Demonitisation, EWS Quota, SEBC Reservation For Muslims, Jallikattu & More : Summary Of 25 Constitution Bench Matters To Be Listed From August 29

Notably, the matters are not listed for substantive hearing but for directions related to the completion of filings, indication of tentative time to be taken by lawyers for arguments etc.

Here is the summary of those 5-judge bench matters:

Case Title: State of A.P. & Ors. Vs. B. Archana Reddy & Ors. with 18 connected matters - SEBC quota for Muslims in AP

Case No. C.A. No.7513/2005

The Apex Court will consider the challenge against the five-Judge Bench decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, which by four different opinions, has declared the "Andhra Pradesh Reservation of Seats in the Educational Institutions and of appointments/posts in the Public Services under the State to Muslim Community Act, 2005" as unconstitutional and violative of Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution.

The High Court had dealt with following questions of law:

1. Whether Muslims, as a community, can be declared socially and educationally backward for the purposes of Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution ?
2. Whether there was relevant and scientific material before the Commission to come to a conclusion that Muslims in Andhra Pradesh were, as a Community, backward socially and educationally ?
3. How far the Court could go into analyzing the material which was collected by the Commission ?
4. Whether the criteria adopted by the Commission was right and if the Court could go into the relevance of the criteria ?

Case Title: Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee Vs. Shail Mittal & Ors. with 5 connected matters - minority quota for Sikhs

Case No.: SLP (C) No.2755/2008 etc. (Main matter is SLP (C) No.3660/2008)

The present matter pertains to an appeal filed by the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) challenging the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, regarding reservation for Sikh students within SGPC managed institutes under minority quota.

On December 17, 2007, the Punjab and Haryana High Court had struck down a notification issued by the Punjab government on April 13, 2001 which permitted the SGPC to give 50 per cent reservation to Sikh students in colleges run by it on grounds that Sikhs were a minority community.

The High Court had observed that the notification had not applied the requisite parameters for adjudging a group of individuals as minority. It had said, "The country could not be taken as a unit, as has been done. There is no material to substantiate that "Sikhs" are a non-dominant group in Punjab apprehending deprivation of their rights at the hands of "dominant" groups, who may come to power in the State in a democratic election. The notifications are clearly ultra vires the jurisdiction of the State government, violating right of equality and public interest."

The Apex Court will also consider whether the decision rendered by a three Judge Bench of this Court in Bal Patil & Anr. vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2005 (6) SCC 690 is legally correct.

In Bal Patil, the Apex Court had refused to grant relief to an appellant-organisation representing a section of Jain community, who had approached by writ petition the High Court of Bombay seeking issuance of a mandamus/direction to the Central Government to notify 'Jains' as a 'minority' community under section 2(c) of the National Commission for Minorities Act, 1992.

Case Title: V. Vasanthakumar vs H.C. Bhatia and Ors - creation of appellate wings for Supreme Court at regional benches

Case No: W.P.(C)No.36/2016

This petition, filed in public interest, raises questions touching possible structural reforms at the highest echelons of the Indian judicial system. The Apex Court has referred following 11 questions of law before the larger bench on 13.07.2016:

1. With access to justice being a fundamental right, would the said right stand denied to litigants, due to the unduly long delay in the disposal of cases in the Supreme Court?
2. Would the mere increase in the number of judges be an answer to the problem of undue delay in disposal of cases and to what extent would such increase be feasible?
3. Would the division of the Supreme Court into a Constitutional wing and an appellate wing be an answer to the problem?
4. Would the fact that the Supreme Court of India is situate in the far North, in Delhi, rendering travel from the Southern states and some other states in India, unduly long and expensive, be a deterrent to real access to justice?
5. Would the Supreme Court sitting in benches in different parts of India be an answer to the last mentioned problem?
6. Has the Supreme Court of India been exercising jurisdiction as an ordinary court of appeal on facts and law, in regard to routine cases of every description?
7. Is the huge pendency of cases in the Supreme Court, caused by the Court not restricting its consideration, as in the case of the Apex Courts of other countries, to Constitutional issues, questions of national importance, differences of opinion between different High Courts, death sentence cases and matters entrusted to the Supreme Court by express provisions of the Constitution?
8. Is there a need for having Courts of Appeal, with exclusive jurisdiction to hear and finally decide the vast proportion of the routine cases, as well as Article 32 petitions now being decided by the Supreme Court of India, especially when a considerable proportion of the four million cases pending before the High Court may require review by a higher intermediate court, as these judgments of the High Courts may fail to satisfy the standards of justice and competence expected from a superior court?
9. If four regional Courts of Appeal are established, in the Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western regions of the Country, each manned by, say, fifteen judges, elevated or appointed to each Court by the Collegium, would this not satisfy the requirement of 'access to justice' to all litigants from every part of the country?
10. As any such proposal would need an amendment to the Constitution, would the theory of 'basic structure' of the Constitution be violated, if in fact, such division of exclusive jurisdiction between the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal, enhances the efficacy of the justice delivery system without affecting the independence of the judicial wing of the State?
11. In view of cases pending in the Supreme Court of India on average for about 5 years, in the High Courts again for about 8 years, and anywhere between 5-10 years in the Trial Courts on the average, would it not be part of the responsibility and duty of the Supreme Court of India to examine through a Constitution Bench, the issue of divesting the Supreme Court of about 80% of the pendency of cases of a routine nature, to recommend to Government, its opinion on the proposal for establishing four Courts of Appeal, so that the Supreme Court with about 2500 cases a year instead of about 60000, may regain its true status as a Constitutional Court?

