingredients of the specific offences are met. It also criticized the police's routine practice of registering both offences without proper application of mind. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531

Section 406 and 420 - The Court called for proper legal training for police officers across the country to prevent wrongful prosecution under these distinct offences. It further directed that the judgment be sent to the Union Ministries of Law & Justice and Home Affairs for appropriate action, highlighting the need for systemic reforms. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531

Section 406 and 420 - Mere non-performance of a contractual obligation, such as failure to register the sale, does not constitute cheating or criminal breach of trust. Radheyshyam v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 595

Sections 418 and 420 - The complainant purchased a BMW 7 Series vehicle and reported a defect. A complaint was lodged for alleged offences under Sections 418 and 420 of the IPC, naming the manufacturer, Managing Director, and other directors as accused. The High Court concluded that the ingredients of the offence of cheating were not established based on the contents of the FIR. Having come to this conclusion, there was no justification for the High Court thereafter to direct the manufacturer to replace the vehicle with a new BMW 7 Series. Held, the High Court correctly quashed the criminal proceedings, as the ingredients of cheating were not established based on the FIR. The Court deemed it unnecessary to continue prosecution, given the nature of the dispute and the elapsed time. Exercising jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court directed BMW India Private Limited to pay Rs 50 lakhs to the complainant in full settlement. (Para 10 - 15) State of Andhra Pradesh v. BMW India P.Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 466

Section 498A, 323, 504, 506 r/w. 34 - Need for clear and specific allegations to proceed in criminal cases, especially in matrimonial disputes. The Court reiterated its concern over the abuse of criminal processes through general and omnibus allegations, noting that such claims, without specific details or evidence, can lead to the misuse of legal provisions intended to protect against genuine harm. When criminal proceedings are used as instruments of harassment or revenge, the judiciary has the power to intervene and prevent the miscarriage of justice by quashing such proceedings. Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 753

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994

Section 30 - Search and seizure operation must be authorised by all three members of the District Appropriate Authority under the Act collectively, and any decision by a single member is illegal. Ravinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 710 : AIR 2024 SC 4311

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

It is the settled convention in such cases that the Trap Laying Officer makes efforts to verify the factum of demand of bribe by the public servant before initiating the trap proceedings. The factum of demand of bribe can also be verified by recording the telephonic conversation between the decoy and the suspect public servant. Often, a recording device is secretly placed on the person of the decoy to record the conversation which would transpire during the course of acceptance of bribe by the public servant. (Para 31) Mir Mustafa Ali Hasmi v. State of A.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 468 : AIR 2024 SC 3356 : 2024 Cri LJ 3102

Section 19 and Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 319 – Summon order challenged – Sanction under Section 19 of PC Act is Necessary to Summon Public Servant as Additional Accused – Held, courts cannot take cognizance against any public servant for offences committed under the PC Act on an application under section 319 of the CrPC, without first following the requirements of Section 19 of the P.C Act. The correct procedure should have been for the prosecution to obtain sanction under Section 19 of the P.C Act from the appropriate Government, before formally moving an application before the Court under Section 319 of CrPC. Hence, on absence of the sanction the entire procedure remains flawed. High Court's order of setting aside the order of Summon is upheld. (Para 11) State of Punjab v. Partap Singh Verka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 461 : AIR 2024 SC 3299

Section 19 (1) - Sanction won't be rendered invalid merely because it was granted after the trial court had taken cognizance of the chargesheet. Shivendra Nath Verma v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 518

The allegations against the appellants primarily pertained to a civil dispute arising from contractual obligations rather than criminal misconduct. The investigation initiated by the CBI, based on an incomplete CAG report, was flawed, and there was no basis to conclude that the appellants had engaged in any criminal conspiracy or wrongful conduct. The CBI's investigation relied on an audit report that had not been finalized, and the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate criminal intent. The Karnataka High Court had previously ruled favorably for the appellants in related proceedings, which the CBI ignored. There was no evidence to support the claims that the appellants had caused financial loss to the state or wrongfully profited from the disposal of coal rejects. As a result, the Supreme Court quashed the order framing charges and set aside the proceedings, concluding that the matter was of a civil nature, devoid of criminal elements. Appeals allowed, and charges against the appellants quashed. Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954

Section 7 r/w Section 16 – Conviction for use of permitted food colour – Tartrazine yellow colour permissible under Rule 28 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 – Erroneous conviction set aside. Mahesh Chander @ Mahesh Chand v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 610

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Arvind Kejriwal is an elected leader and the Chief Minister of Delhi, a post holding importance and influence. We have also referred to the allegations. While we do not give any direction, since we are doubtful whether the court can direct an elected leader to step down or not function as the Chief Minister or as a Minister, we leave it to Arvind Kejriwal to take a call. Larger Bench, if deemed appropriate, can frame question(s) and decide the conditions that can be imposed by the court in such cases. (Para 86) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463

Continued custody is unnecessary once investigation and charge sheet are complete. Bail granted under the principle that prolonged pre-trial incarceration should not amount to punishment without trial. Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 614 : AIR 2024 SC 4247

ED can't arrest after court takes cognizance' : Supreme Court grants anticipatory bail to Odisha officer in money laundering case. Bijay Ketan Sahoo v. Enforcement Directorate, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 532

Here the accused is lodged in jail for a considerable period and there is little possibility of trial reaching finality in the near future. The liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution does not get abrogated even for special statutes where the threshold twin bar is provided and such statutes, in our opinion, cannot carve out an exception to the principle of bail being the rule and jail being the exception. The cardinal principle of bail being the rule and jail being the exception will be entirely defeated if the petitioner is kept in custody as an under-trial for such a long duration. This is particularly glaring since in the event of conviction, the maximum sentence prescribed is only 7 years for the offence of money laundering. (Para 12) Vijay Nair v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 644

In order to avail the right to fair trial, the accused cannot be denied the right to have inspection of the documents including the “un-relied upon documents. Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 563 : AIR 2024 SC 4053

