Important MCQ's Based On Latest Supreme Court Judgments For Law Examinations
Q 1. Does calling an accused to admit/deny the document produced by the prosecution under Section 294 CrPC violate the right against self-incrimination?a. Yes, the accused has a right to silence.b. Yes, the accused cannot be compelled to be a witness against itself.c. No, the accused cannot be a witness against himself if called upon to admit/deny the documents produced by the prosecution.d....
Q 1. Does calling an accused to admit/deny the document produced by the prosecution under Section 294 CrPC violate the right against self-incrimination?
a. Yes, the accused has a right to silence.
b. Yes, the accused cannot be compelled to be a witness against itself.
c. No, the accused cannot be a witness against himself if called upon to admit/deny the documents produced by the prosecution.
d. Both (a) and (b)
Answer: Option (c)
Explanation: Recently, the Supreme Court in Ashok Daga V. Directorate of Enforcement held that an accused could not be said to be a witness against himself if he was called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of the documents produced by the prosecution under Section 294 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).
Q 2. The Plaintiff based on an earlier compromise recorded between the parties before the Court, filed a fresh suit for possession and temporary injunction against the Appellants/Defendant. Defendant countered Plaintiff's contention and argued that the compromise made between the parties in an earlier suit cannot be recognized as there was no compromise decree passed by the Court because of non-compliance with Order 23 Rule 3 of CPC. Decide.
a. Plaintiff's suit will not succeed because of the settlement recorded between the parties before the Court.
b. Settlement recorded before the Court is a valid settlement, and can be acted upon.
c. Plaintiff's suit will not succeed due to non-compliance with Order 23 Rule 3 of CPC, which says that the compromise must be written and signed by the parties.
d. Both (a) and (c)
Answer: Option (c)
Explanation: The Supreme Court held that a compromise deed cannot be recognized unless it is reduced to writing and signed by the parties. The Court said that the settlement or compromise cannot be said to arrive on mere recording of statements before the Court.
Q 3. The Director being an authorized signatory of the company issued a cheque to the payee, however, the cheque was dishonored on account of insufficient funds in the company's bank account. The complainant sought interim compensation from the Director under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instrument Act, of 1881. Decide the liability of the Director.
a. The director being an authorized signatory would be liable to pay interim compensation as he can be considered as a drawer of cheque.
b. The director being an authorized signatory would not be liable to pay interim compensation as he cannot be considered as a drawer of the cheque.
c. Director is liable to pay interim compensation as the company's liability can be shifted to an authorized signatory on account of the Company's default to honor the cheque.
d. Both (a) and (c)
Answer: Option (b)
Explanation: The Supreme Court held that an authorized signatory of the company could not be considered as a 'drawer' of cheque, and therefore, could not be directed to pay the interim compensation to the complainant under Section 143A of the Negotiable Instruments Act of 1881 (“NI Act”).
Q 4. A defendant's right to file a written statement stands forfeited, however, the defendant participated in the trial and produced its case indirectly through evidence. Decide whether the defendant could introduce his case directly through leading evidence in the trial.
a. Yes, the defendant can introduce the case through leading evidence in the trial despite not filing a written statement.
b. Yes, the defendant can introduce the case through leading evidence in the trial as the participation of the defendant in the trial is not barred.
c. No, when the right to file a written statement in a case has been forfeited than the defendant cannot introduce his case indirectly through evidence or written submission.
d. Both (a) and (b)
Answer: Option (c)
Explanation: The Supreme Court held that a party whose right to file a written statement in a case has been forfeited cannot introduce his case indirectly through evidence or written submission. Such a party can still participate in the proceedings and cross-examine the complainant, but cannot indirectly introduce his case.
Q 5. The appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“the IPC”), and he has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. The prosecution's case was based on the last seen theory as the body was found in the house of the appellant at about 5:00 p.m. on the date of the incident when the accused was present in his house. However, no credible evidence was given by the prosecution to prove the last-seen theory. Decide the applicability of Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
a. Section 106 IEA would not be applicable as the prosecution has not discharged an initial burden of proving the presence of the accused at the crime scene.
b. For invoking Section 106 IEA, the prosecution need not be required to discharge the initial burden of proof as the burden is on the accused to prove the facts which are in his knowledge.
c. For invoking Section 106 IEA, the prosecution should have discharged the initial burden of proof by producing cogent evidence regarding the presence of the accused at the crime scene.
d. Both (a) and (c)
Answer: Option (d)
Explanation: Recently, the Supreme Court acquitted an accused who was charged with the offence of murdering his wife because the prosecution was not able to prove the prima facie case against the accused. For invoking Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act of 1872 (“Evidence Act”), the prosecution ought to have discharged the burden on it by adducing cogent evidence to prove the accused presence at the relevant time in his house when the alleged offence was committed, the court said.
