A Christian And A Hindu Walk Into A Gurudwara: A Legal Catch-22 In Marriage Laws
A petition under Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (SMA) before the Family Court, Patiala House, New Delhi for the grant of the 'first motion' for divorce recently brought to light an anomaly that has been created by judicial interpretation in the validity of a marriage celebrated in any other form and subsequently registered under Section 15 of the SMA. In a situation...
A petition under Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 (SMA) before the Family Court, Patiala House, New Delhi for the grant of the 'first motion' for divorce recently brought to light an anomaly that has been created by judicial interpretation in the validity of a marriage celebrated in any other form and subsequently registered under Section 15 of the SMA.
In a situation not uncommon these days, a Christian and a Hindu were married in an anand karaj ceremony at a gurudwara and a certificate to this effect was issued by the gurudwara. Subsequently, they got their marriage registered under Section 15 of the SMA. When the marriage fell apart, they moved a petition for divorce under Section 27 of the SMA and the question was whether a divorce petition was maintainable, or if the marriage was no marriage at all.
The issue arising in that case, which has been dealt with in this article, was whether a marriage celebrated through a religious ceremony between persons one or both of whom did not profess the religion in question can be subsequently registered under Section 15 of the SMA and would be covered by the deeming fiction in Section 18 as to the validity of marriages registered under Section 15.
The scheme of the SMA is such that Chapter II deals with 'Solemnization of Special Marriages' under that Act, whereas Chapter III deals with 'Registration of Marriages Celebrated in Other Forms'.
Chapter II provides the procedure for solemnization of a marriage between “any two persons” who satisfy the conditions contained in Section 4 of the SMA. These conditions include the requirement that neither party should have a spouse living, both parties should be capable of giving consent, the man should have completed the age of twenty-one years and the woman the age of eighteen years and the parties should not be within the degrees of the prohibited relationship as defined in the SMA. The procedure prescribed includes giving of notice of intended marriage under Section 5, publication of the notice by the Registrar of Marriages under Section 6, objections to the intended marriage to be given within 30 days, a quasi-judicial determination of the objections by the Registrar of Marriages under Sections 8 to 10 and issuance of a certificate of marriage under Section 13.
Chapter III provides the procedure for registration of a marriage 'celebrated' in any other form. The conditions for registration under Section 15 include that a 'ceremony' of marriage has been performed between the parties and they have been living together as husband and wife ever since, neither party has a spouse living, both parties should be capable of giving consent, the parties should have completed the age of twenty-one years and should not be within the degrees of prohibited relationship. The procedure for registration prescribed under Section 16 is similar to the one in Chapter II and involves an application for registration being made by both parties, public notice being given, objections being invited and dealt with and subsequently, a certificate of marriage being issued. Section 18 creates a deeming fiction and provides that where a certificate of marriage has been granted under Section 16, the marriage shall, as from the date of grant of the certificate, be deemed to be a marriage solemnized under the SMA.
While the statute is amply clear, the Karnataka High Court in Rency Mathew v. Bharat Kumar, ILR 2021 Kar 16 has interpreted Section 15 of the SMA in a manner that has created a paradox within the statute. Dealing with a marriage wherein a Christian and a Hindu underwent a wedding ceremony according to Hindu rites and customs and then registered their marriage under Section 15 of the SMA, the Court held that the marriage as per Hindu rites and customs between parties was invalid on a reading of Sections 2, 5 and Section 7 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 as one of the parties was not Hindu. The Court then went on to hold that a marriage that was invalid could not be registered under Section 15 of the SMA, and a valid marriage was a condition precedent for registration. The phrase 'ceremony of marriage' in Section 15 of the SMA was interpreted by the Court to mean a valid ceremony in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act.
This begs the question, if the 'celebration' or 'ceremony' contemplated under Section 15 is interpreted to mean a ceremony that constitutes a valid solemnization in the eyes of the law, what need would remain for further registration under the SMA? Such an interpretation renders the entire Chapter III of the SMA otiose and superfluous. The entire purpose of Chapter III is to extend legal validity and recognition to marriages celebrated through ceremonies that do not of themselves constitute valid solemnization in the eyes of the law.
Coming back to the case at hand, there are varying opinions within Sikh religion concerning whether an anand karaj marriage can be performed at a gurudwara between persons one or both of whom do not profess the Sikh religion.
The 'Sikh Rehat Maryada' issued by the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar in 1945 states that persons professing faiths other than the Sikh faith cannot be wedded in an anand karaj ceremony. However, this rehat maryada is not binding and Section 19 of the Delhi Sikh Gurudwaras (Management) Act, 1971 provides complete autonomy to a gurudwara from interference in matters of religious or spiritual functions performed in the gurudwara. Therefore, while some gurudwaras choose to allow persons not professing the Sikh religion to be wedded in an anand karaj ceremony, others do not. However, the Anand Marriage Act, 1909 that recognizes anand karaj marriages as legally valid carves out any marriage between persons not professing Sikh religion from the benefit of recognition under the Act.
If it were not for this carve-out, an anand karaj marriage between any two persons would be statutorily recognized as a valid marriage and nothing further would be required to be done by the parties. It is only because of the carve-out in Section 3 of the Anand Marriage Act of marriages between non-Sikhs that a need arises for registration under Section 15 of the SMA to extend legal recognition to such marriages. However, if recognition under Sikh personal law of the ceremony performed at the gurudwara as a legally valid marriage is made a condition precedent for registration under Section 15 of SMA, then Section 15 would serve no purpose at all. The only marriages that can then be registered under Section 15 would be marriages that are already valid and do not need such registration! And so, the paradox is complete.
Joseph Heller's Catch-22, viz., 'you can only get out of combat duty if you are insane, but if you are sane enough to recognize the danger to yourself and ask for release from combat duty, you are obviously not insane enough' has been now matched by the Karnataka High Court's 'you can only get the benefit of the deeming provision granting legal validity if your marriage is already legally valid to begin with, in which case why would you need the deeming provision in the first place'.
It is essential that the incorrect proposition of law laid down by the Karnataka High Court in Rency Mathew v. Bharat Kumar is corrected so that this paradox is resolved. In both the case before the Patiala House and the one before the Karnataka High Court, since the parties were mutually seeking to dissolve the marital tie, the litigants were happy with the outcome if their marriage was annulled (since the process was quicker and they could, in fact, truthfully write that they were 'unmarried' instead of 'divorced' whenever asked). However, this could create complications in cases where divorce is resisted by one of the parties, as the party seeking separation will be able to get away with having the marriage declared a nullity in the eyes of the law, effectively depriving the other party of judicial redress.
Mohammad Nizamuddin Pasha is a lawyer practising in the Supreme Court of India. Views are personal.