Armed ForcesCivilian Killings - FIR and subsequent proceedings quashed due to absence of mandatory sanction under Section 6 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), 1958. Rabina Ghale v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 707 : AIR 2024 SC 4547BailAccused in custody can seek anticipatory bail for another case. Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 675Accused need...
Armed Forces
Civilian Killings - FIR and subsequent proceedings quashed due to absence of mandatory sanction under Section 6 of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), 1958. Rabina Ghale v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 707 : AIR 2024 SC 4547
Bail
Accused in custody can seek anticipatory bail for another case. Dhanraj Aswani v. Amar S. Mulchandani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 675
Accused need not furnish multiple sureties against multiple bail orders - Courts can do away with the condition of local surety if its insistence delays the release of the accused from jail and renders the bail order ineffective. Girish Gandhi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : AIR 2024 SC 4396
An order granting a stay to the operation of the order granting bail during the pendency of the application for cancellation of bail should be passed in very rare cases. (Para 11) Parvinder Singh Khurana v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : AIR 2024 SC 3572 : 2024 CriLJ 3652
Bail cannot be denied on the ground that trial is expedited. Rup Bahadur Magar @ Sanki @ Rabin v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 656
Charge Sheet - The Court has to examine the material forming part of the charge sheet to decide whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the person applying for bail are prima facie true. While doing so, the court must take the charge sheet as it is. (Para 15, Referred; Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India (2022) 14 SCC 766) Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : AIR 2024 SC 4380
Denial of Bail - Chhattisgarh Vishesh Jan Suraksha Act, 2005 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - National Investigation Agency Act, 2008; Section 21(4) - Co-accused had been granted bail and that there was no likelihood of early conclusion of the trial, with only 40 out of 100 prosecution witnesses examined. The petitioner has been in custody since 2020. Bail granted. Mukesh Salam v State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 641
Even in a case where there are stringent conditions for the grant of bail in the relevant statutes, the same rule holds good with only modification that the bail can be granted if the conditions in the statute are satisfied. (Para 21) Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : AIR 2024 SC 4380
Higher thresholds for granting bail in stringent penal statutes like the PMLA, UAPA, and NDPS Act cannot be a tool to keep an accused incarcerated without trial. V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 750
If an accused approaches the High Court directly without first seeking relief from the Trial Court, it is generally appropriate for the High Court to redirect them to the Trial Court at the threshold. Nevertheless, if there are significant delays following notice, it may not be prudent to relegate the matter to the Trial Court at a later stage. Bail being closely tied to personal liberty, such claims should be adjudicated promptly on their merits, rather than oscillating between courts on mere procedural technicalities. (Para 45) Arvind Kejriwal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 694
Imposition of a condition for the petitioner to close his YouTube channel as a prerequisite for bail which involved allegations under the Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 2002, and the Information Technology Act, 2000. The Court found this condition to be unwarranted and extraneous to the bail decision. Felix Jerald v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 761
In the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to grant bail. But it would be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of our constitutional jurisprudence. (Para 32) Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : AIR 2024 SC 3579 : (2024) 8 SCC 293
Liberty granted to an accused under the order granting bail cannot be lightly and causally interfered with by mechanically granting an exparte order of stay of the bail order. (Para 13) Parvinder Singh Khurana v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : AIR 2024 SC 3572 : 2024 CriLJ 3652
Long custody will enure to benefit of accused for bail when delay in trial isn't his fault. Modh. Enamul Haque v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 740
Matrimonial Disputes - Condition that the husband must fulfill all the physical and financial requirements of the wife. Held, Such an impracticable requirement infringes on personal liberty and the right to dignity. Bail conditions should be reasonable and proportionate, particularly in matrimonial disputes, to allow the accused to comply and foster reconciliation between the parties. (Para 8) Sudeep Chatterjee v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 540
Once a court concludes that an accused is entitled to bail, the implementation of the bail order cannot be postponed. Such a postponement would violate the accused's fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Jitendra Paswan Satya Mitra v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 655
Pre-trial process itself shall not become a punishment - the Supreme Court set aside a bail condition to the effect that the bail bonds be furnished by the accused after completion of 6 months in custody from the date of the order. The condition in effect put on hold the implementation of the bail order for six months. Vikash Kumar Gupta v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 688
