Supreme Court Monthly Digest: November 2021 [Citation: LL 2021 SC 617 To LL 2021 SC 695]
1. Insurance Claim Liable To Be Rejected If Premium Was Not Paid On Due Date[Case: Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sunita; Citation: LL 2021 SC 617]The Supreme Court observed that it is not permissible to rewrite the contract while interpreting the terms of the Insurance Policy. The bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Bela M. Trivedi said that the terms of the insurance policy have to...
1. Insurance Claim Liable To Be Rejected If Premium Was Not Paid On Due Date
[Case: Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Sunita; Citation: LL 2021 SC 617]
The Supreme Court observed that it is not permissible to rewrite the contract while interpreting the terms of the Insurance Policy. The bench of Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Bela M. Trivedi said that the terms of the insurance policy have to be strictly construed. In a contract of insurance there is a requirement of Uberrima fides i.e. good faith on the part of the assured, the court said. The accident claim of complainant's husband was refused by LIC stating that his said policy had already lapsed on account of non-payment of the due premium. The court observed that the Accident benefit could have been claimed and availed of only if the accident had taken place subsequent to the renewal of the policy.
2. PC Act - More Time Taken For Preliminary Enquiry Not A Ground To Quash Criminal Proceedings
[Case: The State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Dr Saleem ur Rehman; Citation: LL 2021 SC 618]
The Supreme Court observed that whatever enquiry is conducted at the stage of Preliminary Enquiry, by no stretch of imagination, can be considered as investigation under the code of criminal procedure which can only be after registration of the FIR. The Court also observed that merely because some time is taken for conducting preliminary enquiry, that cannot be a ground to quash the criminal proceedings for an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The bench of Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna was considering an appeal against the High Court's judgement in which the Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction quashed the criminal proceedings and declared Rule 3.16 of the Vigilance Manual, 2008 dealing with the Preliminary Enquiry (PE) as ultra vires, being in direct conflict with the Top Court's judgement in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh.
3. Taluk Land Board's Determination Has Evidentiary Value In Proceedings Under Kerala Private Forest Vesting Act
[Case: State Of Kerala & Anr. v. M/S Popular Estates; Citation: LL 2021 SC 619]
The Supreme Court observed that determination arrived by the Land Board about the character of lands, under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 becomes a piece of evidence for the purposes of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971. The bench of Justices Indira Banerjee and S Ravindra Bhat in the present matter was dealing with a special leave petition assailing Kerala High Court's order by which the Court held that an area of slightly over 402 acres vested in the State of Kerala and the rest of the land of a total of 1534.40 acres had to be treated as plantation and thus belonged to Popular Estates. It thus opined that "the enunciation of the principle that "unless a contrary state of affairs" were shown to exist, the Board's order "would have to be given due weight" had to apply, and was correctly invoked by the High Court."
4. Mere Apprehension Of Threat Of life Without Substantiating It Not Sufficient Ground To Transfer A Criminal Case U/Sec 406 CrPC
[Case: Dinesh Mahajan v. Vishal Mahajan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 620]
The Supreme Court observed that mere apprehension of threat of life is not a sufficient ground to transfer a case, without lodging a complaint or substantiating the said ground. In this case, the petition sought transfer of Complaint filed under Sections 420 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu to Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi. "No complaint has been lodged by the petitioner to the authorities concerned or before any Court. Mere apprehension of threat of life is not a sufficient ground to transfer a case, without lodging a complaint or substantiating the said ground.", the court noted.
5. Principle Of Preferential Candidates Applies When There Is A Tie With A General Candidate
[Case: Chairman, TANGEDCO v. Priyadaarshini; Citation: LL 2021 SC 621]
The Supreme Court observed that the principle of preferential candidates would apply when there is a tie between the preferential candidate and a general candidate and the person who is to be treated as a preferential can be given a mark over a general candidate. Rule 55 of Tamil Nadu State and Subordinate Service Rules read thus: Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or in the Special Rules for the various State and Subordinate Service, other things being equal, preference shall be given to the Outstanding scouts for appointment to any post by direct recruitment. In this case, the Madras High Court had directed TANGEDCO to consider the claim of a candidate for appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer in the priority category in the post earmarked for Scheduled Caste. The court had relied on Rule 55 of the Service Rules. In appeal filed against this judgment, the Apex Court noted that the said Rules provided for "preference only " and not a priority.
"The principle of preferential candidates would apply when there is a tie between the preferential candidate and a general candidate and the person who is to be treated as a preferential can be given a mark over a general candidate. This is the most material distinction. In view thereof, the respondent could not have been treated as a "preferential candidate" much less a "priority candidate", the bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and MM Sundresh said.
6. [Minimum Wages Act] Burden Of Person In Charge Of Company - Proviso To Section 22(c) Does Not Reverse Onus Of Proof
[Case: Dayle De'Souza v. Government of India Through Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (C) And Another; Citation: LL 2021 SC 622]
The Supreme Court held that the burden on the accused to prove innocence under proviso to Section 22C(1) of the Minimum Wages Act,1948 shifts only when the ingredients of Section 22C(1) have been satisfactorily established by the prosecution. A bench comprising Justices R Subhash Reddy and Sanjiv Khanna quashed a summoning order and proceedings issued by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sagar, Madhya Pradesh taking cognisance of the offence under Section 22A of the Minimum Wages (Central) Rules,1950 as per the complaint filed by the Labour Enforcement Officer (Central) against the appellant, Dalye De'Souza, a director of M/s. Writer Safeguards Pvt. Ltd. and one Mr. Vinod Singh, Madhya Pradesh head of M/s. Writer Safeguards Pvt. Ltd.
7. Criminal Cases Having Overwhelmingly & Predominatingly A Civil Flavour Stands On Different Footing For Purpose Of Quashing
[Case: Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab; Citation: LL 2021 SC 623]
The allegations made in the FIR had an overwhelmingly and predominatingly a civil flavour, the Supreme Court remarked while quashing a criminal proceeding. The bench of Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Vikram Nath observed that inherent powers should be exercised in a given and deserving case where the Court is satisfied that exercise of such power would either prevent abuse of such power or such exercise would result in securing the ends of justice. In this case, the complainant alleged that he had paid money to the accused to get employment for his son abroad. That they did not honour their promise and harassed his son and did not arrange for a job as per their promise. The High Court dismissed the petition filed by the accused and declined to quash the proceedings on the ground that a perusal of the FIR goes to show that the name of the accused is specifically mentioned in the FIR and criminal acts have been attributed to him. "In our view, the present one is amongst those fittest cases where the High Court ought to have exercised its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and ought to have secured the ends of justice by closing the proceedings against the appellants", the Apex Court noted.
8. Will Can't Be Revoked By Subsequent Agreement; Revocation Only By Modes Under Section 70 Succession Act
[Case: Badrilal v. Suresh & Ors; Citation: LL 2021 SC 624]
The Supreme Court held that a Will cannot be revoked by an agreement and can be revoked only as per the modes specified under Section 70 of the Indian Succession Act. A Bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka clarified the essential ingredients of S.70 of the Indian Succession Act required to be fulfilled in a case involving a question of revocation of a will by a subsequent agreement.
9. If Transfer Of Employee Results In Changing Conditions Of Service, Section 9A Of ID Act Will Be Applicable
[Case: Caparo Engineering India Ltd. v. Ummed Singh Lodhi And Anr; Citation: LL 2021 SC 625]
The Supreme Court observed that Fourth Schedule and Section 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would be attracted if transfer of workmen results in change of service conditions and nature of work. Section 9A of the ID Act says that employer should give a notice to employee regarding any change in the conditions of service applicable to any workman in respect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule. The bench of Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna in the present matter noted, "the question is not about the transfer only, the question is about the consequences of transfer. In the present case, the nature of work/service conditions would be changed and the consequences of transfer would result in the change of service conditions and the reduction of employees at Dewas factory, for which the Fourth Schedule and Section 9A shall be attracted."
10. Non-Residential Club Won't Come Under MP Shops & Establishments Act Merely Because Food Supply Is There
[Case: P.B. Nayak And Ors. v. Managing Director, Bhilai Steel Plant And Ors; Citation: LL 2021 SC 626]
The Supreme Court held that merely because a non-residential club is supplying meals and refreshments, the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act, 1958, will not become applicable to it. A bench comprising Justices KM Joseph and PS Narasimha noted that the members did not assemble at the club premises for the purpose of 'wholly or principally' having their meals or refreshment, but in connection with other activities, and serving meal, refreshment and drink are only incidental to such other activities. Relying on the definition of 'club' and examining the facts of the case, the Supreme Court concluded that Respondent No. 2 was indeed a non-residential club and therefore, entitled to exemption.
