Nominal Index:1. Benedic R. Marak v. State of Meghalaya & Ors. 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 1 2. Megha Technical & Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Meghalaya & Ors. 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 2 3. Sanjeeb Ch. Marak v. State of Meghalaya & Ors. 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 3 4. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Shillong Regional Unit, Shillong v. Shri Ajay Babu...
Nominal Index:
1. Benedic R. Marak v. State of Meghalaya & Ors. 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 1
2. Megha Technical & Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Meghalaya & Ors. 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 2
3. Sanjeeb Ch. Marak v. State of Meghalaya & Ors. 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 3
4. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Shillong Regional Unit, Shillong v. Shri Ajay Babu Manda 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 4
5. Shri Delican Shadap & Anr. v. Smti. Dal Nongtri & Anr. 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 5
6. Cheerfulson Snaitang v. State of Meghalaya 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 6
7. M/s Saj Food Products Pvt. Ltd. Versus State of Meghalaya & Ors. 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 7
8. Miss Bisakha Geonka v. North Eastern Indira Gandhi Regional Institute of Health & Medical Sciences & Anr. 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 8
9. Union of India & Ors. v. Dharamvir Singh 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 9
10. North Eastern Indira Gandhi Regional Institution of Health and Medical Sciences & Anr. v. Bisakha Goenka 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 10
11. Shri. Skhemborlang Suting & Anr. v. State of Meghalaya & Anr. 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 11
12. Morningstar Nongsiej v. State of Meghalaya 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 12
Digest Of Cases Reported:
Case Title: Benedic R. Marak v. State of Meghalaya & Ors.
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 1
The High Court refused to interfere with a notice issued by the Governor of Meghalaya under Rule 36(5) of the Assam and Meghalaya Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951, whereby the District Council had been summoned to take up a no-confidence motion against the Executive Committee of the Garo Hills Autonomous District Council. Stressing upon the need to urgently conduct a floor test, Justice H.S. Thangkhiew observed:
"It has to be kept in mind that the District Council as constituted under the Sixth Schedule is a democratic legislative institution apart from other functions, wherein members are elected, and to prove majority or strength in the house in such institutions, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a number of decisions has consistently held that in the event of conflicting alliances or claims, a floor test can be directed to avoid uncertainty and to ensure smooth running of a democratic institution which would in turn ensure stability."
Case Title: Megha Technical & Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Meghalaya & Ors.
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 2
The High Court has nullified the Meghalaya Cement Cess Act, 2010, holding it to be arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional. While rebuking the State for irrationally raising revenue through the legislation, a Division Bench of Chief Justice Sanjib Banerjee and Justice W. Diengdoh held that the principle is too well established to be questioned. Yet, it will not do for a State in a constitutional republic wedded to the rule of law to suggest that it may indulge in arbitrary or irrational or illegal generation of funds without being liable to return the same upon the Court finding the process to be illegal.
Case Title: Sanjeeb Ch. Marak v. State of Meghalaya & Ors.
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 3
The High Court upheld the removal (sans inquiry) of a member of the State Police Force who was found passing on information pertaining to police operations and movements to a banned and extremist outfit by the name of Garo National Liberation Army. Finding justification in the move to remove him from service without giving him an opportunity to defend the charges levelled against him, the Bench of Chief Justice Sanjib Banerjee and Justice W. Diengdoh observed,
"When a member of the police force was found betraying his own force and supplying information to an extremist outfit that the police organisation was trying to deal with, it was justifiable on the part of the disciplinary authority to consider it to be not reasonably practicable to afford the writ petitioner an opportunity of dealing with the charge against him in the course of any inquiry."
Case Title: Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Shillong Regional Unit, Shillong v. Shri Ajay Babu Manda
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 4
A Single Judge Bench of Justice W. Diengdoh has held that Magistrate cannot employ his power under Sections 451/457, Cr.P.C. when trial or inquiry has not been set in motion. Sections 451 and 457 deal with an order for custody and disposal of property pending trial and procedure by police upon seizure of property respectively. While setting aside the order of the Magistrate under such Sections, observed,
"…at the time of passing of the original impugned order, the matter was still under investigation by the Customs officials and the stage of prosecution has not yet commenced as evident from the fact that the relevant sanction for prosecution by the Principal Commissioner of Customs or Commissioner of Customs have not yet been issued to enable the Court to take cognizance of the offence. Therefore, the learned Magistrate in the absence of a trial or inquiry could not have passed the said impugned order under Section 451/457 Cr.P.C."
Case Title: Shri Delican Shadap & Anr. v. Smti. Dal Nongtri & Anr.
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 5
The Court held that a plaintiff may file application under Section 151 read with Order XX Rule 6A, where suit filed by him is conclusively decided but no formal decree was drawn to that effect. The Single Judge Bench of Justice H.S. Thangkhiew relied on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Sir Sobha Singh and Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Shashi Mohan Kapur (Deceased), wherein it was ruled that so long as the formal decree is not passed, the order was to be treated as a decree during the interregnum period by virtue of Order XX Rule 6A(2) of the Code. In other words, notwithstanding the fact that the decree had not been passed, yet by virtue of principle underlined in Order XX Rule 6A(2) of the Code, the order had the effect of a decree till the date of actual passing of the decree by the Court for the purposes of execution or for any other purpose. This empowered the Executing Court to entertain the execution application and decide the objections raised by the respondent on merits.
