Cheque Case Against Director/Partner Of Firm Can Be Quashed Only If There Is Unimpeachable & Incontrovertible Evidence That They Were Not Concerned With Issuance Of Cheque: Supreme Court

Update: 2022-09-16 13:52 GMT
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The Supreme Court observed that a High Court can quash a cheque case only if it comes across some unimpeachable and incontrovertible evidence to indicate that the Director/partner of a firm could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques."Vicarious criminal liability can be inferred against the partners of a firm when it is specifically averred in...

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The Supreme Court observed that a High Court can quash a cheque case only if it comes across some unimpeachable and incontrovertible evidence to indicate that the Director/partner of a firm could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques.

"Vicarious criminal liability can be inferred against the partners of a firm when it is specifically averred in the complaint about the status of the partners 'qua' the firm.", the bench comprising Justices Surya Kant and JB Pardiwala observed.

In this case, the High Court quashed a cheque case against the accused (partner of a firm) on the ground that there was nothing to indicate that in what manner the accused herein was in­charge and responsible for the day­to­day affairs of the firm so as to make her vicariously liable for the alleged offence with the aid of Section 141 of the NI Act. The High Court held that merely by reciting the words used under Section 141 of the NI Act in the complaint no vicarious liability can be fastened on the partner of the firm.

In appeal, Advocate E.R. Kumar for the complainant-appellant, contended that there are averments made in the complaint that the partners which include the accused are regularly looking after and actively taking part in the day­to­day business of the firm. Advocate Hari Priya Padmanabhan, who appeared for the respondent, contended that mere bald averments in the complaint are not sufficient to fasten the vicarious lability on the partner of the firm as envisaged under Section 141 of the NI Act.

The bench, analysing the scope of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881, summarized the legal position as follows:

(a) Vicarious liability can be fastened on those who are incharge of and responsible to the company or firm for the conduct of its business. For the purpose of Section 141, the firm comes within the ambit of a company;
(b) It is not necessary to reproduce the language of Section 141 verbatim in the complaint since the complaint is required to be read as a whole;
(c) If the substance of the allegations made in the complaint fulfil the requirements of Section 141, the complaint has to proceed in regards the law.
(d) In construing a complaint a hyper­technical approach should not be adopted so as to quash the same.
(e) The laudable object of preventing bouncing of cheques and sustaining the credibility of commercial transactions resulting in the enactment of Sections 138 and 141 respectively should be kept in mind by the Court concerned.
(f) These provisions create a statutory presumption of dishonesty exposing a person to criminal liability if payment is not made within the statutory period even after the issue of notice.
(g) The power of quashing should be exercised very sparingly and where, read as a whole, the factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint, it should not be quashed.
(h) The Court concerned would owe a duty to discharge the accused if taking everything stated in the complaint is correct and construing the allegations made therein liberally in favour of the complainant, the ingredients of the offence are altogether lacking.

The court noted that in the instant case, there are clear and specific averments not only in the complaint but also in the statutory notice issued to the accused and that the cheque was issued with the consent of the accused and within her knowledge. While allowing the appeal, the bench observed:

"In our view, this was sufficient to put the respondent herein to trial for the alleged offence. We are saying so because the case of the respondent that at the time of issuance of the cheque or at the time of the commission of the offence, she was in no manner concerned with the firm or she was not in­charge or responsible for day­to­day affairs of the firm cannot be on the basis of mere bald assertion in this regard. The same is not sufficient. To make good her case, the respondent herein is expected to lead unimpeachable and incontrovertible evidence. Nothing of the sort was adduced by the respondent before the High Court to get the proceedings quashed. The High Court had practically no legal basis to say that the averments made in the complaint are not sufficient to fasten the vicarious liability upon the respondent by virtue of Section 141 of the NI Act."