Case Title: Janhit Abhiyan v. Union Of India with 32 connected matters - EWS quota

Case No.: W.P.(C)NO.55/2019

The Supreme Court on 05.08.2020 decided to refer to the Constitution Bench the petitions challenging the validity of Constitution 103rd Amendment which introduced provision for reservation to Economically Weaker Sections (EWS).

Economic reservation in jobs and education was proposed to be provided by inserting clause(6) in Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution through the amendment passed by the Parliament in January 2019.

The newly inserted Article 15(6) enables the State to make special provisions for advancement of any economically weaker section of citizens, including reservations in educational institutions. It states that such reservation can be made in any educational institution, including private institutions, whether aided or unaided, except minority educational institutions covered under Article 30(1). It further states that the upper limit of the reservation will be ten percent, which will be in addition to the existing reservations.

After the amendment was notified by the President, a batch of petitions were filed in the SC challenging the constitutional validity of economic reservation.

Case Title: Ashok Kumar Jain Vs. U.O.I with 7 connected matters - regarding validity of increasing the time limit for reservation in Parliament and assemblies

Case No.: W.P. (C) No.546/2000 (Election Matter)

Here, the petitioners have challenged the validity of the Constitution (79th Amendment) Act, 1999 whereby the words 'sixty years' have been substituted in place of 'fifty years' in Article 334 of the Constitution- which provides for reservation of seats for SC/ST and special reservation in Parliament and assemblies. Their counsel argued that this amendment is against the basic feature of the Constitution. According to them, democracy has been recognised as one of the essential features of the Constitution by this Court and since the Amendment Act deprive the democratic rights of the petitioners, inasmuch as it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, it deserves to be struck down. The Apex Court had transferred the matter to a 5-judge bench on 02.09.2003.

Case Title: Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. X with 16 connected matters - regarding Citizenship Act

Case No.: W.P. (C) No.562/2012

In this matter, the issue pending is whether the expression "every person born in India" would apply only to persons born to Indian citizens and whether the expression "either of whose parents is a citizen of India at the time of his birth" in S.3(1)(b) of the Citizenship Act, 1955 would apply to only a person who is born to parents one of whom is a citizen and the other a foreigner, provided he or she has entered India lawfully and his/her stay in India is not in contravention of applicable Indian laws.

Case Title: Anoop Baranwal vs. Union of India with 1 connected matter

Case No.: W.P.(C)NO.104/2015

The matter relates to what the petitioner perceives to be a requirement of having a full-proof and better system of appointment of members of the Election Commission. The Apex Court had earlier observed that the matter requires a close look and interpretation of the provisions of Article 324 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court also stated that the issue has not been debated and answered by it earlier.

Case Title: The Animal Welfare Board Of India And Ors. Vs. Union Of India And Ors.with 14 connected matters - Jallikattu case

Case No.: W.P.(C)NO.23/2016

A bench of then Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justice Rohinton Nariman had felt the writ petition revolving around Jallikattu involved substantial questions relating to interpretation of the Constitution and referred the matter to the constitution bench with five questions to decide on besides those raised in the writ petitions. The questions which was referred to a Bench of 5 Judges are set out hereinbelow:

i. Is the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act referable, in pith and substance, to Entry 17, List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India, or does it further and perpetuate cruelty to animals; and can it, therefore, be said to be a measure of prevention of cruelty to animals? Is it colourable legislation which does not relate to any Entry in the State List or Entry 17 of the Concurrent List?