No assertion in ED complaint that scheduled offences generated proceeds of crime - grants bail. Bhagwan Bhagat v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 576

Provisions of PMLA will prevail over Cr.P.C. in relation to the summoning of a person. Abhishek Banerjee v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 674

Section 19 - Power to arrest under Section 19(1) is not for the purpose of investigation. Arrest can and should wait, and the power in terms of Section 19(1) of the PML Act can be exercised only when the material with the designated officer enables them to form an opinion, by recording reasons in writing that the arrestee is guilty. (Para 41) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463

Section 19 - (a) Whether the “need and necessity to arrest” is a separate ground to challenge the order of arrest passed in terms of Section 19(1) of the PML Act? (b) Whether the “need and necessity to arrest” refers to the satisfaction of formal parameters to arrest and take a person into custody, or it relates to other personal grounds and reasons regarding necessity to arrest a person in the facts and circumstances of the said case? (c) If questions (a) and (b) are answered in the affirmative, what are the parameters and facts that are to be taken into consideration by the court while examining the question of “need and necessity to arrest”? Questions referred to the larger bench. (Para 84) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463

Section 24 - Foundational Facts and Legal Presumption of involvement in money laundering - Held, this presumption only arises once three basic facts are established by the prosecution: (i) the commission of a scheduled offence, (ii) the property in question being derived from the criminal activity, and (iii) the involvement of the accused in any process or activity related to the proceeds of crime. Once these foundational facts are established, a legal presumption arises that the proceeds of crime are involved in money laundering. However, the presumption is rebuttable, and the accused has the opportunity to disprove their involvement by presenting evidence within their personal knowledge. This presumption is not conclusive, and the accused must be given a fair opportunity to rebut it through cross-examination, presenting evidence, or under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The provision, therefore, balances the burden of proof between the prosecution and the accused, ensuring that the presumption under Section 24(a) of the PMLA is neither unreasonable nor unconstitutional. (Para 14) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286

Section 24 - Significance of the Counter to Bail Application under PMLA - The counter must establish a cogent case by demonstrating the three foundational facts required under Section 24 of the Act: (i) the commission of a scheduled offence, (ii) the derivation of proceeds of crime from that offence, and (iii) the accused's involvement in any process or activity related to those proceeds. Only after these foundational facts are prima facie established does the presumption under Section 24 arise, shifting the burden to the accused to rebut the same. The counter affidavit must crystallize the material relied upon, thereby assisting the court in making an informed decision at the bail stage under Section 45 of PMLA. It enables the court to assess whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty, aligning with the framework laid down in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 633. (Para 15) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286

Section 45 – Bail - In cases where there has been a delay in trial and the accused has spent a long period in custody, right to bail shall be read into Section 439 Cr.P.C. and Section 45 PMLA. The same will however depend on the nature of allegations, as well. Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 563 : AIR 2024 SC 4053

Section 45 – Bail - Interpretation and Application - Court must balance the statutory twin conditions required for bail with the fundamental principle that "bail is the rule and jail is the exception." Even in cases under PMLA, the overarching principle of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution prevails, ensuring that statutory conditions for bail should not override constitutional safeguards. Thus, courts should be guided by the higher constitutional mandate of speedy trial and personal liberty, especially where prolonged incarceration occurs without the conclusion of trial. (Para 11) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286

Section 45 gives primacy to the opinion of the Directorate of Enforcement (DoE) when it comes to grant of bail. DoE should act uniformly, consistent in conduct, confirming one rule for all. (Para 79) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463

Section 45 - Scope of Inquiry - In assessing bail applications under Section 45 of the PMLA, the Court need not delve deeply into the merits of the case. The inquiry is limited to determining whether there are "reasonable grounds for believing" that the accused is guilty, based on the material collected during the investigation. This does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt, but rather an assessment of the broad probabilities of the case. Thus, Section 45 requires the Court to assess the genuineness of the case against the accused, but not to conclusively determine guilt at this stage. (Para 13) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286

Section 45 (1) - Proviso to Section 45(1) of PMLA extends special treatment to women, regardless of their social status or qualifications. Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 614 : AIR 2024 SC 4247

Section 45 (1) - Refusal to grant bail - The appellant, a political figure, sought bail after being charged with offenses related to money laundering. The appellant contended that since the investigation was complete and the charge sheet had been filed, her continued custody was unnecessary. Additionally, it was argued that the appellant, being a woman, was entitled to special treatment under the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA, as affirmed in Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 563. Held, detailed discussions on the merits of the case should be avoided at the bail stage to prevent prejudice during trial. The Court rejected the High Court's reasoning, which had denied the benefit of the proviso to Section 45(1) based on the appellant's educational qualifications and social standing, finding that the lower court misinterpreted the provision as applicable only to "vulnerable women." The Supreme Court reiterated that the statutory provision mandates special treatment for women, and such benefit should not be denied unless specific reasons are provided. The Court set aside the High Court's order, granted bail to the appellant, and imposed conditions to prevent tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses. Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 614 : AIR 2024 SC 4247

Section 50 - When an accused is in custody under PMLA irrespective of the case for which he is under custody, any statement under Section 50 PMLA to the same Investigating Agency is inadmissible against the maker. The reason being that the person in custody pursuant to the proceeding investigated by the same Investigating Agency is not a person who can be considered as one operating with a free mind. It will be extremely unsafe to render such statements admissible against the maker, as such a course of action would be contrary to all canons of fair play and justice. (Para 32) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286

Section 50 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 30 - Enforcement Directorate cannot start with a statement of a co-accused to implicate the accused. An incriminating statement of a co-accused would not amount to substantive evidence. (Para 37) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286

Section 197(1) of CrPC, which provides that prior sanction from the government is required to prosecute public servants and judges for offences alleged while discharge of public duties, will apply to cases under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 670

Supreme Court relaxes Section 45 PMLA conditions, grants bail citing long custody and time needed to complete trial. Ramkripal Meena Versus Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 527

