Leave To Defend U/Sec 25B Delhi Rent Control Act Cannot Be Granted To Tenant On Mere Asking : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court observed that a leave to defend under Section 25B of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, cannot be granted on mere asking and a tenant has to put in some material of substance to the extent of raising a triable issue.

The object behind Section 25B is facilitating not only the expeditious but effective remedy for a class of landlords, sans the normal procedural route, the bench comprising Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and MM Sundresh observed.

In this case, the landlord filed the eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The tenant filed an application seeking leave to defend raising some contentions. Rent Controller dismissed the application. Allowing the revision petition filed by the tenant, the Delhi High Court observed that there are triable issues.

In appeal filed by the landlord, the Apex Court bench first discussed the scope of Section 14(1)(e) and 25B as follows:

1. Section 14(1)(e) carves out an exception to the regular mode of eviction. Thus, in a case where a landlord makes an application seeking possession of the tenanted premises for his bona fide requirement, the learned Rent Controller may dispense with the protection prescribed under the Act and then grant an order of eviction. Requirement is the existence of bona fide need, when there is no other "reasonably suitable accommodation". Therefore, there has to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non-availability of a reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Such reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlord and not the tenant. When the learned Rent Controller comes to the conclusion that there exists a bona fide need coupled with the satisfaction that there is no reasonably suitable residential accommodation, the twin conditions mandated under Section 14(1)(e) stand satisfied.
2. For availing the leave to defend as envisaged under Section 25B(5), a mere assertion per se would not suffice as Section 14(1)(e) creates a presumption subject to the satisfaction of the learned Rent Controller qua bona fide need in favour of the landlord which is obviously rebuttable with some material of substance to the extent of raising a triable issue. The satisfaction of the Rent Controller in deciding on an application seeking leave to defend is obviously subjective. The degree of probability is one of preponderance forming the subjective satisfaction of the Rent Controller. Thus, the quality of adjudication is between a mere moonshine and adequate material and evidence meant for the rejection of a normal application for eviction.
3. Before a presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty bound to place prima facie material supported by the adequate averments. It is only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted and the onus shifts on the tenant. The object of 11 Section 14(1)(e) vis a vis Section 25B has to be seen in the light of yet another provision contained under Section 19. Section 19 gives a right to the dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is a non-compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction, to put the premises to use for the intended purpose. Such a right is available only to a tenant who stood dispossessed on the application filed by the landlord invoking Section 14(1)(e) being allowed. Thus, Section 19 inter alia throws more light on the legislative objective facilitating a speedy possession. The obj

The bench, referring to the High Court judgment noted that the High Court proceeded to allow the revision by treating it like an appeal. While allowing the appeal and restoring the Rent Controller's order, the bench observed:

The High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial Court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature.

Case details

Abid Ul Islam vs Inder Sain Dua | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 353 | CA 9444 OF 2016 | 7 April 2022

Coram: Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and MM Sundresh

Counsel: Adv Amit Andley for appellant

Headnotes

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958; Section 14(1)(e) and 25B(5) - For availing the leave to defend as envisaged under Section 25B(5), a mere assertion per se would not suffice - The satisfaction of the Rent Controller in deciding on an application seeking leave to defend is obviously subjective. The degree of probability is one of preponderance forming the subjective satisfaction of the Rent Controller. Thus, the quality of adjudication is between a mere moonshine and adequate material and evidence meant for the rejection of a normal application for eviction - The tenant is expected to put in adequate and reasonable materials in support of the facts pleaded in the form of a declaration sufficient to raise a triable issue. (Para 15-17)

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958; Section 25B (8) - Revisional Jurisdiction - The High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial Court by exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature. (Para 20)

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958; Section 14(1)(e) - Eviction on Bona fide need - There has to be satisfaction on two grounds, namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non-availability of a reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Such reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlord and not the tenant - Section 14(1)(e) creates a presumption subject to the satisfaction of the Rent Controller qua bona fide need in favour of the landlord which is obviously rebuttable with some material of substance to the extent of raising a triable issue- Before a presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty bound to place prima facie material supported by the adequate averments. It is only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted and the onus shifts on the tenant. (Para 12,15)

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958; Section 25B - Legislative object - expeditious and effective remedy for a class of landlords, sans the normal procedural route. (Para 17)

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958; Section 19 - Right to the dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is a non-compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction, to put the premises to use for the intended purpose - Such a right is available only to a tenant who stood dispossessed on the application filed by the landlord invoking Section 14(1)(e) being allowed. (Para 16)

Summary- Appeal against Delhi HC judgment which allowed revision petition filed by a tenant under Section 25B(8) of Delhi Rent Control Act - Allowed - High Court proceeded to allow the revision by treating it like an appeal.

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