11. Principle Of Initial Date Of Appointment Valid Principle To Determine Inter-Se Seniority In Absence Of Rules To Contrary
[Case: Sudhir Kumar Atrey v. Union of India & Ors; Citation: LL 2021 SC 627]
The Supreme Court held that the principle of initial date of appointment or continuous officiation will be the valid principle to be considered for determination of inter se seniority in the absence of any rule or guidelines to the contrary. A Bench compromising Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice Abhay Oka has made the observations while delivering its judgment in appeals challenging judgments of both the Delhi and Punjab & Haryana High Court raising the same question of determination of seniority inter se of the candidates selected in their respective Command at the stage when a combined All India seniority list is to be prepared.
"We are also of the view that in the matter of adjudging seniority of the candidates selected in one and the same selection, placement in the order of merit can be adopted as a principle for determination of seniority but where the selections are held separately by different recruiting authorities, the principle of initial date of appointment/continuous officiation may be the valid principle to be considered for adjudging inter se seniority of the officers in the absence of any rule or guidelines in determining seniority to the contrary", the Bench observed.
12. No Statutory Power To Waive Interest Under Employees' State Insurance Act
[Case: The Transport Corporation of India Ltd v. Employees State Insurance Corporation; Citation: LL 2021 SC 628]
The Supreme Court held that there is no statutory power to waive the interest payable by an employer under the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948. It also refused to exercise powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to do the same. This is not a fit case to exercise the power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, the Court said. A Division Bench comprising Justice Ajay Rastogi and Justice Abhay S. Oka made the observation while deciding an appeal challenging the judgment of Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in a Letters Patent Appeal directing the appellant employer to pay interest on the delayed payment of contribution for the period from 30th March 1975 to 31st March 1988.
13. Supreme Court Sets Aside Calcutta HC's Total Ban Of Firecrackers In West Bengal; State To Ensure No Import Of Banned Firecrackers
[Case: Goutom Roy and Anr v. State of West Bengal; Citation: LL 2021 SC 629]
The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Calcutta High Court which imposed a complete ban on the use of firecrackers in the State of West Bengal. "...we are convinced that Calcutta High Court should have called upon parties to give explanation before passing such an extreme order", the Court observed in the order. The Court observed that the High Court ought to have given opportunities to the authorities to place on record if any mechanism was in place to ensure that only "green crackers", as permitted by the Supreme Court, are being used. While setting aside the High Court's order, the Supreme Court also gave liberty to any party to approach the High Court with adequate materials. "There cannot be a complete ban of firecrackers. Strengthen the mechanism to stop misuse", orally observed the bench during the course of the hearing.
14. Conviction Based On Disclosure Statement Can Be Sustained Only When Resultant Recovery Is Unimpeachable
[Case: Bijender @ Mandar v. State of Haryana; Citation: LL 2021 SC 630]
The Supreme Court observed that to convict an accused exclusively on the basis of his disclosure statement and the resultant recovery of inculpatory material, the recovery should be unimpeachable and not be shrouded with elements of doubt. The issue before it was whether the conviction on the strength of the purported disclosure statement and the recovery memo in the absence of any corroborative evidence, can sustain? The bench of CJI NV Ramana, Justices Surya Kant, and Hima Kohli noted that the Trial Court and the High Court have shifted the burden on the accused to elucidate how he bechanced to be in possession of the incriminating articles, without primarily scrutinizing the credibility and admissibility of the recovery as well as its linkage to the misconduct.
15. Arbitration - Party Not Barred From Raising New Grounds To Set Aside Award In An Sec 37 Appeal
[Case: State of Chhattisgarh v. Sal Udyog Private Limited; Citation: LL 2021 SC 631]
The Supreme Court has observed that a party is not barred from raising an additional ground for setting aside an arbitration award in arbitration appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration Conciliation Act,1996, merely because the said ground was not raised in the petition under Section 34 to set aside the Arbitration award. A Bench comprising CJI NV Ramana, Justices Surya Kant and Hima Kohli observed, "We are afraid, the plea of waiver taken against the appellant-State on the ground that it did not raise such an objection in the grounds spelt out in the Section 34 petition and is, therefore, estopped from taking the same in the appeal preferred under Section 37 or before this Court, would also not be available to the respondent-Company having regard to the language used in Section 34(2A) of the 1996 Act that empowers the Court to set aside an award if it finds that the same is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the same."
16. Low Age Of Rape Victim Is Not Considered As The Only Or Sufficient Factor To Impose Death Sentence
[Case: Irappa Siddappa Murgannavar v. State of Karnataka; Citation: LL 2021 SC 632]
The Supreme Court observed that the low age of the rape victim is not considered as the only or sufficient factor for imposing a death sentence. The bench of Justices L. Nageswara Rao, Sanjiv Khanna, and BR Gavai referred to a recent judgment in Shatrughna Baban Meshram v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 1 SCC 596. In the said judgment, 67 judgments of the Supreme Court in the previous 40 years were surveyed wherein death sentence had been imposed by the trial court or the High Court for the alleged offences under Sections 376 and 302 of the Code, and where the age of victims was below 16 years. "It appears from the above data that low age of the victim has not been considered as the only or sufficient factor by this Court for imposing a death sentence. If it were the case, then all, or almost all, 67 cases would have culminated in imposition of sentence of death on the accused.", the Bench observed.
17. Sec 138 NI Act - Merely Because Complaint Mentions Managing Director's Name First, It Can't Be Held That Complaint Is Not On Behalf Of Company
[Case: Bhupesh Rathod v. Dayashankar Prasad Chaurasia and Anr; Citation: LL 2021 SC 633]
The Supreme Court held that a complaint filed on behalf of a company under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not liable to be dismissed for the sole reason that it stated the name of the Managing Director first followed by the company's name. A bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and MM Sundersh held that though this format may not be perfect it cannot be termed defective. "There could be a format where the Company's name is described first, suing through the Managing Director but there cannot be a fundamental defect merely because the name of the Managing Director is stated first followed by the post held in the Company", the bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and MM Sundersh observed in the order.
18. Land Acquisition | 2 Year Period For Lapse Of Proceedings Under 1894 Act Won't Apply After Notification Of 2013 Act
[Case: Executive Engineer, Gosikhurd Project Ambadi, Bhandara, Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corporation v. Mahesh A; Citation: LL 2021 SC 634]
The Supreme Court held that the 2 year period prescribed under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 for the lapse of land acquisition proceedings for not delivering the award will not apply to an award passed after the notification of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The limitation period for passing/making of an award under Section 24(1)(a) of the Land Acquisition Act 2013 would commence from 1st January 2014, that is, the date when the 2013 Act came into force, the court observed. Under the new Act, the limitation period for lapse of the proceedings as per Section 25 is 12 months. The bench comprising Justices AM Khanwilkar and Sanjiv Khanna observed that practical absurdities and anomalies may arise if the two-year period for making of an award in terms of Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 commencing from the date of issue of the declaration is applied to the awards to be made under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act.
19. Total Ban On Legal Mining Will Give Rise To Illegal Mining & Cause Huge Loss To Public Exchequer: Supreme Court Modifies NGT Directives On Sand Mining
[Case: State of Bihar v. Pawan Kumar; Citation: LL 2021 SC 635]
Modifying some directions issued by the National Green Tribunal, the Supreme Court observed that the total ban on legal mining, apart from giving rise to illegal mining, also causes huge loss to the public exchequer. When legal mining is banned, it gives rise to the mushroom growth of illegal mining, resulting into clashes between sand mafias, criminalization and at times, loss of human lives, the Court said. The State of Bihar had approached the Supreme Court challenging an NGT order holding that unless the State Expert Appraisal Committee ("SEAC") and the State Environment Impact Assessment Authority ("SEIAA") grants approval to the District Survey Report for the purpose of mining of sand, the same cannot be carried out. The bench comprising Justices L. Nageswara Rao, Sanjiv Khanna and BR Gavai observed that the directions require modification and that until the DSRs are finalized and granted approval by SEAC and SEIAA, it is appropriate that certain necessary arrangements are permitted so that the State can continue with legal mining activities.
20. Advocate Losing A Case After Arguing Is Not 'Deficiency Of Service' For Filing Consumer Complaint
[Case: Nandlal Lohariya v. Jagdish Chand Purohit; Citation: LL 2021 SC 636]
The Supreme Court observed that an advocate losing a case cannot be said to be deficiency in service on his/her part. "In every litigation, either of the party is bound to lose and in such a situation either of the party who will lose in the litigation may approach the consumer fora for compensation alleging deficiency in service, which is not permissible at all", the bench comprising Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna observed while dismissing a Special Leave Petition filed against the order passed by National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The court observed that such complaints may lie only in a case where it is found that there was any deficiency in service by the advocate.