The Supreme Court grants bail to money laundering accused considering age and custody period. Humayun Suleman Merchant v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 521

Preventive Detention

Each day's delay matters in cases of personal liberty - representation against preventive detention must be decided soon. Jaseela Shaji v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 690 : AIR 2024 SC 4721

Failure to furnish documents relied on by detaining authority violates Article 22(5). Jaseela Shaji v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 690 : AIR 2024 SC 4721

Property

No transfer of title in absence of registered document - Supreme Court rejects tenant's claim for ownership based on settlement with landlord. Beena v. Charan Das, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 706 : AIR 2024 SC 4197

Revenue records are for tax purposes and do not confer ownership. Merely because the name of the plaintiff continued in the revenue records it would not confer any title upon him. (Para 27) State of Punjab v. Bhagwantpal Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 479

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Registration Act, 1908 - A vendor who has executed a sale deed cannot execute another deed with respect to the same plot just because the first sale deed is pending registration. The moment a deed is executed, the vendor loses all rights over the property and he cannot claim any right just because the deed has not been registered. The only consequence of non-registration is that the purchaser cannot produce such a deed as evidence. (Para 33.13) Kaushik Premkumar Mishra v. Kanji Ravaria @ Kanji, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 493 : AIR 2024 SC 3766

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

Create awareness about the POCSO act among children, implement sex education programs. Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 728

Desire to sexually exploit children inherent in the act of watching child sexual exploitative materials. Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 728

Don't use the term 'child pornography', instead use 'child sexual exploitative & abuse material'. Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 728

Governments have the obligation to impart sex education and create awareness among the general public about the statute. Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 728

Knowingly watching child pornography over the internet without downloading amounts to 'possession' under POCSO act. Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 728

Issue of victim support and rehabilitation under the POCSO Act and the Juvenile Justice (JJ) Act - The Court observed the failure of the State machinery under the JJ Act in fulfilling its obligations toward the victim and emphasized the need for remedial actions. It directed the formation of a team of experts, including a clinical psychologist and a social scientist, to meet the victim and help her make an informed choice regarding her future. The team is to carefully ascertain the victim's needs and any support she might be receiving from the accused and his family. The Court emphasized that the process must be handled with sensitivity to avoid causing further insecurity to the victim. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004

Section 4 and 6 - Indian Penal Code, 1860; Sections 376 (2) and 506 - Continued use of the "two-finger test" on rape survivors, despite previous rulings condemning the practice - Referred to its earlier decisions in Lillu alias Rajesh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 643 and State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai, (2022) 14 SCC 299, which decried the test as regressive and invasive. A circular issued by the Government of Meghalaya on June 27, 2024, prohibiting the test and mandating disciplinary action for non-compliance, was noted and placed on record. The circular directs all government doctors and medical practitioners in Meghalaya to cease conducting the test immediately, with strict disciplinary actions, including suspension and penalties, to be imposed for non-compliance. It also mandates adherence to medico-legal guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare and emphasizes the importance of compassionate care for sexual assault survivors. After reviewing the case, found no merit to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court dismissed the petition on merits, upholding the conviction, and urged full compliance with the circular. (Para 4 - 8) Sunshine Kharpan v. State of Meghalaya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 654

Section 19(6) - The Court expressed concern over the failure of the State machinery to follow the mandatory rehabilitation provisions under Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act. Emphasizing the importance of victim rehabilitation, the Court directed the formation of a committee comprising experts from NIMHANS or TISS to assist the victim in making an informed choice regarding her future. The State was instructed to provide the committee with details of the benefits available to the victim. The Court also directed all States and Union Territories to implement the provisions of Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act and Section 46 of the Juvenile Justice Act and submit compliance reports. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004

Section 33 (5) - Recall of Witness under Section 311 of Cr.P.C – Protection of Child from Repeated Testimony – a child should not be repeatedly called to testify to protect them from further trauma. Mechanical recall of the victim would defeat the protective purpose of the POCSO Act. Madhab Chandra Pradhan v. State of Odisha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 615

Sex education is not a western concept, misconception that it encourages promiscuity among youth. Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 728

Storage of child pornography without deletion or reporting indicates intention to transmit, constitutes POCSO Act offence. Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 728

The accused was not an adolescent, but his age was about twenty-five years on the date of the commission of the offence, and the victim was only fourteen years old. When such offences of rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault are committed, by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and/or Section 482 of the Cr.PC, the High Court cannot acquit an accused whose guilt has been proved. Even if the accused and the victim (who has now attained majority) were to come out with a settlement, the High Court could not have quashed the prosecution. (Para 21 & 23.1) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004

The State had a duty to provide care and protection to the victim of an offense under the POCSO Act. Despite the legal framework in place, the State failed in its responsibilities. The court emphasized that under Section 19 of the POCSO Act, police must report such cases to the Child Welfare Committee (CWC) within 24 hours. Similarly, under Section 29 of the Juvenile Justice Act, the CWC is empowered to ensure the care and protection of children in need. The court further underscored the obligations of the CWC to act swiftly in cases of sexually abused children and take suo motu cognizance where necessary. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005

Alteration / modification / revocation of an order passed under Section 12 of the DV Act can be sought through Section 25(2) only on the basis of change of circumstances which took place subsequent to the passing of the order. S. Vijikumari v. Mowneshwarachari C., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 745

The Act is a piece of Civil Code which is applicable to every woman in India irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social background for a more effective protection of her rights guaranteed under the Constitution and in order to protect women victims of domestic violence occurring in a domestic relationship. S. Vijikumari v. Mowneshwarachari C., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 745

Railway Accident

Claimants entitled to benefit of higher compensation prescribed after the date of incident. Doli Rani Saha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 575

Reasoning

Judgment cannot be sustained in absence of reasoning. State Project Director, UP Education for all Project Board v. Saroj Maurya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 647