ii. The Tamil Nadu Amendment Act states that it is to preserve the cultural heritage of the State of Tamil Nadu. Can the impugned Tamil Nadu Amendment Act be stated to be part of the cultural heritage of 4 the people of the State of Tamil Nadu so as to receive the protection of Article 29 of the Constitution of India?

iii. Is the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act, in pith and substance, to ensure the survival and well-being of the native breed of bulls? Is the Act, in pith and substance, relatable to Article 48 of the Constitution of India?

iv. Does the Tamil Nadu Amendment Act go contrary to Articles 51A(g) and 51A(h), and could it be said, therefore, to be unreasonable and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India?

v. Is the impugned Tamil Nadu Amendment Act directly contrary to the judgment in A. Nagaraja (supra), and the review judgment dated 16th November, 2016 in the aforesaid case, and whether the defects pointed out in the aforesaid two judgments could be said to have been overcome by the Tamil Nadu 5 Legislature by enacting the impugned Tamil Nadu Amendment Act?

Case Title: Central Board of D.B. Community & Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. with 1 connected matter - regarding excommunication in Dawoodi Bohra community

Case No.: W.P.(C) No.740/1986

On 26.2.1986 the present petition was filed seeking re-consideration, and over-ruling, of the decision of Apex Court in Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb Vs. State of Bombay \026 1962 Suppl.(2) SCR 496 and then issuing a writ of mandamus directing the State of Maharashtra to give effect to the provisions of the Bombay Prevention of Ex-communication Act, 1949. Notably, the Apex Court ruled by a majority of 4 : 1 that the Bombay Prevention of Ex-communication Act was ultra vires the Constitution as it violated Article 26 (b) of the Constitution and was not saved by Article 25(2).

On 17.12.2004, the Apex Court opined that the matter should be placed for hearing before a Constitution Bench (of five Judges) and not before a larger Bench of seven Judges. It is only if the Constitution Bench doubts the correctness of the law laid down in Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb's case (supra) that it may opine in favour of hearing by a larger Bench consisting of seven Judges or such other strength as the Chief Justice of India may in exercise of his power to frame a roster may deem fit to constitute, added the court.

Case Title: C.B.I. Vs. R.R. Kishore with 1 connected matter

Case No.: CRL.A.No.377/2007

In the present matter, the provisions of Section 6A(1) of DPSE Act which indicates that for officers of the level of Joint Secretary and above, a kind of immunity has been provided for. The moot question that arose on the present matter is whether there can be a deprivation of such immunity by a retrospective operation of a judgment of the Court, in the context of Article 20 of the Constitution of India.. The Apex Court had referred the matter to a larger bench on 10.03.2016.

Case Title: Karmanya Singh Sareen And Anr. Vs. Union Of India & Ors. with 1 connected matter

Case No.: SLP(C) NO.804/2017

This is a special leave petition filed against Delhi High Court judgment in Whatsapp Privacy case. Karmanya Singh Sareen and Shreya Sethi had challenged the 2016 privacy policy of popular mobile application WhatsApp. While allowing the WhatsApp to go ahead with the privacy policy and to share data with Facebook, the High Court had issued following directions

i) If the users opt for completely deleting "WhatsApp" account before 25.09.2016, the information/data/details of such users should be deleted completely from "WhatsApp" servers and the same shall not be shared with the "Facebook" or any one of its group companies.

ii) So far as the users who opt to remain in "WhatsApp" are concerned, the existing information/data/details of such users upto 25.09.2016 shall not be shared with "Facebook" or any one of its group companies.

iii) The respondents shall consider the issues regarding the functioning of the Internet Messaging Applications like "WhatsApp" and take an appropriate decision at the earliest as to whether it is feasible to bring the same under the statutory regulatory framework.

In April 2017, the bench headed by the then Chief Justice of India J S Khehar had referred this SLP to the Constitution Bench.

Case Title: Sita Soren Vs. Union Of India

Case No.: CRL.A.NO.451/2019

"Whether Article 105/194 (2) of the Constitution of India confers any immunity on the Members of Parliament/Legislative Assembly from being prosecuted for an offence involving offer or acceptance of bribe to caste vote in a legislature?"

A three judge bench of the Supreme Court led by then CJI Ranjan Gogoi has referred the aforesaid question to a larger bench, while considering Sita Soren's appeal against Jharkhand High Court order which held that she could not claim immunity.

