High Court's Intervention On Industrial Tribunal's Decision Is Restricted To Cases Of Perversity: Delhi High Court
The Delhi High Court division bench of Justice Rekha Palli and Justice Sudhir Kumar Jain held that the scope of intervention of the High Court is very limited in matters of factual findings made by Industrial Tribunals unless they were found to be perverse or based on no evidence.The High Court was adjudicating on the letters patent appeals filed by Delhi Doordarshan Kendra, which was accused...
The Delhi High Court division bench of Justice Rekha Palli and Justice Sudhir Kumar Jain held that the scope of intervention of the High Court is very limited in matters of factual findings made by Industrial Tribunals unless they were found to be perverse or based on no evidence.
The High Court was adjudicating on the letters patent appeals filed by Delhi Doordarshan Kendra, which was accused of illegally terminating the employment of its permanent workers by falsely claiming them as 'contract workers'. It was already factually determined by the Industrial Tribunal that the Management was not authorized to employ contract workers, as it lacked a license under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, of 1970.
Brief Facts:
The Respondents (“Workmen”) worked for Delhi Doordarshan Kendra (“Management”). After being removed from service, the Workmen filed a petition before the Industrial Tribunal, alleging wrongful termination by the Management. The Industrial Tribunal directed the Management to reinstate the Workmen with 25% back wages, considering their termination illegal.
Feeling aggrieved, the Management filed a writ petition before the High Court of Delhi (“High Court”). A single-judge bench dismissed the Management's challenge to the award made by the Industrial Tribunal. Dissatisfied by the order of the single judge, the Management filed a Letters Patent appeal in the High Court.
Contentions of the Management:
The Management argued both the Industrial Tribunal and the single judge failed to recognize that the Workmen were never employed directly by the Management, but were engaged by M/S Navnidh Carriers, who provided manpower services to the Management as and when required. Further, the Industrial Tribunal did not assess whether the Workmen had completed 240 days of continuous service in the year preceding their termination, a point overlooked by the single judge of the High Court. The single judge also wrongly shifted the burden of proof onto the Management regarding the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
Contentions of the Workmen:
The Workmen argued that the Industrial Tribunal found that they had been working with the Management long before M/S Navnidh Carriers was engaged. They pointed to an experience certificate issued by the Management to one of the Workmen in 1999, stating his employment since July 1997. Moreover, since the Management lacked a license to engage workmen through a contractor, as mandated by the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, of 1970, the Workmen should be considered employees of the Management.
Observations of the Court:
The High Court observed that both the Industrial Tribunal and the single judge concluded that the Workmen were indeed employed by the Management and were terminated illegally. The decision was based on evidence including gate passes and experience letters issued to the Workmen by the Management. It was found that the purported contract with M/s Navnidh Carriers was deemed a 'sham' to conceal the engagement of the Workmen by the Management.
The High Court scrutinized the experience letter issued to one of the Workmen and noted that it indicated the direct employment of the Workmen by the Management before the contract with M/s Navnidh Carriers was established on 31.07.1998. Further, no satisfactory explanation was provided for the issuance of the experience certificate if the Workmen were not employees of the Management. Additionally, the absence of a license under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, of 1970, further suggested direct engagement by the Management.
In light of these observations, the High Court concluded that it was not within the jurisdiction of the single judge to interfere with these findings or for the High Court to examine them further. The High Court reiterated its limited scope of interference in matters of factual findings made by Industrial Tribunals unless they were found to be perverse or based on no evidence.
Ultimately, the High Court found no reason to intervene with the concurrent findings of fact established by the Industrial Tribunal and the single judge of the High Court. It affirmed that the Workmen were indeed engaged by the Management and were terminated illegally. Consequently, the appeals filed by the Management were dismissed.
Case Title: Director General, Delhi Doordarshan Kendra vs Mohd. Shahbaz Khan and Others
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (Del) 506
Case No.: LPA 242/2024, CM APPL.18228/2024 (stay), CM APPL.18229/2024 (delay of 50 days) & CM APPL. 18230/2024 (exemption) + LPA 243/2024, CM APPL.18232/2024 (stay), CM APPL.18233/2024 (delay of 50 days) & CM APPL. 18234/2024 (exemption) + LPA 244/2024, CAV 150/2024, CM APPL.18238/2024 (stay), CM APPL.18239/2024 (delay of 50 days) & CM APPL. 18240/2024 -Ex + LPA 245/2024, CM APPL.18245/2024 (stay), CM APPL.18246/2024 (delay of 50 days) & CM APPL. 18247/2024 (exemption) + LPA 246/2024, CM APPL.18251/2024 (stay), CM APPL.18252/2024 (delay of 50 days) & CM APPL. 18253/2024 (exemption).
Advocate for the Appellant (Management): Ms Shruti Sharma and Mr Aman Kumar Singh
Advocate for the Respondents (Workmen): Mr Sanjay Ghose with Mr Prakhar Bhatnagar and Mr Rohan Mondal
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