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

Disability assessment boards must apply mind - Disability assessment boards are not just monotonous automation to just look at the quantified benchmark disabilities as set out in the certificate of disability to cast aside a candidate. Such an approach would be antithetical to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution and all canons of justice, equality and good conscience. The Disability assessment boards are obliged to assess the further question as to whether the candidate, in the opinion of the experts, would be eligible to pursue the course or in other words whether the disability will or will not come in the way of the candidate pursuing the course in question. (Para 46) Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770

Government and private sector should focus on how to accommodate, not disqualify, candidates with disabilities. Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770

Mere existence of a benchmark disability is not a reason to bar a person from pursuing medical education unless there is a report by the disability assessment board that that candidate is incapacitated from studying the MBBS course. Mere quantification of the disability will not disbar a candidate and the capacity to pursue the course has to be examined by the disability assessment board. The negative opinion of the disability assessment board is not final and can be reviewed by the judicial bodies till appellate forums are created. (Para 50) Omkar Ramchandra Gond v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770

Right to Information Act, 2005

Section 12(4) – Validity of Central Information Commission (Management) Regulations, 2007 framed by the Chief Information Commissioner (CIC) under Section 12(4) of the RTI Act – Powers of the CIC – Held, the use of the words “superintendence, direction and management” in Sections 12(4) of the RTI Act clearly provides the CIC an ambit of power wide enough to frame its own Regulations and to delegate its power to a committee formed by it. While the RTI Act does not explicitly grant CIC the authority to frame Regulations, a purposive interpretation of Section 12(4) reveals that the powers of "superintendence, direction and management" are intended to be comprehensive, enabling the CIC to adopt measures, including the framing of Regulations, that ensure transparency, accountability, and efficient handling of its responsibilities. The Chief Information Commissioner's powers to frame Regulations pertaining to constitution of Benches of the Commission are upheld. (Para 22 & 25) Central Information Commission v. DDA, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 465

Section 12(4) and Central Information Commission (Management) Regulations, 2007; Regulation 22 – Powers of the CIC to constitute Benches within the Commission. Held, Sections 12(4) RTI Act, grants the CIC wide-ranging powers to manage the Commissions' affairs, including the ability to constitute benches. This interpretation aligns with the purpose and objective of the RTI Act, which aims to facilitate the efficient disposal of cases and the effective implementation of the right to information. The absence of an explicit provision for Benches does not negate the CIC's authority to constitute them, as such powers are implicitly included within the scope of the CIC's general superintendence and management responsibilities. The formation of Benches allows for the efficient allocation of work and ensures the timely disposal of cases, which is crucial for upholding the right to information. (Para 15, 16, 17, 18 & 19) Central Information Commission v. DDA, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 465

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

Section 3(1)(r) - Whether mere knowledge of the complainant's caste identity is sufficient to attract the offence - Held, mere knowledge of the complainant's Scheduled Caste identity is not sufficient to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act. The offence must be committed "on the ground" or "for the reason" that the person belongs to a Scheduled Caste. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557

Section 3(1)(r) - The Court emphasized that penal statutes must be interpreted strictly, and the intent to humiliate or insult the complainant must be based on their caste identity. The Court noted that where the legislature intended mere knowledge to be sufficient, it had expressed so in clear terms in other sections of the Act. As the allegations in the present case did not establish that the insult was made because of the complainant's caste, the requirements of Section 3(1)(r) were not met. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557

Section 3(1)(u) - Whether any offence under Section 3(1)(u) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, is prima facie made out in the present FIR/complaint. Held, no prima facie case was made out under Section 3(1)(u) of the Act, 1989. To constitute an offence under this provision, the accused must promote or attempt to promote enmity, hatred, or ill-will against members of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes as a group, through words, signs, or visible representation. The Court found that the video in question did not target Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes as a group but was directed solely against the complainant as an individual. Therefore, the essential ingredients of Section 3(1)(u) were not satisfied. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557

Section 3(1)(r) - Meaning of the expression "intent to humiliate" - Held, the phrase "intent to humiliate" under Section 3(1)(r) must be interpreted within the context of caste-based discrimination. Insult or intimidation must be linked to the caste identity of the victim, arising from practices such as untouchability or entrenched caste hierarchies. Not every insult or intimidation against a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes qualifies as an offence under this provision; it must be motivated by the intention to humiliate based on caste. For the offence to be made out, caste-based remarks or actions reinforcing systemic humiliation must be present. The mere fact that the complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe does not automatically trigger the offence. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557

Section 3(1)(r) - An offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act requires a caste-based intent to humiliate, not just ordinary insult or intimidation. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557

Section 3(1)(r) - For an offence to be made out under this provision, certain specific ingredients must be present. These include intentional insult or intimidation directed at a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe with the intent to humiliate, and this act must occur in a place within public view. Mere insult or intimidation of a person belonging to SC/ST community, without any caste-based motivation, does not suffice to attract Section 3(1)(r). Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557

Section 3(1)(r) - Insult or intimidation does not constitute an offence under the Act unless it is specifically aimed at humiliating the victim because of their caste. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557

Section 18 - Anticipatory Bail – When can it be said that a prima facie case is made out in an FIR/complaint? A prima facie case, which translates to "at first sight" or "based on first impression," is made out in an FIR or complaint when the necessary ingredients to constitute an offence under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 are evident upon a plain reading of the allegations. If such ingredients are absent, no prima facie case is established, and courts are not precluded from granting anticipatory bail despite the bar under Section 18 of the Act. However, when the FIR or complaint does disclose the essential elements of the offence, anticipatory bail becomes unavailable. Its duty is to ensure that the allegations in the complaint are evaluated for their sufficiency in establishing the offence, free from external influence. Additionally, in cases involving digital or social media content, courts may examine the materials referenced in the complaint to assess if the prima facie case is made out. If the ingredients of the offence are not found, the bar under Section 18 does not apply. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557