Case Title: Union of India Vs. M/s Union Carbide Corporation & Ors. & 1 connected matter

Case No.: Curative Petition(C) No.345- 347/2010 in R.P.(C)No.229/1989 & 623- 624/1989 in C.A.Nos.3187- 3188/1988 & SLP(C)No.13080/1988 With T.P. (C)No.170/2011 IV-A

The curative petition was filed by the Centre for additional compensation for Bhopal gas tragedy victims from US-based Union Carbide Company( which is now owned by Dow Chemicals).

The petition filed in December 2010 seeks additional compensation of Rs.7413 crores, seeking re-examination of the apex court's February 14, 1989 judgement by which the compensation was fixed at US$ 470 million (Rs 750 crore) and subsequent orders of February 15 and May 4 determining the mode of payment and settlement. According to Central Government, the earlier settlement was based on incorrect assumptions on the number of deaths, injuries and losses, and has not taken into account the subsequent environmental degradation. The settlement was based on the earlier figure of 3,000 deaths and 70,000 injury cases; the curative petition has put the death numbers at 5,295 and injury figure at 527,894. has sought.

As per Centre, the earlier settlement was based on incorrect assumptions on the number of deaths, injuries and losses, and has not taken into account the subsequent environmental degradation. The settlement was based on the earlier figure of 3,000 deaths and 70,000 injury cases; the curative petition has put the death numbers at 5,295 and injury figure at 527,894. has sought.

A group of victims have sought impleadment in the case through Advocate Karuna Nundy supporting the enhancement of the compensation.

Case Title: State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. Paschim Banga B.K. Samity & Ors. with 23 connected matters

Case No.: C.A.No.16879/1996

The questions referred by two judge bench to larger bench:

"(i) The scope and content of Article 300A in particular whether a law contemplated therein has to conform Article 14 and/or any facet of Article 14 of the Constitution;

(ii) the extent of protection available in respect of law which is challenged under Article 300A in the context of the protective umbrella of Articles 31A, 31B and 31C of the Constitution.

(iii) When the scope of agrarian reform law is altered by amendment of the meaning of expressions "estate", "rights", "proprietor", sub-proprietor", "tenure holder", "raiyat and under raiyat" and "other intermediaries" 5 (contrary to their meaning in 31A(2)of the Constitution) thereby covering non-agricultural lands including factories and mills, whether the protection of Article 31A will be available.

(iv) The constitutional validity of Amendments repeatedly and gradually reducing the ceiling area, thereby denying reasonable compensation for the land which was held within ceiling limit as per the original ceiling Legislation, which render the second proviso to Articles 31A, 31B and 31C nugatory."

Additional Questions of law referred by parties, in addition to the questions referred by 2-judge bench:

"1. Whether Article 300 A, which does not contain a provision like Article 31(2), would mandate payment of any amount as compensation for depriving of a person of his property under the authority of law? If yes, then what are the parameters of adjudging the principles for payment of amount or the amount fixed by the Acquiring Act as illusory?

2. Whether the Constitutional Amendments inserting the amending Acts in the IXth Schedule would be violative of the Basic Structure of the Constitution and would therefore be open to challenge in the light of the judgment of this Hon'ble Court in I.R. Coelho (Dead by LRS) Vs. State of Tamil Nadu [(2007) 2 SCC 1] and therefore be liable to be struck down?

3. Whether the Section 4-D inserted by the 1981 Amendment Act of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 which prescribes the offences and penalties with retrospective effect from 07.08.1969 in the face of the prohibition contained in Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India is valid?"

Notably, the Apex Court or 26.02.2016 has ordered to list the matter after decision in 9 Judge bench matter i.e. C.A.No.1012/2002 etc.

Case Title: Bar Council of India Vs. Bonnie Foi Law College & Ors. with 14 connected matters

Case No.: SLP(C)No.22337/2008

The following questions were referred to the 5-judge bench:

1. Whether Pre-enrollment training in terms of Bar Council of India Training Rules, 1995 framed under Section 24(3)(d) of the Advocates Act, 1961 could be validly 4 prescribed by the Bar Council of India and if so whether the decision of this Court in Sudeer vs. Bar Council of India & Anr. [(1999) 3 SCC 176) requires reconsideration.
2. Whether a pre-enrollment examination can be prescribed by the Bar Council of India under the Advocates Act, 1961.
3. In case questions Nos.1 and 2 are answered in the negative whether a post-enrollment examination can be validly prescribed by the Bar Council of India in terms of Section 49(1)(ah) of the Advocates Act, 1961

Case Title: Union Of India & Ors. Vs. Preeti Aggarwal with 6 connected matters

Case No.: CRL.A.NO.375/2006

On 10.07.2014, the two judges bench comprising Justices Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla and Shiva Kirti Singh referred the question of, "whether the ordinance and its continuance ad infinitum as a law made by the Executive, would be contrary to the basic features of separation of powers and the scheme of checks and balances inscribed in the polity the Constitution has adopted". The Apex Court opined that deciding the constitutional questions involved in the present case would have serious ramifications on other pre-constitution laws which continue to be in force by virtue of Article 372 of the Constitution of India.