Special courts power to grant bail in cases of inordinate delay – If a bail application is made to the Special Court with a grievance regarding inordinate delay in the disposal of pending cases, the Special Court will be empowered to exercise power to grant bail. (Para 11.1) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : AIR 2024 SC 3418 : (2024) 8 SCC 415 : 2024 CriLJ 3297
The Court dealing with the application for cancellation of bail can always ensure that notice is served on the accused as soon as possible and that the application is heard expeditiously. An order granting bail can be stayed by the Court only in exceptional cases when a very strong prima facie case of the existence of the grounds for cancellation of bail is made out. The prima facie case must be of a very high standard. (Para 12) Parvinder Singh Khurana v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : AIR 2024 SC 3572 : 2024 CriLJ 3652
The High Court took notice of the fact that the petitioner had been in custody since 11th May 2022, and only one witness had been examined so far. In such circumstances, the High Court deemed it fit to order the release of the petitioner on bail, but only for a period of two months. Held, it is an incorrect order. If the High Court was of the view that the petitioner's right to a speedy trial had been infringed, then the High Court should have ordered the release of the petitioner on bail pending the final disposal of the trial itself. There was no good reason for the High Court to limit the period of bail. (2 - 5) Kishor Karmakar v. State of Odisha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 436
The High Court ordered the release of the petitioner on bail, but subject to the condition that the surety shall be the victim. It is the case of the petitioner that it was practically impossible to ask the victim to stand as a surety. In such circumstances, the petitioner preferred an application seeking modification of the condition. The modification application was rejected by the High Court. In such circumstances, the petitioner is before the Supreme Court. Held, it is very unfortunate to note that because of such an absurd condition imposed by the High Court, the petitioner, although ordered to be released on bail way back in July 2023, is still languishing in jail. The condition imposed by the High Court requiring the victim to stand as a surety is stayed from its operation. The petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to the terms and conditions that the trial court may deem fit to impose. (Para 2 - 9) Sharwan Kumar Yadav @ Sharwan Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 435
The maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel a person to do the impossible) emphasized in relation to onerous bail conditions. A court should not impose conditions that are impracticable or impossible for the accused to comply with, particularly in cases of anticipatory bail. (Para 1) Sudeep Chatterjee v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 540
The Supreme Court granted bail to Trinamool Congress (TMC) leader Anubrata Mondal in the case registered by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in relation to an alleged India-Bangladesh border cattle smuggling scam stating that the "trial is unlikely to commence soon". However, Mondal will remain in jail as he was arrested by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) which is also investigating the matter along with CBI. Anubrata Mondal @ Kesto v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 528
Travesty of justice if a prisoner can't get benefit of bail order due to inability to furnish local surety. Ramchandra Thangappan Aachari v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 715
To avoid trial process itself being the punishment' : Supreme Court grants bail to undertrial; reaffirms right to speedy trial. Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 680
When an application for cancellation of bail is filed, the High Court or Sessions Court should be very slow in granting drastic interim relief of stay of the order granting bail. (Para 10) Parvinder Singh Khurana v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : AIR 2024 SC 3572 : 2024 CriLJ 3652
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
Section 72(1) - Unauthorized dissemination of the identity and graphic content related to a murder and alleged rape case - The Court reiterated its directives established in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703 emphasizing the necessity to protect the identity of victims of sexual violence and the prohibition against media exposure of such identities. In light of these violations, the Court issued an injunction ordering the immediate removal of all references, photographs, and video clips of the deceased from social media and electronic platforms. Kinnori Ghosh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 590
Section 479 - Maximum period for detaining undertrial prisoners - Implementation of - Inhuman conditions in prisons - The Court directed that this provision, which allows for the release of first-time offenders who have served one-third of the maximum imprisonment period, shall apply to all undertrials regardless of when their cases were registered. The Court mandated the Superintendents of Jails across India to expedite the processing of applications for bail based on this new legislation within two months. Additionally, it ordered State Governments and Union Territories to submit comprehensive affidavits detailing the number of undertrials eligible for release, applications made, and actual releases. Re-Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons v. Director General of Prisons, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 632