Q 6. Recently, the Supreme Court in ______________ held that sub-classification of Scheduled Castes is permissible to grant separate quotas for more backward within the SC categories.
a. State Of Punjab And Ors. v Davinder Singh And Ors.
b. State Of Punjab And Ors. v Ravinder Singh And Ors.
c. State Of Punjab And Ors. v Kavinder Singh And Ors.
d. State Of Punjab And Ors. v Lavinder Singh And Ors.
Answer: Option (a)
Explanation: The Supreme Court in State Of Punjab And Ors. v Davinder Singh And Ors. held that the States can identify more backward among the SC categories and can sub-classify them for separate quotas within the quota.
Q 7. The Supreme Court in the State Of Punjab And Ors. v Davinder Singh And Ors. while allowing the State to introduce quotas within quota in SC Category overrule which Judgment of the Supreme Court?
a. EV Chinniah v State of Kerala
b. EV Chinniah v. State of Andhra Pradesh
c. ES Chinniah v. State of Kerala
d. EV Chinniah v. State of Karnataka
Answer: Option (b)
Explanation: The majority judgment has overruled the EV Chinniah v. State of Andhra Pradesh judgment of 2004 which held that sub-classification is not permissible. The majority judgment held that sub-classification is permissible amongst the SCs/STs.
Q 8. Recently, the Supreme Court by the ratio of 8:1 delivered a Judgment on the State's taxing powers on the mineral rights and mineral-bearing lands. What is the issue involved in the matter?
a. Whether the Parliamentary law Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act 1957 took away the powers of the State to impose and collect tax on mineral rights.
b. Whether the Parliamentary law Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act 1957 impinges on the State's legislative power to make laws on taxing mineral rights.
c. Whether royalties on mining leases be considered as tax.
d. All of the above
Answer: Option (d)
Explanation: The Supreme Court 9-judge constitution bench today held by an 8:1 majority that States have the power to levy tax on mineral rights and that the Union law - Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act 1957 - does not limit such power of the States.
Q 9. What is the correct position of law if there is a repugnancy between the earlier and later clauses of a deed, whereby a later clause destroys altogether the obligation created by the earlier clause?
a. The later clause is to be rejected as repugnant to the earlier clause and the earlier clause prevails.
b. The later clause is not to be rejected as repugnant to the earlier clause and the earlier clause will not prevail.
c. If the earlier and later clauses of a deed cannot be reconciled then the earlier clause(s) would prevail over the later clause(s) when construing a Deed or a Contract.
d. Both (a) and (c)
Answer: Option (d)
Explanation: The Supreme Court observed that if there is a repugnancy between the earlier and later clauses of a deed, whereby a later clause destroys altogether the obligation created by the earlier clause, then the later clause is to be rejected as repugnant to the earlier clause and the earlier clause prevails.
Q 10. The Prosecution's case was that the prosecutrix/complainant (belonging to the Schedule Caste Community) was engaged in doing household jobs in the house of the accused who tried to outrage her modesty while the prosecutrix/complainant was doing the household chores. Section 3 (1)(xi) bars the use of force on any woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe with the intent to dishonor or outrage her modesty. Decide whether the offence under Section 3 (1)(xi) of the SC/ST Act is made out against the accused.
a. Yes, the accused has committed an offence under the SC/ST Act by outraging the victim's modesty as the victim belonged to the Schedule Caste community.
b. No, there was no intention on the part of the accused to outrage her modesty on the grounds of caste.
c. Section 3(1)(xi) of the SC/ST Act doesn't bar acts committed on the ground of caste.
d. Both (a) and (c)
Answer: Option (b)
Explanation: The Supreme Court observed that the conviction for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989 cannot be sustained if the act of outraging the modesty of a woman was not committed on the ground of caste.
(The questions are drafted by Mr. Yash Mittal. In case of doubt, he can be reached at yash@livelaw.in)