21. Arbitration - 2015 Amendment Won't Apply To Section 34 Applications Filed Prior To It
[Case: Ratnam Sudesh Iyer v. Jackie Kakubhai Shroff; Citation: LL 2021 SC 637]
The Supreme Court held that the 2015 amendment to Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 will apply only to Section 34 applications that have been made after the date of the amendment. "Section 34 as amended will apply only to Section 34 applications that have been made to the Court on or after 23.10.2015, irrespective of the fact that the arbitration proceedings may have commenced prior to that", the Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M.M.Sundaresh observed. The judgment examined the question whether an arbitration award can be challenged on the grounds of 'patent illegality if the arbitration proceedings had commenced before the 2015 Amendment Award coming into force.
22. Compensation / Penalty Cannot Be Restricted To Value Of Illegally-Mined Mineral; Cost Of Restoration Of Environment Also To Be Considered
[Case: Bajri Lease LoI Holders Welfare Society v. State of Rajasthan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 638]
The Supreme Court observed that the compensation/penalty to be paid by those indulging in illegal sand mining cannot be restricted to the value of illegally-mined mineral. The cost of restoration of the environment, as well as the cost of ecological services, should be part of the compensation, the bench comprising Justices L. Nageswara Rao, Sanjiv Khanna, and BR Gavai observed. The polluter, according to the court, is liable to pay the cost to the individual sufferers as well as the cost of reversing the damaged ecology.
23. High Court In An Appeal U/Sec 374(2) CrPC Has To Independently Evaluate Entirety Of Evidence
[Case: Jogi v. State of Madhya Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 639]
The Supreme Court reiterated that a High Court in a criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure is duty-bound to consider the entirety of the evidence. In the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, the High Court was required to evaluate the evidence on the record independently and to arrive at its own findings as regards the culpability or otherwise of the accused on the basis of the evidentiary material, the bench of Justices DY Chandrachud and AS Bopanna observed.
24. Even If Punishment Imposed By Disciplinary Authority Is Disproportionate, Court Should Not Normally Decide Quantum; Matter Should Be Sent Back
[Case: Union of India v. Ex Constable Ram Karan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 640]
The Supreme Court reiterated that the scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment imposed in disciplinary proceedings is limited. "Even in cases where the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court, normally the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority should be directed to reconsider the question of imposition of penalty", the bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka observed. The court added that it is only in rare and exceptional cases where the court might to shorten the litigation may think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in place of punishment awarded by the competent authority that too after assigning cogent reasons.
25. Supreme Court Upholds Application Of RERA To Real Estate Projects Ongoing At Act's Commencement
[Case: Newtech Promoters And Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of UP; Citation: LL 2021 SC 641]
The Supreme Court upheld the retroactive application of the Real Estate(Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 to the real estate projects which were ongoing at the commencement of the Act. The bench comprising Justices Uday Umesh Lalit, Ajay Rastogi, and Aniruddha Bose observed that the RERA Act does not apply to the projects already completed or to which the completion certificate has been granted at the commencement of the Act. The Court rejected the contentions raised by Promoters/Developers that the first proviso to Section 3(1) of the Act is violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. Taking note of the statutory provisions especially Section 3 of the RERA, the court observed that all "ongoing projects" that commence prior to the Act and in respect to which completion certificate has not been issued are covered under the Act.
Also Read: Condition Of Pre-Deposit For Filing Appeal U/Sec 43(5) RERA Not Discriminatory Against Promoters
Also Read: RERA Authority Can Delegate Single Member To Decide Homebuyers' Complaint Under Section 31
26. High Court Cannot Quash Criminal Proceedings U/Sec 482 CrPC Relying On 'Draft Charge Sheet' Which Is Yet To Be Filed Before Magistrate
[Case: Jitul Jentilal Kotecha v. State of Gujarat; Citation: LL 2021 SC 642]
A High Court cannot place reliance on a "draft charge-sheet" which is yet to be placed before the Magistrate to quash the criminal proceedings under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure, the Supreme Court has observed. The bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and BV Nagarathna observed that a High Court can neither direct an investigating agency to submit the investigation report before it nor can it quash a criminal proceeding under Section 482 relying on such a report when the report has not been submitted to the Magistrate.
27. Section 307 IPC - Intention To Be Ascertained From Weapon Used, Body Part Chosen For Assault & Nature Of Injury
[Case: Sadakat Kotwar v. State of Jharkhand; Citation: LL 2021 SC 643]
The Supreme Court observed that, in an attempt to murder cases (Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code), the intention has to be ascertained from the weapon used, part of the body chosen for assault, and the nature of the injury caused. The Court observed thus while dismissing the appeal filed by the accused whose conviction under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC was upheld by the High Court of Jharkhand. Taking note of the evidence on record, the bench comprising Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna observed that the injury of a single blow was on the vital part of the body i.e. stomach and near chest and that the nature of the injury is a grievous injury caused by a sharp cutting weapon.
28. Employer Can Terminate Service In The Event Of Suppressing Or On Submitting False Information By The Employee
[Case: Rajesh Kumar v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 644]
The Supreme Court reiterated that in the event of any suppression or submitting false information, it is always open for the employer to cancel the candidature or terminate service of the employee/ candidate. The Bench comprising Justices R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy placed reliance on the judgment in Avtar Singh v. Union of India and observed, "No doubt about it that once verification form requires certain information to be furnished, declarant is duty-bound to furnish it correctly and any suppression of material facts or submitting false information, may by itself lead to termination of his services or cancellation of candidature in an appropriate case. However, in a criminal case incumbent has not been acquitted and case is pending trial, employer may well be justified in not appointing such an incumbent or in terminating the services as conviction ultimately may render him unsuitable for job and employer is not supposed to wait till outcome of criminal case. In such a case non-disclosure or submitting false information would assume significance and that by itself may be ground for employer to cancel candidature or to terminate services."
29. Supreme Court Raps Manipur Govt For Not Inviting Fresh Tenders To Transport Grains From FCI Depot To Child Development Project Officers
[Case: BK Enterprise v. State of Manipur and Another; Citation: LL 2021 SC 645]
The Supreme Court deprecated the State of Manipur for lethargy and negligence on the State and Social Welfare Department part for not issuing the fresh tender process and Notice Inviting Tenders ("NIT") after 2018 for transporting rice and other micronutrients from Food Corporation of India's depots in the State to offices of Child Development Project Officers. Considering that since 2017-18 the contract for transportation of rice and other micronutrients under Wheat Based Nutrition Programme ("WBNP") was continuing solely on the basis of interim arrangement without inviting fresh tenders and without entering into permanent contracts, the bench of Justices MR Shah and AS Bopanna observed that, "At the outset, it is required to be noted that this is a glaring example of lethargy on the part of the State Government in not inviting the fresh tenders for transporting Rice & other micronutrients under the Wheat Based Nutrition Programme (WBNP), from Food Corporation of India's depots in the State of Manipur, to the offices of Child Development Project Officers and to continue the contract without inviting fresh tenders on the basis of the Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) issued on 22.06.2017 causing huge loss to the State and the Public Exchequer."
30. Merely Having An Explicit Clause Not Sufficient To Make Time The Essence Of The Contract
[Case: Welspun Specialty Solutions Limited v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd; Citation: LL 2021 SC 646]
The Supreme Court observed that merely having an explicit clause may not be sufficient to make time the essence of the contract. 'The contractual clauses having extension procedure and imposition of liquidated damages, are good indicators that 'time was not the essence of the contract', the bench comprising CJI NV Ramana and Justice Surya Kant observed. It added whether the time is of the essence in a contract, has to be culled out from the reading of the entire contract as well as the surrounding circumstances.
31. Tenants Ought To Be In Actual Possession Of Premises To Avail Benefit Of Section 9 Of TN City Tenants Protection Act
[Case: National Company, Represented by its Managing Partner v. The Territory Manager, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. And Ors; Citation: LL 2021 SC 647]
The Supreme Court reiterated that the tenants ought to be in actual possession of the premises to avail the benefit of Section 9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1972, which deals with the application filed by the tenant before the Court to direct the landlord to sell the land. A bench comprising Justices L. Nageshwara Rao and B.R. Gavai said, "While interpreting subclause (b) to Section 2(4)(ii), this Court has held that the expression "actual physical possession of land and building" would mean and require the tenant to be in actual possession and subclause (b) would not apply if the tenant has sublet the building or has given the premises on leave and license basis. The aforesaid decision would operate as res judicata in the case of the appellant and the landlords who were parties to the decision. In other cases, it would operate as a binding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution."