Section 483(3) - Bail - Cancellation of - As a normal rule, the ex-parte stay of the bail order should not be granted. The said power can be exercised only in rare and very exceptional cases where the situation demands the passing of such drastic order. Where such a drastic ex-parte order of stay is passed, it is the duty of the Court to immediately hear the accused on the prayer for continuation of the interim relief. When the Court exercises the power of granting ex-parte ad interim stay of an order granting bail, the Court is duty bound to record reasons why it came to the conclusion that it was a very rare and exceptional case where a drastic order of ex-parte interim stay was warranted. (Para 20) Parvinder Singh Khurana v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : AIR 2024 SC 3572 : 2024 CriLJ 3652
Section 483(3) - Bail - Cancellation of - In an application made under Section 439(2) of the CrPC or Section 483(3) of the BNSS or other proceedings filed seeking cancellation of bail, the power to grant an interim stay of operation of order to bail can be exercised only in exceptional cases when a very strong prima facie case of the existence of the grounds for cancellation of bail is made out. While granting a stay of an order of grant of bail, the Court must record brief reasons for coming to a conclusion that the case was an exceptional one and a strong prima facie case is made out. (Para 20) Parvinder Singh Khurana v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 502 : AIR 2024 SC 3572 : 2024 CriLJ 3652
CBI Investigation
The High Court while exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution can entrust investigation to the CBI. However, for doing so, it has to come to a reasoning as to why it finds that investigation by State police is not fair or is partisan. Merely, on the basis of some letters, such exercise is not warranted. Such an exercise of entrusting the investigation by the High Court has to be done in very rare cases. A perusal of the order passed by the learned single judge would reveal that there is not even a whisper as to why it finds the investigation by the state to be unfair or impartial so as to find it necessary to direct an enquiry to be conducted by CBI. For the very same reasons, the order passed by the learned Division Bench is also not sustainable in law. State of West Bengal v. Jashimuddin Mondal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 759
The petitioners, mother and brother of the deceased, who died in 2016 under suspicious circumstances, contended that her death was not a simple case of suicide, as initially reported by the local police. They alleged that respondent No. 7, her husband and a senior judicial officer, influenced the investigation to avoid the registration of an FIR. The appellants sought a fresh investigation, citing six ante-mortem injuries on the deceased's body and suggesting the respondent's influence compromised the initial inquiry. The High Court had dismissed their plea, directing them to pursue alternate remedies under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. However, the appellants argued that, given respondent No. 7's judicial position, they had no hope of an impartial inquiry if overseen by a subordinate magistrate. The Supreme Court, recognizing the serious nature of the allegations and the need to maintain public confidence in judicial impartiality, allowed the appeal. It ordered the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to conduct an independent and thorough investigation, including filing an FIR if warranted, and to submit its report expeditiously. The Court clarified that it had not commented on the merits but emphasized that its observations should not influence the CBI's investigation. The appeal was allowed. Mandakini Diwan v. High Court of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 672
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
Age of the convict at the time of the commission of an offence would be of relevance along with other mitigating circumstances while commuting the sentence of the death penalty. Rabbu @ Sarvesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 730
Court cannot convict one accused and acquit another when similar or identical evidence is pitted against two accused persons. Yogarani v. State by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 731 : AIR 2024 SC 4641
Courts should refrain from ordering further investigation when the party requesting further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC has not whispered about anything new in its evidence and has based its application for further investigation without averring fresh materials. K. Vadivel v. K. Shanthi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 757
Criminal cases cannot be allowed to proceed based on vague and obscure complaints. Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 753
Framing of charge – Requirements – The standard of test and judgment which is finally applied before recording a finding of conviction against an accused is not to be applied at the stage of framing the charge and just a very strong suspicion, based on the material on record, would be sufficient to frame a charge. The strong suspicion should be the one emerging from the materials on record brought by the prosecution. It is within the jurisdiction of the Court concerned to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused concerned has been made out. Held, the question of framing the charge would arise only in a case where the court upon such exercise satisfies itself about the prima facie case revealing from “the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith” against the accused concerned. Hence, the intention embedded is to ensure that an accused will be made to stand the ordeal of trial only if 'the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith' discloses ground for proceeding against him. Further held, there is no ground for a prima facie case revealed from the materials produced by the prosecution. (Para 14, 15, 19 & 32) Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 475 : AIR 2024 SC 3540 : 2024 Cri LJ 3639
