'Limitation Period Of Three Years Expired' : Supreme Court Sets Aside Court Martial Proceedings Against Army Officer
The Supreme Court set aside a court martial proceedings against an army officer on the ground that it was barred under limitation prescribed under Section 122 of the Army Act. In this case, a colleague of Col Anil Kumar (appellant), wrote a letter on 13.08.2015 to his superior in which he alleged that the appellant was sending indecent messages to his wife which were sexually explicit in...
The Supreme Court set aside a court martial proceedings against an army officer on the ground that it was barred under limitation prescribed under Section 122 of the Army Act.
In this case, a colleague of Col Anil Kumar (appellant), wrote a letter on 13.08.2015 to his superior in which he alleged that the appellant was sending indecent messages to his wife which were sexually explicit in nature and that he had reasonable cause to believe that they had indulged in illegitimate physical relationship with each other.
Following this letter, a Court of Inquiry was conducted by the HQ Delhi Area and the same was finalized with direction to initiate disciplinary proceedings against Col Anil Kumar. On the completion of Summary of Evidence, a prima facie case was made out against him and three charges were framed against him under Section 45 of the Army Act. On 22.11.2018 the Convening Authority directed the trial by General Court Martial.
He filed an Original Application before the Armed Forces Tribunal under Section 14 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, challenging the charge-sheet and the direction of trial of the appellant by General Court Martial. In the said application, he raised an issue pertaining to the period of limitation in terms of Section 122 of the Army Act. As the Tribunal dismissed his OA, he approached the Apex Court.
In appeal, the Apex Court bench noted the Section 122 of the Army Act which prescribes period of Limitation for trial. It provides that no trial by Court Martial of any person subject to the Army Act, for any offence could be commenced after the expiration of a period of three years, and such period would commence on the date of offence or where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the authority competent to initiate action, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or authority, whichever is earlier.
"Hence for the purpose of Section 122, the two dates will be relevant i.e., the date when the alleged offence comes to the knowledge of the person aggrieved and the date on which the authority competent to initiate action comes to know about the alleged offence", the bench noted.
Taking note of the dates involved in this case, the court said that the date 13.08.2015 would be the crucial date on which the aggrieved person had the knowledge about the commission of the alleged offence.
"Therefore the time had started running from the said date for the purpose of Section 122 of the said Act. In that view of the matter, the submission of the learned senior advocate appearing for the respondents that date of aggrieved person's knowledge about the commission of the alleged offence by the appellant, should be construed as the date when the respondents prima facie concluded after the Court of Inquiry that the appellant had committed the offence, cannot be accepted. The date 13.08.2015 therefore would be the date on which the aggrieved persons i.e., Col. Ramneesh Pal Singh had the knowledge about the commission of the alleged offence by the appellant. The Convening Authority having directed the trial by General Court Martial vide order dated 22.11.2018, the same was clearly beyond three years and therefore barred under Section 122 of the Act.", the court said while allowing the appeal.
Case details
Col Anil Kumar Gupta vs Union of India | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 931 | CA 8968 OF 2019 | 7 Nov 2022 | CJI UU Lalit and Justice Bela M. Trivedi
For Appellant(s) Mr. Indra Sen Singh, Adv. Mr. Abhishek Singh, Adv. Mr. Aditya Bari, Adv. Mr. Elvin Joshy, Adv. Mr. Ujjwal Verma, Adv. Mr. J. Amal Anand, Adv. Ms. Alisha Sharma, Adv. Mr. Sarvesh Singh, AOR
For Respondent(s) Ms. Neela Gokhale, Adv. Mr. Arvind Kumar Sharma, AOR
Headnotes
Army Act, 1950 ; Section 122 - For the purpose of Section 122, the two dates will be relevant i.e., the date when the alleged offence comes to the knowledge of the person aggrieved and the date on which the authority competent to initiate action comes to know about the alleged offence - In this case, a letter dated 13.08.2015 written by the aggrieved person to the concerned authority which showed that he was aware of the alleged offence - The date 13.08.2015 would be the crucial date on which the aggrieved person had the knowledge about the commission of the alleged offence. Therefore the time had started running from the said date for the purpose of Section 122 - The contention that the date of aggrieved person's knowledge about the commission of the alleged offence should be construed as the date when the authority prima facie concluded after the Court of Inquiry that the offence was committed, cannot be accepted - The Convening Authority having directed the trial by General Court Martial vide order dated 22.11.2018, the same was clearly beyond three years and therefore barred under Section 122 of the Act.
Constitution of India, 1950 ; Article 226 - Judicial Review - Disciplinary Proceedings - The power of judicial review in the matter of disciplinary proceedings is extremely limited. It is circumscribed by the limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. The power of judicial review is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not of the merits of the decision itself. (Para 11)
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