Time-Barred Civil Contempt Petitions Can't Be Entertained Mechanically Accepting Bogey Of 'Continuing Wrong': Supreme Court

The Supreme Court bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Datta has interpreted Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and held that the action for contempt should be brought within a year, and not beyond, from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.

In this case, the first respondent filed a contempt petition in 2014 against the non-compliance of the High Court order issued in 2009. The respondent argued that the contempt petition is not time-barred because the non-compliance resulted in continuous wrong, which was upheld by a Single Judge of the High Court and then by a division bench of the High Court in review.

However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument and held: “Even if contempt is committed and within the stipulated period of one year from such commission no action is brought before the court on the specious ground that the contempt has been continuing, no party should be encouraged to wait identifiable to choose his time to approach the court.”

It further remarked stale claims of contempt, often camouflaged as a “continuing wrong/breach/offence” cannot be entertained under Section 20.

In this regard, it held: “If the bogey of “continuing wrong/breach/offence” is mechanically accepted whenever it is advanced as a ground for claiming exemption, an applicant may knock the doors of the Court any time suiting his convenience. If an action for contempt is brought belatedly, say any time after the initial period of limitation and years after the date of first breach, it is the prestige of the court that would seem to become a casualty during the period the breach continues. Once the dignity of the court is lowered in the eyes of the public by non-compliance of its order, it would be farcical to suddenly initiate proceedings after long lapse of time.”

Therefore, the court held that per Section 20 read with Rule 21 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977 (as applicable in this case), the limitation for the initiation of contempt action commenced on May 4, 2009, after two months from when the High Court order was pronounced as stipulated in Rule 21, and it ended on May 3, 2010.

In this case, the court found that the order of the High Court was wilfully not complied. However, it held that compliance with the order can only be sought within the four courts of the contempt petition. Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that the orders, upholding the legality of the contempt petition, are unsustainable in the eyes of the law.

The court has further clarified the period of limitation does not stand extended to the last of repeated representations made by a party, if filing of representation is not statutorily provided.

When can a contempt petition be filed beyond the time stipulated?

The Supreme Court has highlighted that there could be cases where the party wants to seek an exemption from the law of limitation under Section 20. This could be done per the principle flowing from Order VII Rule 6 (Grounds of exemption from limitation law) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by showing the grounds upon which the exemption is claimed. However, the principle under Order VII Rule 6 could only be invoked if there exists an object and purpose for which the jurisdiction to punish for contempt is exercised by the court, and it is satisfied that the benefit of such an exemption ought to be extended in the given case.

However, the court has held that the benefit of exemption cannot be granted on equitable consideration or on the grounds of hardship. It relied on the decision of the Privy Council in Maqbul Ahmad vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh (1935).

Specifically for claiming exemption on the ground of continuing wrong/breach/offence, the court said: “Where a civil contempt is alleged by a party by referring to a “continuing wrong/breach/offence” and such allegation prima facie satisfies the court, the action for contempt is not liable to be nipped in the bud merely on the ground of it being presented beyond the period of one year as in section 20 of the Act.”

Continuing wrong/breach/offence is mentioned under Section 22 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1963 as: “In the case of a continuing breach of contract or in the case of a continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation beings to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the tort, as the case may be, continuous”.

The interpretation of continuing wrong has been explained by the court in M. Siddiq (Ram Janmabhoomi Temple-5 J.) vs Mahant Suresh Das (2020) as “The mere fact that the effect of the injury caused has continued, is not sufficient to constitute it as a continuing wrong. For instance, when the wrong is complete as a result of the act or omission which is complained of, no continuing wrong arises even though the effect or damage that is sustained may enure in the future. What makes a wrong, a wrong of continuing nature is the breach of a duty which has not ceased but which continues to subsist. The breach of such a duty creates a continuing wrong and hence a defence to a plea of limitation.”

The court further added that for the court to accept the ground of “continuing wrong/breach/offence” as a ground for seeking exemption in an action for contempt, the party must not only show the court what the phrase means but also would be required to show, from the pleadings, the grounds on which the exemption is rested.

In this regard, the court said: “Should the party fail to satisfy the court, the petition is liable to outright rejection.”

In this case, the court found that there was no pleading made by the first respondent seeking exemption based on the ground of “continuing wrong/breach/offence”. It held that the absence of the first respondent's name from the revenue record cannot be characterised as the injury or wrongful act itself. Despite that, the single judge of the High Court had accepted the plea of continuing “wrong/breach/offence”.

The court reprimanded the single judge for going beyond the pleadings and making out a never pleaded case. It said: “The assertion of the contumacious conduct being in the nature of a “continuing wrong/breach/offence” is factual and has to be borne from the pleadings on record. Law is, again, well-settled that when a point is not traceable in the pleas set out either in a plaint or a written statement, findings rendered on such point by the court would be unsustainable as they would amount to an altogether new case being made for the party. Absent such pleading of there being a “continuing wrong/breach/offence”, the finding returned by the Single Judge, since affirmed by the Division Bench (review), cannot be sustained in law.”