Case Title: Cheerfulson Snaitang v. State of Meghalaya
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 6
A Division Bench of the High Court comprising of Chief Justice Sanjib Banerjee and Justice W. Diengdoh held that rubbing male organ on vagina or urethra of prosecutrix despite she wearing her underpants, would still amount to penetration for the purpose of Section 375(b), IPC. Further it observed, penetration for the purpose of Section 375 of the Penal Code does not have to be complete. Any element of penetration would suffice for the purpose of the relevant provision. Section 375(b) of the Penal Code recognises that insertion, to any extent, of any object into the vagina or urethra would amount to rape. Accordingly, even if it be accepted that the appellant herein forced his organ into the vagina or urethra of the victim despite the victim wearing her underpants, it would still amount to penetration for the purpose of Section 375(b) of the Penal Code.
Case Title: M/s Saj Food Products Pvt. Ltd. Versus State of Meghalaya & Ors.
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 7
A Division Bench of the High Court, consisting of Chief Justice Sanjib Banerjee and Justice W. Diengdoh, ruled that rusk is not bread and the Value Added Tax (VAT) exemption available to bread in the state of Meghalaya must not be extended to rusk. The Court relied upon Vasantham Foundry v. Union of India & Ors., wherein the Supreme Court held that cast iron casting could not be regarded as cast iron since the manufactured cast iron was subjected to a further process of manufacture to be converted into cast iron castings, similarly in the present case, the same ingredients that go into the manufacture of bread may, doubtlessly, be used by the petitioner, but upon such bread being manufactured by the petitioner, the petitioner subjects such bread to a further process of manufacturing activity to arrive at its finished product of rusk. Quite obviously, some value is added to bread to make it into rusk, and that would attract VAT.
Case Title: Miss Bisakha Geonka v. North Eastern Indira Gandhi Regional Institute of Health & Medical Sciences & Anr.
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 8
The High Court came to the rescue of a National Eligibility Cum Entrance Test (NEET) candidate who missed her counselling because e-counselling invitation mail was delivered in the spam folder of her e-mail. While allowing the writ petition, a Single Judge Bench of Justice H.S. Thangkhiew observed,
"In this age of technology and in the prevalent COVID situation, a lot of such lapses have occurred especially when it concerns matters like these which involves communication through digital platforms. It is undisputed that the petitioner as per the merit list for the second counselling was placed at No. 4, and as such was assured of a seat for the MBBS Course, had she attended the counselling as scheduled, but however, due to the situation that had prevented her from appearing for the e-counselling, she is at risk of being deprived of a seat to pursue the MBBS Course."
Case Title: Union of India & Ors. v. Dharamvir Singh
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 9
A Division Bench of the High Court comprising of Chief Justice Sanjib Banerjee and Justice W. Diengdoh ruled that 'disciplinary proceedings' should be sparingly quashed in their entirety, only when the 'show-cause notice' leading to such proceedings is bad. In other words, they should only be quashed in their entirety, when the proceedings were bad ab initio. The Bench held that judicial precedents instruct that it is a tall order for a show-cause notice to be quashed, just like an FIR may be quashed only in the rare case when no ingredients of any offence is made out therein.
Case Title: North Eastern Indira Gandhi Regional Institution of Health and Medical Sciences & Anr. v. Bisakha Goenka
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 10
In an interesting development, a Division Bench of the High Court, comprising of Chief Justice Sanjib Banerjee and Justice W. Diengdoh, has conditionally affirmed the decision of the Single Judge, who had provided relief to a National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET) candidate, whose initial e-counselling invitation mail was delivered in her 'spam box'. It observed that there was an element of discretion available to the writ court, considering the peculiar facts of this case; and, though the fundamental principle that ought to have guided the writ court was that upon a default being committed by a candidate, whatever be the circumstances, the consequences of the default must rest with the candidate, since the last placed candidate among the remaining four in this case, quite fortuitously, did not accept the seat, a window opened up for the writ petitioner which has been offered by the writ court in exercise of its discretion. In the circumstances in which the discretion has been exercised, it cannot be said to be perverse.
It concluded that though it does not appear that any right vested in any waitlisted candidate has been prejudiced as a result of the impugned order; however, if any of them lodges a challenge and succeeds, the consequences have to be borne by the writ petitioner. To such extent, the writ petitioner's admission, if at all, was held to be provisional for a period of six months.
Case Title: Shri. Skhemborlang Suting & Anr. v. State of Meghalaya & Anr.
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 11
A Single Judge Bench of Justice W. Diengdoh quashed an FIR and criminal proceedings in a POCSO case registered against a man as it noted that the accused man and victim-wife were living with each other as husband and wife and out of the said union, a child was born. The Bench, however, stressed that such cases of consensual or voluntary sexual intercourse with an underage girl by an adult man while they are living as husband and where the wife gives birth to a child, are complex. Further, the Court noted that being a child and not capable of giving consent, the act of sexual contact made by the husband-accused was contemplated to be punished as aggravated penetrative sexual assault. However, the Court further opined that the act committed under the circumstances of the instant case cannot be called or termed in any logical or rational sense as a case of assault as there was no threat or attempt to inflict offensive physical contact or bodily harm on the girl has been made out.
Case Title: Morningstar Nongsiej v. State of Meghalaya
Citation: 2022 LiveLaw (Meg) 12
The High Court held that the expression "came on top of me" must be construed as a euphemism for commission of 'penetrative sexual assault'. A Division Bench Chief Justice Sanjib Banerjee and Justice W. Diengdoh observed that the statement of the victim recorded in course of her deposition at the trial must be seen in the milieu of how a woman in this country, particularly a girl child, would be intimidated in the foreign and suffocating atmosphere of a court and in the presence of rank strangers to describe how she had been violated. Thus, the expression, "came on top of me" must be seen to be a euphemism for the offender having violated her in the sense of having committed penetrative sexual assault.