Limitation Period U/S 468 CrPC Not Applicable To Application U/S 12 Domestic Violence Act : Supreme Court

The Court added that the starting point for limitation for an offence committed under Domestic Violence Act would arise only after there is a breach of an order passed under Section 12 of the Act.

"There would never be a starting point for limitation from the date of application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005", the bench comprising Justices UU Lalit and PS Narasimha stated.

The appellant had contended that the offence under Section 31 of the Act will be said to have been committed only after the breach of an order passed under Section 12 of the Act and there is no limitation under the Code or under the provisions of the Act for filing of an application as such. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that the starting point for reckoning the period of limitation ought to be from the date of application and as such, the High Court was justified in observing that the action was barred by time.

To address these rival contentions, the bench referred to the provisions of the Act and observed thus:

The provisions of the Act contemplate filing of an application under Section 12 to initiate the proceedings before the concerned Magistrate. After hearing both sides and after taking into account the material on record, the Magistrate may pass an appropriate order under Section 12 of the Act. It is only the breach of such order which constitutes an offence as is clear from Section 31 of the Act. Thus, if there be any offence committed in terms of the provisions of the Act, the limitation prescribed under Section 468 of the Code will apply from the date of commission of such offence. By the time an application is preferred under Section 12 of the Act, there is no offence committed in terms of the provisions of the Act and as such there would never be a starting point for limitation from the date of application under Section 12 of the Act. Such a starting point for limitation would arise only and only after there is a breach of an order passed under Section 12 of the Act.

The court observed that the High Court wrongly equated filing of an application under Section 12 of the Act to lodging of a complaint or initiation of prosecution. While allowing the appeal, the bench observed:

"It is thus clear that the High Court wrongly equated filing of an application under Section 12 of the Act to lodging of a complaint or initiation of prosecution.In our considered view, the High Court was in error in observing that the application under Section 12 of the Act ought to have been filed within a period of one year of the alleged acts of domestic violence.

The respondent also contended that in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal, it was held that if a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, issues process without there being any allegation against the accused, or any material implicating the accused, or in contravention of provisions of Sections 200 and 202, the order of the Magistrate may be vitiated. In this regard, the court observed that issuing notice under Section 12 cannot be regarded as taking cognizance of an offence.

The relevant observation from the judgment is as follows:

"The ratio in that case applies when a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence and issues process, in which event instead of going back to the Magistrate, the remedy lies in filing petition under Section 482 of the Code. The scope of notice under Section 12 of the Act is to call for a response from the respondent in terms of the Statute so that after considering rival submissions, appropriate order can be issued. Thus, the matter stands on a 31 different footing and the dictum in Adalat Prasad would not get attracted at a stage when a notice is issued under Section 12 of the Act"