Case Title: Sukhpal Singh Khaira Vs. The State Of Punjab with 2 connected matters

Case No.: CRL.A.NO.885/2019

The Supreme Court has referred to a larger bench following three questions on the scope and ambit of power under Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code which remains unanswered even after the judgment of the Constitution bench in Hardeep Singh:

1. Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 of CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial with respect to other co-accused has ended and the judgment of conviction rendered on the same date before pronouncing the summoning order?
2. Whether the trial court has the power under Section 319 of the CrPC for summoning additional accused when the trial in respect of certain other absconding accused (whose presence is subsequently secured) is ongoing/pending, having been bifurcated from the main trial?
3. What are the guidelines that the competent court must follow while exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C?

Case Title: Tej Prakash Pathak & others Vs. Rajasthan High Court & others with 14 connected matters

Case No.: C.A. No. 2634 of 2013

Tej Prakash Pathak specifically doubted the correctness of K. Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh and another (2008) 3 SCC 512, wherein it was held that "introduction of the requirement of the minimum marks for interview, after the entire selection process (consisting of written examination and interview) was completed, would amount to changing the rules of the game after the game was played which is clearly impermissible" and subsequently, reference has been made by the 3-judge bench to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement.

In Manjushree, 75 marks were allotted for the written examination and 25 marks for the interview. The aggregate governed the merit. However, the written examination was conducted for 100 marks. When the Full Court noticed this, a sub-committee was appointed to make the arithmetical correction to scale down the marks in the written. examination to 75 instead of 100. The sub-committee did two things – (1) it made the arithmetical correction (2) it introduced the same cut-off percentage for the interview as in the written examination and thus revised the merit list, which was approved by the Full Court. In the process, a few candidates were removed from the original merit list including Manjusree.

Notably, in Salam Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur At Imphal and Anr (2016) 10 SCC 484 which dealt with almost a similar issue was heard by a three Judge Bench in view of the difference of opinion and it has also since been posted along with Tej Prakash (supra) by order dated 10.08.2017. The Apex Court also acknowledged to refer the aforesaid matter to a larger bench in Sivanandan C.T. & Ors. v. High Court of Kerala & Ors. [WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 229 OF 2017]

Case Title: M/S Shanti Fragrances vs. Union of India & Ors. with 10 connected matters

Case No.: C.A.No.8485/2011

In this case, the Constitution bench will decide whether the dictum in Kothari Products Ltd v Government of AP, or the contradictory dictum laid down in Commissioner, Sales Tax UP v M/s Agra Belting Works, Agra, is correct.

In Kothari Products case, a three-judge bench had held that an entry under a sales tax statute which only specifies rate cannot be used to eat into an exemption entry.

Whereas in the Agra Belting Works, it has been held that the charging section, the rate of tax section, and the exemption section all form part of one scheme and when a notification is issued under a rate of tax section, which is subsequent to a notification exempting certain goods, the intention of the legislature is that such exemption then gets withdrawn and makes the sale of such goods liable to tax.

Another important question posed by the bench is this: "Under the present practice, it is clear that the view of four learned Judges speaking for the majority in a 7-judge bench will prevail over a unanimous 5-judge bench decision, because they happen to speak for a 7-judge bench. Has the time come to tear the judicial veil and hold that in reality a view of five learned Judges cannot be overruled by a view of four learned Judges speaking for a Bench of 7 learned Judges?

Case Title: Sameena Begum vs. Union of India & ors. with 8 connected matters

Case No.: W.P.(C)NO.222/2018

The Supreme Court is seized of with petitions- filed by three victims Nafisa Begum, Sameena Begum, Farzana and two advocates Ashwini Upadhyay and Mohsin Kathiri challenging the constitutional validity of the polygamy and nikah-halala. Jamiat-Ulama-I-Hind moved the SC supporting the practices

On May 7, 2018, another victim, one Shabnam, had also knocked on the doors of the SC.

