Supreme Court Quarterly Criminal Digest 2024

Acquittal

Appeal from acquittal – Principles of deciding – Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive i.e. inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary. Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge. If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed. If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal. If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts. In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court. (Para 36) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Reversing the order of acquittal into conviction – The High Court had erred in reversing the decision of acquittal, without arriving at any finding of illegality or perversity or error in the reasoning of the Trial Court. Setting aside an order of acquittal, which signifies a stronger presumption of innocence, on a mere change of opinion is not permissible. A low standard for turning an acquittal into conviction would be fraught with the danger of failure of justice. In reversing the order of acquittal, what is required is an illegality or perversity in order of trial court. (Para 34 & 39) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Anticipatory Bail

Custodial interrogation is one of the effective modes of investigating into the alleged crime. It is equally true that just because custodial interrogation is not required that by itself may also not be a ground to release an accused on anticipatory bail if the offences are of a serious nature. However, a mere assertion on the part of the State while opposing the plea for anticipatory bail that custodial interrogation is required would not be sufficient. The State would have to show or indicate more than prima facie why the custodial interrogation of the accused is required for the purpose of investigation. (Para 12) Ashok Kumar v. State of Union Territory Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 223

Bail

An accused, while joining investigation as a condition for remaining enlarged on bail, is not expected to make self-incriminating statements under the threat that the State shall seek withdrawal of such interim protection. Bijender v State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 209

Bail condition restraining political activities violates fundamental rights, can't be imposed. Siba Shankar Das v. State of Odisha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 259

Anticipatory bail cannot be granted merely because the accused is willing to pay an interim compensation. State of Jharkhand v. Md. Sufiyan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 54

Bail / Anticipatory Bail - Expeditious adjudication of bail matters - High Court's duty to ensure timely justice - Supreme Court's directive to High Court of Bombay - Constitutionality of Article 21 - Liberty of citizen paramount - Urgency in deciding bail applications emphasized. (Para 3 - 6) Amol Vitthal Vahile v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 159

Bail / Anticipatory Bail - Application for anticipatory bail was not decided for a period of more than four years. The Judges are not deciding the matter on merits but find an excuse to shunt the case on different grounds. Held, decide the matter pertaining to bail / anticipatory bail as expeditiously as possible. (Para 4 - 6) Amol Vitthal Vahile v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 159

Bail cannot be cancelled merely due to non-appearance of accused before court. Krishna Sharma v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Cancellation of Bail - Merely because the accused did not appear personally could not have been a ground for cancellation of bail. The parameters for grant of bail and cancellation of bail are totally different. The bail already granted may be cancelled, if it is found that the person who has been granted the benefit of bail has violated any of the conditions or misused the liberty by influencing the witnesses or tampering with the evidence. Krishna Sharma v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 65

Delays in the disposal of bail applications - Need for expeditious delivery of judgments - Bail applications should ideally be disposed of within two weeks, and anticipatory bail applications within six weeks. Despite these guidelines, the Court noted persistent delays and directed all courts to strictly adhere to the issued directions. The High Courts were left with the discretion to devise mechanisms for monthly checks on pending cases. (Para 5 – 9) Rajanti Devi @ Rajanti Kumari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 50

Personal Liberty - When the petitioner applied for bail on merits and also on the ground that he had been incarcerated in jail for seven and a half years, the approach of the High Court in only permitting him to file an application for bail before the Trial Court/Sessions Court and not deciding the prayer for bail on merits, would amount to non-exercise of jurisdiction vested in it. The approach of the High Court was not in accordance with the sanctity that has been given to personal liberty in the catena of judgments. Amol Vitthal Vahile v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 78

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Delay in registration of FIR – The FIR suffers from a serious delay of three years which is totally unexplained. The unexplained inordinate delay in bringing allegations to the police's attention despite knowledge of previous inquiry, adds a layer of scepticism to the authenticity of the claims. Deepak Kumar Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2024 Cri LJ 1388 : (2024) 3 SCC 601

The Police Officer seems to be under an impression that the accused has to appear before him and prove his innocence. Such an approach cannot be countenanced. Md Tauhid v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 106

When there is a fixed term sentence and especially when the appeal is not likely to be heard before completing the entire period of sentence, normally suspension of sentence and bail should be granted. Atul @ Ashutosh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 93

Sections 61, 70, 204, 437 - An accused cannot be taken into custody when he voluntarily surrenders before the Court even though the Court which has taken cognizance of the chargesheet has not issued a summoning order against him. Bail application filed by such an accused, who voluntarily surrendered even in the absence of a summoning order, cannot be entertained. (Para 10) Souvik Bhattacharya v. Enforcement Directorate, Kolkata Zonal Office - II, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 122

Section 82(1) - An accused would not be entitled to pre-arrest bail if the non-bailable warrant and the proclamation under Section 82(1) Cr.P.C. is pending against him. (Para 5) Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : AIR 2024 SC 1600

Section 82 and 83 - Mere filing of an anticipatory bail application by the accused could not be treated as his appearance before the court which had initiated proceedings under Section 82/83 Cr.P.C. against the accused. (Para 20) Srikant Upadhyay v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 232 : AIR 2024 SC 1600

Section 91 - Courts cannot issue processes under Section 91 Cr.P.C. to compel the production of things / documents based on the application made by the accused at the stage of framing of charges. The accused's entitlement to seek an order for the production of things or documents under Section 91 of Cr.P.C. would ordinarily not come till the stage of defence. (Para 6) State of Rajasthan v. Swarn Singh @ Baba, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 136

Section 125 - The approach of the State of taking the side of the husband in a maintenance case, to say the least, is very strange. In fact, the counsel, who appeared for the State, was under a duty and obligation to act as an officer of the Court and to assist the Court in arriving at a correct conclusion. (Para 7 & 8) Asiya Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 140

Section 156 (3) - An affidavit is necessary with the application under Section 156 (3) Cr.P.C. - Directions in Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P., (2015) 6 SCC 287 are mandatory. Ramesh Kumar Bung v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 213

Section 161 - If the PWs had failed to mention in their statements about the involvement of an accused, their subsequent statement before court during trial regarding involvement of that particular accused cannot be relied upon. Prosecution cannot seek to prove a fact during trial through a witness which such witness had not stated to police during investigation. The evidence of that witness regarding the said improved fact is of no significance. (Para 26) Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : AIR 2024 SC 627 : (2024) 3 SCC 164

Section 167 and 173 - Once from the material produced along with the chargesheet, the court is satisfied about the commission of an offence and takes cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the accused, it is immaterial whether the further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) is pending or not. The pendency of the further investigation qua the other accused or for production of some documents not available at the time of filing of chargesheet would neither vitiate the chargesheet, nor would it entitle the accused to claim right to get default bail on the ground that the chargesheet was an incomplete chargesheet or that the chargesheet was not filed in terms of Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. (Para 23) Central Bureau of Investigation v. Kapil Wadhawan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 58 : AIR 2024 SC 905 : 2024 Cri LJ 1082

Section 172 – Diary of proceedings – Every police officer making an investigation under Chapter XII Cr.P.C. is required to enter his proceedings in the investigation in a diary day by day. Sub-section (IA) of Section 172 requires that the statements of the witnesses recorded during the course of investigation under section 161 have to be inserted in the case diary; and sub-section (1B) of Section 172 requires that such diary shall be a volume and duly paginated. (Para 11) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

A case diary is maintained by an Investigating Officer during his investigation for the purpose of entering the day-to-day proceedings of the investigation. While doing so, the Investigating Officer should mandatorily record the necessary particulars gathered in the course of investigation with the relevant date, time and place. Under sub-section (1-A) and (1-B) of Section 172 of CrPC, the Investigating Officer has to mention, in his case diary, the statement of witnesses recorded during investigation with due pagination. Sub-section (1-A) and (1-B) were inserted by Act 5 of 2009 with effect from 31/12/2009. The object of these sub-sections is to facilitate a fair investigation since a statement made under Section 161 of CrPC is not expected to be signed as mandated by Section 162 of CrPC. (Para 20) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Section 172 (3) - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 145 and 161 - Whenever a case is made out either under Section 145 or under Section 161 of the Evidence Act, the benefit conferred thereunder along with the benefit of Section 172(3) of CrPC has to be extended to an accused. Thus, the accused has a right to cross-examine a police officer as to the recording made in the case diary whenever the police officer uses it to refresh his memory. Though Section 161 of the Evidence Act does not restrict itself to a case of refreshing memory by perusing a case diary alone, there is no exclusion for doing so. Similarly, in a case where the court uses a case diary for the purpose of contradicting a police officer, then an accused is entitled to peruse the said statement so recorded which is relevant, and cross-examine the police officer on that count. What is relevant in such a case is the process of using it for the purpose of contradiction and not the conclusion. To make the position clear, though Section 145 read with Section 161 of the Evidence Act deals with the right of a party including an accused, such a right is limited and restrictive when it is applied to Section 172 of CrPC. Suffice it is to state that the said right cannot be declined when the author of a case diary uses it to refresh his memory or the court uses it for the purpose of contradiction. Therefore, held that Section 145 and Section 161 of the Evidence Act on the one hand and Section 172(3) of CrPC on the other are to be read in consonance with each other, subject to the limited right conferred under sub-section (3) of Section 172 of CrPC. (Para 27) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Section 173 – Power of Magistrate to act on Police report – When such a Police Report concludes that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons, the Magistrate has three options: (i) he may accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process, (ii) he may direct further investigation under sub-section (3) of Section 156 and require the police to make a further report, or (iii) he may disagree with the report and discharge the accused or drop the proceedings. If such Police Report concludes that no offence appears to have been committed, the Magistrate again has three options: (i) he may accept the report and drop the proceedings, or (ii) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (iii) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-section (3) of Section 156. (Para 14) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173 – Police report – It is an opinion or intimation of the investigating officer to the concerned court that on the material collected during the course of investigation, an offence appears to have been committed by the particular person or persons, or that no offence appears to have been committed. (Para 13) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173(2) – Mandatory requirements of police report – It is found that the investigating officers while submitting the chargesheet/Police Report do not comply with the requirements of the Section 173(2). Though the form of the report to be submitted under Section 173(2) has to be prescribed by the State Government and each State Government has its own Police Manual, the mandatory requirements required to be complied with by such officers in the Police Report/Chargesheet are laid down in Section 173. It is incumbent on the part of the Investigating Officer to strictly comply with the requirements of Section 173(2). Only the report forwarded by the police officer to the Magistrate under Section 173(2). can form the basis for the competent court for taking cognizance thereupon. A chargesheet is nothing but a final report of the police officer under Section 173(2) of. (Para 12 & 13) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173(2) – Directions issued and particulars listed for compliance in a police report on completion of investigation – Report of police officer on the completion of investigation shall contain (i) A report in the form prescribed by the State Government stating- (a) the names of the parties; (b) the nature of the information; (c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case; (d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom; (e) whether the accused has been arrested; (f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, whether with or without sureties; (g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170 Cr.PC. (h) Whether the report of medical examination of the woman has been attached where investigation relates to an offence under [sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB] or section 376E of the IPC. (ii) If upon the completion of investigation, there is no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify the forwarding of the accused to a Magistrate, the Police officer in charge shall clearly state in the Report about the compliance of Section 169 Cr.PC. (iii) When the report in respect of a case to which Section 170 Cr.PC. applies, the police officer shall forward to the Magistrate along with the report, all the documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely other than those already sent to the Magistrate during investigation; and the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.PC. of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. (iv) In case of further investigation, the Police officer in charge shall forward to the Magistrate a further report or reports regarding such evidence in the form prescribed and shall also comply with the details mentioned in the above sub para (i) to (iii). (Para 17) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173(2) – Right to default bail on grounds of incomplete police report – Once from the material produced along with the chargesheet, the court is satisfied about the commission of an offence and takes cognizance of the offence allegedly committed by the accused, it is immaterial whether the further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) is pending or not. The pendency of the further investigation qua the other accused or for production of some documents not available at the time of filing of chargesheet would neither vitiate the chargesheet, nor would it entitle the accused to claim right to get default bail on the ground that the chargesheet was an incomplete chargesheet or that the chargesheet was not filed in terms of Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. (Para 15) Dablu Kujur v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 227

Section 173(8) - Protest Petition - An application seeking further investigation can be treated as a protest petition if the application prima facie establishes the commission of the offences, and such an application can't be technically rejected because procedural recourse of filing a protest petition is not followed. Although the proper course for the complainant would have been to file a protest petition instead of filing it under Section 173(8) for further investigation, a petition should not be rejected merely because it is filed under the wrong caption. XXX v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Section 178 (8) - It would be impermissible under the law for a Judicial Magistrate to take cognizance of a supplementary charge-sheet submitted after further investigation if it doesn't contain any fresh oral or documentary evidence, would be impermissible under the law. While submitting the supplementary charge-sheet as a result of an order of further investigation under Section 178 (8) Cr.P.C., the Investigating Officer shall mention new evidence found to substantiate the conclusions drawn by him. Otherwise, such supplementary charge-sheet lacks investigative rigour and fails to satisfy the requisites of Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. The provision for submitting a supplementary report infers that fresh oral or documentary evidence should be obtained rather than reevaluating or reassessing the material already collected and considered by the investigating agency while submitting the initial police report, known as the chargesheet under Section 173(2) CrPC. (Para 26 & 27) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Section 197 - Fabrication of records cannot be a part of the official duty of a public servant. (Para 25) 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 42

