HCs & SC Should Refrain From Fixing Time-Bound Schedules For Case Disposal In Other Courts Ordinarily: Supreme Court
In a momentous ruling, a Supreme Court constitution bench on Thursday (February 29) reversed its 2018 Asian Resurfacing judgment, firmly stating that directives mandating automatic expiration of interim orders after a set period cannot be issued by the apex court under Article 142 of the Constitution.The latest ruling was handed down on Thursday by a five-judge bench led by Chief Justice...
In a momentous ruling, a Supreme Court constitution bench on Thursday (February 29) reversed its 2018 Asian Resurfacing judgment, firmly stating that directives mandating automatic expiration of interim orders after a set period cannot be issued by the apex court under Article 142 of the Constitution.
The latest ruling was handed down on Thursday by a five-judge bench led by Chief Justice DY Chandrachud, alongside Justices Abhay S Oka, JB Pardiwala, Pankaj Mithal, and Manoj Misra. While the verdict was unanimous, the lead judgment was authored by Justice Oka, with Justice Mithal penning a concurring opinion.
Expressing disagreement with the directions outlined in paragraphs 36 and 37 of the Asian Resurfacing verdict, the court, through Justice Oka, today stated that “a direction that all interim orders of stay on proceedings passed by every high court will automatically expire only by reason of lapse of time cannot be issued in exercise of the jurisdiction of this court under Article 142 of the Constitution."
Importantly, it also categorically stated that constitutional courts should refrain from imposing time-bound schedules for disposal of cases in other courts. Only in exceptional circumstances, directions for the time-bound disposal of cases can be issued.
"Constitutional courts in ordinary course should refrain from fixing a time-bound schedule for the disposal of cases pending before any other courts. Constitutional courts may issue directions for the timebound disposal of cases only in exceptional circumstances. The issue of prioritising cases should be best left to the decision of the concerned courts "
Recognising the diverse patterns of case pendency across courts, the bench further stressed the importance of judges' awareness of the local situation. Out-of-turn priority for specific cases, the court noted, is best left to the discretion of the concerned judge.
Only the legislature can provide that cases of a particular category should be decided within a specific time. There are many statutes which incorporate such provisions. However, all such provisions are usually held to be directory.
The judgment written by Justice Oka stated :
"There is another important reason for adopting the said approach. Not every litigant can easily afford to file proceedings in the constitutional Courts. Those litigants who can afford to approach the constitutional Courts cannot be allowed to take undue advantage by getting an order directing out-of-turn disposal of their cases while all other litigants patiently wait in the queue for their turn to come. The Courts, superior in the judicial hierarchy, cannot interfere with the day-to-day functioning of the other Courts by directing that only certain cases should be decided out of turn within a time frame. In a sense, no Court of law is inferior to the other. This Court is not superior to the High Courts in the judicial hierarchy. Therefore, the Judges of the High Courts should be allowed to set their priorities on a rational basis. Thus, as far as setting the outer limit is concerned, it should be best left to the concerned Courts unless there are very extraordinary circumstances."
In his concurring opinion, Justice Pankaj Mithal emphasised the importance of judicial discretion in stay orders, insisting that a reasoned stay order, unless specified to be time-bound, should persist until the main matter is decided, or until the order is extended, modified, varied, or vacated. His stance aligns with the broader sentiment of the bench of giving precedence to a case-by-case approach over a blanket rule.
Background
The 2018 Asian Resurfacing ruling, which came under the Supreme Court's scrutiny, directed stay orders to be automatically vacated without requiring courts to provide reasons or consider the circumstances of each case. The ruling stipulated that trial courts could resume proceedings after six months from the issuance of stay orders by higher courts. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in August 2019 clarified that the six months' cap on interim stay orders will not be applied to Supreme Court orders.
The original judgment, delivered by a three-judge bench comprising Justices AK Goel, Navin Sinha, and Rohinton Nariman, mandated automatic stay vacation after six months unless in any exceptional case, such stay is extended by a speaking order.
“The speaking order must show that the case was of such exceptional nature that continuing the stay was more important than having the trial finalised. The trial court where the order of stay of civil or criminal proceedings is produced may fix a date not beyond six months of the order of stay so that on expiry of period of stay, proceedings can commence unless order of extension of stay is produced,” the court held.
Although the dictum was reiterated by the Supreme Court in October 2020, this verdict was not free from criticism. In September last year, a bench led by Justice BR Gavai orally remarked that it required 'serious consideration'.
In November, a three-judge bench of the Allahabad High Court, while rejecting a reference regarding the directions in the Asian Resurfacing judgment, framed ten questions of law for the apex court to consider. It also granted a certificate of appeal to applicants, allowing them to approach the top court.
While hearing the appeal, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court led by Chief Justice Chandrachud expressed reservations over the Asian Resurfacing judgment, raising apprehensions of potential miscarriage of justice in some cases. Accordingly, the court referred its earlier decision to a larger bench for reconsideration. In its order, the bench noted -
"We have reservations in regard to the correctness of the broad formulations of principle in the above terms. There can be no gainsaying the fact that a stay of an indefinite nature results in prolonging civil or criminal proceedings, as the case may be, unduly. At the same time, it needs to be factored in that the delay is not always on account of conduct of the parties involved. The delay may also be occasioned by the inability of the Court to take up proceedings expeditiously. The principle which has been laid down in the above decision to the effect that the stay shall automatically stand vacated (which would mean an automatic vacation of stay without application of judicial mind to whether the stay should or should not be extended further) is liable to result in a serious miscarriage of justice."
On the same day, another bench comprising Justices Oka and Mithal also raised doubts about the 2018 ruling.
Other reports about the judgment can be found here.
Case Details
High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State Of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. | Criminal Appeal No. 3589 of 2023
Citation : 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177