Section 41 and 41A - Supreme Court asks Police Chiefs to take action against erring officials for arrests in violation of Section 41/41A Cr.P.C. and Supreme Court guidelines. Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 600
Section 125 – A divorced Muslim woman is entitled to file a petition for maintenance against her ex-husband under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This right of a Muslim woman is in addition to the right under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986. Mohd Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 452 : AIR 2024 SC 3665 : 2024 CriLJ 3460
Section 160 - The proceedings arose from remarks made by the petitioner on social media regarding her exclusion from a decision-making process despite being invited by the Manipur State Transgender Welfare Board. Upon the petitioner expressing regret for her remarks and undertaking not to make similar comments in the future, the Court encouraged the respondent State to show leniency. The Advocate General for Manipur agreed to quash the proceedings, acknowledging the incident as a one-time, bona fide mistake. Consequently, the Court quashed the notice issued under Section 160 Cr.P.C. and all subsequent proceedings. The Writ Petition was disposed of accordingly, with the Court appreciating the State's magnanimity. Thangjam Santa Singh @ Santa Khurai v. State of Manipur, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 752
Section 162 - FIR Manipulation – Investigation Tainted by Delay in FIR Recording – Reiterated that when the police deliberately delay recording the First Information Report (FIR) after receiving information about a cognizable offense, and the FIR is prepared after on-site deliberation, consultation, and discussion, such an FIR cannot be considered the actual FIR but a statement made during the investigation, thereby falling under Section 162 Cr.P.C. Failure to promptly record the FIR raises doubts about the authenticity of the investigation, as it leaves room for fabrication of evidence and false clues. Deliberate delay in FIR registration taints the investigation. FIR prepared after consultation and deliberation is inadmissible as it is hit by Section 162 CrPC. Non-production of the Daily Diary (Roznamcha) can suggest fabrication and concealment of material facts. FIR delayed and investigation tainted. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : AIR 2024 SC 4201
Section 162 - Obligation to Record FIRs - The Court emphasized that police officers must record information about cognizable offenses, regardless of territorial jurisdiction. Refusing to do so constitutes a dereliction of duty. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : AIR 2024 SC 4201
Section 195 Cr.P.C. bar not applicable when forgery was committed on document before it was given as evidence in Court. Arockiasamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 717
Section 202 - Scope of Inquiry - At the stage of the issuing process under Section 202 Cr.P.C., the court is not required to determine whether the accused will ultimately be convicted or acquitted. The inquiry is limited to ascertaining whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding with the case. The Magistrate must focus on the existence of a prima facie case, based on the allegations in the complaint and the evidence presented, without engaging in detailed evaluation of the merits. The accused has no right to be heard at this stage, and the Magistrate's discretion must be judicially exercised. Grounds for quashing the issuance of process include: lack of essential ingredients of the offence, patently absurd allegations, capricious exercise of discretion, or fundamental legal defects in the complaint. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531
Section 202 and 482 - Issuance of Process and Application of Mind by Magistrate - The issuance of summons in a criminal case is a serious matter and cannot be done mechanically. The Magistrate must apply their mind to the facts alleged in the complaint, consider the evidence, and ensure that sufficient grounds exist for proceeding further. This requires a careful evaluation of whether the complaint discloses an offense and whether the accused is prima facie answerable. Vicarious liability of corporate office bearers cannot be assumed unless explicitly provided for in the statute, and direct allegations against them must be demonstrated. The process of summoning can be challenged under Section 482 of CrPC if it is shown that the Magistrate failed to exercise due discretion and formed an opinion without sufficient material. The Magistrate's order must reflect a subjective satisfaction based on proper scrutiny. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531
Section 216 does not give any right to the accused to file a fresh application seeking his discharge after the charge is framed by the court, more particularly when his application seeking discharge under Section 227 has already been dismissed. Unfortunately, such applications are being filed in the trial courts sometimes in ignorance of law and sometimes deliberately to delay the proceedings. Once such applications, though untenable, are filed, the trial courts have no alternative but to decide them, and then again such orders would be challenged before the higher courts, and the whole criminal trial would get derailed. Suffice it to say that such practice is highly deplorable, and if followed, should be dealt with sternly by the courts. (Para 11) K. Ravi v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : AIR 2024 SC 4074