Section 197 Cr.P.C. does not extend its protective cover to every act or omission of a public servant while in service. It is restricted to only those acts or omissions which are done by public servants in the discharge of official duties. (Para 23) 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 42

Section 202 – Issue of summon – The Magistrate cannot issue the summons until there is satisfaction that the material was sufficient to pass the summoning order. The learned Magistrate being not satisfied that the material on the record of the complaint, was sufficient to pass the summoning order, had called for the police report under Section 202 of the Cr.PC. Once the Magistrate has called for the police report under Section 202 of the Cr.PC, then the magistrate couldn't issue summon unless the report is submitted by the police. The order issuing process has drastic consequences and requires application of mind. The learned Magistrate was not justified in passing the order to issue a summons. Shiv Jatia v. Gian Chand Malick, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : AIR 2024 SC 1186 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1360

Section 202 – Summons - A Magistrate, while issuing the summoning order, shall not act in a casual manner; rather they should be satisfied that there exists a sufficient ground for proceedings against the accused. The recording of the satisfaction of the Magistrate while issuing the summons should not be in a cryptic manner but only when a prima facie case is made out from the allegations. Detailed reasoning is not required from the Magistrate while issuing summons, but the Magistrate also needs to record satisfaction that there exists a sufficient ground for proceedings. (Para 18) Sachin Garg v. State of U.P, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Section 202(1) – Postponement of issue of process – Section 202(1) was amended with effect from 23rd June 2006. The requirement of postponing the issue of the process is applicable only when one of the accused stays outside the jurisdiction of the court. The mandate of postponing the issue of the process introduced with effect from 23rd June 2006 was not applicable on the date of filing of the complaint in 2004. Shiv Jatia v. Gian Chand Malick, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : AIR 2024 SC 1186 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1360

Section 242(3) - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 138 – The general rule is that witnesses shall be examined in the order laid down in Section 138 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. An exception to this rule is Section 242(3) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 under which, in a warrant case, the learned Magistrate, by recording reasons, can permit cross-examination of a witness to be postponed till a particular witness or witnesses are examined. Held, recording only the examination-in-chief of 12 prosecution witnesses without recording cross-examination is contrary to the law. (Para 6 & 7) Ekene Godwin v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 261

Section 313 – It is only after the prosecution discharges its duty of proving the case beyond all reasonable doubt that the false explanation or non-explanation of the accused could be taken into consideration. (Para 21) Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 60 : AIR 2024 SC 695 : (2024) 3 SCC 481

Section 313 - Statement recorded u/s. 313 CrPC cannot form the sole basis of conviction. Mere omission to take a specific plea by accused when examined u/s 313 CrPC, is not enough to denude him of his right if the same can be made out otherwise. (Para 33) Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : AIR 2024 SC 627 : (2024) 3 SCC 164

Section 319 – Discretionary powers of High Court –The materials on record could not be said to have satisfied the threshold envisaged under Hardeep Singh v State of Punjab & Ors., i.e., more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. The High Court failed to appreciate that the discretionary powers under Section 319 of the CrPC ought to have been used sparingly where circumstances of the case so warrant. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence laid before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner. (Para 7 & 10) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Section 319 - High Court overturned the Trial Court Order; and accordingly impleaded the Appellants' as accused person(s) in the Underlying Proceedings on the satisfaction of a prima-facie finding that the materials on record i.e., (i) vague allegations emanating from the underlying complaint; (ii) the Complainant's statement under Section 161 of the CrPC; and (iii) the Complainant's examination-in-chief, are sufficient to proceed against the Appellant(s). Held, the High Court failed to appreciate that the discretionary powers under Section 319 of the CrPC ought to have been used sparingly where circumstances of the case so warrant. The Trial Court Order was well reasoned and did not suffer from any perversity. Moreover, the materials on record could not be said to have satisfied the threshold i.e., more than a prima facie case, as exercised at the time of framing of charge but short of evidence that if left unrebutted would lead to conviction. (Para 9 & 10) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Section 357(1) - A victim of a crime cannot be treated merely as a prosecution witness. Section 357(1) of Cr.P.C. empowers the court to order that the fine amount recovered be given to any person as compensation who has suffered any loss or injury caused due to that offence. There may be times when the situation may demand that a substantive amount of compensation be paid to the victim and the convict may not be financially that strong to bear that burden. For such situations, Section 357A was therefore introduced in Criminal Procedure Code for this reason, where compensation to the victims may be paid out of State funds, as the State had the responsibility to protect the victim against the offence that had been committed against the victim of the crime. (Para 19) Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : AIR 2024 SC 271 : (2024) 3 SCC 125

Section 378 - Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 r/w. 2 & 3 - Delay that occurred in preferring an appeal against acquittal can be condoned under limitation act. Mohd Abaad Ali v. Directorate of Revenue Prosecution Intelligence, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 141 : AIR 2024 SC 1271 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1335

Section 391 – A party who was not diligent in producing evidence at the trial stage of a criminal case cannot seek to produce the same in appeal. The power to record additional evidence at the appellate stage should not be exercised in a routine and casual manner. Such a power shall only be exercised when non-recording of the evidence may lead to failure to justice. Power to record additional evidence under Section 391 CrPC should only be exercised when the party making such request was prevented from presenting the evidence in the trial despite due diligence being exercised or that the facts giving rise to such prayer came to light at a later stage during pendency of the appeal. (Para 9) Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : AIR 2024 SC 787

Section 432 - A consideration for remission must be by way of an application under Section 432 of the CrPC which has to be made by the convict or on his behalf. In the first instance whether there is compliance of Section 433A of the CrPC must be noted inasmuch as a person serving a life sentence cannot seek remission unless fourteen years of imprisonment has been completed. (Para 55 (b) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Section 432 - The application for remission under Section 432 of the CrPC could be only before the Government of the State within whose territorial jurisdiction the applicant was convicted (appropriate Government) and not before any other Government within whose territorial jurisdiction the applicant may have been transferred on conviction or where the offence has occurred. (Para 55 (a) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Section 432 - The guidelines under Section 432(2) with regard to the opinion to be sought from the Presiding Judge of the Court which had convicted the applicant must be complied with mandatorily. While doing so it is necessary to follow the requirements of the said Section which are highlighted, namely, (i) the opinion must state as to whether the application for remission should be granted or refused and for either of the said opinions, the reasons must be stated; (ii) the reasons must have a bearing on the facts and circumstances of the case; (iii) the opinion must have a nexus to the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists; (iv) the Presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed, must also forward along with the statement of such opinion granting or refusing remission, a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists. (Para 55 (c) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Section 432 (2) - The Jail Advisory Committee which has to consider the application for remission may not have the District Judge as a Member inasmuch as the District Judge, being a Judicial Officer may coincidently be the very judge who may have to render an opinion independently in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 432 of the CrPC. (Para 55 (g) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Section 435 - State Government to act after consultation with Central Government in certain cases - Held, there has also to be consultation in accordance with Section 435 of the CrPC wherever the same is necessitated. (Para 55 (f) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Section 438 – Anticipatory bail granted on the condition is totally alien to the principles governing bail jurisprudence and is nothing short of perversity. State v. B. Ramu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 128

Section 438 – Pre-arrest/Anticipatory Bail – Grant of pre-arrest bail to a police officer facing allegations of manipulating the investigation so as to favour an accused would send out a wrong signal in society and would be against public interest. Presumptions and other considerations applicable to a layperson facing criminal charges may not carry the same weight while dealing with a police officer who is alleged to have abused his office. Considering the position held by the respondent, even if he was suspended from service, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and the evidence was sufficiently high. Bail order is liable to be set aside. (Para 9 & 10) State of Jharkhand v. Sandeep Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 205

Section 438 – Pre-arrest/Anticipatory Bail – Court must record reasons for grant of Bail – An order of bail, bereft of any cogent reason, could not be sustained. Though grant of bail is discretionary, it calls for exercise of such discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. The High Court did not deem it necessary to record as to what weighed with it while granting pre-arrest bail to the respondent, hence, bail order is set aside. (Para 5, 6 & 7) State of Jharkhand v. Sandeep Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 205

Section 438 – Bail / Anticipatory Bail – Considerations by Court while dealing with a bail petition – Similar considerations would apply even for grant of anticipatory bail – The nature and seriousness of the offence; the character of the evidence; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; the larger interest of the public or the State and other similar factors relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case. (Para 7) State of Jharkhand v. Sandeep Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 205

Sections 438 and 439 - Bail Applications - Applicants must include : details and copies of previous bail orders. Information on pending bail applications in any court, with a clear statement if none are pending. Bail applications in the same FIR should be heard by the same Judge, unless there are specific circumstances. The application indicates whether it is the first, second, or subsequent one for clarity. The court registry should attach a system-generated report on decided or pending bail applications for the specified crime case. This procedure applies to private complaints as well, with cases assigned specific numbers. The Investigating Officer or State Counsel should inform the court of relevant orders, and counsels must conduct themselves as officers of the Court. These suggestions aim to streamline proceedings and prevent anomalies in bail applications during ongoing trials or sentence suspension. (Para 20 & 21) Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : AIR 2024 SC 790

Section 439 (2) – Cancellation of Bail order - The exercise of jurisdiction by the learned Single Judge in cancelling the bail granted by another Single Judge of the same High Court, by examining the merits of the allegations, tantamounts to judicial impropriety/indiscipline. The application for cancellation of bail filed on merits as opposed to violation of the conditions of the bail order should have been placed before the same learned Single Judge who had granted bail to the accused. The act of reviewing the orders granting bail to the accused by another Single Judge is uncalled for and amounts to gross impropriety. (Para 10) Himanshu Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2024 Cri LJ 1482

Section 439 – Grounds for cancellation of bail - Bail granted to an accused can only be cancelled if the Court is satisfied that after being released on bail, (a) the accused has misused the liberty granted to him; (b) flouted the conditions of bail order; (c) that the bail was granted in ignorance of statutory provisions restricting the powers of the Court to grant bail; (d) or that the bail was procured by misrepresentation or fraud. None of these grounds existed while cancellation of bail granted by another bench. (Para 12) Himanshu Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 157 : 2024 Cri LJ 1482

Section 482 and Constitution of India; Article 226 – Exercise of extraordinary power to quash proceedings – Such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Some instances where such power can be exercised is: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Held, present case would squarely fall under categories (1), (3) and (5) and even if the allegations made in the FIR and the material on which the prosecution relies, are taken at its face value, there are no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. (Para 17 & 18) Ms. X v. Mr. A, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 242

Section 482 - Quashing of FIR – The entire case of prosecution is based on unauthorizedly and illegally collected sample of meat. Hence, the High Court was right when it interfered by quashing the First Information Report. (Para 9) Joshine Antony v. Asifa Sultana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 195

Section 482 - Quashing of FIR – Law with regard to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash complaints and criminal proceedings - Discussed. (Para 9, 10 & 21) A.M. Mohan v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 197

Section 482 - Quashing of FIR – Offence of Rape - A relationship may be consensual at the beginning but the same state may not remain so for all time to come. Whenever one of the partners show their unwillingness to continue with such relationship, the character of such relationship at it was when started will not continue to prevail. In the instant case, we do not think the relationship had remained consensual to justify quashing of the criminal complaint at the threshold. Rajkumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 214

Section 482 – Inherent power of court – High Court should have exercised power under Section 482 to stop the abuse of the process and to secure the ends of justice. Although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature but are given a cloak of criminal offence. Criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. (Para 5 & 6) Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 228

Section 482 - High Court could not have stayed the investigations and restrained the investigating agencies from investigating cognizable offences as alleged in the FIRs and the Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR), particularly when the investigations were at a very nascent stage. The inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.PC do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whims or caprice. The statutory power has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. In a way, by passing such orders of staying the investigations and restraining the investigating agencies from taking any coercive measure against the accused pending the petitions under Section 482 Cr.PC, the High Court has granted blanket orders restraining the arrest without the accused applying for the anticipatory bail under Section 438 of Cr.PC. (Para 20) Directorate of Enforcement v. Niraj Tyagi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 114 : AIR 2024 SC 1161 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1306

Section 482 - Iudicial comity and judicial discipline demands that higher courts should follow the law. The extraordinary and inherent powers of the court do not confer any arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whims and caprice. (Para 24) Directorate of Enforcement v. Niraj Tyagi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 114 : AIR 2024 SC 1161 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1306

Section 482 - If the charge sheet is filed against the accused during the pendency of the petition for quashing of the FIR, the High Court is not restrained from exercising its inherent jurisdiction and could still examine if offences alleged to have been committed were prima facie made out or not on the basis of the F.I.R., charge sheet and other documents. Mamta Shailesh Chandra v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 86