Section 18 - Anticipatory Bail – Significance of the Expression "Arrest of Any Person" - Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, 1989 does not impose an absolute restriction on anticipatory bail; rather, it applies when a valid arrest under CrPC provisions can be made. For an arrest to be lawful under Section 41 of the CrPC, there must be a reasonable belief, credible information, or reasonable suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, and the arrest must be necessary for purposes like preventing further offences or ensuring proper investigation. Thus, the bar on anticipatory bail under Section 18 only applies if prima facie evidence points to the commission of an offence under the Act. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557

Section 18 – Anticipatory Bail – Absolute Bar on Grant of Anticipatory Bail – Constitutionality - The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Section 18 imposes an absolute bar on the grant of anticipatory bail for offenses under the Act. The provision does not violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, as the offenses under the Act form a separate class arising from the historical practice of untouchability and systemic oppression against SC/ST communities. Section 18 was upheld as it is necessary to prevent potential threats and intimidation by the accused, ensuring victims are not obstructed in pursuing justice. The Court acknowledged concerns of misuse but emphasized that the provision aligns with the object of the Act to protect vulnerable sections of society and uphold their dignity. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557

Service

Any decision taken by the State Government to reduce an employee's pay scale and recover the excess amount cannot be applied retrospectively and that too after a long time gap. Any step of reduction in the pay scale and recovery from a Government employee would tantamount to a punitive action because the same has drastic civil as well as evil consequences. (Para 21 & 26) Jagdish Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : AIR 2024 SC 3950

Article 226 - High Court should not re-appreciate evidence led in departmental enquiry. State of Rajasthan v. Bhupendra Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 569 : AIR 2024 SC 4034

A statutory body such as a University cannot act unfairly and arbitrarily in matters of regularization. The decision to regularize should not be based "on the whims of the decision-making authority"; rather, it should have good reasons to justify the exercise of its power. Maitreyee Chakraborty v. Tripura University, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : AIR 2024 SC 4431

Dying in Harness - When the termination of a contractual appointment is stigmatic, the principles of natural justice have to be followed. Merely because an appointment was made on a contract basis, following an application for compassionate appointment, would not constitute an appointment under Dying in Harness Rules. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Brijesh Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 628 : AIR 2024 SC 4424

Eligibility of re-designated Research Assistants for the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS). Held: Research Assistants, although re-designated as Lecturers or Assistant Professors, do not qualify for CAS benefits unless they were directly recruited as Assistant Professors. The CAS requires eight years of service following a "regular appointment," a term that excludes re-designation. The Court emphasized the distinction between cadres of re-designated and directly appointed Assistant Professors and clarified that such differentiation is crucial for determining benefits under the CAS. Additionally, the Court ruled that any benefits already paid to the respondents should not be recovered, though future benefits would be calculated notionally, excluding CAS benefits. Rajasthan Agricultural University v. Dr. Zabar Singh Solanki, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 555 : AIR 2024 SC 3941

Bihar City Manager Cadre (Appointment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2014 - The candidate, who applied for the position of City Manager scored 22.575 marks (32.14%) out of 70, which exceeded the required 32% threshold. However, her candidature was rejected due to having zero work experience. The BSSC had considered work experience as part of the minimum qualifying marks, thus counting her total score out of 100 marks instead of just the written examination score. The Supreme Court, upholding the High Court's findings, ruled that the BSSC's approach was contrary to the statutory rules, and clarified that while work experience marks should be considered in the final merit list, the candidate's qualifying score in the written exam entitled her to be included in the merit list. The appeal by the BSSC was dismissed. (Para 16) Bihar Staff Selection Commission v. Himal Kumari, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 483

Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) - Termination of Employment for Suppression of Information in Verification Roll - Whether Justified ? The respondent had deliberately withheld material information regarding a pending criminal case, despite having knowledge of it, and had made false statements in his Verification Roll and during disciplinary proceedings. Upholding the employer's decision to terminate the respondent's employment, the Court emphasized the importance of maintaining high moral standards, particularly in law enforcement agencies, where credibility and trustworthiness are paramount. (Para 24 - 25) Union of India v. Shishu Pal @ Shiv Pal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 507 : AIR 2024 SC 3652

Changes to government order cannot be applied retrospectively to alter established seniority rankings. V. Vincent Velankanni v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 762

Compassionate Appointments - Any appointment obtained through fraudulent means cannot be sustained. Union of India v. Prohlad Guha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 543 : AIR 2024 SC 3588

Employees promoted to a particular cadre cannot claim the benefits of promotion when they were not even born in the cadre. Mhabemo Ovung v. M. Moanungba, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 629 : AIR 2024 SC 4637

Employees governed by different rules and having different duties can't claim parity merely based on the same qualification. Indian Council of Agricultural Research v. Rajinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : AIR 2024 SC 4334

Grant of advance increments for Ph.D. to technical personnel in ICAR - The Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, created two services, Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and Technical Service (TS), governed by separate service rules. The respondents, technical personnel at ICAR, filed applications for two advance increments on acquiring Ph.D. degrees, similar to those granted to scientists in the ARS under a scheme dated 27.02.1999. The Tribunal and the High Court allowed their claim, equating technical personnel with scientists for this benefit. Whether technical personnel are entitled to the same increments as scientists for obtaining Ph.D. qualifications. Whether the Tribunal and High Court erred in applying Article 14 to grant such benefits. Held, Technical personnel and scientists belong to different services, governed by separate rules and qualifications. Merely because both are engaged in the research framework, technical personnel cannot claim the benefits specifically granted to scientists. Article 14 does not apply to such cases of differential treatment based on service rules, and that the benefit of two advance increments for Ph.D. acquisition was part of the pay package exclusively for scientists. The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the High Court and Tribunal were set aside. Indian Council of Agricultural Research v. Rajinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : AIR 2024 SC 4334

Guidelines sanctioning award of excess bonus marks on a differential basis is challenged to be discriminatory and ultra vires the Rules – Bonus marks fixed for applicants with project experience and other applicants are different – Guidelines for the selection were issued before the advertisement for the post – Held, the experience gathered from project work stood on a higher pedestal because it was in tune with the nature of the work of the position of appointment – Hence, there is no illegality in the prescription of additional marks for those applicants who had experience of working in projects, while recruiting Prabhodhaks. (Para 29 & 40) Mahesh Chand Bareth v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 442

