S.116 Evidence Act | Tenant Cannot Deny Landlord's Title At Beginning Of Tenancy Until Eviction/ Surrender Of Possession: Calcutta HC Reiterates

The Division Bench of Justices Tapabrata Chakrabarty and Raju Basu Chowdhury held:

"Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that no tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property; and no person who came upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession thereof shall be permitted to deny that such person had a title to such possession at the time when such licence was given. He cannot deny the same during the pendency of such license or sub-lease, however defective the title of such landlord may be. The significant words under it are 'at the beginning the tenancy'. Such estoppel continues to operate so long as licensee or sub-tenant has not openly restored possession by surrender to such person. This rule of estoppel would cease to operate only after such licensee or sub-tenant has been evicted. In view thereof, respondents cannot be permitted to contend that the property was not belonging to the appellants."

The position of law as laid down by the Court in respect of Section 116 of the Act can be summarised as follows:

(i) The Rule of Estoppel will subsist during the pendency of a license or sub-lease in respect of immovable property, without any consideration on merit as to the defect in the landlord's title in the said immovable property, if any.

(ii) The Rule of Estoppel will bar the tenant from denying the title of the landlord "at the beginning of the tenancy" as long as licensee or sub-tenant has not openly restored possession by surrender to such person.

(iii) The Rule of Estoppel would cease to operate only after the eviction of licensee or sub-tenant from such immovable property.

The Court was deciding an appeal against a lower court judgment dismissing the suit for recovery of possession, mesne profits and injunction moved the Appellant (landlord) in respect of a flat which was the subject of an agreement for leave and license entered into between the Appellant and the Respondents.

The defendant-respondents, even after expiry of the said agreement, purportedly refused to hand over possession of the suit premises and contrary to such agreement, converted the suit premises to a gallery. The lower court dismissed the suit on the basis of its finding that the plaintiffs had failed to adduce any positive evidence in support of their title to the suit property.

Observing that the lower court ought to have ascertained the evidentiary dispute pertaining to the title of the suit property by proper application of the principles of preponderance of probabilities, standard and degree of proof and the probative value of evidence, the Court held:

"A scrutiny of the judgment impugned would reveal that in spite of arriving at a finding that no positive evidence had been adduced on behalf of the respondents to dislodge the appellants' contention that the respondents are actually licensees in respect of the suit property, the learned Court below dismissed the suit as the appellants had failed to prove title over the suit property by producing documents as regards such ownership.

The key to unravel the complexities of the problem posed lies in the pleadings and the deposition tendered by the respective parties. The precise degree of imperfections needs to be investigated and categorised on the rudiments of preponderance of probabilities. Standard of proof cannot be put in a strait-jacket formula. No mathematical formula could be laid on degree of proof. The probative value needs to be gauged from facts and circumstances in a given case."

The Court took stock of an exhibit wherein an admission was made by the respondent as a licensee in respect of the suit property, after expiry of the lease agreement, and further that the respondent was willing to surrender the licence and hand over vacant possession of the suit property to the appellant. The Court noted the sufficiency of such an exhibit to prove the title of the suit premises in favour of the plaintiff-appellants without the need for any further corroboration, holding:

"… It is needless to emphasize that admission of a party in the proceedings is the best evidence and the same does not need any further corroboration. The learned Court below ought to have noted such admitted relationship between the parties. In view of such admission there can be no two opinions in the matter that the respondents are estopped from disputing the title of appellant over the suit premises."

In light of these findings, the appeal was allowed with a direction for recovery of possession of the said suit premises.

Case: Bhargav Chatterjee & Anr. v. Infinity & Associates & Anr., FA 147 of 2018

Date: 08.12.2022

Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Cal) 358