Objections Regarding Delay In 'Reference' Under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 Ought To Be Raised Before Final Award: Jharkhand High Court
The Jharkhand High Court division bench of Justice Rongon Mukhopadhyay and Justice Deepak Roshan held that the objection regarding the 'Reference' under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, should be raised before the final Award. The High Court held that the Industrial Tribunal, being a statutory creation, derives its jurisdiction from the reference and is not empowered to scrutinize the...
The Jharkhand High Court division bench of Justice Rongon Mukhopadhyay and Justice Deepak Roshan held that the objection regarding the 'Reference' under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, should be raised before the final Award.
The High Court held that the Industrial Tribunal, being a statutory creation, derives its jurisdiction from the reference and is not empowered to scrutinize the validity of the Reference itself. Since the reference was not challenged before the Final Award, and considering the active participation of the Management in the proceedings, the High Court held the objection regarding the reference to maintainability untenable.
Brief Facts:
The appellant-Bank employed part-time workers for tasks like cleaning and water storage on fixed remuneration. The Respondent-workman was one such worker from 04.09.1981 to 05.01.1983, after which he stopped coming to work. The Respondent was terminated and filed a dispute with the Ministry of Labour, Government of India, in 1994 regarding his alleged illegal termination.
Efforts at conciliation failed, leading to a reference made by the Secretary, Government of India, to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal, after due consideration, directed the Bank to reinstate the respondent without back wages.
Aggrieved by this decision, the appellant filed a writ petition in the Patna High Court in 1999, which later got transferred to the Jharkhand High Court (“High Court”). Due to procedural lapses, the writ petition was dismissed for default in 2009. Despite attempts at restoration, the Court declined to recall the dismissal orders.
Subsequently, the appellant filed a second writ petition in 2017. However, the High Court, noting the delay and inaction on the part of the appellant, dismissed the petition without delving into the merits of the case.
In its ruling, the Court emphasized the principle that a second writ petition can be entertained if the cause of action survives or if the matter hasn't been decided on merits. However, considering the unexplained delay and laches in pursuing the proceedings, the Court declined to entertain the petition and dismissed it. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant approached the High Court and filed a letters patent appeal.
Contentions by the Appellant:
(i) The dispute raised by the respondent workman came after a significant delay of 11 years from the alleged termination, with no substantial evidence supporting the reasons for the delay.
(ii) The reference made under Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Dispute Act is not maintainable, as the matter is of an individual nature and does not affect more than one hundred workmen. Therefore, it should have been referred to a labor court for adjudication.
(iii) The findings of the tribunal in the award are flawed and perverse, as they contradict the evidence presented. The tribunal's conclusion that the respondent workman was a permanent employee was disputed by the appellant, and the termination was justified due to the workman's absence without information.
(iv) Reinstatement is not automatic for casual or daily wage workers.
Contentions by the Respondent:
(i) The termination of the workman was wrongful.
(ii) The delay in raising the dispute was due to continuous assurances from the appellant-bank and not due to any fault of the workman.
(iii) The tribunal's decision to reinstate the workman was justified, considering the illegality of the termination and the absence of any misconduct charges served to the workman.
Observations by the High Court:
The High Court held that the objection regarding the delay in the "Reference" ought to have been raised prior to the final Award. It held that the Industrial Tribunal, being a statutory creation, derives its jurisdiction from the Reference and is not empowered to scrutinize the validity of the Reference itself. Since the Reference was not challenged before the Final Award, and considering the active participation of the Management in the proceedings, the court held the objection to maintainability untenable.
The High Court held that the decision to refer a dispute under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act is an administrative function, and the question of delay can be examined by the Industrial Tribunal, which is empowered to mold the relief accordingly. In this regard, the High Court referred to the decision of Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh and Arn. vs the State of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 271, where the Supreme Court held that the appropriate Government while exercising power under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, is entrusted with an administrative function and cannot delve into the merits of the dispute.
Consequently, the High Court dismissed the petition.
Case Title: Uttar Bihar Gramin Bank vs Ramu Mochi
LL Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (Jha) 63
Case Number: L.P.A. No. 631 of 2022
Advocate for the Appellant: Ms. Amrita Sinha, Advocate
Advocate for the Respondent: Mr. Saibal Kr. Laik, Advocate