32. Jurisdiction Of High Court Hearing An Arbitration Appeal Is Distinct From That Of First Appellate Court In A Civil Suit
[Case: Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd v. Ramesh Kumar and Company; Citation: LL 2021 SC 648]
The Supreme Court observed that the jurisdiction in a first appeal arising out of a decree in a civil suit is distinct from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act arising from the disposal of a petition challenging an arbitral award. While considering a petition under Section 34 of the 1996 Act, it is well-settled that the court does not act as an appellate forum. The grounds on which interference with an arbitral award is contemplated are structured by the provisions of Section 34. The District Judge had correctly come to the conclusion that there was no warrant for interference with the arbitral award under Section 34. The High Court seems to have proceeded as if it was exercising jurisdiction in a regular first appeal from a decree in a civil suit. The jurisdiction in a first appeal arising out of a decree in a civil suit is distinct from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 37 of the 1996 Act arising from the disposal of a petition challenging an arbitral award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act", the Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and AS Bopanna observed.
33. Vehicle Manufacturer Cannot Be Held Liable For Deficiency In Service By Dealer/Authorized Service Centre In Repair
[Case: Honda Cars India Limited v. Sudesh Berry; Citation: LL 2021 SC 649]
The Supreme Court observed that a vehicle manufacturer cannot be held liable for any deficiency in service by the dealer or the authorized centre in rendering assistance for repairs of the vehicle. In this case, the bench of Justices UU Lalit and S. Ravindra Bhat agreed with the submission made by the manufacturer that there is not an iota of material that the accident occurred as a result of any manufacturing defect. If there be any deficiency in service by the dealer or the authorized centre in rendering assistance for repairs of the vehicle, the manufacturer of the vehicle cannot be held liable, the court said while referring to a recent judgment in TATA Motors Ltd. v. Antonio Paulo Vaz.
34. Criminal Appeal Cannot Be Dismissed As Infructuous Merely Because Appellant Served Out Sentence
[Case: Gurjant Singh v. State of Punjab; Citation: LL 2021 SC 650]
The Supreme Court observed that an appeal against conviction cannot be treated as infructuous merely for the reason that the convicted appellant had served out the sentence awarded by the Trial Court. Merely for the execution of the sentence, an appeal against conviction cannot be treated as infructuous, the bench comprising Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Vikram Nath said. "Though learned counsel for the respondent has attempted to support the conviction and sentence of the appellant but could not dispute the position that merely for the execution of the sentence, an appeal against conviction cannot be treated as infructuous", the Bench opined in the facts of the case.
35. There Can't Be Two Appointments To One Sanctioned Post; Otherwise Financial Burden On State
[Case: Wahab Uddin And Ors. v. Km. Meenakshi Gahlot And Ors; Citation: LL 2021 SC 651]
The Supreme Court held that two persons cannot be appointed on one sanctioned post as the same would impose a serious financial burden on the State. A bench comprising Justices M.R. Shah and A.S. Bopanna dismissed a petition filed by the appellants, three Stenographers in the judgeship of Moradabad, whose appointments had been initially quashed by the Single Judge of the Allahabad High Court and later affirmed by the Division Bench.
36. Imposition Of Onerous Conditions For Grant Of Bail Tantamount To Denial Of Bail
[Case: Mithun Chatterjee v. State of Odisha; Citation: LL 2021 SC 652]
The Supreme Court observed that imposition of onerous conditions for grant of bail is tantamount to a denial of bail. "We are of the considered view that imposition of onerous conditions for grant of bail tantamount to denial of bail", the Court said. A Bench comprising Justice Nageswara Rao and Justice BR Gavai made the observation while setting aside Orissa High Court's order directing petitioner to deposit cash of Rs.20 lakhs and providing security of immovable property to the tune of Rs.20 lakhs for grant of bail. The present petitioner is an accused in a criminal case for committing offence under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Scheme (Banning) Act. He was granted bail by the Orissa High Court on 25th March 2021, subject to him depositing cash of Rs.20 lakhs and providing security of immovable property to the tune of Rs.20 lakhs.
37. Admission Supervisory Committee Can Take Suo Motu Action Over Self Financing Colleges Admissions: Supreme Court Upholds Kerala HC Judgment
[Case: Principal Karuna Medical College v. Admission Supervisory Committee And Fee Regulatory Committee For Professional Colleges Of Kerala; Citation: LL 2021 SC 653]
The Supreme Court held that Admission Supervisory Committee in Kerala has jurisdiction to initiate proceedings suo motu in respect of admissions made by the self-financing colleges. "We are in agreement with the findings recorded by the High Court on the powers conferred on the Committee including the power of suo motu action that can be taken by the Committee in respect of admissions made by the self-financing colleges", the bench comprising Justices L. Nageswara Rao and Abhay S. Oka said while upholding a judgment of the Kerala High Court.
38. Right To Be Represented By Counsel Or Agent Of Choice In Disciplinary Proceedings Is Not Absolute
[Case: The Chairman, State Bank of India and another v. MJ James; Citation: LL 2021 SC 654]
The right to be represented by a counsel or agent of one's choice in a disciplinary proceeding is not an absolute right, the Supreme Court observed. The court said that such right to be legally represented depends on how the rules govern such representation. However, if the charge is of severe and complex nature, then the request to be represented through a counsel or agent should be considered, the bench comprising Justices M.R. Shah and Sanjiv Khanna observed.
Also Read: Distinction Between 'Acquiescence' And 'Delay and Laches': Supreme Court Explains
39. Sec 163A MV Act -Fixing Rs 15,000 Per Annum As Notional Income For Non-Earning Members Not Reasonable As Schedule II Not Yet Amended
[Case: Kurvan Ansari alias Kurvan Ali & Anr. v. Shyam Kishore Murmu & Anr; Citation: LL 2021 SC 655]
While dealing with a civil appeal preferred by appellant claimants aggrieved by the High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi's judgment the Supreme Court observed that despite repeated directions, Schedule-II of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has not been amended yet. The bench of Justices R Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy observed, "In this case, it is to be noted that the accident was on 06.09.2004. In spite of repeated directions, Schedule-II is not yet amended. Therefore, fixing notional income at Rs.15,000/- per annum for non- earning members is not just and reasonable."
Considering that the accident was on September 6, 2004 and discussing the law laid down in Puttamma & Ors. v. K.L. Narayana Reddy & Anr. (2013) 15 SCC 45, R.K. Malik & Anr. v. Kiran Pal & Ors. (2009) 14 SCC 1 and Kishan Gopal & Anr. v. Lala & Ors. (2014) 1 SCC 244 4 (2020) 7 SCC 256, the bench observed that it was a fit case to increase the notional income by taking into account the inflation, devaluation of the rupee and cost of living.
40. Restricting 'Touch' Or 'Physical Contact' Only To 'Skin To Skin' Contact Absurd: Supreme Court Reverses Bombay HC's POCSO Judgment
[Case: Attorney General for India v. Satish and Anr; Citation: LL 2021 SC 656]
The Supreme Court set aside the controversial judgment of the Bombay High Court which held that 'skin-to-skin' contact is necessary for the offence of sexual assault under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences(POCSO) Act. A bench comprising Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Justice S Ravindra Bhat, and Justice Bela M Trivedi pronounced the judgment in the appeals filed by the Attorney General of India, National Commission for Women and the State of Maharashtra against the judgment of the High Court. "Restricting the interpretation of the words "touch" or "physical contact" to "skin to skin contact" would not only be a narrow and pedantic interpretation of the provision contained in Section 7 of the POCSO Act, but it would lead to an absurd interpretation of the said provision. "skin to skin contact" for constituting an offence of "sexual assault" could not have been intended or contemplated by the Legislature. The very object of enacting the POCSO Act is to protect the children from sexual abuse, and if such a narrow interpretation is accepted, it would lead to a very detrimental situation, frustrating the very object of the Act, inasmuch as in that case touching the sexual or non sexual parts of the body of a child with gloves, condoms, sheets or with cloth, though done with sexual intent would not amount to an offence of sexual assault under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. The most important ingredient for constituting the offence of sexual assault under Section 7 of the Act is the "sexual intent" and not the "skin to skin" contact with the child", the Bench observed.
41. Temple Rituals Can't Be A Matter Of Court Adjudication Unless Secular Or Civil Rights Of Others Are Affected
[Case: Srivari Daadaa v. Tirupathi Tirumala Devasthanam; Citation: LL 2021 SC 657]
In a petition filed by a devotee alleging irregularities in the rituals at the iconic Tirupati Tirumala temple, the Supreme Court observed that a constitutional court cannot interfere in the daily rituals of a temple. It added that it can only look into issues relating to temple administration not following the prescribed rules and regulations. But it is not feasible for the Court to interfere into issues related to rituals and sevas. Observing that a constitutional court cannot interfere in the day to day affairs of a temple, the bench comprising CJI NV Ramana, Justice AS Bopanna and Justice Hima Kohli disposed of the devotee's special leave petition, which was filed challenging the order of Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing his PIL which sought directions to Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam to rectify the method of performing rituals and seva to Lord Sri Venkateshwara Swamy at the Temple.