Section 482 - Allegations made by the complainant do not give rise to the offences for which the accused has been summoned for trial. A commercial dispute, which ought to have been resolved through the forum of Civil Court has been given criminal colour by lifting from the penal code certain words or phrases and implanting them in a criminal complaint. No case at all has been made out that would justify invoking the machinery of the Criminal Courts. The dispute, per se, is commercial in nature having no element of criminality. The Magistrate here failed to apply his mind in issuing summons and the High Court also failed to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the 1973 Code to prevent abuse of the power of the Criminal Court. (Para 18) Sachin Garg v. State of U.P, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Section 482 - When the High Court was called upon to invoke power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash a criminal case, it was incumbent upon the High Court to consider the question whether the allegations would constitute the offence(s) alleged against the person-accused. (Para 6) Rajaram Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 40

Constitution of India

Article 22(4) and Act, 1986; Section 9, 10, 11 & 12 - Advisory Board - Article 22(4) mandates that, any law pertaining to preventive detention must provide for constitution of an Advisory Board consisting of persons who have been or qualified to be appointed as judges of the High Court. It further vests the Advisory Board with the pivotal role of reviewing an order of detention within three-months by forming an opinion as to whether there is a sufficient cause for such detention or not, after consideration of all the material on record including representation if any, of the detenu. Under preventive detention legislations, Advisory Boards(s) are constitutional safeguards available to the detenu against an order of detention. Under the Act, 1986, Section 9 gives expression to this constitutional requirement, and provides for the constitution and composition of an Advisory Board for the purposes of the Act. Under section 10, any order of detention that has been made under the Act shall be placed before an Advisory Board thereunder within three-weeks from the date of its passing. As per Section 11, the Advisory Board must form an opinion and specify as to whether there is sufficient cause warranting the detention of the detenu. (Para 50, 52 & 53) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Article 32 – Quashing the order of detention – The Court does not sit in judgment over the correctness of the subjective satisfaction but may ascertain whether the subjective satisfaction is based on objective facts or influenced by any caprice, malice or irrelevant considerations or non-application of mind. (Para 43) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Article 32 – Writ of Habeas Corpus – 'Habeas Corpus' literally means 'have his body'. This is a prerogative process for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an effective relief of immediate release from unlawful or unjustifiable detention, whether in prison or in private custody. It is the duty of the Court to issue this writ to safeguard the freedom of the citizen against arbitrary and illegal detention. By the writ of habeas corpus, the Court can cause any person who is imprisoned to be brought before the Court and obtain knowledge of the reason why he is imprisoned and then either set him free then and there if there is no legal justification for the imprisonment, or see that he is brought speedily to trial. The writ may be addressed to any person whatsoever an official or a private individual who has another in his custody. (Para 29 & 30) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Article 136 – Power to interfere in acquittal passed by High Court – Once the appellate court acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence as it existed before conviction by the Trial Court, stands restored. Court, while scrutinizing the evidence, will proceed with great circumspect and will not routinely interfere with an order of acquittal, save when the impeccable prosecution evidence nails the accused beyond any doubt. An intervention is warranted when the High Court's approach or reasoning is deemed perverse or when based on suspicion and surmises court rejects evidence or when the acquittal is primarily rooted in an exaggerated adherence to the rule of giving the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused. Further circumstance for intervention arises when the acquittal would lead to a significant miscarriage of justice. An erroneous or perverse approach to the proven facts of a case and/or ignorance of some of the vital circumstances would amount to a grave and substantial miscarriage of justice. Supreme Court will be justified in exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction to undo the injustice mete out to the victims of a crime. (Para 15, 17 & 18) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218

Article 226 and Criminal procedure Code, 1973; Section 482 – Categories of cases wherein quashing power could be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice are: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are absurd and inherently improbable to reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is provision providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is mala fide. (Para 32) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Quashing of proceedings – Held, tested on the touchstone of the principles stated in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors., allowing continuance of the proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIR is gross abuse of process of law because the allegations as set out in the FIR do not disclose necessary ingredients of any cognizable offence. Hence, the impugned FIR and all proceedings sought to be taken against the appellant are quashed and set aside. (Para 33) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Right to legal aid – When the examination-in-chief of a prosecution witness is being recorded, the presence of the Advocate for the accused is required, as the advocate has a right to object to a leading or irrelevant question being asked to the witness. The report of trial court records that the evidence of prosecution witnesses was recorded in the presence of the appellants, but their Advocate was not present as they had not engaged any Advocate. Held, after finding that the appellants-accused had not engaged any Advocate, the Trial Court ought to have provided a legal aid Advocate to the appellants accused so that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses could have been recorded in the presence of the Advocate representing the appellants-accused. Recording of evidence in this fashion is not justified even if the High Court had fixed a time-bound schedule for disposal of the case. The trial court could have always sought an extension of time from the High Court. (Para 5 & 6) Ekene Godwin v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 261

Constitution of India; Article 19(1)(a) and Indian Evidence act, 1872; Section 124 – Scope of right to information in the context of deciding the disclosure of evidence relating to affairs of the State – Conflict between public interest and private interest – Article 19(1)(a) has been held to guarantee the right to information to citizens. It is the role of citizens to hold the State accountable for its actions and inactions and they must possess information about State action for them to accomplish this role effectively. Provisions of the Indian Evidence Act stipulate that evidence which is relevant and material to proceedings need not be disclosed to the party if the disclosure would violate public interest. When such disclosure is denied on the ground that it would violate public interest, there is a conflict between private interest and public interest. There is a public interest in the impartial administration of justice which can only be secured by the disclosure of relevant and material documents. There is a close relationship between the right to information and open governance. Citizens have a duty to hold the government of the day accountable for their actions and inactions, and they can effectively fulfil this duty only if the government is open and not clothed in secrecy. The right to information has an instrumental exegesis, which recognizes the value of the right in facilitating the realization of democratic goals. But beyond that, the right to information has an intrinsic constitutional value; one that recognizes that it is not just a means to an end but an end in itself. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 32 - Writ or direction for expeditious disposal of Criminal Appeal - Held, the Supreme Court has no power of superintendence over the High Courts. There is no provision in Chapter-IV (titled The Union Judiciary) under Part-V (The Union) of the Constitution of India which, in terms similar to Article 227 of the Constitution (Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court) under Chapter-V thereof, confers power of superintendence on the Supreme Court over the High Courts. In our constitutional scheme there is a clear division of jurisdiction between the two institutions and both the institutions need to have mutual respect for each other. Accepting the prayer of the petitioner and issuing any direction, as prayed, would amount to inappropriate exercise of discretionary jurisdiction showing disrespect to another constitutional court; hence, no such direction, as prayed by the petitioner, can be issued. That apart, assuming that an extraordinary case requires a nudge from Supreme Court for early hearing of a long pending criminal appeal, it is only a request that ought to be made to the High Court to such effect in appropriate proceedings, care being taken to ensure that the proceeding before Supreme Court is otherwise maintainable. (Para 1 - 3) Ganpat @ Ganapat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 147

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 21 and 32 - Writ petition aggrieved by non-consideration and non-disposal of criminal appeal is not maintainable. If priority has not been given to the criminal appeal by the High Court for early hearing, for whatever reason, the same is also part of the judicial process and cannot be made amenable to a challenge in a writ petition under Article 32 citing breach of Article 21. A judicial decision rendered by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him does not infringe a Fundamental Right. If the petitioner wishes to be released on bail pending the criminal appeal, cannot invoke the writ remedy but has to take recourse to an application under Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Para 3) Ganpat @ Ganapat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 147

Quashing of proceedings – The object of dispute, manifestly rife with mala fide intentions of only recovering the tainted money by coercion and threat of criminal proceedings. Such proceedings cannot be allowed to proceed further and exploit the time and resources of the law enforcement agency. The valuable time of the police is consumed in investigating disputes that seem more suited for civil resolution. The need for vigilance on the part of the police is paramount, and a discerning eye should be cast upon cases where unscrupulous conduct appears to eclipse the pursuit of justice. There is a need for a circumspect approach in discerning the genuine from the spurious and thus ensuring that the resources of the state are utilised for matters of true societal import. (Para 14 & 15) Deepak Kumar Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2024 Cri LJ 1388 : (2024) 3 SCC 601

Corruption

Bribery not protected by legislative privileges - No immunity for MPs / MLAs taking bribes for vote/speech in legislature. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701

Corruption and bribery of members of the legislature erode the foundation of Indian parliamentary democracy. It is disruptive of the aspirations and deliberative ideals of the Constitution and creates a polity which deprives citizens of a responsible, responsive, and representative democracy. (Para 104) Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701

Offence of bribery not dependent on actual performance of act for which bribe is taken, mere acceptance of bribe enough. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701

The offence of bribery is complete the moment illegal gratification is accepted and is not dependent on the actual performance of the promise for which the bribe was sought. Offence is complete one mere acceptance of undue advantage. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701

Cow Slaughter

Prevention of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act, 1964 (Karnataka); Section 10 – Power of competent authority to enter and inspect – The power of the authorized person was confined to enter and inspect. As per the provisions, the assistant director had no power to seize any sample of meat. (Para 9) Joshine Antony v. Asifa Sultana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 195

Criminal Justice System

It is the bounden duty of every Court of law that injustice wherever visible must be hammered and the voice of a victim of the crime is dispassionately heard. XXX v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 110

In recent years the machinery of criminal justice is being misused by certain persons for their vested interests and for achieving their oblique motives and agenda. Courts have therefore to be vigilant against such tendencies and ensure that acts of omission and commission having an adverse impact on the fabric of our society must be nipped in the bud. Vishal Noble Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 96

Criminal Law

Appropriate sentence – Principle of proportionality – The aggravating and mitigating circumstances which the Court considers while deciding commutation of penalty from death to life imprisonment, have a large bearing in deciding the number of years of compulsory imprisonment without remission, too. In the process of arriving at the number of years which the convict will have to undergo before which the remission powers could be invoked, some of the relevant factors that the courts bear in mind are:- (a) the number of deceased who are victims of that crime and their age and gender; (b) the nature of injuries including sexual assault if any; (c) the motive for which the offence was committed; (d) whether the offence was committed when the convict was on bail in another case; (e) the premeditated nature of the offence; (f) the relationship between the offender and the victim; (g) the abuse of trust if any; (h) the criminal antecedents; and whether the convict, if released, would be a menace to the society. Some of the positive factors have been, (1) age of the convict; (2) the probability of reformation of convict; (3) the convict not being a professional killer; (4) the socioeconomic condition of the accused; (5) the composition of the family of the accused and (6) conduct expressing remorse. The Court would be additionally justified in considering the conduct of the convict in jail; and the period already undergone to arrive at the number of years which the Court feels the convict should, serve as part of the sentence of life imprisonment and before which he cannot apply for remission. These are not exhaustive but illustrative and each case would depend on the facts and circumstances therein. No interference required for sentence of offences under Section 449 and Section 309. However, sentence under Section 302 is modified from 30 years imprisonment without remission to 25 years imprisonment without remission. (Para 57) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248

Framing of charge – Even a strong suspicion founded on material on record which is ground for presuming the existence of factual ingredients of an offence would justify the framing of charge against an accused person. (Para 43) Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 260

Quashing of Charge – Appellants have not made out a case for interference with the order on charge and the order of framing charge. The Court is only required to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of charge without blindly accepting the decision of the prosecution. (Para 43) Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 260

Power of constitutional courts to transfer case to CBI – The powers of the Supreme Court for directing further investigation regardless of the stage of investigation are extremely wide. This can be done even if the chargesheet has been submitted by the prosecuting agency. Held, unresolved crimes tend to erode public trust in institutions which have been established for maintaining law and order. In the present case the investigation has been ineffective is self-evident. Hence, this case needs to be handed over to CBI, for a proper investigation and also to remove any doubts in the minds of the appellants, and to bring the real culprits to justice. Case shall be transferred from SIT to the CBI. (Para 14 & 16) Awungshi Chirmayo v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 263

Standard of proof – Beyond reasonable doubt – Various lapses cumulatively affect the overall sanctity of the prosecution case, making it fall short of the threshold of beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution case stands shaken beyond a point to which no conviction resting thereupon can be said to be just in the eyes of law. (Para 47) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667

Custodial Death

It is a fact that, in ordinary circumstances, we ought not to invoke our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to invalidate an order granting bail to an accused. But this criteria, while dealing with the question of granting bail, would not apply in a case of custodial death, where police officials are arraigned as accused. Such alleged offences are of grave and serious nature. Ajay Kumar Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 266

Custodial Violence

The High Court directs the Director General of Police to issue a circular for medical examination of persons brought to police stations for investigation, aiming to curb custodial violence. The State submitted that there cannot be an omnibus direction of this nature and that certain guidelines are required to be framed in that regard. The Supreme Court rejects State's plea to quash direction but permits State to formulate Standard Operating Procedure for guidance. (Para 1 - 7) State U.P v. Ramadhar Kashyap, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 148

