Section 69 Kerala Forest Act Does Not Place Reverse Burden Of Proof On Culpability Of Accused: Supreme Court

The Supreme Court observed that the Section 69 of the Kerala Forest Act merely directs a presumption that the forest produce belongs to the government and it does not place reverse burden of proof on culpable mental state of the accused.

The court said that seizure of the goods ipso facto does not mean that the accused had conscious knowledge about their illicit nature or origin or that they procured the goods illegally. "The presumption under Section 69 is with respect to not a conscious mental state, or a direction by the legislature that a certain state of affairs is deemed to exist, but with respect to ownership of the property", the bench of Justices Indira Banerjee and S. Ravindra Bhat observed.

Section 69 reads as follows: When, in any proceedings taken under this Act, or in consequence of anything done under this Act, a question arises as to whether any forest produce is the property of the Central or State Government, such produce shall be presumed to be the property of the Central or State Government, as the case may be, until the contrary is proved.

In this case, the court was considering an appeal against a judgment of the Kerala High Court which had restored the conviction and sentence of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 27 of the Kerala Forest Act. The conviction of the accused was on a complaint filed by the Kerala Forest Department, which alleged that he illegally possessed sandalwood oil which was a forest produce.

To restore conviction of the accused under Section 27 of the Act, the High Court referred to Section 69 of the Act, and observed that there is a presumption of culpability in the event possession was found. According to High Court the accused should have given an account regarding the raw materials collected and used. 

The appellant-accused before the Apex Court contended that the High Court convicted the appellant holding that the presumption under Section 69 applied. He submitted that he had in fact, discharged the burden placed upon them by producing registers maintained regarding details of individuals and firms from whom they had purchased the red oil. Therefore, the prosecution was under a duty to prove that such entries were false, it was contended. The state, on the other hand, contended that the seizure of the sandalwood oil from the accused at the airport and the subsequent search and seizure from their premises, resulted in the discharge of the foundational onus that lay upon the State and therefore Section 69 and the presumption enacted by it were attracted.

In appeal, the court, taking note of the Section 69, observed thus:

23. There can be no dispute that sandalwood oil is a forest product. However, Section 27 (1) (d)- which enacts the offence- and which has been applied in this case, points to the offender's conscious mental state when it enacts that whoever "knowingly receives or has in possession any major forest produce illicitly removed from a Reserved Forest" would be subjected to the prescribed punishment. The presumption under Section 69 is with respect to not a conscious mental state, or a direction by the legislature that a certain state of affairs is deemed to exist, but with respect to ownership of the property i.e. that it "belongs to the state, unless the contrary is proved."

24. This is a significant aspect, because unlike some statutes, the Act in the present case, does not create a presumption about a culpable mental state of the alleged offender. Instead, the nature of the presumption is that it relates to the ownership of the forest produce. This important aspect has a bearing on the matter. Whether an offence can be said to have been committed without the necessary mens rea has often arisen for consideration. Generally, there is a presumption that mens rea is an essential ingredient in every offence. Yet, that presumption can be displaced either by the phraseology of the law creating the offence or by the subject matter with which it deals; both must be considered.

The court therefore set side the High Court for the following reasons:

1. The High Court concluded incorrectly that the result of Section 69 is a presumption that places the reverse burden of proof in respect of an offence - no such inference can be drawn from the plain text of that provision;

2. Section 27 (1) (d) requires conscious knowledge, of the nature of the goods, i.e. their illicit origin, which compels proof by the prosecution, beyond reasonable doubt.  

It said:

"28. The High Court, in our opinion, fell into error, in holding that the presumption that the seizure of forest produce belonging to the State, automatically can result in a presumption of culpable mental state of the accused- in other words, that seizure of the goods ipso facto meant that the appellant had conscious knowledge about their illicit nature or origin, or that the accused's inability to account for a transit pass, implied that they procured the goods illegally, thus attracting Section 27. Such a leap of reasoning is not justified, given that the appellants had furnished a series of documents explaining how they had sourced the oil in question. The State's absence of diligence in producing those materials (which were in its possession) and proving that they were without credibility, cannot result in a conviction. Nor could the court have concluded adversely that the appellant's participation in the auction of the seized goods and their purchase, implicated them. There can be several reasons for such a conduct, including their wish to fulfil contractual obligations."

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