Section 227 - Application of judicial mind at the stage of considering discharge - A judge is required to sift through the evidence presented by the prosecution to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused. The judge must not act merely as a post office for the prosecution but must exercise judicial discretion to determine whether a prima facie case exists. (Para 20) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606
Section 227 - Principles - The judge has the power to sift and weigh evidence to determine if a prima facie case is made out. If the materials disclose a grave suspicion, a charge can be framed; however, mere suspicion or weak evidence would justify a discharge. The judge must avoid conducting a mini-trial and should focus on whether the evidence, taken at face value, presumes an offense has been committed. (Para 20) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606
Section 227 – Discharge of accused in criminal cases – When an application for discharge is filed under Section 227, Cr.PC, the Court concerned is bound to disclose the reason(s), though, not in detail, for finding sufficient ground for rejecting the application or in other words, for finding prima facie case, as it will enable the superior Court to examine the challenge against the order of rejection. (Para 22) Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 475 : AIR 2024 SC 3540
Section 294 - Calling upon the accused to admit or deny the genuineness of the documents produced by the prosecution alongwith the list under Section 294 of Cr.P.C., could not be said to be in any way prejudicial to the right of the accused, nor could it be said to be compelling him to be a witness against himself as contemplated under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. However, the Court deleted the observations made in paragraph 56 of the impugned order, which suggested that deliberate denial of a document's genuineness could be considered an aggravating circumstance during sentencing. The petitioner is allowed to raise all legally permissible contentions during the trial. (Para 2 - 4) Ashok Daga v. Directorate Of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 480
Section 311 - A conjoint reading of Section 311 CrPC and Section 165 of the Evidence Act makes it clear that the trial Court is under an obligation not to act as a mere spectator and should proactively participate in the trial proceedings, so as to ensure that neither any extraneous material is permitted to be brought on record nor any relevant fact is left out. It is the duty of the trial Court to ensure that all such evidence which is essential for the just decision of the case is brought on record irrespective of the fact that the party concerned omits to do so. (Para 48) Gaurav Maini v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 471 : AIR 2024 SC 3601
Section 313 – Conviction of accused challenged on grounds of violation of Section 313 – Section 313 embodies principle of natural justice viz., audi alteram partem, empowering the Court to examine the accused thereunder to give the accused concerned an opportunity to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence. Questioning under Section 313(1)(a), Cr.PC, is discretionary but the questioning under Section 313(1)(b) thereof is mandatory. Held, if a fatal non-compliance in the matter of questioning resulted in 'material prejudice' to any convict in a criminal case, the trial concerning that convict should stand vitiated. The examination of the appellant under Section 313, Cr.PC, reveals that both the incriminating circumstances were not directly or even indirectly put to the appellant while being examined under Section 313, Cr.PC. Held, the twin incriminating circumstances were not put to the appellant while he was being questioned under Section 313, Cr.PC, and they ultimately culminated in his conviction, it is clear that the appellant was 'materially prejudiced' and it had resulted in blatant miscarriage of justice. The failure as above is not a curable defect and it is nothing but a patent illegality vitiating the trial qua the appellant. Hence, the conviction of the appellant could not be sustained. (Para 19, 20, 24 & 26) Naresh Kumar v. State of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : AIR 2024 SC 3233 : 2024 CriLJ 3224
Section 319 - Order to summon additional accused passed after acquittal/conviction of co-accused is unsustainable. Devendra Kumar Pal v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 687
Section 321 – Permission for withdrawal of the prosecution against an accused is challenged – Held, the Trial Court's has taken a casual approach towards the accusations against the then sitting Member of Legislative Assembly in allowing withdrawal of his prosecution and merely because an accused person is elected to the Legislative Assembly cannot be a testament to their image among the general public. Matters of a gruesome crime akin to the double murder in the present case do not warrant withdrawal of prosecution merely on the ground of good public image of an accused named in the charge sheet after thorough investigation. Contrary to the Trial Court's view, such withdrawal cannot be said to be allowed in public interest in cases of involvement of influential people. Hence, it is of paramount importance to ensure progression of the trial without further delay. (Para 12) Shailendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : AIR 2024 SC 3727