Dispute

Nature of dispute – Dispute between the parties was essentially of a civil nature – There is no criminal element and consequently the case is nothing but an abuse of the process. The complainant has not been able to establish that the appellants had intention to cheat right from the beginning. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal offence in every case. Every breach of contract would not give rise to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. (Para 4, 7, 8) Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 228

Settlement of dispute between parties – The additional amount paid by the appellants pursuant to a settlement is primarily to bring a quietus to the dispute and to have peace and to avoid litigation. The mere fact that the appellants have paid an additional amount pursuant to the settlement, cannot be presumed as an act of cheating. The allegation that the complainant was coerced into a settlement, looks unlikely because there is no FIR or Complaint that the complainant was coerced into this settlement and the amount was duly accepted by the complainant. Further the complainant does not dispute that the additional amount paid by the appellants under the terms of the compromise deed. Hence, the dispute is settled. (Para 4) Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 228

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940; Sections 18A and 28 - Non-disclosure of the name of the manufacturer - The quantities of the 29 kinds of medicines recovered from the clinic run by the doctor were of small quantity. In such a situation, the non-disclosure of the name of the manufacturer/person from whom the said medicines were acquired cannot be said to endanger public interest (which obviously is the primary object of the prohibition in law) by allowing the circulation of such substances unauthorizedly. In the attending facts and circumstances, considering that the accused is a doctor, it was held that imposing a sentence of imprisonment would be unjustified, particularly when the intent to sell/distribute under Section 18(c) of the Act has been held unproven. Accordingly, the appeals were allowed, and the sentence of imprisonment was set aside; instead, a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- was imposed on the Appellant doctor. (Para 11 - 13) Palani v. Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 121

Proceedings under the Act initiated on the basis of the complaint of the Police Inspector is legally invalid. Accordingly, the cognizance order is found to be unjustified and is set aside. (Para 9) Rakesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 264

Dying Declaration

Dying declaration can be the sole basis of the conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the court. The Court is required to satisfy itself that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. Where the Court is satisfied about the dying declaration being true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. There cannot be an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. (Para 7) Naeem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 199

Evidence

Burden of Proof – The threshold of the 'burden of proof' required to be discharged, when challenging a particular charge as an “illegal charge”, is only on the preponderance of probabilities, upon which the onus will shift on the authorities to establish how the particular charge is valid. Railways failed to establish that 444 kms was the correct chargeable distance, hence, it was declared that the said computation was illegal. (Para 121) Union of India v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 256

Conclusive Evidence – The accused persons had sought to place reliance on income tax returns and income tax assessment orders. Held, income tax returns and orders may be admissible as evidence but are not themselves conclusive proof of lawful source of income under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and that independent evidence to corroborate the same would be required. The probative value of value of the Orders of the Income Tax Authorities, including the Order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the subsequent Assessment Orders, would depend on the nature of the information furnished and findings recorded in the order, and would not ipso facto either conclusively prove or disprove a charge. The High Court has rightly not discharged the appellants based on the Orders of the Income Tax Authorities. (Para 29 & 32) Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 260

Conviction on sole evidence of victim – Conviction undoubtedly can be recorded on the sole evidence of a victim of crime; however, it must undergo a strict scrutiny through the well settled legal principles. (Para 22) Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221

Court has to strike a balance between testimonies of Injured Witness & Interested Witness. The evidence of an injured witness is considered to be on a higher pedestal than that of a witness simpliciter. (Para 28 & 34) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667

Credibility of testimony of the victim in matters involving sexual offences –The statement of the prosecutrix ought to be consistent from the beginning to the end (minor inconsistences excepted), from the initial statement to the oral testimony, without creating any doubt qua the prosecution's case. The Court can rely on the victim as a “sterling witness” without further corroboration, but the quality and credibility must be exceptionally high. While a victim's testimony is usually enough for sexual offence cases, an unreliable or insufficient account from the prosecutrix, marked by identified flaws and gaps, casts serious doubt with regard to the veracity of the prosecution version and could make it difficult for a conviction to be recorded. Considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost accurate account of the incident and allows the victim to provide her version based on her recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free from doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that version. Material contradictions apparent in the depositions of prosecution witnesses, including the victim, significantly undermine the credibility of the prosecution version. Enough missing links present to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused. (Para 15, 16, 17 & 22) Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221

Circumstantial evidence – Chain of circumstances – The circumstances set out are by themselves consistent with the sole hypothesis that the accused and the accused alone is the perpetrator of these murders which were most foul. Held, the circumstances presented in evidence in this case meets the ingredients that are required to be established. Hence, no reason to interfere with the concurrent conviction recorded by the trial Court and the High Court against the appellant. (Para 15) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248

Circumstantial evidence – Panchsheel or the five principles essential to be kept in mind while convicting an accused in a case based on circumstantial evidence: - (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established, (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. (Para 14) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248

Delay in filing the FIR and delay in examination of prosecution witness – The delay therefore renders the circumstances questionable. Hence, it cannot be said that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing its case against the two accused persons beyond reasonable doubt warranting a conviction under Section 302 IPC. (Para 42) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667

Incidental witnesses – The incident, which transpired partly within the confines of the house and extended slightly beyond the deceased's premises, the family members and close relatives naturally become the witnesses. These individuals cannot be considered incidental witnesses; instead, they emerge as the most natural witnesses. (Para 29) Thoti Manohar v. State Of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) SCC 7 723; referred. State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218

Independent witness – No independent witnesses were examined – The non-examination of independent witnesses would not be fatal to a case set up by the prosecution but if witnesses examined are found to be 'interested' then, the examination of independent witnesses would assume importance. It is hard to conceive how the Trial Court concluded that despite being the first cousin of D-1 and himself a person injured in the incident, PW-1 was not an interested witness. Further, considering categorical statement that “the wine shop is in the main road” and “the wine shop would be crowded always” the joining of independent witnesses ought not to have been a difficult task but, yet, it remained unachieved. (Para 31) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667

Insufficiency of evidence – Sufficiency of the materials on record - Ordinarily the court should not get into or look into the sufficiency of the materials on record on the basis of which the requisite subjective satisfaction is arrived at by the Detaining Authority. However, if the facts of the case are such that the court is required to go into such issues, it may be done. The detention of the detenue is only relied upon on his confessional statement before the police and there is no test identification parade carried out by the police. There is nothing to indicate that the nefarious activities of the detenu created an atmosphere of panic and fear in the minds of the people of the concerned locality. Held, it is a case of and it prima facie, appears that the detenu might have been picked up by the police on suspicion and then relied upon his confessional statement before the police. (Para 33) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Offence of sexual harassment in a public place, as opposed to one committed within the confines of a room or a house, or even in a public place but away from the view of the public, stands on different premise. If any doubt arises in the Court's mind regarding the veracity of the victim's version, the Court may, at its discretion, seek corroboration from other witnesses who directly observed the incident or from other attending circumstances to unearth the truth. (Para 18) Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221

Evidence Act, 1872

Section 9 – Test Identification parade – Identification of the appellant by witness is quite doubtful as no proper identification parade has been conducted. Witness clearly states that he has identified the accused persons out of two people shown by the police. In the absence of proper identification parade being conducted, the identification for the first time in the Court cannot be said to be free from doubt. (Para 6 & 7) Jafar v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 238

Section 106 – Burden of proof – When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its duty. However, in exceptional cases where it could be impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish the facts which are especially within the knowledge of the accused, the burden will be on the accused since he could prove as to what transpired in such scenario, without difficulty or inconvenience. In this case, when an offence like multiple murders is committed inside a house in secrecy, the initial burden has to be discharged by the prosecution and once the prosecution successfully discharged the burden cast upon it, the burden did shift upon the appellant being the only other person inside the four corners of the house to offer a cogent and plausible explanation as to how the offences came to be committed. The appellant has miserably failed to prove. (Para 12) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248

Section 25 – Confession before a police office – Confession of an accused recorded by a Police Officer is not admissible in evidence as the same is hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. (Para 23) Mohammed Khalid v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 183

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 65B – Admissibility of electronic record – Certificate to prove electronic evidence – The call records were discarded by the High Court as there was no certification under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. The Investigating Officer, was not aware of the procedure to be followed for obtaining a certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. The State Government must ensure that the Police Officers are imparted proper training on this aspect. William Stephen v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 168

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 113A – Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married women – The words 'may presume' makes the presumption discretionary. Before the presumption under Section 113A is raised, the prosecution must show (1) that her husband or relatives subjected her to cruelty and (2) that the married woman committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage. The presumption would not be automatically applied on the mere fact that the deceased committed suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage. The legislative mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act may be raised, having regard to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : (2024) 3 SCC 573 : 2024 Cri LJ 1561

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 145 and 161 - When a police officer uses a case diary for refreshing his memory, an accused automatically gets a right to peruse that part of the prior statement as recorded in the police officer's diary by taking recourse to Section 145 or Section 161, as the case may be, of the Evidence Act. (Para 26) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 145 and 161 - Accused has a right to cross-examine a police officer as to the recording made in the case diary whenever the police officer uses it to refresh his memory. Similarly, in a case where the court uses a case diary for the purpose of contradicting a police officer, then an accused is entitled to peruse the said statement so recorded which is relevant, and cross-examine the police officer on that count. Although the accused or his agents have no right to seek production of the case diaries as per Section 172(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whenever the police officer uses it to refresh his memory, the accused will get a right to access it for the purpose of cross-examination. (Para 22, 26 & 27) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 145 and 161 - While it is the responsibility and duty of the Investigating Officer to make a due recording in his case diary, there is no corresponding right under subsection (3) of Section 172 of CrPC for accused to seek production of such diaries, or to peruse them, except in a case where they are used by a police officer maintaining them to refresh his memory, or in a case where the court uses them for the purpose of contradicting the police officer. In such a case, the provision of Section 145 or Section 161, as the case may be, of the Evidence Act, shall apply. (Para 22) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Ballistic expert - It is not that in each and every case where the death of the victim is due to gunshot injury that the opinion of the ballistic expert should be obtained and the expert be examined. When there is direct eye witness account which is found to be credible, omission to obtain ballistic report and non-examination of ballistic expert may not be fatal to the prosecution case but if the evidence tendered including that of eyewitnesses do not inspire confidence or suffer from glaring inconsistencies coupled with omission to examine material witnesses, the omission to seek ballistic opinion and examination of the ballistic expert may be fatal to the prosecution case. (Para 29) Ram Singh v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 144

Evidence Act, 1872 – Extra judicial confession – It is considered as a weak type of evidence and is generally used as a corroborative link to lend credibility to the other evidence on record. An extra judicial confession must be accepted with great care and caution. If it is not supported by other evidence on record, it fails to inspire confidence and in such a case, it shall not be treated as a strong piece of evidence for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion of guilt. The prosecution must establish that a confession was indeed made by the accused, that it was voluntary in nature and that the contents of the confession were true. The standard required for proving an extra judicial confession to the satisfaction of the Court is on the higher side and these essential ingredients must be established beyond any reasonable doubt. The standard becomes even higher when the entire case of the prosecution necessarily rests on the extra judicial confession. (Para 14) Kalinga @ Kushal v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Evidence Act, 1872 – Circumstantial evidence – Entire case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence. The principles concerning circumstantial evidence are referred to as the “Panchsheel” principles. Essentially, circumstantial evidence comes into picture when there is absence of direct evidence. For proving a case on the basis of circumstantial evidence, it must be established that the chain of circumstances is complete and is consistent with the only conclusion of guilt. The chain of circumstantial evidence is essentially meant to enable the court in drawing an inference and the task of fixing criminal liability on the strength of an inference must be approached with abundant caution. The circumstances sought to be proved by the prosecution are inconsistent and the inconsistencies are unexplained by the prosecution. Drawing an inference of guilt on the basis of inconsistent circumstantial evidence would result into failure of justice. The evidence on record fails the test for the acceptability of circumstantial evidence. (Para 27) Kalinga @ Kushal v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Evidence Act, 1872 – Reasonable doubt – Minor inconsistencies could not be construed as reasonable doubts for ordering acquittal. A reasonable doubt is essentially a serious doubt which renders the possibility of guilt as highly doubtful. The inconsistencies in the case of the prosecution are not minor inconsistencies and the prosecution has miserably failed to establish a coherent chain of circumstances. The present case does not fall in the category of a light-hearted acquittal. (Para 29) Kalinga @ Kushal v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Evidence Act, 1872 – Re-appreciation of evidence – Reverse an order of acquittal - The Trial Court had appreciated the entire evidence in a comprehensive sense and the High Court reversed the view without arriving at any finding of perversity or illegality in the order of the Trial Court. The High Court, in exercise of appellate powers, may re-appreciate the entire evidence, however reversal of an order of acquittal is not to be based on mere existence of a different view or a mere difference of opinion. To reverse an order of acquittal in appeal, it is essential to arrive at a finding that the order of the Trial Court was perverse or illegal; or that the Trial Court did not fully appreciate the evidence on record; or that the view of the Trial Court was not a possible view. The High Court took a cursory view of the matter and merely arrived at a different conclusion on a re-appreciation of evidence. (Para 25) Kalinga @ Kushal v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 142

