Mere Existence Of Alternate Forums Not A Legal Bar To Exercise Writ Jurisdiction: SC [Read Judgment]

The Supreme Court has observed mere existence of alternate forums where the aggrieved party may secure relief does not create a legal bar on a High Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction.

It is a factor to be taken into consideration by the High Court amongst several factors, said the bench comprising Justice Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud and Justice Indira Banerjee in Maharashtra Chess Association vs. Union of India.

The issue considered by the bench in was whether a private agreement entered into between the parties in the form of the Constitution and Bye Laws of the latter can, by conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the courts at Chennai, oust the writ jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was contended before the bench that since the High Court at Madras is capable of granting adequate relief in this case, there was a bar on the Bombay High Court exercising its writ jurisdiction in the present matter. Rejecting the said submission, the bench observed:

The existence of an alternate remedy, whether adequate or not, does not alter the fundamentally discretionary nature of the High Court's writ jurisdiction and therefore does not create an absolute legal bar on the exercise of the writ jurisdiction by a High Court. The decision whether or not to entertain an action under its writ jurisdiction remains a decision to be taken by the High Court on an examination of the facts and circumstances of a particular case.
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The mere existence of alternate forums where the aggrieved party may secure relief does not create a legal bar on a High Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction. It is a factor to be taken into consideration by the High Court amongst several factors."

Private Contract Between Parties By Itself Doesn't Oust Writ Jurisdiction

The bench answered the main issue whether the contract clause ousts its writ jurisdiction by observing thus:

The Bombay High Court has relied solely on Clause 21 of the Constitution and Bye Laws to hold that its own writ jurisdiction is ousted. The Bombay High Court has failed to examine the case holistically and make a considered determination as to whether or not it should, in its discretion, exercise its powers under Article 226. The scrutiny to be applied to every writ petition under Article 226 by the High Court is a crucial safeguard of the rule of law under the Constitution in the relevant territorial jurisdiction. It is not open to a High Court to abdicate this responsibility merely due to the existence of a privately negotiated document ousting its jurisdiction.

Setting aside the High Court judgment, the bench observed that the sole and absolute reliance by the Bombay High Court on Clause 21 of the Constitution and Bye Laws to determine that its jurisdiction under Article 226 is ousted, was erroneous. The following are some other observations made in the judgment:

On ouster of jurisdiction by Contract

• It is a well settled principle of contract law that parties cannot by contract exclude the jurisdiction of all courts. Such a contract would constitute an agreement in restraint of legal proceedings and contravene Section 28 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 . However, where parties to a contract confer jurisdiction on one amongst multiple courts having proper jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts, the parties cannot be said to have ousted the jurisdiction of all courts. Such a contract is valid and will bind the parties to a civil action. (Referred to A B C Laminart (P) Limited v A P Agencies, Salem)
• Parties cannot by agreement confer jurisdiction on a court which lacks the jurisdiction to adjudicate. But where several courts would have jurisdiction to try the subject matter of the dispute, they can stipulate that a suit be brought exclusively before one of the several courts, to the exclusion of the others.

Article 226: Powers of High Court and Self Imposed Rule

• The role of the High Court under the Constitution is crucial to ensuring the rule of law throughout its territorial jurisdiction. In order to achieve these transcendental goals, the powers of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction are necessarily broad. They are conferred in aid of justice. This Court has repeatedly held that no limitation can be placed on the powers of the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.
• The nature of power exercised by the High Court under its writ jurisdiction is inherently dependent on the threat to the rule of law arising in the case before it (A V Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay v Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani). The powers of the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot be circumscribed by strict legal principles so as to hobble the High Court in fulfilling its mandate to uphold the rule of law.
• While the powers the High Court may exercise under its writ jurisdiction are not subject to strict legal principles, two clear principles emerge with respect to when a High Court's writ jurisdiction may be engaged. First, the decision of the High Court to entertain or not entertain a particular action under its writ jurisdiction is fundamentally discretionary. Secondly, limitations placed on the court's decision to exercise or refuse to exercise its writ jurisdiction are self-imposed. It is a well settled principle that the writ jurisdiction of a High Court cannot be completely excluded by statute. If a High Court is tasked with being the final recourse to upholding the rule of law within its territorial jurisdiction, it must necessarily have the power to examine any case before it and make a determination of whether or not its writ jurisdiction is engaged. Judicial review under Article 226 is an intrinsic feature of the basic structure of the Constitution.
• If High Courts were to exercise their writ jurisdiction so widely as to regularly override statutory appellate procedures, they would themselves become inundated with a vast number of cases to the detriment of the litigants in those cases. This would also defeat the legislature's intention in enacting statutory appeal mechanisms to ensure the speedy disposal of cases. If, by the self-imposed rule, the writ jurisdiction of High Courts is circumscribed by the existence of a suitable alternate remedy, whether constitutional, statutory, or contractual, then a High Court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction where such an alternate remedy exists

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