Subramanium: Yes, the feter is with purpose of exercising 370.
CJI: At the best it is an implied limitation.
Subramanium: It is implied. Even though it is implied, it is strongly expressed in the architecture of the whole of 370.
CJI: Are you suggesting that when a proclamation under Art 356 is in operation, there is a feter on the exercise of power under second proviso of Art 370(1)(d)?
Subramanium: Sans that, there is a polarity in 370- president on one hand and state government on another hand. That polarity cannot be merged.
Subramanium: The expression "state government" for the purpose of 370, by the very nature of that article, contemplates a validly elected, democratically constituted state government, accountable to an assembly.
Subramanium: CO 273 is a clear order under (3).
Subramanium: An adaptation order can be passed whenever a law prior to the commencement of Constitution which continues as on the date of commencement of Constitution needs to be brought in conformity in the Constitution.
CJI: You're saying that what is done by CO 272 is to directly amending Art 370(3) and this couldn't be done by amendment of an interpretative provision. What if they had done by an adaptation order?
Subramanium: This is a direct amendment to Art 370(3). And that amendment cannot be achieved by an interpretation provision. This is insofar as CO 272 is concerned.
Subramanium: In other words, if constituent assembly and legislative assembly by their very nature are different bodies, then it cannot be an interpretation that Constituent Assembly shall read legislative assembly.
Subramanium: If you see the new clause (d)- "Constituent Assembly should read legislative assembly of the State". Is this interpretation? Is this exception permissible in a clause of interpretation?