Background

As per the brief facts, the legal proceedings began in 1953 when Sultana Jahan Begum, daughter of Nawab Moin-ud-Dowla Bahadur, instituted an original suit before the City Civil Court, Andhra Pradesh, seeking partition of her father's properties known as 'Asman Jahi Paigah'.

The schedule of properties included within it Raidurg village (subject land).

The original suit was eventually transferred to the Andhra Pradesh High Court as a civil suit. On April 6, 1959, the high court passed a preliminary decree based on a compromise entered into by and between the parties to the civil suit. Subsequently, Begum withdrew her claims against defendant no. 48, which was Secretary of the Finance Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh. Resultantly, the suit was dismissed unconditionally against Andhra Pradesh.

During the pendency of the suit, Bahadur's son Nawad Zaheer Yar Jung claimed the subject land as Jagir land (feudal land) before the Nazim-e-Atiyat (competition court or authority which decides claims to succession). However, this claim was rejected vide an order dated October 28, 1968, wherein it was stated that no document granting Paigah (title) of the subject land to Bahadur existed. This order was confirmed by the Board of Revenue in 1976, which held that the subject land stood escheated to the Government.

On October 1, 2003, the decree holders of the civil suit executed a deed of assignment in favour of the first respondent. On 26 December 2003, the high court passed the final decree and judgment in the civil suit in favour of the first respondent for land measuring more or less actress 84.30 guntas forming part of survey no. 46 of the subject land.

Pursuant thereof, the first respondent approached the Tahsildar for the mutation of his name in respect of the decretal property in the revenue records. However, it failed.

Consequently, in 2009, the first respondent filed a writ petition before the high court seeking directions for effecting mutation in terms of the final decree in the civil suit. It was heard with a connected matter being Writ Petition 581/2009.

On March 5, 2009, the court directed the Tahsildar to mutate the names of the decree holders. It directed that those who have purchased parts of the property from the parties to the decree shall be entitled to purchase their remedies once the names of the decree holders have been mutated.

The decision was challenged by one Syed Azizulla Husaini in the Writ Petition 581/2009. The division bench of the High Court modified the March 5 order and directed the Tahsildar to also consider the objections regarding mutation filed by affected parties on August 18, 2009.

However, the Tahsildar (appellant in the current proceedings) did not carry out the objections of the first respondent pursued to the modified order. The first respondent alleged inaction against Tahsildar and instituted a contempt case before the High Court on February 10, 2014.

On October 4, 2017, the single judge of the High Court allowed the contempt petition and directed the Tahsildar to mutate the name of the first respondent in terms of the final decree. However, it did not specify the time frame within which the order was to be implemented.

The court rejected the contention of the State that the petition was barred by limitation because the Tahsildar's failure to obey the order of the court constituted a continuing wrong. Therefore, the Tahsildar was sentenced to simple imprisonment for a term of two months, with a fine of Rs. 1500/-.

The Tahsildar challenged the decision through a Contempt Appeal (presented against the punishment imposed on him) and a Letter Patent appeal (against the direction for mutation of the name of the first respondent).

On August 16, 2018, the division bench of the High Court allowed both appeals and set aside the October 4 order primarily because the contempt petition was time-barred and the preliminary decree recorded in the civil suit was withdrawn against the State Government in 1959.

As a consequence, the State could not be bound to effect mutation in the revenue records in terms of the decree which is unenforceable against it, the high court reasoned.

It was also held that the attempt of the first respondent to seek a direction of mutation against the State based on the decree was fraudulent.

The first respondent subsequently filed a special leave petition in 2018 and a review petition in 2019 before the Supreme Court, which were dismissed. He then filed a review petition challenging the August 16 order and judgment before the high court.

A division bench of the High Court subsequently allowed the review petitions. It held that the State failed to obtain a decree against the first respondent or his predecessors-in-interest about the claim that the subject land belonged to the government.

The High Court held that the State suppressed material information regarding the title of the subject land and approached the court with unclean hands. It also stated that there is a discrepancy in the Government's stand as it first claimed absolute title over the property based on the right to escheat but later relied on the revenue entries to claim it was a Government land.

Therefore, it rejected the State's contention that the contempt action was time-barred and held that it was a continuing wrong.

It relied on the decision in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian (2001), wherein it was held that the period of limitation would only commence upon the date from which the fraud had been discovered.

Further, the court examined additional documents like sale deeds, orders by revenue authorities, and governmental memos to conclude that the subject land was the self-acquired private property of the first respondent's predecessor-in-interest. One of such additional documents was an order of the Board of Revenue dated November 19, 1959 which allegedly confirmed that the subject land was a private property.

The order of the High Court's division bench in the review petition has been challenged before the Supreme Court in the present case on different grounds, including that the failure to mutate the names was not a continuing wrong and, therefore, the contempt petition was barred by limitation.

Case Number: SLP (Civil) Nos.19748-19749 of 2022

Citation : 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 503

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