It is true that an employee engaged on daily wages has no legally vested right to seek regularisation of his services. However, if the competent authority takes a policy decision within the permissible framework, its benefit must be extended to all those who fall within the parameters of such a policy. Authorities cannot be permitted to pick and choose in such circumstances. (Para 5) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyam Kumar Yadav, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 515

Limiting candidates for interview necessary to enhance efficiency and transparency of the selection process. Sukhmander Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 749

Once the termination order is set aside and judgment of the High Court dismissing the writ petition challenging the said termination order has also been set aside, the natural consequence is that the employee should be taken back in service and thereafter proceeded with as per the directions. Once the termination order is set aside then the employee is deemed to be in service. Anantdeep Singhv v. High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 683

Mere grant of prosecution sanction against a Central Government employee is not a reason to put the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) in a sealed cover. Union of India v. Doly Loyi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 742

Pension is a right and not a bounty. It is a constitutional right for which an employee is entitled on his superannuation. However, pension can be claimed only when it is permissible under the relevant rules or a scheme. If an employee is covered under the Provident Fund Scheme and is not holding a pensionable post, he cannot claim pension, nor the writ court can issue mandamus directing the employer to provide pension to an employee who is not covered under the rules. (Para 35) U.P. Roadways Retired Officials and Officers Association v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 517

Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Prabodhak Service Rules, 2008; Rule 13(v) which provides for age relaxation to the persons serving under educational projects is challenged to be discriminatory and contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India – Fixing of minimum and maximum age requirement is a policy decision – There was a valid classification based on intelligible differentia which distinguished applicants with project experience and those who lacked project experience. Further the differentia had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Rules. Held, the historical background leading to the enactment of the Rules itself provides a justification for granting relaxation to the persons serving under the educational project, if they fulfil the condition that they were within the age limit when they were initially engaged. Hence, relaxation provided for in Rule 13(v) is not arbitrary or unreasonable. (Para 22, 24 & 25) Mahesh Chand Bareth v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 442

Resignation is not final until its acceptance is communicated to the employee. S.D. Manohara v. Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : AIR 2024 SC 4308

Retrospective Promotion - A promotion shall be effective from the date on which it is granted and not from the date when a vacancy occurs on the subject post or when the post itself is created. (Para 18) Bihar State Electricity Board v. Dharamdeo Das, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 506 : AIR 2024 SC 4609

Similarly placed employees discriminated - Regularization of worker who served for 30 years. Ushaben Joshi v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 612

Supreme Court grants relief to UPSC aspirant who missed re-medical test in 2014, allows his appointment on clearing test. Rakshit Shivam Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 547

Supreme Court imposes 1 lakh cost on man for repeated litigations to change birth date in service records. Balbir Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 689

Supreme Court upholds quashing of disciplinary proceedings against professor who couldn't join duty due to covid. Kerala Agricultural University v. T.P. Murali @ Murali Thavara Panen, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 663

'Temporary' employees working for decades like regular government employees can't be denied equal benefits. Rajkaran Singh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : AIR 2024 SC 4321

Whenever a Scheme/Policy is brought into force, ceteris paribus, the Court could not and would not import something which is not present therein and which may not be proper to be interfered with, especially when it relates to financial matters where primacy is required to be granted to the pay-master as to what scale was to be granted to the category of staff concerned. By its very nature, such exercise would fall under the realm of policy-formulation. (Para 20) Rajasthan Agricultural University v. Dr. Zabar Singh Solanki, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 555 : AIR 2024 SC 3941

When non-renewal of an employee's contract is for disciplinary reasons, formal enquiry is necessary. Swati Priyadarshini v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : AIR 2024 SC 4339

The appellant, a retired IAS officer appointed as the State Vigilance Commissioner, challenged the pay scale offered to him upon his appointment, contending it was lower than that accorded to his predecessors who were granted pay parity with the Chief Secretary. The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court, which was initially allowed by a Single Judge. However, this decision was reversed on appeal by the Division Bench, which upheld the original terms of the appellant's pay. Whether the appellant, who accepted the terms of his appointment unreservedly, is entitled to a pay scale equivalent to that of the Chief Secretary. Held, the appellant, having voluntarily accepted the terms of his appointment, could not later claim a higher pay scale. The Court also rejected the invocation of the "equal pay for equal work" principle, noting it was inapplicable as the post of State Vigilance Commissioner was unique with no comparable positions during the appellant's tenure. Appeal dismissed. Metongmeren Ao v. State of Nagaland, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 657

The appellant challenged a censure penalty imposed for gross negligence and indifference in the performance of his duties, asserting that he had not been afforded an opportunity to show cause prior to the imposition of the penalty, thus breaching the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991, and the principles of natural justice. The Court found that a notice had been issued by the Circle Officer seeking the appellant's explanation regarding pending investigations, and his response was deemed unsatisfactory by the senior police officials. The censure, as a minor penalty under Rule 4, was properly imposed by the Superintendent of Police, who acted within the jurisdiction conferred by the Rules. The High Court had correctly dismissed the writ petition and appeal of the appellant, upholding the validity of the censure entry in his service record. Sub Inspector Sanjay Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 758

There cannot be a discrimination amongst the homogenous class of the candidates based on their date of admission who secured admission to the same course through the same process in the same academic session while determining their eligibility for getting an appointment to a particular position. Manilal v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 685 : AIR 2024 SC 4404

When recruitment for public posts is being done, authorities shall preserve answer scripts of candidates until the process is complete, to obviate any allegations of wrong-doing. Khunjamayum Bimoti Devi v. State of Manipur, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 756

Slum Rehabilitation

Slum rehabilitation scheme not to be seen as a real estate development project, it's linked to right to life. Yash Developers v. Harihar Krupa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : AIR 2024 SC 4113

