Supreme Court Annual Digest 2023 - Prevention Of Corruption Act

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - In the present case, there are no circumstances brought on record which will prove the demand for gratification. Therefore, the ingredients of the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act were not established and consequently, the offence under Section 13(1)(d) will not be attracted. 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - It is desirable that High Courts maintain a "hands-off" approach and not quash FIRs relating to corruption cases at investigation stage-This is because, it is difficult to form an opinion conclusively at the stage of reading a first information report that the public servant is either in or not in possession of property disproportionate to the known sources of his/her income. It would all depend on what is ultimately unearthed after the investigation is complete -The considerations that could apply to quashing of first information reports pertaining to offences punishable under general penal statutes ex proprio vigore may not be applicable to a P.C. Act offence. (Para 74) 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 158

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - the complainant did not produce a copy of the application made by him for providing electricity meter - the complainant did not clearly tell that he had given such application. In absence of proof of making such application, the prosecution's case regarding demand of bribe for installing new electricity meter becomes doubtful. (Para 18) 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Zero Tolerance to Corruption - Though it is the preambular promise of the Constitution to secure social justice to the people of India by striving to achieve equal distribution of wealth, it is yet a distant dream. If not the main, one of the more prominent hurdles for achieving progress in this field is undoubtedly 'corruption'. Corruption is a malaise, the presence of which is all pervading in every walk of life. (Para 49) 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 158

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 13(1)(e) - Second proviso is in the nature of additional safeguard for the public servant who are accused of the offence punishable under Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act against an investigation by a police officer without the knowledge and consent of superior police officer not below the rank of Superintendent of Police. A superior police officer of the rank of Superintendent of Police or any officer higher in rank is required to pass an order before an investigation, if any, for such offence is commenced. It is needless to point-out that, before directing such investigation, the Superintendent of Police or an officer superior to him is required to apply his mind to the information and come to an opinion that the investigation on such allegations is necessary. (Para 88) 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 365

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 19 - The question with regard to the validity of such sanction should be raised at the earliest stage of the proceedings, however could be raised at the subsequent stage of the trial also - The stages of proceedings at which an accused could raise the issue with regard to the validity of the sanction would be the stage when the Court takes cognizance of the offence, the stage when the charge is to be framed by the Court or at the stage when the trial is complete i.e., at the stage of final arguments in the trial - Competence of the court trying the accused also would be dependent upon the existence of the validity of sanction, and therefore it is always desirable to raise the issue of validity of sanction at the earliest point of time - In case the sanction is found to be invalid, the trial court can discharge the accused and relegate the parties to a stage where the competent authority may grant a fresh sanction for the prosecution in accordance with the law. (Para 10) 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 595

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 19(3), 19(4) - Findings recorded by the Special Judge could not have been and should not have been reversed or altered by the High Court in the petition filed by the accused challenging the said order of the Special Judge, in view of the specific bar contained in sub-section (3) of Section 19, and that too without recording any opinion as to how a failure of justice had in fact been occasioned to the respondent-accused as contemplated in the said subsection (3). (Para 12-14) 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 595

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 7 - Demand of Gratification - When we consider the issue of proof of demand within the meaning of Section 7, it cannot be a simpliciter demand for money but it has to be a demand of gratification other than legal remuneration - Every demand made for payment of money is not a demand for gratification. It has to be something more than mere demand for money. (Para 16, 17) 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 7 - To attract Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand for gratification has to be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. The word used in Section 7, as it existed before 26th July 2018, is 'gratification'. There has to be a demand for gratification. It is not a simple demand for money, but it has to be a demand for gratification. If the factum of demand of gratification and acceptance thereof is proved, then the presumption under Section 20 can be invoked, and the Court can presume that the demand must be as a motive or reward for doing any official act. This presumption can be rebutted by the accused. (Para 11) 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 314

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w. 13(2) - In the instant case the pre-trap and post-trap proceedings were duly proved by the prosecution by examining the concerned witnesses, who had duly supported the case of prosecution. Both the courts below have recorded the findings that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt the conscious acceptance of the tainted currency by the accused and also the recovery of tainted currency from the accused. Therefore, the burden had shifted on the accused to dispel the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the said Act, and prove that it was not accepted as a motive or reward for the performance of his public duty, which the accused had failed to dispel. The explanation offered by the accused did not tally with the statement of the complainant recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. The High Court had also recorded that the defence taken by the accused that the acceptance of tainted currency by him was towards the Audit fees of the Society was not proved by him in as much as there was nothing on record to show that the amount paid by the complainant to the accused was out of the funds of the Society. Both the courts have appreciated the evidence on record threadbare in the right perspective and have found the accused guilty for the offence. (Para 12 - 14) 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 819

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 7 and 20 - Presumption where public servant accepts any undue advantage - Once the undue advantage i.e., any gratification whatever, other than the legal remuneration is proved to have been accepted by the accused, the Court is entitled to raise the presumption under Section 20 that he accepted the undue advantage as a motive or reward under Section 7 for performing or to cause performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly. No doubt, such presumption is rebuttable. (Para 11) 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 819

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Sections 20 and 7 - The presumption under Section 20 can be invoked only when the two basic facts required to be proved under Section 7, are proved. The said two basic facts are 'demand' and 'acceptance' of gratification. The presumption under Section 20 is that unless the contrary is proved, the acceptance of gratification shall be presumed to be for a motive or reward, as contemplated by Section 7. It means that once the basic facts of the demand of illegal gratification and acceptance thereof are proved, unless the contrary are proved, the Court will have to presume that the gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or reward as contemplated by Section 7. However, this presumption is rebuttable. Even on the basis of the preponderance of probability, the accused can rebut the presumption. (Para 11) 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Sections 7 and 13 – In absence of direct evidence, the demand and/or acceptance can always be proved by other evidence such as circumstantial evidence – Also, allegation of demand of gratification and acceptance made by a public servant has to be established beyond a reasonable doubt - the Constitution Bench ruling in Neeraj Dutta v. State, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1029 that direct evidence of demand or acceptance of bribe is not necessary for a conviction under the Act does not dilute the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 14) 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Sections 7 and 13 - The Constitution Bench was dealing with the issue of the modes by which the demand can be proved and laid down that the proof need not be only by direct oral or documentary evidence, but it can be by way of other evidence including circumstantial evidence. When reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence to prove the demand for gratification, the prosecution must establish each and every circumstance from which the prosecution wants the Court to draw a conclusion of guilt. The facts so established must be consistent with only one hypothesis that there was a demand made for gratification by the accused. (Para 14) 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 211