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 90 – Presumption for 30 years old documents – If the document is more than 30 years old and is being produced from proper custody, a presumption is available to the effect that signatures and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting and in case a document is executed or attested, the same was executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. This does not lead to a presumption that recitals therein are correct. (Para 17) Tehsildar, Urban Improvement Trust v. Ganga Bai Menariya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Ocular Evidence - No doubt, they are members of the family and may be interested persons but their testimony cannot be discarded simply for the reason that they are family members in the scenario of the case that the incident took place inside the house of the deceased Shivanna, where there could not have been any other eyewitnesses other than the family members. The evidence of the aforesaid two eyewitnesses could not be shaken in the cross-examination. (Para 16) Haalesh @ Haleshi @ Kurubara Haleshi v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : AIR 2024 SC 1056 : (2024) 3 SCC 475

Ocular evidence is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused even if it unmatches with the doctor's expert evidence-Undoubtedly, only one kind of weapon i.e. chopper was used in committing the crime and, therefore, the evidence of the doctor may not be matching with that of the prosecution, but again, the ocular evidence of PW-3 and PW-4 is sufficient enough to prove that only chopper was used as a weapon of crime. In the light of the said evidence of the two eyewitnesses, the suggestion or opinion of the doctor cannot prevail as the opinion based upon probability is weak evidence in comparison to the ocular evidence of eyewitnesses. (Para 21) Haalesh @ Haleshi @ Kurubara Haleshi v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : AIR 2024 SC 1056 : (2024) 3 SCC 475

Witness who was shown in the prosecution list but not examined by prosecution can be summoned as a defence witness. (Para 3 & 4) Sunder Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 98

Appreciation of Evidence – The High Court fails to appreciate evidence in a thorough manner and merely relied on a limited set of facts to arrive at a finding. In an appeal, as much as in a trial, appreciation of evidence essentially requires a holistic view and not a myopic view. Appreciation of evidence requires sifting and weighing of material facts against each other and a conclusion of guilt could be arrived at only when the entire set of facts, lined together, points towards the only conclusion of guilt. Appreciation of partial evidence is no appreciation at all, and is bound to lead to absurd results. (Para 35) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Circumstantial evidence – In absence of direct evidence, case essentially falls back on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution has failed to complete the chain of circumstances. The circumstances are far from conclusive and a conclusion of guilt could not be drawn from them. To sustain a conviction, the Court must form the view that the accused “must have” committed the offence, and not “may have”. (Para 37 & 38) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Interested witness – Where a testimony is duly explained and inspires confidence, the Court is not expected to reject the testimony of an interested witness. However, when the testimony is full of contradictions and fails to match evenly with the supporting evidence the Court is bound to sift and weigh the evidence to test its true weight and credibility. (Para 33) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Power of the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence – There is no inhibition on the High Court to re-appreciate or re-visit the evidence on record. However, such power is a qualified power. For re-appreciating evidence, the court must consider, whether the Trial Court thoroughly appreciated the evidence on record and gave due consideration to all material pieces of evidence or whether the finding of the Trial Court is illegal or affected by an error of law or fact or whether the view taken by the Trial Court is a fairly possible view. (Para 25) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115

Presumption of constitutionality – The presumption of constitutionality is based on two premises. First, it is based on democratic accountability, that is, legislators are elected representatives who are aware of the needs of the citizens and are best placed to frame policies to resolve them. Second, legislators are privy to information necessary for policy making which the Courts as an adjudicating authority are not. The presumption of constitutionality is rebutted when a prima facie case of violation of a fundamental right is established, upon which the onus would shift to the State to justify the infringement. The broad argument of the petitioners that the presumption of constitutionality should not apply to a specific class of statutes, that is, laws which deal with electoral processes cannot be accepted. Courts cannot carve out an exception to the evidentiary principle which is available to the legislature based on the democratic legitimacy which it enjoys. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441

Presumption of innocence – The presumption is in favour of accused, unless proven guilty – The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretized when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal. (Para 24) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Principles of circumstantial evidence – The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. (Para 37) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

Two-views theory – When the appreciation of evidence results into two equally plausible views, the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution and reinforces the presumption of innocence of accused. When two views are possible, following the one in favour of innocence of the accused is the safest course of action. It is also settled that if the view of the Trial Court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for the High Court to convict the accused by re-appreciating the evidence. If such a course is permissible, it would make it practically impossible to settle the rights and liabilities in the eyes of law. (Para 26) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544

illiterate witness - Appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to be treated differently from other kinds of witnesses. It cannot be subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry and much emphasis ought not to be given to imprecise details that may have been brought out in the evidence. The evidence of a rustic/illiterate witness must not be disregarded if there were to be certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the deposition. (Para 27) Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : AIR 2024 SC 627 : (2024) 3 SCC 164

illiterate witness - However, the testimony of an illiterate witness suffers not merely from technical imperfections, there are glaring omissions and improvements that have been brought out in the cross-examination, which cannot be attributed to the illiteracy of the individual deposition. If there were minor contradictions and inconsistencies, that could have been ignored since the recollection of exact details as to location and time can be attributed to the lack of literacy. (Para 28) Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : AIR 2024 SC 627 : (2024) 3 SCC 164

Injured Witness - The importance of an injured witness in a criminal trial cannot be overstated. Unless there are compelling circumstances or evidence placed by the defence to doubt such a witness, this has to be accepted as extremely valuable evidence in a criminal Trial. (Para 11) Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : AIR 2024 SC 271 : (2024) 3 SCC 125

Evidence Act, 1872 - As soon as an accused or suspected person comes into the hands of a police officer, he is no longer at liberty and is under a check, and is, therefore, in “custody” within the meaning of Sections 25 to 27 of the Evidence Act. (Para 28) Erumal Raja @ Perumal v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 8

Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 17 and 18 – Admission is a conscious and deliberate act and not something that could be inferred. An admission could be a positive act of acknowledgement or confession. To constitute an admission, one of the requirements is a voluntary acknowledgement through a statement of the existence of certain facts during the judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, which conclude as true or valid the allegations made in the proceedings or in the notice. The formal act of acknowledgement during the proceedings waives or dispenses with the production of evidence by the contesting party. The admission concedes, for the purpose of litigation, the proposition of fact claimed by the opponents as true. An admission is also the best evidence the opposite party can rely upon, and though inconclusive, is decisive of the matter unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous by the other side. (Para 13.1) Raja Gounder v. M. Sengodan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 48

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 18 – A statement made by a person is not only evidence against the person but is also evidence against those who claim through him. Section 18 of the Act lays down the conditions and the requirements satisfied for applying to a statement as an admission. (Para 14) Raja Gounder v. M. Sengodan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 48

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 18 – Admission by party to proceeding or his agent - Section 18 of the Act deals with: (i) admission by a party to a proceeding, (ii) his agent, (iii) by a suitor in a representative character, (iv) statements made by a party in trusted subject matter, (v) statements made by a person from whom interest is derived. The qualifying circumstances to merit as admission are subject to satisfying the requirements. (Para 13.2 & 13.3) Raja Gounder v. M. Sengodan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 48

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 - Four conditions to invoke Section 27 - First condition imposed and necessary for bringing the section into operation is the discovery of a fact which should be a relevant fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence. The second is that the discovery of such a fact must be deposed to. A fact already known to the police will fall foul and not meet this condition. The third is that at the time of receipt of the information, the accused must be in police custody. Lastly, it is only so much of information which relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered resulting in recovery of a physical object which is admissible. Rest of the information is to be excluded. The word 'distinctly' is used to limit and define the scope of the information and means 'directly', 'indubitably', 'strictly' or 'unmistakably'. Only that part of the information which is clear, immediate and a proximate cause of discovery is admissible. (Para 22) Erumal Raja @ Perumal v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 8

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 - The expression “custody” under Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not mean formal custody. It includes any kind of restriction, restraint or even surveillance by the police. Even if the accused was not formally arrested at the time of giving information, the accused ought to be deemed, for all practical purposes, in the custody of the police. (Para 25) Erumal Raja @ Perumal v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 8

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 of the Evidence Act is frequently used by the police, and the courts must be vigilant about its application to ensure credibility of evidence, as the provision is vulnerable to abuse. However, this does not mean that in every case invocation of Section 27 of the Evidence Act must be seen with suspicion and is to be discarded as perfunctory and unworthy of credence. (Para 24) Erumal Raja @ Perumal v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 8

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 73 - Certified copy of a document issued by a Bank is itself admissible under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 without any formal proof thereof. Hence, in an appropriate case, the certified copy of the specimen signature maintained by the Bank can be procured with a request to the Court to compare the same with the signature appearing on the cheque by exercising powers under Section 73 of the Act. (Para 15) Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : AIR 2024 SC 787

Goonda Act

Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of BootLeggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 (Act 1986); Section 2(g) – Preventive detention is challenged – Difference between 'law and order' and 'public order' – In order to pass an order of detention under the Act 1986 against any person, the Detaining Authority must be satisfied that he is a “GOONDA” within the meaning of Section 2(g) and to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it necessary that he is preventively detained. Held, mere registration of the two FIRs for the alleged offences of robbery etc. could not have been made the basis to preventively detaining the appellant herein on the assumption that he is a “GOONDA”. What has been alleged against the detenu could have raised the problems relating to 'law and order' but it is difficult to say that they impinged on 'public order'. Further held, to bring the activities of a person within the expression of “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” the activities must be of such a nature that the ordinary laws cannot deal with them or prevent subversive activities affecting society. The true distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Inability on the part of the state's police machinery to tackle the law and order situation should not be an excuse to invoke the jurisdiction of preventive detention. (Para 20, 31, 32) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Act 1986; Section 2(a) –The Explanation to Section 2(a) provides that a person shall be deemed to be “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” when such person is a “GOONDA” and engaged in activities which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. 'Public order' shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely, inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in Section 2(a) directly or indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. (Para 23) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610

Act 1986; Section 3(2) – Subjective satisfaction of detaining authority – The Detaining Authority should take into consideration only relevant and vital material to arrive at the requisite subjective satisfaction. There is an implicit duty to apply mind to the pertinent and proximate matters and eschew those which are irrelevant & remote. If the detaining authority does not consider relevant circumstances or considers wholly unnecessary, immaterial and irrelevant circumstances, then such subjective satisfaction would be vitiated. The satisfaction cannot be inferred by mere statement in the order that “it was necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order”. To arrive at a proper satisfaction, the detaining authority must examine (i) the material adduced against the prospective detenu to satisfy itself whether his conduct or antecedent(s) reflect that he has been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and, (ii) whether it is likely that the said person would act in a manner prejudicial to the public order in near future unless he is prevented from doing so by passing an order of detention. Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Act 1986; Section 2(a) –The Explanation to Section 2(a) provides that a person shall be deemed to be “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” when such person is a “GOONDA” and engaged in activities which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. 'Public order' shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely, inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in Section 2(a) directly or indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. (Para 23) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Act 1986 – Object – To prevent crime and to protect the society from the anti-social elements and dangerous characters by placing them under detention for such a duration as would disable them from resorting to undesirable criminal activities. The provisions of the Act are intended to deal with habitual criminals, dangerous and desperate outlaws, who are so hardened and incorrigible that the ordinary provisions of the penal laws and the mortal/moral fear of punishment for crime are not sufficient deterrence for them. (Para 19) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Act 1986 – Invocation of Section 3 of the 1986 Act is not justified as mere involvement in a sexual offence, including one under Section 376D, by itself will not be sufficient to invoke Section 3 of the 1986 Act. This is for the reason that the 5 offence must be integrally connected 'with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order'. It is not decipherable from the order of Detaining Authority coupled with the grounds of detention, or from the Confirmation Order dated 09.08.2023, how the offence is connected to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. (Para 7) Vaddi Lakshmi v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 254

Investigation

The power to transfer an investigation is exercised in extraordinary situations. (Para 32) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414

Juvenile Justice Act, 1986

Juvenile Justice Act, 1986; Section 2 (h) and 21 - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302 and 201 r/w. 34 – Murder - Issue of juvenility was raised in Appeal - On the date on which the incident constituting the offence took place, the age of the appellant was less than 18 years. The 2000 JJ Act was admittedly not in force when the incident occurred. Therefore, the case will be governed by the 1986 JJ Act. Under clause (h) of Section 2 of the 1986 JJ Act, a 'juvenile' has been defined to mean a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years. Thus, on the date of occurrence of the offence, the appellant was a juvenile. As per Section 22(1) of the 1986 JJ Act, there was a prohibition on sentencing a juvenile to undergo imprisonment. As the appellant has undergone incarceration for a period of more than eight years, no purpose will be served by sending the appellant before the Juvenile Justice Board. Pramila v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 57