Special Leave Petition

Show proof of applying for certified copy while seeking exemption from filing certified copy of judgment with SLP. Harsh Bhuwalka v. Sanjay Kumar Bajoria, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 554

The Supreme Court prima facie disagrees that a second SLP can be filed if the first SLP was dismissed without any reasons or was withdrawn. N.F. Railway Vending and Catering Contractors Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 542

Specific Performance

Limitation period for a specific performance suit will run from the date fixed for the performance and not from the expiry of the validity of the agreement. Usha Devi v. Ram Kumar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 568 : AIR 2024 SC 4591

Specific Relief Act, 1963

Section 16(c) - Mandatory requirement of demonstrating readiness and willingness - Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. As such, the Courts, while exercising power to grant specific performance of contract, need to be extra careful and cautious in dealing with the pleadings and the evidence in particular led by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made out a case for grant of relief of specific performance of contract. The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and balances which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief. The pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(C) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. (Para 22(i)) P. Ravindranath v. Sasikala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 491

Section 19(b) – Specific performance of the suit agreement – Held, the defendants, who are subsequent purchasers, fail to prove that they entered into the sale deed in good faith and without notice of earlier suit agreement. Hence, in view of Section 19(b), a decree for specific performance of the sale agreement can be passed against such defendants. (Para 16) Maharaj Singh v. Karan Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 473 : AIR 2024 SC 3328 : (2024) 8 SCC 83

Section 28 - An application under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, can be filed before the trial court even if the decree for specific performance was passed by the appellate Court. Ishwar v. Bhim Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 651 : AIR 2024 SC 4232

Section 28 - Execution Court can entertain application under Section 28 provided it's the Court which passed the decree in terms of Section 37 CPC. Ishwar v. Bhim Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 651 : AIR 2024 SC 4232

Section 31 - It is not mandatory for a third party, against whom a sale deed is void, to seek its cancellation. Golam Lalchand v. Nandu Lal Shaw, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : AIR 2024 SC 4193

In the present case, the Court found substantial irregularities in the findings of the courts below concerning an agreement to sell agricultural land. The appellant-defendant challenged the authenticity of the agreement, arguing that his thumb impression had been obtained on blank stamp paper, with the agreement being transcribed later. Additionally, the respondent-plaintiff, a police constable, failed to seek departmental permission for a high-value purchase, raising further doubts about the transaction's legitimacy. After examining evidence, the Court concluded that the respondent-plaintiff's claim of a valid agreement and payment of Rs.16,00,000 as earnest money was unsubstantiated, indicating a fraudulent and concocted case. The lower courts overlooked critical factual discrepancies, warranting the Supreme Court's intervention. The Court allowed the appeal, quashing the judgments of the trial court, first appellate court, and High Court, holding them perverse and unsustainable. Lakha Singh v. Balwinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 755

Stamp

Insufficiently stamped document not admissible merely because it was exhibited unless deficiency is cured. Bidyut Sarkar v. Kanchilal Pal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 723

Stamp Act, 1957 (Karnataka) - Procedure for admitting insufficiently stamped instruments - Explained. Seetharama Shetty v. Monappa Shetty, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 648

Stamp Act, 1957 (Karnataka) - Levy of ten times penalty on deficit stamp duty to admit document in evidence - Approved. N.M. Theerthegowda v. Y.M. Ashok Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 668 : AIR 2024 SC 4409

When an agreement for sale consists of a clause to hand over possession of the property, then it has to be treated as "conveyance" for the purpose of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. Therefore, the liability to pay stamp duty will arise at the time of the execution of such an agreement for sale. The fact that a sale deed was ultimately executed in pursuance of the agreement for sale and that stamp duty was paid on such sale deed will not absolve the primary liability of paying the appropriate stamp duty at the time of execution of the sale agreement. Because, in such a case, the agreement for sale is the principal document, the Court stated, referring to Explanation 1 to Article 25 of Schedule-I of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. Shyamsundar Radheshyam Agrawal v. Pushpabai Nilkanth Patil, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 741

Standards of Weight & Measures (Packaged Commodity) Rules, 1977

Rule 2(x)(iii) & 29 and Central Excise Act, 1944; Section 4A –Wholesale package – Rule 29 does not require a declaration of sale price on the wholesale package. The respondent is selling HDPE bags containing 100 poly packs each to the distributors and dealers. The Commissioner held that an HDPE bag containing 100 poly packs does not contain a declaration of selling price and therefore, it would be a wholesale package. Rule 29 do not require the display of price on such HDPE bags. Held, HDPE bags would be covered by the definition of 'wholesale package' as defined in clause (iii) of Rule 2(x) of the said Rules. Hence, duty under Section 4A(1) of the Excise Act was not applicable to the goods and subject matter of the show cause notices, cannot be faulted with. (Para 17 & 18) Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur -II v. Miraj Products Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 470

Rule 2(q) – “Retail sale” – to attract the definition of retail sale, a commodity has to be sold, distributed, or delivered for consumption by an individual, a group of individuals, or any other consumer. Thus, the sale or distribution of a commodity to a dealer who, in turn, sells the commodity to retail dealers will not be a retail sale. (Para 11) Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur -II v. Miraj Products Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 470

Stay

If an interim protection order passed by a High Court stood automatically vacated pursuant to Asian Resurfacing but the trial has not been concluded, the vacation of stay shall be invalid and inoperative from the date of overruling. Pawan Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 511

Suppression of Facts

Such litigants have no place in Court - Supreme Court imposes Rs. 10 lakh fine on litigant company for suppression of facts. Shristi Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited v. Avishek Gupta, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 767

Tax

Finance Act, 1994; Section 65(19)(ii) r/w. 65(105)(zzb) - Sale of lottery tickets by a State Government is not a service but an activity to earn additional revenue. Hence, the wholesale lottery purchasers are not promoting or marketing any service rendered by the State so as to attract service tax liability under the head "business auxiliary service”. (Para 6) K. Arumugam v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 639

Mere insertion of an explanation cannot make an activity a taxable service when it is not covered under the main provision. (Para 6.10) K. Arumugam v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 639