42. 'Ambush PILs' Filed To Preclude Genuine Litigants; Summary Dismissal Of Earlier Article 32 Petition Won't Operate As Res Judicata
[Case: National Confederation of Officers Association of Central Public Sector Enterprises v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 658]
The Supreme Court observed that the summary dismissal of an earlier writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution does not operate as res judicata. "There is a trend of poorly pleaded public interest litigations being filed instantly following a disclosure in the media, with a conscious intention to obtain a dismissal from the Court and preclude genuine litigants from approaching the Court in public interest", the bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and BV Nagarathna observed. The court said that it must be alive to the contemporary reality of "ambush Public Interest Litigations".
43. Compassionate Appointment Policy Prevalent At The Time Of Employee's Death Applies, Not Subsequent One
[Case: State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ashish Awasthi; Citation: LL 2021 SC 659]
The Supreme Court reiterated that the policy prevalent at the time of death of the deceased employee is required to be considered for the appointment on compassionate ground. "The claim for compassionate appointment must be decided only on the basis of relevant scheme prevalent on date of demise of the employee and subsequent scheme cannot be looked into", the bench of Justices MR Shah and Sanjiv Khanna observed.
44. Motor Accident Compensation: Claimants Entitled To 'Future Prospects' Even If Deceased Was Not Earning
[Case: Meena Pawaia v. Ashraf Ali; Citation: LL 2021 SC 660]
The Supreme Court observed that even in case of a deceased who had no income at the time of death, their legal heirs shall also be entitled to future prospects by adding future rise in income. It is not expected that the deceased who was not serving at all, his income is likely to remain static and his income would remain stagnant, the bench comprising Justices MR Shah and Sanjiv Khanna said. In this case, in an accident which occurred on 12.09.2012, the son of the claimants, who was a bachelor aged 21 years studying in 3rd year of B.E (Engineering Course), died. The High Court reduced the amount of compensation awarded by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal from Rs.12,85,000/ to Rs.6,10,000/ assessing the income of the deceased at Rs.5,000/ per month instead of Rs.15,000/ per month as awarded by the Tribunal.
45. 'Pension A Deferred Compensation, Hard Earned Benefit For Employee': Supreme Court Grants Relief To Widow
[Case: Veena Pandey v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 661]
The Supreme Court directed to disburse pension to a deceased employee's widow who has been litigating for over a decade. "Pension as is well known, is the deferred portion of the compensation for rendering long years of service. It is a hard-earned benefit accruing to an employee, in the nature of property,", the bench comprising Justices R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy observed. Following the employee's death on 12.01.2011, as per the Pension Scheme, 1998 the widow of the pensioner made claim for a sum equivalent to 100 times the full monthly pension of her husband. Vide letter dated 30.09.2012, she applied for payment of the lump sum amount in pursuance of para 15(1)(b) read with para 15(2) of the Coal Mines Pension Scheme, 1998. As her representation was rejected, she approached the High Court by filing a writ petition. This petition was dismissed by the High court on the ground that no cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court of Patna. It was observed that the services rendered by the pensioner were outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Patna High Court and hence the writ petition filed by the widow of the pensioner was not maintainable.
46. Supreme Court Issues Additional Directions For Disbursement Of Compensation And Expeditious Adjudication Of MACT Claims
[Case: Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Private Ltd. v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 662]
The Supreme Court issued a slew of directions regarding disbursement of compensation and expeditious adjudication of motor accident claims by online mechanism. The bench of Justices SK Kaul and MM Sundresh directed as follows- A. Format For Payment Advised For Remittance Of Compensation To Be Followed Across Country B. Interest On Disbursement Of Compensation To Beneficiaries To Be Enured To Their Benefit C. Insurance Company/Depositor To Communicate Factum Of Deposit Expeditiously To MACT With Copy To Beneficiary D. District Medical Board To Follow Guidelines Issued By Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment E. Aspect Of Disparity In TDS Certificate Can Be Redressed By Directions To Legal Services Authority Or Any Agency/Mediation Group To Assist The Claimant In Obtaining A Pan Card And Amending The Formats Across The Country F. Registrar General Of High Courts To Show Compliance Of Directions Passed On March 16, 2021 G. Insurance Companies To Develop Common Mobile App Within 2 Months From Date Of Order H. Alternative Mechanism To Ensure Availability Of Sufficient Pool With The State Corporations
47. Having An Option To Surrender & Apply For Regular Bail After Filing Charge Sheet Does Not Preclude Parties From Seeking Anticipatory Bail
[Case: Vinod Kumar Sharma and Anr v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr; Citation: LL 2021 SC 663]
The Supreme Court observed that merely because it was kept open for the parties to surrender and apply for Regular Bail after filing of the charge sheet, the same did preclude them to apply for anticipatory bail u/s 438 Cr.P.C. after filing the charge sheet. "Merely because it was kept open for the petitioners to surrender and apply for Regular Bail after filing of the charge sheet, the same does not preclude the petitioners to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. after filing of the charge sheet. It also cannot be said, that same is a second application for grant of anticipatory bail as pleaded by learned counsel appearing for respondents, on the same cause of action", the bench of Justices R Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy observed.
48. Plea Of Bias Can't Be Taken After Participating In Selection Process With Knowledge About Composition Of Panel
[Case: Mohd. Mustafa v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 664]
While rejecting the challenge against the appointment of Dinkar Gupta IPS as the Punjab Director General of Police in 2019, the Supreme Court observed that a person can't take the plea of bias after having participated in the selection process with full knowledge about the composition of the selection panel. "When a person takes a chance and participates, thereafter he cannot, because the result is unpalatable, turn around to contend that the process was unfair or the selection committee was not properly constituted", the bench comprising Justices L.Nageswara Rao, Sanjiv Khanna, and B.R.Gavai remarked. The judgment upheld the validity of the High Court judgement which had set aside the Central Administrative Tribunal's finding that the appointment of the DGP was liable to be set for not being in compliance with the Prakash Singh guidelines, among other grounds.
49. Injunction Orders Cannot Be Passed Against Third Parties Without Hearing Them
[Case: Acqua Borewell Pvt. Ltd. v. Swayam Prabha & Ors; Citation: LL 2021 SC 665]
The Supreme Court held that injunction orders with respect to a suit property cannot be passed in detriment to the interest of third parties who are directly affected by it, without impleading them or giving them an opportunity of being heard. A bench comprising Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna set aside the common judgment and order passed by the Karnataka High Court, which had granted injunction against alienation to the extent of 1/7th share in the suit property, without giving the third parties (appellants), who have right, title or interest in the property by way of development agreements and/or otherwise, an opportunity of being heard. At the outset, the Court observed that, the respondents, who are original plaintiffs have acknowledged that the third parties (appellants) are necessary and property parties by filing applications to implead them as parties to the suit. In view of the same, the Court noted that before granting the injunction, the appellants ought to have been impleaded and given an opportunity to be heard.
50. SMS Intimation To Candidate's Mobile Number Sufficient Communication For Selection Process
[Case: State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors v. Pankaj Kumar; Citation: LL 2021 SC 666]
The Supreme Court rejected the argument of a candidate that the intimation given through SMS about physical fitness test and document verification is not sufficient. The Court noted that the SMS intimation was given in the mobile number furnished by the candidate. "When a requirement is stated in the application to provide the mobile number, it is with a purpose to communicate and in the instant case, the appellants have sent the SMS to the very number which had been furnished by the appellant", the Bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and AS Bopanna said. Further, the Court observed that a line has to be drawn at some stage as otherwise, the recruitment process undertaken by the competent authorities would be meaningless without a timeline and the next recruitment process will also get affected as determination of the number of vacancies for the next process would keep fluctuating.
51. Juvenile Justice Act: Age Recorded By JJ Board Or CWC Deemed To Be True Age Of Accused
[Case: Rishipal Singh Solanki v. State of UP& Ors; Citation: LL 2021 SC 667]
The Supreme Court held that for the purpose of the Juvenile Justice Act 2015, the age recorded by the Juvenile Justice Board or the Child Welfare Committee of the person so brought before it will be deemed to be the true age of the person. A Bench comprising Justice DY Chandrachud and Justice BV Nagarathna has made the observation while delivering its judgment in a plea challenging Allahabad High Court's order sustaining the judgment of the District & Sessions Court as well as of the Juvenile Justice Board declaring the accused a juvenile delinquent. In the present matter, a victim of the crime had approached the Supreme Court challenging the declaration of the accused as a juvenile, arguing that the matriculation certificate can't be a conclusive document for determining the age of the juvenile irrespective of other material discrepancies in the oral testimony of the witnesses or other documents being produced. The Bench has held that the deeming provision Section 94 (3) of the JJ Act, 2015 is significant inasmuch as 'the controversy or the doubt regarding the age of the child brought before the Committee or the JJ Board is sought to be set at rest at the level of the JJ Board or the Committee itself'.
