UAPA | Mere Allegations Of Terrorist Gang Association Without 'Specific Evidence' Insufficient To Deny Bail: Jharkhand High Court

Update: 2024-10-24 10:45 GMT
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The Jharkhand High Court has held that merely alleging membership in a terrorist gang and association with its leadership, without providing specific instances of involvement in criminal activities, would not be enough to substantiate such claims. Thus granting bail to the appellant charged under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), the court ruled that vague and...

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The Jharkhand High Court has held that merely alleging membership in a terrorist gang and association with its leadership, without providing specific instances of involvement in criminal activities, would not be enough to substantiate such claims.

Thus granting bail to the appellant charged under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), the court ruled that vague and generalized accusations would not suffice to withhold liberty.

The division bench comprising Justice Rongon Mukhopadhyay and Justice Deepak Roshan observed,

“The allegations itself are vague and generalized. The involvement of the appellant in terrorist activities has to be founded upon specific evidence. Merely, alleging that the appellant is a member of a terrorist gang closely associated with the top brass of such gang and his involvement in various nefarious activities without specifying instances would not cement such allegations into a concrete form.”

“Antecedents are there against the appellant and as per Mr. Srinivasan, in most of the cases the appellant has either been acquitted or he is on bail which has not much been refuted by the learned Spl. P.P. for the N.I.A. and, the mere presence of antecedents would not lead to a presumption about the active involvement of the appellant in the instant case without there being any material in support thereof,” the bench added.

The case originated when the Superintendent of Police received confidential intelligence that a group had formed an association connected to the banned extremist organization, Tritiya Prastuti Committee (TPC). This group was allegedly involved in extorting coal traders and Delivery Order (DO) holders by instilling fear under the guise of TPC. Acting on this information, a raid was conducted at the residence of the association's president, Binod Kumar Ganjhu.

During the search, authorities recovered Rs. 91,75,890/- from under his bed and inside an almirah, for which no satisfactory explanation was provided. Two individuals apprehended at the scene confessed their links to the TPC, leading to the registration of a case under Sections 414, 384, 386, 387, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), Sections 25(1-B)(a), 26, and 35 of the Arms Act, and Sections 17(1)(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act.

Subsequent to these initial charges, sections under the UAPA—specifically, Sections 16, 17, 20, and 23—were added. The appellant, who was alleged to be a zonal commander of the TPC, was denied bail by the special judge, leading to an appeal before the High Court.

The Appellant argued that the allegations against them are generic and lack specificity. It was also contended that in most cases against the Appellant, they have either been acquitted or granted bail. Moreover, no prima facie case is established against the Appellant, and as a result, the embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act for the denial of bail would not apply.

The State, however, submitted that the Appellant had nine prior criminal records, including charges of murder, criminal intimidation, and extortion, indicating that the Appellant is a notorious criminal in the region. Additionally, it was argued that the Appellant, being the zonal commander, was an active member of the TPC, and the trial is nearing conclusion, with only one witness remaining to be examined.

The Court observed in its order that the Supplementary Charge-Sheet submitted by the National Investigation Agency was ambiguous.

The Court noted that while it outlined hierarchical structures involved in collecting levies from contractors, it did not include a Zonal Commander, the role attributed to the appellant by the Investigating Agency. The Court further noted that attributing the appellant with extorting levies from coal transporters or contractors in a generalized manner would not suffice to enhance the appellant's role.

The Court stated, “We are aware about the settled law that in deducing whether a prima facie case is made out or not the Court cannot conduct a mini trial. Our conclusion is primarily and solely based on the materials which have been mentioned in the Supplementary Charge-Sheet and which is to the effect that no prima facie case is made out against the appellant to deny him bail in terms of Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act.”

In light of the above observations, the Court set aside the special judge's order and directed that the appellant be released on bail, with conditions to be determined by the trial court. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.

Case Title: Bhikhan Ganjhu V. Union of India

LL Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (Jha) 162

Click Here To Read Judgement

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