Tamil Nadu Entertainment Tax Act not applicable to the online cinema ticket booking charges. Commercial Tax Officer v. PVR Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 533

Technological impediment cannot be a reason to harass an assessee. Sunil Bakht v. Asst. Director of Income Tax, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 751

Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (Gujarat) - Section 11(3)(b) - Definition of "purchase price" does not include VAT. State of Gujarat v. Ambuja Cement Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 544

Vodafone Idea is not liable to deduct tds on charges paid to non-resident telecom operators. Deputy Director of Income Tax v. Vodafone Idea Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 522

Temple

Supreme Court dismisses Guru Manicka Prabhu temple head's claim over Chennai's Arulmighu Kamakala Kameshwarar temple property. Siddaraja Manicka Prabhu Temple v. Idol of Arulmighu Kamakala Kameshwarar Temple, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 697 : AIR 2024 SC 4417

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Section 3 Explanation 1 and Registration Act 1908; Section 17(2) – Constructive notice of sale agreement – Under the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act 1976, clause (v) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act 1908 was amended, which made an agreement for the sale of an immovable property, a compulsorily registerable document in the State. Held, in view of explanation 1 to Section 3 of the TP Act, the second to fourth defendants shall be deemed to have knowledge of the suit agreement, which was duly registered in view of the constructive notice. Hence, it cannot be said that they paid money in good faith to the first Defendant. Therefore, the second to fourth defendants can never be held to be bona-fide purchasers who have paid consideration in good faith without the notice of the suit agreement. (Para 13) Maharaj Singh v. Karan Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 473 : AIR 2024 SC 3328 : (2024) 8 SCC 83

Section 52 – Doctrine of lis pendens – Lis pendens does not render all transfers pendente lite to be void ab-initio, it merely renders rights arising from such transfers as subservient to the rights of the parties to the pending litigation and subject to any direction that the Court may pass thereunder. The mere fact that the registered sale deed was executed during the pendency of the Underlying Suit does not automatically render it null and void. Held, there exists no bar to the impleadment of transferees pendente lite with notice. Permitting the impleadment of a transferee pendente lite is, in each case, a discretionary exercise undertaken to enable a purchaser with a legally enforceable right to protect their interests especially when the transferor fails to defend the suit or where there is a possibility of collusion. Further held, the Appellant has a registered sale deed in his favour and in the interest of justice the appellant is entitled to impleadment in the Underlying Suit in order to protect his interests, if any, in the Subject Land. Hence, the Appellant is directed to be added as a party defendant in the Underlying Suit. (Para 16, 17, 21 & 22) Yogesh Goyanka v. Govind, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 457 : AIR 2024 SC 3903 : (2024) 7 SCC 524

Section 54 – Zamindari Abolition Act; Section 154B - Prohibition of the sale or transfer of agricultural lands to a person who is not an agriculturalist – Section 154-B permits the sale of agricultural land to a non-agriculturalist with the permission of the State Government for the purposes specified in clause (i) to (v) of clause (h). Held, an 'agreement for sale' does not transfer the property subject matter of the agreement to the purchaser and does not create any interest in the property subject matter of the agreement. Therefore, the embargo created by sub-section (1) of Section 154-B will apply only to the execution of the sale deed and not to the execution of the agreement for sale. Further held, a decree enjoining the defendants to obtain permission to sell the suit property can be passed and a decree for the specific performance can be passed contingent upon the grant of the permission. (Para 17 & 18) Maharaj Singh v. Karan Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 473 : AIR 2024 SC 3328 : (2024) 8 SCC 83

Section 58 (f) - Production of title deeds of the property as a security towards the debt amounts to the creation of a 'mortgage by deposit of title deeds'. A.B. Govardhan v. P. Ragothaman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 626 : AIR 2024 SC 4269

Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019

Application process for a PAN card - Requested that certificates issued by District Magistrates under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act be accepted for the application process. The Union of India broadly accepted the demands made in the petition. The Supreme Court observed that the Union of India may consider incorporating these provisions into formal rules for greater clarity. Reshma Prasad @ Ramesh Prasad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 623

Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967

A constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused-undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part. (Para 32) Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : AIR 2024 SC 3579 : (2024) 8 SCC 293

Bail - Denial of - Chhattisgarh Vishesh Jan Suraksha Act, 2005 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - National Investigation Agency Act, 2008; Section 21(4) - Co-accused had been granted bail and that there was no likelihood of early conclusion of the trial, with only 40 out of 100 prosecution witnesses examined. The petitioner has been in custody since 2020. Bail granted. Mukesh Salam v State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 641

'Bail is the rule, jail is the exception' even in special statutes like the UAPA. If the conditions in the special statute for the grant of bail are met, then bail should be granted. Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : AIR 2024 SC 4380

In the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to grant bail. But it would be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of our constitutional jurisprudence. (Para 32) Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : AIR 2024 SC 3579 : (2024) 8 SCC 293

The judgement in the case of NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 cannot be cited as a precedent to deny bail in UAPA cases where the accused has suffered long incarceration. (Para 28) Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : AIR 2024 SC 3579 : (2024) 8 SCC 293

The validity of sanction should be challenged at the earliest instance available, before the Trial Court. If such a challenge is raised at an appellate stage it would be for the person raising the challenge to justify the reasons for bringing the same at a belated stage. Such reasons would have to be considered independently so as to ensure that there is no misuse of the right of challenge with the aim to stall or delay proceedings. Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : AIR 2024 SC 4684

The timelines mentioned in Rules 3 & 4 of the 2008 Rules are couched in mandatory language and, therefore, have to be strictly followed. This is keeping in view that UAPA being a penal legislation, strict construction must be accorded to it. Timelines imposed by way of statutory Rules are a way to keep a check on executive power which is a necessary position to protect the rights of accused persons. Independent review by both the authority recommending sanction and the authority granting sanction, are necessary aspects of compliance with Section 45 of the UAPA. Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : AIR 2024 SC 4684