52. [Punjab Security Of Land Tenures Act] Civil Court Would Retain Jurisdiction In Cases Where the Landlord-Tenant Relationship Itself Is Disputed
[Case: Assa Singh (D) By LRs v. Shanti Parshad (D) By LRs. & Others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 668]
The Supreme Court held that if the landlord-tenant relationship itself is disputed, the Civil Court would continue to have jurisdiction to look into the illegality of the eviction orders passed by the Revenue Court, despite the bar of Section 25 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, whereby exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the Revenue Court to, inter alia, order eviction of tenants. A bench comprising Justices K.M. Joseph and S. Ravindra Bhat dismissed a civil appeal, wherein it was enjoined upon to decide on the ambit of Section 25 of the Act in respect of the bar of the Civil Courts to determine the validity of proceedings or order passed in accordance with the provision of the Act. The only issue raised by the appellant before the Apex Court was the interpretation of the ambit of Section 25 of the Act, with reads as under: "Section 25. Exclusion of courts and authorities - Except in accordance with the provisions of this Act, the validity of any proceedings or order taken or made under this Act shall not be called in question in any court or before any other authority."
53. Arbitrator Cannot Modify Award On An Application Under Section 33 Arbitration Act
[Case: Gyan Prakash Arya v. Titan Industries Limited; Citation: LL 2021 SC 669]
The Supreme Court observed that an Arbitrator cannot modify an Arbitration award on an application filed under Section 33 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Only in a case of arithmetical and/or clerical error, the award can be modified and such errors only can be corrected, the bench comprising Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna said. In this case, the Court noted "What was claimed by the original claimant in the statement of claim was awarded. Therefore, the order passed by the learned arbitrator on an application filed under Section 33 8 of the 1996 Act and thereafter modifying the original award cannot be sustained. The order passed by the learned arbitrator in the application under Section 33 of the 1996 Act is beyond the scope and ambit of Section 33 of the 1996 Act."
54. Sale Deed Executed Without Payment Of Price Is Void; Has No Legal Effect: Supreme Court
[Case: Kewal Krishan v. Rajesh Kumar; Citation: LL 2021 SC 670]
The Supreme Court observed that the payment of price is an essential part of a sale. If a sale deed in respect of an immovable property is executed without payment of price and if it does not provide for the payment of price at a future date, it is not a sale at all in the eyes of law, the bench comprising Justices Ajay Rastogi and Abhay S. Oka said. The court also observed that a document which is void need not be challenged by claiming a declaration as the said plea can be set up and proved even in collateral proceedings.
55. Civil Court Cannot Declare Orders Passed Under Urban Land Ceiling Act As Illegal Or Non Est
[Case: State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ghisilal; Citation: LL 2021 SC 671]
The Supreme Court held that the civil courts have no jurisdiction to try suit relating to land which is the subject-matter of ceiling proceedings, Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. Civil court cannot declare, orders passed by the authorities under the ULC Act, as illegal or non-est, the court said. "The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 is a self-contained Code. Various provisions of the Act make it clear that if any orders are passed by the competent authority, there is provision for appeal, revision before the designated appellate, and revisional authorities. In view of such remedies available for aggrieved parties, the jurisdiction of the civil courts to try suit relating to land which is subject-matter of ceiling proceedings, stands excluded by implication. Civil court cannot declare, orders passed by the authorities under the ULC Act, as illegal or non est. More so, when such orders have become final, no declaration could have been granted by the civil court", the Bench comprising Justices R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy observed.
56. Writ Of Mandamus Cannot Be Issued Directing Competent Authority To Grant Relaxation In Qualifying Service For Promotion
[Case: State of U.P. v. Vikash Kumar Singh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 672]
No writ of mandamus can be issued directing the competent authority to grant relaxation in qualifying service for promotion, the Supreme Court observed. In this case, the Allahabad High Court directed the competent authority to prepare the eligibility list of the Superintending Engineer (Civil) including the names of the writ petitioners for promotion to the post of Chief Engineer (Civil) Level – II by granting them relaxation in the minimum length of service in accordance with the U.P. Government Servants Relaxation in Qualifying Service for Promotion Rules, 2006. The bench comprising Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna observed: "The word used in the Rule 8 of Relaxation Rules, 2006 is "MAY". Therefore, the relaxation may be at the discretion of the competent authority. The relaxation cannot be prayed as a matter of right. If a conscious decision is taken not to grant the relaxation, merely because Rule permits relaxation, no writ of mandamus can be issued directing the competent authority to grant relaxation in qualifying service."
57. Scheme Not Constitutionally Suspect Merely Because It Was Based On Electoral Promise: Supreme Court Upholds TN Loan Waiver Scheme To Small/Marginal Farmers
[Case: State of Tamil Nadu v. National South Indian River Interlinking Agriculturist Association; Citation: LL 2021 SC 673]
The Supreme Court upheld a Tamil Nadu Government scheme that granted loan waivers to small and marginal farmers. A scheme cannot be held to be constitutionally suspect merely because it was based on an electoral promise, the bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and Justices AS Bopanna said. The court observed that it is justifiable that the benefit of the scheme is only provided to a specified class as small and marginal farmers constitute a class in themselves. The Court also observed that since the classification in the impugned scheme is based neither on the grounds in Article 15 nor on the 'innate and core trait' of an individual, it cannot be struck down on the alleged grounds of under-inclusiveness and over-inclusiveness.
58. NEET- National Testing Agency Bound To Scrupulously Enforce Specific Relaxations For Persons With Disability
[Case: Avni Prakash v. National Testing Agency and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 674]
"The NTA must remember that all authority under the law is subject to the responsibility and above all to a sense of accountability. It is governed by the rule of law and the necessity of observing fairness. As an examining body, the NTA was bound to scrupulously enforce the guidelines for the examination which provide for specific relaxations for persons with disability", ruled the Supreme Court. The bench comprising Justice D. Y. Chandrachud and Justice A S Bopanna was pronouncing its decision on the plea by a female NEET-2021 candidate suffering from dysgraphia whose grievance was that she was refused an additional one hour's time for attempting the paper by the examination centre. Her prayers were that either she may be allowed a re-examination, or be appropriately compensated by way of grace marks or no negative marking or otherwise.
59. IBC: NCLT Cannot Adjudicate Contractual Dispute If Termination Of Contract Is Based On Grounds Unrelated To Corporate Debtor's Insolvency
[Case: TATA Consultancy Services Limited v. Vishal Ghisulal Jain, Resolution Professional, SK Wheels Private Limited; Citation: LL 2021 SC 675]
The Supreme Court observed that the residuary jurisdiction of the NCLT cannot be invoked to adjudicate contractual dispute if the termination of a contract is based on grounds unrelated to the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor. Even if the contractual dispute arises in relation to the insolvency, a party can be restrained from terminating the contract only if it is central to the success of the CIRP, the Court added. The bench comprising Justices DY Chandrachud and AS Bopanna noted that Section 60(5)(c) grants residuary jurisdiction to the NCLT to adjudicate any question of law or fact, arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution of the Corporate Debt.
60. Land Acquisition Act 1894 -Section 17(4) Notification Liable To Be Quashed If State Fails To Show Exceptional Circumstances Justifying Urgency
[Case: Hamid Ali Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 676]
The Supreme Court held that the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 can be invoked only in exceptional circumstances. Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 gives power to the land acquisition authorities to take immediate possession of the land before the proceedings related to award of compensation are over. As per Section 17(4), the authority can dispense with the requirement under Section 5A of hearing the objections of the land owners to the acquisition notification in case of urgent acquisition.
A bench comprising Justices KM Joseph and S Ravindra Bhat observed, "The power under Section 17 (4) is discretionary. Being a discretion it must be exercised with due care. It is true that if there is relevant material however meagre it may be and the authority has without being guided by extraneous considerations applied his mind and taken a decision, then the court would adopt a hands-off approach. In the ultimate analysis as with any other decision a balancing of conflicting interests is inevitable. The authorities must remain alive and alert to the precious right created in favour of the citizens which is not meant to be a mere empty ritual".