The court also summarized principles in this regard as follows:

  1. The primary responsibility of the complainant is to make specific averments in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no legal requirement for the complainant to show that the accused partner of the firm was aware about each and every transaction. On the other hand, the first proviso to sub­section (1) of Section 141 of the Act clearly lays down that if the accused is able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that the offence was committed without his/her knowledge or he/she had exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence, he/she will not be liable of punishment.
  2. The complainant is supposed to know only generally as to who were in charge of the affairs of the company or firm, as the case may be. The other administrative matters would be within the special knowledge of the company or the firm and those who are in charge of it. In such circumstances, the complainant is expected to allege that the persons named in the complaint are in charge of the affairs of the company/firm. It is only the Directors of the company or the partners of the firm, as the case may be, who have the special knowledge about the role they had played in the company or the partners in a firm to show before the court that at the relevant point of time they were not in charge of the affairs of the company. Advertence to Sections 138 and Section 141 respectively of the NI Act shows that on the other elements of an offence under Section 138 being satisfied, the burden is on the Board of Directors or the officers in charge of the affairs of the company/partners of a firm to show that they were not liable to be convicted. The existence of any special circumstance that makes them not liable is something that is peculiarly within their knowledge and it is for them to establish at the trial to show that at the relevant 45 time they were not in charge of the affairs of the company or the firm.
  3. Needless to say, the final judgement and order would depend on the evidence adduced. Criminal liability is attracted only on those, who at the time of commission of the offence, were in charge of and were responsible for the conduct of the business of the firm. But vicarious criminal liability can be inferred against the partners of a firm when it is specifically averred in the complaint about the status of the partners 'qua' the firm. This would make them liable to face the prosecution but it does not lead to automatic conviction. Hence, they are not adversely prejudiced if they are eventually found to be not guilty, as a necessary consequence thereof would be acquittal.
  4. If any Director wants the process to be quashed by filing a petition under Section 482 of the Code on the ground that only a bald averment is made in the complaint and that he/she is really not concerned with the issuance of the cheque, he/she must in order to persuade the High Court to quash the process either furnish some sterling incontrovertible material or acceptable circumstances to substantiate his/her contention. He/she must make out a case that making him/her stand the trial would be an abuse of process of Court.

Case details

S P Mani and Mohan Dairy vs Dr. Snehalatha Elangovan | 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 772 | CrA 1586 OF 2022 | 16 September 2022 | Justices Surya Kant and JB Pardiwala

Headnotes

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ; Section 482 - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ; Section 138,141 - High Court should not interfere under Section 482 of the Code at the instance of an accused unless it comes across some unimpeachable and incontrovertible evidence to indicate that the Director/partner of a firm could not have been concerned with the issuance of cheques - If any Director wants the process to be quashed by filing a petition under Section 482 of the Code on the ground that only a bald averment is made in the complaint and that he/she is really not concerned with the issuance of the cheque, he/she must in order to persuade the High Court to quash the process either furnish some sterling incontrovertible material or acceptable circumstances to substantiate his/her contention. He/she must make out a case that making him/her stand the trial would be an abuse of process of Court. (Para 47)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ; Section 138,141 - Vicarious criminal liability can be inferred against the partners of a firm when it is specifically averred in the complaint about the status of the partners 'qua' the firm. This would make them liable to face the prosecution but it does not lead to automatic conviction - On the other elements of an offence under Section 138 being satisfied, the burden is on the Board of Directors or the officers in charge of the affairs of the company/partners of a firm to show that they were not liable to be convicted. (Para 47)

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ; Section 138,141 - The object of notice before the filing of the complaint is not just to give a chance to the drawer of the cheque to rectify his omission to make his stance clear so far as his liability under Section 138 of the NI Act is concerned -  It is essential for the person to whom statutory notice is issued under Section 138 of the NI Act to give an appropriate reply. The person concerned is expected to clarify his or her stance. If the person concerned has some unimpeachable and incontrovertible material to establish that he or she has no role to play in the affairs of the company/firm, then such material should be highlighted in the reply to the notice as a foundation. (Para 44)

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