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015

Section 15(1) & 19(1) – The procedure provided under Sections 15 and 19 has been held to be mandatory by this Court in the case of Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh. Held, there has been a flagrant violation of the mandatory requirements of Sections 15 and 19 of the JJ Act. Neither was the charge sheet against the accused appellant filed before the Board nor was any preliminary assessment conducted by the Board under Section 15, so as to find out whether the accused appellant was required to be tried as an adult. In absence of a preliminary assessment being conducted by the Board under Section 15, and without an order being passed by the Board under Section 15(1) read with Section 18(3), it was impermissible for the trial Court to have accepted the charge sheet and to have proceeded with the trial of the accused. All the proceedings taken against the accused appellant are vitiated as being in total violation of the mandatory procedure prescribed under the JJ Act. (Para 37 & 38) Thirumoorthy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 262

Section 15(1), 18(3) & 19(1) – Section 15(1) provides that in case where a heinous offence/s (defined under Section 2(33) of the JJ Act) are alleged to have been committed by a child who has completed or is above the age of sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a preliminary assessment with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he committed the offence. Section 18(3) provides that where the Board after preliminary assessment under Section 15 opines that there is a need for the said child to be tried as an adult, then the Board may order transfer of the trial of the case to the Children's Court having jurisdiction to try such offences. By virtue of Section 19(1), the Children's Court, upon receiving such report of preliminary assessment undertaken by the Board under Section 15 may further decide as to whether there is a need for trial of the child as an adult or not. (Para 32, 33 & 34) Thirumoorthy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 262

Section 94(2) – Mode for determination of age – In the order of priorities, the date of birth certificate from the school stands at the highest pedestal in determination of age. The ossification test has been kept at the last rung to be considered, only in the absence of both certificate from school and birth certificate issued by a Corporation/Municipal Authority/Panchayat. Opinion of medical board that estimation of age based on X-ray examination becomes uncertain after 25 years is accepted. (Para 19 & 20) Vinod Katara v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 210 : AIR 2024 SC 1430

Murder Trial

Merely on the basis of suspicion, conviction would not be tenable. (Para 20) Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 60 : AIR 2024 SC 695 : (2024) 3 SCC 481

Only on the sole circumstance of recovery of a blood-stained weapon, it cannot be said that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 19) Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 60 : AIR 2024 SC 695 : (2024) 3 SCC 481

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

Section 52A – Safe custody of sample packets – Proceedings required to be followed as per Section 52A of the NDPS Act, by the investigating officer of preparing an inventory and obtaining samples in presence of the jurisdictional magistrate is not followed. Due to lack of proper procedure followed, the FSL report is held to be nothing but a waste paper and cannot be read in evidence. Glaring loopholes in the prosecution case give rise to an inescapable inference that the prosecution has failed to prove the required link evidence to satisfy the Court regarding the safe custody of the sample packets from the time of the seizure till the same reached the Forensic Science laboratory (FSL). (Para 21 & 22) Mohammed Khalid v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 183

Section 67 - Confession statements are not admissible evidence. The authorities / officers of the Narcotics Control Bureau must comply and abide by the judgment in Toofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1. Sharik Khan v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 216

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37 – Bail to the accused charged in connection with offence involving commercial quantity of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance – In case of recovery of huge quantities of narcotic substance, the Courts should be slow in granting even regular bail to the accused, more so when the accused is alleged to be having criminal antecedents. The Court would have to mandatorily record the satisfaction in terms of the rider contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act that there are grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence alleged and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The High Court not only omitted to record any such satisfaction, but has rather completely ignored the factum of recovery of narcotic substance, multiple times the commercial quantity. The impugned order is cryptic and perverse on the face of the record and cannot be sustained. Thus, the same is quashed and set aside. State v. B. Ramu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 128

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Director of the company not responsible for its day-to-day affairs cannot be held liable for dishonor of cheque. (Para 10) Susela Padmavathy Amma v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 237

Section 143A - Mere filing of the cheque dishonor complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act would not grant a right to a complainant to seek interim compensation under Section 143A (1) of the N.I. Act, as the power of the court to grant interim compensation, isn't mandatory but discretionary and needs to be decided after prima facie evaluating the merits of the case. (Para 14) Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 235

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 118 r/w. 139 - Even if a blank cheque leaf is voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused towards some payment would attract the presumption under Section 139 of the Act and in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of the debt, the presumption would hold good. (Para 5) K. Ramesh v. K. Kothandaraman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 118 r/w. 139 - Accused has signed the cheque. The only dispute is with regard to the age of the ink used in making the signature on the cheque and the age of the signature and contents of the cheque. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence. (Para 5 & 6) K. Ramesh v. K. Kothandaraman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Sections 138 and 141 - The Director of the company wouldn't be held liable for the dishonor of a cheque issued by the company pursuant to the retirement of the Director unless some credible evidence is brought on record proving the guilt of the director. The director could be held liable for the dishonor of the cheque after his retirement only when it is proved that any act of a company is proved to have been done with the connivance or consent or may be attributable to a director. (Para 10) Rajesh Viren Shah v. Redington (India) Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : AIR 2024 SC 1047

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 118(e) and 138 - If the accused is disputing the signature on the cheque, then the certified copies of the signatures from the bank could be summoned from the bank to compare the same with the signature appearing on the cheque. The indorsements on a cheque carry a presumption of genuineness as per Section 118(e) of the Act. Hence, it is incumbent upon the accused to lead evidence to rebut the presumption of genuineness of signatures. (Para 16) Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : AIR 2024 SC 787

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 118(e) and 138 - The accused had not taken any efforts to disprove his signature at the trial stage. No question was put to the witness from the bank regarding the genuineness of the signature. Also, the cheque was returned not on the grounds of any discrepancy in the signatures. If at all, the accused was desirous of proving that the signatures as appearing on the cheque issued from his account were not genuine, then he could have procured a certified copy of his specimen signatures from the Bank and a request could have been made to summon the concerned Bank official in defence for giving evidence regarding the genuineness or otherwise of the signature on the cheque. (Para 16) Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : AIR 2024 SC 787

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 - Accused persons filed an undertaking based on a settlement. Since the amount agreed was not paid, the interim protection, granted via suspension of sentence and bail, was withdrawn. Appeal dismissed with cost of Rs 5 lakhs and directed to surrender within a period of four weeks. Satish P. Bhatt v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 16

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 - Once the settlement has been arrived at and the complainant has signed the deed accepting a particular amount in full and final settlement of the default amount and the fine amount awarded by the Trial Court, the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act need to be quashed. (Para 4) Ghanshyam Gautam v. Usha Rani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 23

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 - Question regarding the time-barred nature of an underlying debt or liability in proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act is a mixed question of law and fact which ought not to be decided by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. (Para 7) Atamjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 76

Passport

Passports Act, 1967; Section 12(b) - As discernible from the language of the provision, what must be established is that the accused knowingly furnished false information or suppressed material information with the intent of obtaining a passport or travel document. In the present case, it is crucial to consider that the alleged forgery of signatures on the passport application was inconclusive. Moreover, the cognizance of such like offence can be taken only at the instance of the Prescribed Authority. No complaint to that effect has been disclosed against the Appellants. This Court, therefore, will exercise caution before invoking such severe offences and penalties solely on the basis of conjectures and surmises. Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Penal Code, 1860

Section 34 & 120B – Since the foundational facts essential for constituting the substantive offences under Sections 153A and 504 IPC are not available from the admitted allegations of prosecution, the allegations qua the subsidiary offences under Sections 34 and 120B IPC would also be non est. (Para 30) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Section 149 - If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence-A plain reading of the provision abundantly makes clear that an overt act of some of the accused persons of an unlawful assembly with the common object to kill the deceased Shivanna and to cause grievous hurt to the other family members is enough to rope in all of them for an offence under Section 302 IPC in aid with Section 149 IPC. (Para 20) Haalesh @ Haleshi @ Kurubara Haleshi v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : AIR 2024 SC 1056 : (2024) 3 SCC 475

Section 153A – For applying Section 153A IPC, the presence of two or more groups or communities is essential. Held, in the present case, no such groups or communities were referred to in the news article. Hence, the FIR lacks the necessary ingredients of the said offence. (Para 29) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Section 153-A (1) (a) & Section 153-A (1) (b) and Constitution of India; Article 19(1) (a) – Freedom to criticise decisions of the government – Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, under which, every citizen has the right to offer criticism of the action of abrogation of Article 370 or every other decision of the State. If every criticism or protest of the actions of the State is to be held as an offence under Section 153-A, democracy, which is an essential feature of the Constitution of India, will not survive. The appellant intended to criticise the action of the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India and did not refer to any religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community. Describing the day the abrogation happened as a “Black Day” is an expression of protest and anguish. The effect of the words used by the appellant will have to be judged from the standards of reasonable women and men. Merely because a few individuals may develop hatred or ill will, it will not be sufficient to attract Section 153-A (1) (a) of the IPC. Further, every citizen has the right to extend good wishes to the citizens of the other countries on their respective independence days. It cannot be said that such acts will tend to create disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious groups. Motives cannot be attributed only because the person belongs to a particular religion. WhatsApp status of the appellant cannot be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony among various groups. Thus, continuation of the prosecution under Section 153-A of the IPC will be a gross abuse of the process of law. (Para 9, 10, 11, 12 & 14) Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 208

Section 292 and Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 67 – Obscenity – Profanity is not per se obscene – Vulgarity and profanities do not per se amount to obscenity. While a person may find vulgar and expletive-filled language to be distasteful, unpalatable, uncivil, and improper, that by itself is not sufficient to be 'obscene'. The specific material which the High Court found to be obscene, was “foul, indecent and profane” language and nothing more. The High Court has equated profanities and vulgarity with obscenity, without undertaking a proper or detailed analysis into how such language, by itself, could be sexual, lascivious, prurient, or depraving and corrupting. (Para 35) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775

Section 292 and Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 67 – Standard to determine obscenity – 'Community standard test' – The Supreme Court in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal markedly moved away from the Hicklin test to the “community standard test”. The standard of determination is that of an ordinary common person and not a hypersensitive person such as an adolescent's or child's mind, who is susceptible to influences. The High Court has incorrectly used the standard of “impressionable minds” to gauge the effect of the material and has therefore erred in applying the test for obscenity correctly. (Para 7. 1 & 39) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775

Section 292 and Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 67 – Objective consideration while assessing whether the material is obscene – The court must consider the work as a whole and then the specific portions that have been alleged to be obscene in the context of the whole work to arrive at its conclusion. The High Court has taken the meaning of the language in its literal sense, outside the context in which such expletives have been spoken. While the literal meaning of the terms used may be sexual in nature and they may refer to sexual acts, their usage does not arouse sexual feelings or lust in any viewer of ordinary prudence and common sense. Rather, the common usage of these words is reflective of emotions of anger, rage, frustration, grief, or perhaps excitement. By taking the literal meaning of these words, the High Court failed to consider the specific material (profane language) in the context of the larger web-series and by the standard of an “ordinary man of common sense and prudence”. Neither did the creator of the web-series intend for the language to be taken in its literal sense nor is that the impact on a reasonable viewer who will watch the material. Therefore, there is a clear error in the legal approach adopted by the High Court in analysing and examining the material to determine obscenity. (Para 36 & 37) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775

Section 292 – Obscene material – Section 292 defines 'obscene' as a book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation, figure or any other object that is lascivious, appeals to the prurient interest, or has such effect, if taken as a whole, that tends to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to read, see or hear the matter contained in it. The provision criminalises the sale, distribution, public exhibition, circulation, import, export, etc of obscene material. The provision excludes such material when the publication is justified as being for public good on the ground that it is in the interest of science, art, literature, or learning or other objects of general concern; such material is kept or used for bona fide religious purposes; it is sculptured, engraved, painted or represented on or in ancient monuments and temples. (Para 12) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775

Section 299, 302 & 304 Part II – The act of celebratory firing during marriage ceremonies is an unfortunate practice – In the absence of any evidence on record to suggest that the Appellant aimed at and / or pointed at the large crowd whilst engaging in such celebratory firing; or there existed any prior enmity between the Deceased and the Appellant, the act cannot be punishable under Section 302 IPC. On grounds that (i) there was no previous enmity between the Deceased; (ii) no intention may be attributed to the Appellant as may be culled out from the record to cause death of the Deceased; and (iii) person carrying a gun with live cartridges has knowledge that firing the gun in presence of several people is an act likely to cause death, the Appellant is guilty of commission of 'culpable homicide' under Section 299 IPC i.e., punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The conviction and sentence of the Appellant under Section 302 IPC is liable to set aside. (Para 13, 14 & 15) Shahid Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : AIR 2024 SC 1319 : 2024 Cri LJ 1579