61. Witness Testimony Inconsistent With Medical Evidence: Supreme Court Alters Conviction For Murder
[Case: Viram @ Virma v The State of Madhya Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 677]
The Supreme Court converted the conviction of appellants from Murder (S.302/149) to Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons (326/149) under the Indian Penal Code on the basis of inconsistencies between oral testimony of witnesses and medical evidence on record. A Bench of Justices L.Nageswara Rao and B.V.Nagarathna relied on Amar Singh v State of Punjab, wherein the Supreme Court had examined the point relating to inconsistencies between oral evidence and medical opinion. In that case, it was held that the inconsistency between the medical evidence on record and the oral evidence of the witnesses was found to be sufficient to discredit the entire prosecution case.
62. Employee Won't Lose Entitlement To Gratuity By Merely Opting To Extend Retirement Age To 60 Years
[Case: G.B. Pant University Of Agriculture And Technology v. Sri Damodar Mathpal; Citation: LL 2021 SC 678]
The Supreme Court held that mere exercise of option by an employee, to avail the benefit of extension of age of retirement to 60 years, could not operate against his entitlement to gratuity. The bench of Justices Dinesh Maheshwari and Vikram Nath in the present matter was hearing a special leave petition assailing Uttarakhand High Court's order dated November 1, 2017 filed by G.B. Pant University Of Agriculture And Technology. While dismissing the special leave petition and opining that no case for interference was made out, the bench further observed that, "...we are at one with the view taken by the High Court that mere exercise of option by an employee, to avail the benefit of extension of age of retirement to 60 years, could not have operated against his entitlement to gratuity; and exercising of such an option will not deprive the private respondents to gratuity unless and until the establishment i.e., the petitioner-University, was exempted in strict compliance of Section 5 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972, after prior approval of the State Government". On the aspect of reduction of interest awarded, the Court said that, "On the other hand, the High Court has been rather considerate to the petitioner in reducing the rate of interest awarded to the private respondents from 10% to 6% p.a.".
63. Delay In Filing Appeal Before DRT Against Recovery Officer Order Cannot Be Condoned U/Sec 5 Limitation Act
[Case: Avneesh Chandan Gadgil v. Oriental Bank of Commerce; Citation: LL 2021 SC 679]
The Supreme Court observed that the delay in filing appeal before Debt Recovery Tribunal against the order passed by the Recovery Officer cannot be condoned by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall not be applicable to the appeal against the order of Recovery Officer as provided under Section 30 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, the court observed. In this case, there was a delay of 31 days in the appeal preferred against the order of Recovery Officer. The Debts Recovery Tribunal condoned the delay by applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The DRAT set aside this order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The High Court restored the order passed by DRT relying on A.R. Venugopal Alias R. Venugopal v. Jotheeswaran and Ors., (2016) 16 SCC 588. In appeal, the Apex court bench comprising Justices MR Shah and Sanjiv Khanna restored the DRAT order. It noted that the judgment in A.R. Venugopal Alias R. Venugopal, which has been relied upon by the High Court has been expressly overruled by this Court in the decision in the case of International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Limited v. Official Liquidator of Aldrich Pharmaceuticals Limited (2017) 16 SCC 137.
64. Power Of Judicial Review Cannot Be Invoked To Decide Equivalence Of Prescribed Qualifications With Any Other Qualification
[Case: Devender Bhaskar v. State of Haryana; Citation: LL 2021 SC 680]
The Supreme Court observed that equivalence of prescribed qualifications with any other given qualification cannot be decided by the courts invoking its power of judicial review. Equivalence of qualification is a matter for the State, as recruiting authority, to determine, the court said. The bench comprising Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari set aside a High Court judgment which held that the diploma/degree in Art and Craft given by the Kurukshetra University is equivalent to two-year Diploma in Art and Craft examination conducted by the Haryana Industrial Training Department or diploma in Art and Craft conducted by Director, Industrial Training and Vocational Education, Haryana.
65. Death Penalty - Court Duty Bound To Consider Possibility Of Reformation Even If Accused Remains Silent
[Case: Mofil Khan and another v. The State of Jharkhand; Citation: LL 2021 SC 681]
The Supreme Court allowed the review petitions filed by two death-row convicts to convert the death sentence imposed on them to life imprisonment for a term of 30 years. A bench comprising Justices L Nageswara Rao, BR Gavai and BV Nagarathna noted in the order that the Court is duty bound to elicit all relevant information regarding the possibility of the reformation of the convicts before imposing the harshest punishment of death sentence, even if the accused is remaining silent. Also, the State is under a duty to procure evidence to establish that there is no possibility of reformation and rehabilitation of the accused. In the instant case, the bench noted that the death sentence was awarded without reference to the possibility of reformation of the convicts.
66. Mere Allegation Of Fraud Without Particulars Not Sufficient To Get Over Bar On Civil Suit Under Section 34 SARFAESI
[Case: Electrosteel Castings Limited v. UV Asset Reconstruction Company Limited; Citation: LL 2021 SC 682]
The Supreme Court observed that bar under Section 34 SARFAESI Act on filing civil suit is attracted if allegations of 'fraud' are made without any particulars. The court said that as per Order VI Rule 4 in all cases in which the party pleading relies on any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, wilful default, or undue influence, particulars shall be stated in the pleading. While allowing the appeal, the Bench comprising Justices MR Shah and Sanjiv Khanna further observed: "Having considered the pleadings and averments in the suit more particularly the use of word 'fraud' even considering the case on behalf of the plaintiff, we find that the allegations of 'fraud' are made without any particulars and only with a view to get out of the bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act and by such a clever drafting the plaintiff intends to bring the suit maintainable despite the bar under Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, which is not permissible at all and which cannot be approved.
67. Mechanical Compliance Of Stipulations U/Sec 63 Indian Succession Act Does Not Prove Execution Of Will
[Case: State of Haryana v. Harnam Singh (D); Citation: LL 2021 SC 683]
The Supreme Court observed that mechanical compliance of stipulations under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, does not prove the execution of a Will. Evidence of meeting the requirement of the said provision must be reliable, the bench of Justices L. Nageswara Rao and Aniruddha Bose said. In this case, the person claiming to be scribe of the Will as well as the two attesting witnesses deposed to support the case of the original plaintiff, but both the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court disbelieved their testimony. It was further found that thumb impression of the propounder was not matched and that there was contradiction in the evidences of attesting witnesses as regards the place of execution. However, the High Court allowed the appeal on the basis that the Will was proved in terms of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.
68. Section 362 CrPC Does Not Empower Court To Suo Motu Recall Orders Passed By It
[Case: XXX v. State of Kerala; Citation: LL 2021 SC 684]
The Supreme Court observed that Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not empower a court to suo moto recall the earlier order passed by it. The court said that Section 362 CrPC only provides for correction of any clerical or arithmetical error. The bench comprising Justices Vineet Saran and Aniruddha Bose set aside a Kerala High court order recalling its earlier judgment quashing rape and child sexual assault charges against various accused. The High Court bench presided by Justice K. Haripal had initially quashed the proceedings against on the grounds of the marriage of the accused to the victims. Later, the judge recalled these orders taking note of the Supreme Court judgment in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab held heinous and serious offence offences like murder, rape, and other such offences cannot "be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute". The accused had therefore approached the Apex Court.
69. Hostile Witness's Credible Evidence Can Form Basis For Conviction In Criminal Trial
[Case: Hari v. State of Uttar Pradesh; Citation: LL 2021 SC 685]
The Supreme Court observed that credible evidence even of a hostile witnesses can form the basis for conviction in a criminal trial. Even if the witnesses have turned hostile, their evidence can be accepted, if they are natural and independent witnesses and have no reason to falsely implicate the accused, the bench comprising Justices L. Nageswara Rao, Sanjiv Khanna and BR Gavai observed. The court added that the evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether. The bench was considering a case of honour killing. The Trial Court had sentenced some of the accused to death.
70. Murder Trial - Injured Witness's Evidence Not At A Higher Pedestal In A Case Of Private Defence Where The Accused Also Injured
[Case: Arvind Kumar @ Nemichand and Ors v. State of Rajasthan; Citation: LL 2021 SC 686]
The Supreme Court held that the principle that the evidence of an injured witness has to be placed at a higher pedestal may not apply to a case of private defence when the accused is also injured. A Bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M.M. Sundresh allowed a batch of appeals filed by the accused assailing the charges framed in the first chargesheet, while it dismissed the set of appeals filed by the de facto complainant over a trial started pursuant to the second chargesheet filed after further investigation. On the issue of evidence of eye-witnesses, the Court felt that it did not hold ground.
71. Arms Act - Illegal Use Of Licensed Weapon Per Se Not Offence Under Section 27 Unless Misdemeanour Under Sections 5/7 Proved
[Case: Surinder Singh v. State; Citation: LL 2021 SC 687]
The Supreme Court observed that illegal use of a licensed or sanctioned weapon per se does not constitute an offence under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959, without proving the misdemeanor u/s 5 or 7 of the Act. The Court also observed that at best, it could be a 'misconduct' under the service rules. The bench of CJI NV NV Ramana, Justices Surya Kant and AS Bopanna in the present matter was considering a criminal appeal against Punjab and Haryana High Court's order dated May 19, 2010. As per the impugned order, the High Court had confirmed the order of conviction and sentence dated July 25, 2006 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh of the appellant who was convicted under Section 307 of IPC and Section 27 of the Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of 3 years for both the offences, with a direction that sentences will run concurrently.
