NIA Act | Appeals Must Be Filed Before Division Bench Even If Order Is Passed By Sessions Court Acting In Absence Of Special Court: Jharkhand HC
The Jharkhand High Court has ruled that appeals related to scheduled offences under the National Investigation Agency (NIA) Act, 2008, must be filed before a Division Bench of the High Court, even when the original judgement or order is passed by a Sessions Court acting in the absence of a designated Special Court.In the ruling delivered by Justice Rajesh Shankar, it was observed, “Looking...
The Jharkhand High Court has ruled that appeals related to scheduled offences under the National Investigation Agency (NIA) Act, 2008, must be filed before a Division Bench of the High Court, even when the original judgement or order is passed by a Sessions Court acting in the absence of a designated Special Court.
In the ruling delivered by Justice Rajesh Shankar, it was observed, “Looking to the gravity and seriousness of the offences under the Schedule of the Act, 2008, the legislature has made specific provision under section 21 of the said Act for filing of appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court to expedite the hearing of such cases. Thus, the word “Special Court” as mentioned in section 21 of the Act, 2008 has to be given purposive construction so that the purpose of the provision as intended by the legislature may be achieved.”
“The intention of the legislature while putting the said section must have been that a Session Court dealing with any scheduled offence under the Act, 2008 even in absence of issuance of any notification either by the Central Government or by the State Government under Section 11 & 22 respectively, has to be considered as a Special Court for the purpose of Section 21 of the Act, 2008 and in such case an appeal against the judgment, sentence or order including an order refusing anticipatory bail by the Session Court, will lie before the Division Bench of the High Court,” Justice Shankar emphasised.
Background
The decision came in response to an anticipatory bail application related to offences under Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. The petitioner argued that, since the impugned order was issued by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge-III, Palamau at Daltonganj, and not by a designated Special Court, an appeal should be maintainable before the regular Bench of the High Court rather than the Division Bench.
The question before the Court for its consideration was whether an anticipatory bail application is maintainable before the regular Bench of the High Court against an order by the Additional Sessions Judge that rejected the petitioner's anticipatory bail plea concerning offences punishable under Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908. These offences were listed as scheduled offences under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008. The Court also had to consider whether an appeal is maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court pursuant to Section 21(4) of the Act, 2008.
The Court first reviewed the relevant provisions of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, emphasising that the Act was promulgated to establish an investigation agency at the national level to investigate and prosecute offences that threaten the sovereignty, security, and integrity of India, the security of States, friendly relations with foreign States, and offences under Acts enacted to implement international treaties, agreements, conventions, and resolutions of the United Nations and other international organisations.
Expounding on Section 21 of the Act, 2008, the Court noted that it, “explicitly provides that an appeal shall lie from any judgement, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Special Court only to the High Court both on facts and on law which shall be heard by a Bench of two Judges of the High Court and except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgement, sentence or order including an interlocutory order of a Special Court. It has further been provided that an appeal shall lie to the High Court against an order of the Special Court granting or refusing bail.”
The Court placed reliance on the Supreme Court's ruling in Bikramjit Singh v. State of Punjab, (2020) 10 SCC 616, where the Apex Court held that all scheduled offences, whether investigated by the National Investigation Agency or by the State Government's investigating agencies, are to be tried exclusively by Special Courts established under the Act, 2008. The Court noted that, in the absence of a designated court notified by either the Central or State Government, the jurisdiction falls to the Court of Session.
Building on this precedent, the Court observed that the Court of Session, when dealing with scheduled offences under the Act, 2008 in the absence of a Special Court constituted under Sections 11 and 22 of the Act by either the Central Government or the State Government, is treated as a Special Court.
The Court noted that it retains all the powers to follow the procedures outlined in Chapter IV of the Act, 2008. The Court further stated that while Section 21 of the Act provides for appeals to the Division Bench of the High Court against any judgment, sentence, or order passed by a Special Court, this provision would also extend to any judgment, sentence, or order passed by the Court of Session when it exercises the powers of a Special Court in the absence of a designated Special Court.
The Court interpreted the term "Special Court" in Section 21 as having an extended definition, encompassing a Court of Session acting in the capacity of a Special Court.
The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's decisions in Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. & Others v. Eastern Metals & Ferro Alloys & Others, and X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Government of NCT of Delhi & Another. The Court highlighted the principle that while interpreting statutes, the courts should not extend their interpretation beyond the statute unless absolutely necessary.
The Court emphasised, “the fundamental rule of interpretation of statute is that the court is not supposed to go beyond the statute unless it is absolutely necessary so to do. Purposive interpretation of any provision of a statute is given if literal interpretation of the same may not serve the purpose or may lead to absurdity. The intention of the legislature is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the statute, with a view to understand the purpose or object of the enactment, the mischief, and its corresponding remedy that the enactment is designed to actualise.”
The Court opined that the literal interpretation of the word “Special Court” will not serve the purpose. Section 22(3) provides for the power and jurisdiction of the Special Court to be exercised by the Session Court of the Division in absence of any Special Court, whereas section 21 provides for filing of appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court against any judgement, sentence or order passed by a Special Court.
“If the word “Special Court” is given literal meaning, then appeal against only those judgments and orders which are passed by the Special Courts shall lie before the Division Bench of the High Court and challenge to the judgments and orders passed by Session Courts even in the matter of Scheduled Offences will lie before the regular Bench of the High Court. Thus, the intention of the legislature in promulgating the law that the appeal should lie before to the Division Bench of the High Court in the matter of scheduled offences, will get frustrated,” the Court added.
Given these considerations, the Court concluded that the anticipatory bail application was not maintainable before the regular Bench of the High Court. Instead, it held that an appeal should be filed under Section 21(4) of the Act, 2008 before the appropriate Division Bench of the High Court. Consequently, the Court dismissed the anticipatory bail application as not maintainable.
Case Title: Gulshan Kumar Singh Versus The State of Jharkhand
LL Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (Jha) 144