According to Sharia or the Muslim personal law, men are allowed to practice polygamy that is, they can have more than one wife at the same time, up to a total of four.

'Nikah halala' is a process in which a Muslim woman has to marry another person and get divorced from him before being allowed to marry her divorcee husband again.

They have demanded a ban on Polygamy and Nikah-Halala saying it renders Muslim wives extremely insecure, vulnerable and infringes their fundamental rights.

They prayed that Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act be declared unconstitutional and violative of Articles 14 (right to equality) , 15 (discrimination on ground of religion) and 21 (right to life )of the Constitution, insofar as it seeks to recognize and validate the practice of polygamy and nikah-halala.

Jamiat-Ulama-i-Hind argued that the Constitution does not touch upon the personal laws and therefore the SC cannot examine the question of constitutional validity of the practices.

Case Title: Pyare Lal Vs. State Of Haryana

Case No.: CRL.A.NO.1003/2017

A three judge bench headed by Justice UU Lalit has referred to a larger bench an important legal issue about the validity of Haryana Government's policy allowing premature release of life convicts aged above 75 which overrides Section 433A of Code of Criminal Procedure.

"Whether in exercise of power conferred under Article 161 of the Constitution a policy can be framed, whereunder certain norms or postulates are laid down, on the satisfaction of which the benefit of remission can thereafter be granted by the Executive without placing the facts or material with respect to any of the cases before the Governor and whether such exercise can override the requirements under Section 433-A of the Code?" , the bench, also comprising of Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Vineet Saran, framed this question for consideration of the larger bench.

The court was considering a case of a murder convict (sentenced to life imprisonment) who was released after completing 8 years of actual sentence invoking a remission policy framed by the State. Earlier, the court had issued notice to the State of Haryana asking it to explain its policy which conferred the benefit of remission on convicts who stood convicted for life sentence and are above the age of 75 years (in case of male convicts) and have completed 8 years of actual sentence. It had noted that the policy appears to be in conflict with Section 433A CrPC, which stipulates that a convict shall not be released from jail unless he had served at least 14 years of the imprisonment, if he has been sentenced to life for an offence that entails maximum of death sentence or in cases where capital punishment has been commuted.

Case Title: Shilpa Sailesh Vs. Varun Sreenivasan with 6 connected matters

Case No.: T.P.(C)NO.1118/2014

The questions are formulated herein below:

1. "What could be the broad parameters for exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to dissolve a marriage between the consenting parties without referring the parties to the Family Court to wait for the mandatory period prescribed under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act.
2. Whether the exercise of such jurisdiction under Article 142 should not be made at all or whether such exercise should be left to be determined in the facts of every case."

Case Title: VIVEK NARAYAN SHARMA VS. UNION OF INDIA with 57 connected matters

Case No.: W.P.(C)NO.906/2016

After the announcement of demonetization in November 2016, several petitions were filed in SC challenging the decision. The petitions had raised substantial legal points such as whether the decision was unilaterally announced by the Government without the proper consultation of the RBI Board. On November 25, 2016, the SC agreed to examine the constitutionality of the decision. Earlier, the Apex Court had directed that no other Court shall entertain, hear or decide any Writ Petition/proceedings on the issue or in relation to or arising from the decision of the Government of India to demonetize the old notes of Rs.500/- and Rs.1000/-, as the entire issue in relation thereto is pending consideration before the present proceedings.

Case Title: Kaushal Kishor vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh Govt. of U.P. Home Secretary with 1 connected matter

Case No.: W.P.(CRL.) No.113/2016

The case stems from the Bulandshahar rape incident wherein a Minister of the State, Azam Khan had dismissed the incident as a "political conspiracy and nothing else".

The questions regarding the status of a public official vis-à-vis fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution had been framed by Senior Advocates Mr. Fali S. Nariman and Mr. Harish Salve, who were appointed as amicus curiae and referred to a Constitution Bench vide Order dated 05.10.2017.

The matter was taken up today and four questions of law were framed by the Attorney-General of India, Mr. K.K. Venugopal:

1. Whether any restrictions can be imposed on the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)(a), excluding restriction already enumerated under Article 19(2)? If yes, then to what extent?
2. Whether greater restrictions on Article 19(1)(a) can be imposed, if it concerns persons holding high office?
3. Whether Article 21 can be enforced against individuals and private corporations not encompassed under the definition of 'State' as per Article 12?
4. Whether the State can proceed against individuals under statutory provisions?