72. Disciplinary Proceedings - Reasons Should Be Recorded To Adopt Special Procedure Of Dispensing With Inquiry
[Case: Union of India and Ors v. Ram Bahadur Yadav; Citation: LL 2021 SC 688]
The Supreme Court observed that when Rules contemplate method and manner to adopt special procedure, it is mandatory on the part of the authorities to exercise such power by adhering to the Rule strictly. The bench of Justices R Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy in the present matter was considering a Civil Appeal assailing Allahabad High Court's order dated April 7, 2009. In the Impugned Order the High Court while dismissing the intra court appeal had confirmed Single Judge's order. The Single Judge by setting aside the dismissal order with a direction for payment of all pensionary benefits and 50% of back wages. of directing the Competent Authority to allow Respondent's writ petition. While dismissing the appeal, the bench observed, "Dismissal of a regular member of Force, is a drastic measure. Rule 161, which prescribes dispensing with an inquiry and to pass order against a member of Force, cannot be invoked in a routine and mechanical manner, unless there are compelling and valid reasons."
73. High Court Cannot Dismiss Second Appeal In Limine Without Assigning Reasons
[Case: Hasmat Ali v. Amina Bibi and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 689]
Holding that a High Court cannot dismiss a second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure in limine without assigning reasons, the Supreme Court remitted a matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration. In the instant case, the High Court had dismissed the second appeal with a one-sentence order stating: "Considering the submission made herein and going through the question of law, this Court does not find any question of law for admitting the Second Appeal for which the Second Appeal stands dismissed". Taking exception to this order, the Bench comprising Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna Murari observed that if the case does not involve any substantial question of law, the High Court has no option but to dismiss the appeal. However, in order to come to a conclusion that the appeal does not involve any substantial of law, the High Court has to record the reasons.
74. Consumer Commission Should Issue Bailable Warrant Only If Party Is Not Represented At All Through Counsel Or Representative
[Case: L&T Finance Ltd v. Pramod Kumar Rana and Anr; Citation: LL 2021 SC 690]
The Supreme Court observed that the Consumer Commission should issue a bailable warrant for the appearance of a party only as a last resort. The issuance of bailable warrant is not justified if the party is represented through counsel or authorized representative. "Bailable warrants are to be issued as a last resort and only in a case where it is found that the opponent parties are not cooperating at all and that they are avoiding appearance before the National Commission deliberately and/or they are not represented at all either through their authorised representative or through their counsel", the bench comprising Justices MR Shah and BV Nagarathna observed while considering an appeal filed by L&T Finance Ltd challenging the bailable by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission for the personal appearance of the director of the company.
75. Irregularity In Order Taking Cognizance Will Not Vitiate Criminal Proceedings
[Case: Pradeep S Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka; Citation: LL 2021 SC 691]
The Supreme Court held that an irregularity in the order taking cognizance will not vitiate the proceedings in a criminal trial. Referring to Section 465 (finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error, omission irregularity) CrPC, a bench comprising Justice DY Chandrachud, Justice Vikram Nath, and Justice BV Nagarathna said, "The objective of Section 465 is to prevent the delay in the commencement and completion of trial. Section 465 CrPC is applicable to interlocutory orders such as an order taking cognizance and summons order as well. Therefore, even if the order taking cognizance is irregular, it would not vitiate the proceedings in view of Section 465 CrPC." In the instant case, the cognizance order was challenged by the appellant two years after cognizance was taken. No reason was given to explain the inordinate delay.
Also Read: Special Court Can Conduct Joint Trial Of MMDR Offences With IPC Offences
Also Read: Fully Reasoned Order Not Necessary For Taking Cognizance On The Basis Of Police Report
76. Businessmen Will Be Hesitant To Enter Govt Contracts If Undertakings Are Altered On Mere Change Of Person In Power
[Case: The Vice Chairman and Managing Director, City and Industrial Development Corporation Maharashtra v. Shishir Realty Private Ltd and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 692]
The Supreme Court cautioned against the public authorities changing the undertakings in government contracts merely due to the change of person in power. The Court said that if previous undertakings are violated by the successor authority without any proper grounds of public interests, businessmen will be hesitant to enter into government contracts. Such a situation will be counter-productive to the economy and the business environment, the Court warned. A bench comprising Chief Justice of India NV Ramana, Justice Vineet Saran and Justice Surya Kant disapproved the actions of City and Industrial Development Corporation of Maharashtra, a Maharashtra government instrumentality, in altering the conditions in a lease deed with a private entity.
77. Civil Society Must Also Be Placed With Collective Responsibility To Carry Out Reafforestation Activities
[Case: In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India; Citation: LL 2021 SC 693]
While emphasising on the idea of collective responsibility to carry out reafforestation and ensure a sustainable future, the Supreme Court of India has directed the Delhi Metro Rail Corporation and the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi to evolve a plan of action to plant tree saplings in the city y involving school and college students, educational institutions, NGOs , etc. A bench comprising Justices L Nageswara Rao, BR Gavai and BV Nagarathna has issued the direction in an application filed by DMRC seeking exemption from forest clearance for felling of trees for the Delhi metro Phase -IV project. The Court disposed of the application by directing the DMRC to file an application before the Chief Conservator of Forest seeking clearance under the Forest Conservation Act. The GNCTD has been asked to involve school and college students, educational institutions, Non- Governmental Organizations, Citizen Welfare Associations, public servants and every citizen or person who is interested in the ecology of NCT of Delhi to plant trees or saplings and ensure that they are nurtured and protected so that the NCT of Delhi would in passage of time have more greenery leading to afforestation.
78. Mere Non-Availability Of Operation Theatres When Patient Was Taken For Surgery Not Medical Negligence On Part Of Hospital
[Case: Bombay Hospital and Medical Research Centre v. Asha Jaiswal and others; Citation: LL 2021 SC 694]
The Supreme Court held that non-availability of an emergency operation theatre during the period when surgeries were being performed on other patients is not a valid ground to hold the hospital negligent in any manner. A bench comprising Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian observed that if a patient who was admitted in a critical condition does not survive even after surgery, the blame cannot be passed on to the Hospital or the Doctor who provided all possible treatment within their means and capacity. "The experts in the other fields have been consulted from time to time and the treatment was modulated accordingly. In spite of the treatment, if the patient had not survived, the doctors cannot be blamed as even the doctors with the best of their abilities cannot prevent the inevitable", the Bench observed. The matter emanates from a 2010 order of National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) against the Bombay Hospital and Medical Research Centre and one of its doctors, wherein it had directed them to pay the deceased Rs. 14,18,491 along with interest for medical negligence and deficiency in services.
79. Intention To Cause Death Immaterial If Prosecution Proves Ingredients Of "Thirdly" Of Section 300 IPC
[Case: Vinod Kumar v. Amritpal @ Chhotu & Ors; Citation: LL 2021 SC 695]
The Supreme Court observed that once the prosecution establishes the existence of three ingredients forming part of "thirdly" in Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code, it is irrelevant whether there was an intention on the accused part to cause death. The bench of Justices Ajay Rastogi and AS Oka was considering a criminal appeal against an order dated July 18, 2016 passed by the Rajasthan High Court. By the impugned order, the High Court while maintaining the conviction u/s 147, 364, 201 and 329/149 of IPC, had brought down the conviction u/s 302, IPC to Part II of Section 304 and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 8 years. The fine amount was not disturbed. The 5 respondents were the accused(s) who were prosecuted u/s 147, 364, 302/149, 201 and 323/149 of the Indian Penal Code.
While allowing the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and restoring the order passed by the Session's Court, the bench observed that, "We are constrained to observe that the High Court adopted an easy method of accepting the only contention canvassed that the offence made out was culpable homicide not amounting to murder. As noticed earlier, the High Court ignored that there were injuries on the vital parts of the body of the deceased. The High Court did not notice that all the elements of "thirdly" in Section 300 were established". The Court further held, "Once the prosecution establishes the existence of the three ingredients forming a part of "thirdly" in Section 300, it is irrelevant whether there was an intention on the part of the accused to cause death. As held by this Court in the case of Virsa Singh (supra), it does not matter that there was no intention even to cause the injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. Even the knowledge that an act of that kind is likely to cause death is not necessary to attract "thirdly". Hence, it follows that clause "thirdly" of Section 300 will apply in this case".