Section 302 – Acquittal order reversed in conviction – Reason assigned by High Court to discard evidence of complainant (PW2) and his daughter (PW3) is untenable. Complainant narrated the entire occurrence on a call made to the Police Control Room within ten minutes of the occurrence, hence, the court fails to find any meeting of the minds in such few minutes so as to create a false narrative only to implicate Gurpreet Singh. The presence of Gursewak Singh at the time of occurrence, his prompt reporting of the crime, and the swift action taken by the police immediately upon receipt of the said report, have cumulatively and unequivocally established the prosecution case beyond any doubt. On the contrary, the prosecution has successfully established that accused had been nursing a grudge against the deceased, hence, the attribution of motive by the prosecution stands proved. The reasons assigned by the High Court while granting acquittal are totally perverse and as a result of misreading of the evidence on record. Hence, it warrants interference by Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136. (Para 28, 30, 31, 33) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218

Section 302 & 34 – Co-accused –There is also not an iota of evidence to suggest that other respondents had any meeting with Accused and/or they had conspired with him for the execution of the crime. As there is no specific motive attributed, benefit of doubt can be extended to them. There is no convincing explanation to implicate them as co­accused. (Para 35) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218

Section 302 r/w 34 – Murder - Benefit of Doubt - An appellate court should give the benefit of doubt to the accused persons if the evidence on record indicates the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that a plausible view, different from the one expressed by the courts below can be taken. (Para 17) Jitendra Kumar Mishra @ Jittu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 20 : (2024) 2 SCC 666

Section 302 r/w. 34 – Murder - Circumstantial Evidence - When the prosecution case is solely based on the circumstantial evidence, then the courts must be vigilant while examining the facts proving the circumstantial evidence i.e., it must be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and should be free from doubts, improbabilities and inconsistencies. (Para 29 & 30) Pradeep Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : AIR 2024 SC 518 : (2024) 3 SCC 324

Section 302, 304 (Part II) and 34 - The prosecution has failed to establish common intention of Accused 3 to commit murder of deceased. Held, merely based on the presence of Accused 3 near the scene of offence and his family relations with the other accused, common intention cannot be established. That the trial court and the High Court have mechanically drawn inference against Accused 3 under Section 34. Further, participation of Accused 3 in assault is confirmed. Appeal of Accused 3 is allowed by altering the conviction under Section 302 to Section 304 Part II of IPC due to lack of evidence of common intention to murder. (Para 31) Velthepu Srinivas v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : AIR 2024 SC 1050

Sections 302 and 316 - From every available evidence, which was placed by the prosecution, it is a case where a sudden fight took place between the husband and wife. The deceased at that time was carrying a pregnancy of nine months and it was the act of pouring kerosene on the deceased that resulted in the fire and the subsequent burn injuries and the ultimate death of the deceased. This act at the hands of the appellant will be covered under the fourth exception given under Section 300 of the IPC, i.e., “Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner”. The act of the appellant is not premeditated, but is a result of sudden fight and quarrel in the heat of passion. Therefore, we convert the findings of Section 302 to that of 304 Part-II, as we are of the opinion that though the appellant had knowledge that such an act can result in the death of the deceased, but there was no intention to kill the deceased. Therefore, this is an offence which would come under Part-II not under Part-I of Section 304 of the IPC. (Para 20 & 21) Dattatraya v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 215

Section 304 Part II is in two parts. The section provides for two kinds of punishment to two different situations: Firstly, if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Here the important ingredient is the “intention”. Secondly, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Here the important ingredient is “knowledge”. (Para 28) Velthepu Srinivas v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : AIR 2024 SC 1050

Sections 304A and 338 - Fire Accident - Trekking Expedition - Persons who were part of the trekking expedition died owing to a forest fire which is an instance of vis major. No negligence could have been attributed to the trek organiser who only facilitated the organization of the trekking expedition. The organizers and even the members of the trekking expedition were totally unaware of the forest fire as such. Accidentally they were engulfed in the forest fire and they died by sheer accident and not owing to any negligence or any criminal intent attributable to the trek organiser. The trek organiser had no role whatsoever in causing the death of the trekkers who died due to a forest fire which is a natural cause. Peter Van Geit v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 83

Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. Apprehensions expressed in the suicide note, by no stretch of imagination, can be considered sufficient to attribute to the appellant, an act or omission constituting the elements of abetment to commit suicide. The necessary ingredients of the offence of abetment to commit suicide are not made out from the chargesheet and hence allowing prosecution of the appellant is grossly illegal. (Para 21 & 23) Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : AIR 2024 SC 1405 : (2024) 3 SCC 665 : 2024 Cri LJ 1461

Section 306 – Abetment of Suicide – The basic ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 306 of the IPC are suicidal death and abetment thereof. Oral evidence of witnesses does not disclose any form of incessant cruelty or harassment on the part of the husband which would in ordinary circumstances drag the wife to commit suicide as if she was left with no other alternative. Mere demand of money from the wife or her parents for running a business would not constitute cruelty or harassment. In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime cannot be assumed to be ostensibly present but has to be visible and conspicuous. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide. Mere harassment is not sufficient to hold an accused guilty of abetting the commission of suicide. The court should look for cogent and convincing proof of the act of incitement to the commission of suicide and such an offending action should be proximate to the time of occurrence. In the absence of any cogent evidence of harassment or cruelty, an accused cannot be held guilty for the offence under Section 306 of IPC by raising presumption under Section 113A. Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : (2024) 3 SCC 573 : 2024 Cri LJ 1561

Section 306 - Before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative to put an end to her life. It must be borne in mind that in a case of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the deceased to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC would not be sustainable. (Para 36) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393

Section 306 - In order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It would also require an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and that this act of the accused must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. (Para 39) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393

Section 306 - Human mind is an enigma. There can be myriad reasons for a man or a woman to commit or attempt to commit suicide: it may be a case of failure to achieve academic excellence, oppressive environment in college or hostel, particularly for students belonging to the marginalized sections, joblessness, financial difficulties, disappointment in love or marriage, acute or chronic ailments, depression, so on and so forth. Therefore, it may not always be the case that someone has to abet commission of suicide. Circumstances surrounding the deceased in which he finds himself are relevant. (Para 47) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393

Section 306 - The court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that the victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. (Para 40) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393

Section 306 - Where the accused by his act or omission or by his continued course of conduct creates a situation that the deceased is left with no other option except to commit suicide, then instigation may be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. (Para 34) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393

Sections 306 and 417 - Prohibition of Harassment of Woman Act, 2002 (Tamil Nadu); Section 4 - Broken relationships and heartbreaks are part of everyday life. Merely advising a partner to marry as per the advice of parents would not attract the penal provisions of abetment to suicide. There must be direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. The accused must be shown to have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain acts to facilitate the commission of suicide. Where the words uttered are casual in nature and which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarreling people, and nothing serious is expected to follow from the same, the same would not amount to abetment of suicide. In order to constitute 'instigation', it must be shown that the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide. The words uttered by the accused must be suggestive of the consequence. (Para 10 - 12 & 16) Prabhu v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 112

Sections 341, 323 and 302 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 200, 203 and 227 – Discharge - The version of PW-1 is that the accused repeatedly kicked on chest with a stick. In the post-mortem, no injury was found on the chest or any other part of the body of the deceased. The expert testimony of the doctor who performed the autopsy of the deceased cannot be completely ignored while deciding the guilt of an accused. Therefore, taking the evidence of the witnesses as it is, there was no material to proceed against the accused in the private complaint. (Para 11 & 12) Ramalingam v. N. Viswanathan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : AIR 2024 SC 757

Section 361 & 363 – Kidnapping from lawful guardianship – 'Kidnapping' within the meaning of Section 361 of IPC was established by the prosecution. Held, there was no reason for the father of the victim to falsely implicate the appellants and tutor the child to depose against them. Hence, the accused is convicted for the lesser offence of kidnapping defined by Section 361 of IPC, which is punishable under Section 363 of IPC. William Stephen v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 168

Section 364A – Kidnapping for ransom - Ingredients – There should be a kidnapping or abduction of any person or a person should be kept in detention after such kidnapping or abduction. If the said act is coupled with a threat to cause death or hurt to such person, an offence under Section 364A is attracted. William Stephen v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 168

Section 364A – Kidnapping for ransom not established – Mere Demand For Ransom without a threat to death or hurt would not Amount to offence under Section 364A. The ingredients of Section 364A of IPC were not proved by the prosecution in as much as the prosecution failed to lead cogent evidence to establish the second part of Section 364A about the threats given by the accused to cause death or hurt to such person. Only if the threats given to the parents or the close relatives of the kidnapped person by the accused was established, then a case could be made out that there was a reasonable apprehension that the person kidnapped may be put to death or hurt may be caused to him. Conviction of the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 364A of IPC is set aside. William Stephen v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 168

Section 364A - Kidnapping for Ransom - The necessary ingredients which the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, before the Court are not only an act of kidnapping or abduction but thereafter the demand of ransom, coupled with the threat to life of a person who has been kidnapped or abducted, must be there. (Para 14) Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : AIR 2024 SC 271 : (2024) 3 SCC 125

Section 375 – “Consent” of a woman – To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. Held, the allegations in the FIR so also in the restatement made before the Dy. S.P., do not, on their face, indicate that the promise by accused was false or that the complainant engaged in the sexual relationship on the basis of such false promise. No error has been committed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court by holding that permitting further proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of law and result in miscarriage of justice. (Para 11, 15 & 18) Ms. X v. Mr. A, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 242

Section 375 - If it is established that from the inception, the consent by the victim is a result of a false promise to marry, there will be no consent, and in such a case, the offence of rape will be made out. (Para 7) Sheikh Arif v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 68 : AIR 2024 SC 710

Sections 376, 417 and 420 - Accused is a police officer. The allegation of undue influence and/or unintended favour towards him by the Investigating Officer cannot be brushed aside lightly. The appellant in her application has stated that: (i) respondent no.2 was already married to M and was, thus, disqualified to perform the second marriage; (ii) he being a Government officer, his second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage would have been a misconduct under the Conduct Rules; and (iii) that the first chargesheet itself suggested that the appellant and respondent no.2 had been living together and were in physical relationship. If that is so, the Investigating Agency ought to have further probed as to whether they have been cohabitating pursuant to the so-called marriage performed on 13.09.2012 and/or it was merely a consensual live-in relationship. Similarly, the Investigating Officer does not appear to have taken any pains to visit the hospital/medical clinics to verify whether the appellant underwent abortion twice. We are not sure whether the statements of the persons living in the neighbourhood were recorded or not to find out whether the appellant and respondent no.2 had been living together as husband and wife. All these facts will have a material bearing on the determination by the Trial Court as to whether a prima facie case under Sections 376, 417 and 420 of IPC is made out or not. XXX v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Sections 376 / 506 - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Rape - Lodging a case after 34 years and that too on the basis of a bald statement that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of commission of offence, could itself be a ground to quash the proceedings. No explanation whatsoever is given in the FIR as to why the prosecutrix was keeping silent for a long period of 34 years. The material on record shows that the relationship was consensual, in as much as the son who is born out of the said relationship has been treated by the accused as his son and all the facilities, including cash money, have been provided to him. Rajaram Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 40

Sections 376 and 506 – Rape - False promise of marriage - The relationship between the accused and the victim was a consensual relationship which culminated in the marriage. In the legal notice issued on behalf of the victim, the factum of marriage was admitted and the victim has been described as the wife of the accused. Therefore, on the face of it, the allegation that the physical relationship was maintained due to false promise of marriage is without basis, as their relationship led to the solemnization of marriage. Therefore, this is a case where the allegations made in the FIR were such that on the basis of the statements, no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Hence, a case was made out for quashing the FIR. (Para 9) Ajeet Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 18 : AIR 2024 SC 257 : (2024) 2 SCC 422

Section 376 AB - Punishment for rape on woman under twelve years of age - In the instant case, the petitioner-convict was aged 40 years on the date of occurrence and the victim was then only a girl, aged 7 years. Thus, the position is that he used a lass aged 7 years to satisfy his lust. For that the petitioner-convict took the victim to a temple, unmindful of the holiness of the place, disrobed her and himself and then committed the crime. We have no hesitation to hold that the fact he had not done it brutally will not make its commission non-barbaric. (Para 10) Bhaggi @ Bhagirath @ Naran v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 87 : AIR 2024 SC 938

Section 405 - Criminal Breach of Trust - Commercial disputes over variation of rate cannot per se give rise to an offence under Section 405 of the 1860 Code without presence of any aggravating factor leading to the substantiation of its ingredients. (Para 14) Sachin Garg v. State of U.P, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Section 406, 409, 420, 457, 380 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; S. 13(1)(d) r/w. 13(2) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 319 - Demand of money for extending benefits during custody - Application filed under Section 319 Cr.P.C. against the police officials - All the witnesses have equivocally narrated the incidents that took place at different places regarding threats, demand of huge sum of money, torture etc. - According to them, the amount was being demanded for the following benefits to be extended: (i) firstly, not to physically torture; (ii) not to ask for further police remand; (iii) to help get bail; and (iv) to give good treatment during custody. Held, there appears to be prima facie evidence on record to make it a triable case as against the police officials. (Para 8 - 14) Gurdev Singh Bhalla v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 28 : (2024) 3 SCC 142

Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B - On a reading of the FIR as well as the charge-sheet, we do not find that the offences aforestated is made out at all. We do not find any criminal breach of trust nor any cheating by impersonation. There is also no cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, nor has any documents referred to any forgery or security or any forgery for the purpose of cheating. There is no reference to any document which has been forged so as to be used as a genuine document and much less is as there any criminal conspiracy which can be imputed to the appellants herein in the absence of any offence being made out vis-a-vis the aforesaid Sections. (Para 17) Vishal Noble Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 96

Sections 406 and 506 - The ingredients to allege the offence are neither stated nor can be inferred from the averments. A prayer is made to the police for recovery of money from the appellants. The police is to investigate the allegations which discloses a criminal act. Police does not have the power and authority to recover money or act as a civil court for recovery of money. Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 150

Sections 415 and 420 - Cheating - Ingredients to constitute the offence - Discussed. (Para 11 - 13) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Sections 415 and 420 - Cheating - For attracting the provisions of Section 420 of IPC, it must be shown that the FIR / complaint discloses: (i) the deception of any person; (ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person; and (iii) dishonest intention of the accused at the time of making the inducement. (Para 13) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Sections 415 and 420 - Cheating - The dishonest inducement is the sine qua non to attract the provisions of Sections 415 and 420 of IPC. (Para 20) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Section 417 - Mere non-performance of marriage by accused at booked marriage hall does not constitute commission of offense of cheating. (Para 8) Raju Krishna Shedbalkar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 158

Section 420 - It must also be understood that a statement of fact is deemed 'deceitful' when it is false and is knowingly or recklessly made with the intent that it shall be acted upon by another person, resulting in damage or loss. 'Cheating' therefore, generally involves a preceding deceitful act that dishonestly induces a person to deliver any property or any part of a valuable security, prompting the induced person to undertake the said act, which they would not have done but for the inducement. (Para 12) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Section 420 - The act of the wife to forge the sign of husband to seek the passport for minor child to travel abroad doesn't amount to cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC, due to the absence of a deceitful act that resulted in a loss or damage of property to a husband. Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Section 420 - The term 'property' employed in Section 420 IPC has a well defined connotation. Every species of valuable right or interest that is subject to ownership and has an exchangeable value – is ordinarily understood as 'property'. It also describes one's exclusive right to possess, use and dispose of a thing. The IPC itself defines the term 'moveable property' as, “intended to include corporeal property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth.” Whereas immoveable property is generally understood to mean land, benefits arising out of land and things attached or permanently fastened to the earth. (Para 13) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Section 420 - While prosecuting a person for the offence of cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC, it is to be seen whether the deceitful act of cheating was coupled with an inducement leading to the parting of any property by the complainant. To constitute an offence of cheating, merely committing a deceitful act is not sufficient unless the deceitful act dishonestly induced a person to deliver any property or any part of a valuable security, thereby resulting in loss or damage to the person. (Para 10 - 20) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 323, 504 and 506 - Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh); Section 2(b)(i) and 3(1) - “Gang” - Meaning of - the person alleged to be the member of the gang should be found indulging in anti-social activities which would be covered under the offences punishable under Chapters XVI, or XVII or XXII IPC. For framing a charge for the offence under the Gangsters Act and for continuing the prosecution of the accused under the above provisions, the prosecution would be required to clearly state that the accused are being prosecuted for any one or more offences covered by anti-social activities as defined under Section 2(b). (Para 12 & 13) Farhana v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 131 : AIR 2024 SC 1158

Sections 468 and 471 - Forgery - There are two primary components that need to be fulfilled in order to establish the offence of 'forgery', namely: (i) that the accused has fabricated an instrument; and (ii) it was done with the intention that the forged document would be used for the purpose of cheating. Simply put, the offence of forgery requires the preparation of a false document with the dishonest intention of causing damage or injury. (Para 22) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Sections 499 and 500 - Petitioner described all Gujarati people as “thugs”. It is true that every prosecution for defamation cannot be quashed on the ground that the offending allegations have been withdrawn. After the petitioner has explained the context in which he made the statements and after withdrawal of those statements, in the facts of the case, it is unjust to continue the prosecution. No purpose will be served by continuing the prosecution. Therefore, in the peculiar facts of the case, this is a fit case to quash the complaint. (Para 8 - 10) Tejashwi Prasad Yadav v. Hareshbhai Pranshankar Mehta, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 113 : AIR 2024 SC 1026

Section 500 - A criminal defamation case was filed against the owner of a newspaper for an article published against an advocate. The Magistrate rejected the complaint, stating that the news article in question was published in good faith and in the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Magistrate's view cannot be termed as "illegal or unjustified," and therefore, there is no justification for interference by the Sessions Court or the High Court. (Para 8 & 9) Sanjay Upadhya v. Anand Dubey, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 67

Section 504 – This offence can be invoked when the insult of a person provokes him to break public peace or to commit any other offence. Held, there is no such allegation in the FIR that owing to the alleged offensive post attributable to the appellant, the complainant was provoked to such an extent that he could indulge in disturbing the public peace or commit any other offence. Hence, the FIR lacks the necessary ingredients of the said offence. (Para 30) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Section 506 - Criminal Intimidation - The allegation of criminal intimidation against the accused is made in the complaint statements, no particulars thereof have been given. Both in the complaint petition and the initial deposition of one of the witnesses, there is only reproduction of part of the statutory provision giving rise to the offence of criminal intimidation. This would constitute a mere bald allegation, short of any particulars as regards to the manner in which threat was conveyed. (Para 17) Sachin Garg v. State of U.P, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Commutation of Sentence - The lack of cogent evidence to prove that Accused 3 shared a common intention to commit murder is an important factor to commute a sentence from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II IPC. (Para 29) Velthepu Srinivas v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : AIR 2024 SC 1050

Quashing of FIR – A court must exercise its jurisdiction to quash an FIR or criminal complaint when the allegations made therein, taken prima facie, do not disclose the commission of any offence. (Para 48) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775

Right of Private Defence – The law provides that the person claiming such a right bears the onus to prove the legitimacy of the actions done in furtherance thereof and it is not for the Court to presume the presence of such circumstances or the truth in such a plea being taken. (Para 19) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667

Setting a person on fire is an act of extreme cruelty and would fall under Section 302 IPC. Naresh v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 37

Subjective test of Intention - A person intends a consequence when he (1) foresees that it will happen if the given series of acts or omissions continue, and (2) desires it to happen. The most serious level of culpability, justifying the most serious levels of punishment, is achieved when both these components are actually present in the accused's mind. Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : (2024) 3 SCC 573 : 2024 Cri LJ 1561

The fact remains that both the star witnesses of the prosecution are disbelieved in the trial by clearly stating that their statements are contradictory, the facts are twisted and improvements are made. For trial under Section 302 IPC, if a witness is branded as untrustworthy having allegedly twisted the facts and made contrary statements, it is not safe to impose conviction on the basis of a statement made by such witness. When there is an effort to falsely implicate one accused person, statements made by such an eyewitness cannot be relied upon without strong corroboration. Moreover, there is material on record proving previous enmity between the parties. State of Haryana v. Mohd. Yunus, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 36 : AIR 2024 SC 597 :: (2024) 3 SCC 180

Police Act, 1861

The information disclosing the commission of the cognizable offence needs to be recorded as a First Information Report (FIR) in the form of a book and not in the General Diary maintained by the Police. (Para 28) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 19 - Sanction - The Sessions Court could not have acquitted the accused only on the ground of alleged invalid sanction, without recording its findings on all the issues involved. (Para 8) P.I. Babu v. C.B.I., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 56

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A - Interpretation of - Split Verdict - Referred to Larger Bench. Nara Chandrababu Naidu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 41

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954

Section 2(ix) (k) and Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955; Rule 32(c) & (f) – Misbranded food – The packets taken from shop/godown of the appellants by the food inspector were misbranded as defined under Section 2(ix) (k) of the Act, as they were not labelled in accordance with the requirements of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. (Para 7) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212

Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955; Rule 32(c) & (f) and Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006; Section 52 – Reduction of sentence as per current law applicable – Sentence of imprisonment and fine converted to only fine – The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, repealed by the introduction of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, wherein Section 52 provides a maximum penalty of Rs.3,00,000/- for misbranded food and no provision for imprisonment. When an amendment is beneficial to the accused it can be applied even to cases pending in Courts where such a provision did not exist at the time of the commission of offence. (Para 9) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

A very strange and unusual Writ Petitions have been filed by the State against the Directorate of Enforcement under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, before the High Court seeking relief, which would indirectly stall or delay the inquiry/investigation. The Writ Petitions filed, at the instance of the State Government, challenging summons issued to the District Collectors prima facie appears to be thoroughly misconceived, and the impugned order passed by the High Court also being under utter misconception of law. Directorate of Enforcement v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 172

Once cognizance of a complaint filed under Section 44 is taken by the Special Court under the PMLA Act, the power to arrest vesting under Section 19 of the PMLA Act cannot be exercised. Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement Jalandhar Zonal Office, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 191

Section 45 - The appellants have miserably failed to satisfy that there are reasonable grounds for believing that they are not guilty of the alleged offences. On the contrary, there is sufficient material collected by the respondent-ED to show that they are prima facie guilty of the alleged offences. (Para 30) Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 240 : AIR 2024 SC 1576

Preventive Detention

In a case where a detenue receives the ground of detention in the language known to him which contains a clear statement over his right to make a representation, there is no need for informing verbally once again. Sarfaraz Alam v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 15 : AIR 2024 SC 407 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 755 : (2024) 3 SCC 347

Difference between preventive and punitive detention – The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. An order of preventive detention, may be made before or during prosecution, with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. (Para 25) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Mere involvement in sexual offence not sufficient : Supreme Court quashes Preventive Detention Order. Vaddi Lakshmi v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 254

Prisoner

Guidelines and standard operating procedure for implementation of the scheme for support to poor prisoners. Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 151

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

'One day trial' in POCSO case - Supreme Court affirms High Court Order for fresh trial after setting aside conviction. Bablu Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 203

Remission

A woman deserves respect howsoever high or low she may be otherwise considered in society or to whatever faith she may follow or any creed she may belong to. Can heinous crimes, inter alia, against women permit remission of the convicts by a reduction in their sentence and by granting them liberty? These are the issues which arise in these writ petitions. (Para 1) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

If a criminal is curable, he ought to be improved by education and other suitable arts, and then set free again as a better citizen and less of a burden to the state. This postulate lies at the heart of the policy of remission. In addition, there are also competing interests involved– the rights of the victim and the victim's family to justice vis-a-vis a convict's claim to a second chance by way of remission or reduction of his sentence for reformation. (Para 1) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Reasons for grant or refusal of remission should be clearly delineated in the order by passing a speaking order. (Para 55 (h) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Remission: Scope & Ambit - Discussed. (Para 22 - 39) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

The factors that govern the grant of remission namely: i. Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large? ii. Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime? iii. Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime? iv. Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this convict any more? v. Socio-economic condition of the convict's family. (Para 48) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

The question regarding maintainability of a PIL challenging orders of remission is kept open to be considered in any other appropriate case. (Para 27) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

The policy of remission applicable would therefore be the Policy of the State which is the appropriate Government and which has the jurisdiction to consider that application. The policy of remission applicable at the time of the conviction could apply and only if for any reason, the said policy cannot be made applicable a more benevolent policy, if in vogue, could apply. (Para 55 (d) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

When an application for remission is granted under the provisions of the Constitution, the following among other tests may apply to consider its legality by way of judicial review of the same. (i) that the order has been passed without application of mind; (ii) that the order is mala fide; (iii) that the order has been passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations; (iv) that relevant materials have been kept out of consideration; (v) that the order suffers from arbitrariness. (Para 55 (i) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

While considering an application for remission, there cannot be any abuse of discretion. In this regard, it is necessary to bear in mind the following aspects as mentioned in Laxman Naskar v. State of West Bengal, (2000) 2 SCC 595, namely, - (i) Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large? (ii) Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime? (iii) Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime? (iv) Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this convict any more? (v) Socio-economic condition of the convict's family. (Para 55 (e) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Section 43D(2)(b) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 167(2) - Default Bail - Terrorism cases should not to be taken lightly. (Para 13) State of NCT of Delhi v. Raj Kumar @ Lovepreet @ Lovely, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 10

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Section 43D(5) and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 439 – Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act modifies the application of the general bail provisions in respect of offences punishable under Chapter IV and Chapter VI of the UAP Act. Bail must be rejected as a 'rule', if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the 'final report' or 'Case Diary', the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied, that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with the 'tripod test' (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence). The restrictions, on granting of bail in section 43D(5) are in addition to the restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grant of bail. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence 'bail is the rule, jail is the exception' does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act. The 'exercise' of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form of the words used in proviso to Section 43D(5) - 'shall not be released', in contrast with the form of the words as found in Section 437(1) CrPC - 'may be released', suggests the intention of the Legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule. (Para 17, 18 & 20) Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : AIR 2024 SC 952