Section 357 - The appellant, convicted under Sections 409 and 201 of the IPC and sentenced to four years and six months of rigorous imprisonment, was ordered by the High Court to deposit 50% of the Rs. 2.86 crore compensation to obtain bail and suspension of sentence. The Supreme Court, referencing the principles of Section 357 Cr.P.C. and the case of Dilip S. Dahanukar v. Mahindra Co. Ltd. (2007), found the High Court's condition unjustified and allowed the appeal, removing the requirement to deposit 50% of the compensation. Nikhil v State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 478
Section 374 - When a Court deals with an appeal against an order of conviction, the judgment must contain (i) a concise statement of the facts of the case, (ii) the nature of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defence, if any, (iii) the submissions made by the parties, (iv) the analysis based on the reappreciation of evidence, and (v) the reasons for either confirming the guilt of the accused or for acquitting the accused. The appellate court must scan through the evidence, both oral and documentary, and reappreciate it. (Para 13) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004
Section 374 - After reappreciating the evidence, the appellate court must record reasons for either accepting the evidence of the prosecution or for disbelieving the evidence of the prosecution. The Court must record reasons for deciding whether the charges against the accused have been proved. In a given case, if the conviction is confirmed, the Court will have to deal with the legality and adequacy of the sentence. In such a case, there must be a finding recorded on the legality and adequacy of the sentence with reasons. (Para 13) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004
Section 389 – Suspension of substantive order of sentence of life imprisonment – Held, if a sentence imposed by trial court is for a fixed term, ordinarily, the appellate court may exercise its discretion to suspend the operation of the same liberally unless there are any exceptional circumstances emerging from the record to decline. However, when it is a case of life imprisonment, the only legal test which the Court should apply is to ascertain whether there is anything 'palpable' or 'apparent on the face of the record' on the basis of which the court can come to the conclusion that the conviction is 'not sustainable in law' and that the convict has very fair chances of succeeding in his appeal. Further held, the offence is prima facie established against the appellant before the trial court. Hence, the High Court is at no fault in declining to suspend the substantive order of sentence of life imprisonment. (Para 7 & 8) Bhupatji Sartajji Jabraji Thakor v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 438
Section 401 - Under Section 401 (3) Cr.P.C., the High Court lacks the authority to convert an acquittal into a conviction in revision proceedings. Instead, the High Court should have remitted the matter to the appellate court for re-evaluation. C.N. Shantha Kumar v. M.S. Srinivas, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 660
Section 418 (1) – Proportionality of sentence with respect to the offence committed – To claim enhancement of punishment for conviction for the offence – Held, it is the solemn duty of the Court to strike a proper balance awarding sentence proportionate to the gravity of the offence committed by the accused concerned upon his conviction for serious offence(s). The offence under Section 494 I.P.C., has to be treated as a serious offence, hence, the imposition of 'imprisonment till the rising of the court' is not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule of proportionality. Further held, imposition of sentence of 'imprisonment till the rising of the court' upon conviction for an offence under Section 494 I.P.C., on them was unconscionably lenient or a flea-bite sentence. Hence, it appropriate to use our judicial discretion to modify the sentence imposed under the impugned judgment to six months each, making the nature of the sentence as simple imprisonment for the said period. (Para 14, 15, 17 & 19) Baba Natarajan Prasad v. M. Revathi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : AIR 2024 SC 3348 : (2024) 7 SCC 531 : 2024 Cri LJ 3281
Section 437(3) and Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37 & 52 – Applicability of Section 437(3) in cases of NDPS Act – Once a case is made out for a grant of bail in accordance with Section 37, the conditions of bail will have to be in terms of Section 437(3) of the CrPC. The reason is that because of Section 52 of the NDPS Act, the provisions of the CrPC apply to the arrests made under the NDPS Act insofar as they are not inconsistent with the NDPS Act. (Para 4) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : AIR 2024 SC 3418 : (2024) 8 SCC 415 : 2024 CriLJ 3297
Section 437(3) – Bail – Object of imposing conditions of bail – It is to ensure that the accused does not interfere or obstruct the investigation in any manner, remains available for the investigation, does not tamper with or destroy evidence, does not commit any offence, remains regularly present before the Trial Court, and does not create obstacles in the expeditious conclusion of the trial. (Para 7) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : AIR 2024 SC 3418 : (2024) 8 SCC 415 : 2024 CriLJ 3297
Section 437(3) – Bail conditions – Held, bail conditions cannot be fanciful, arbitrary or freakish and must be within the four corners of Section 437(3). The bail conditions must be consistent with the object of imposing conditions. While imposing bail conditions, the Constitutional rights of an accused, who is ordered to be released on bail, can be curtailed only to the minimum extent required. In case of the accused whose guilt is yet to be established, the presumption of innocence is applicable and such person cannot be deprived of all his rights guaranteed under Article 21. Further held, Courts must show restraint while imposing bail conditions. Hence, while granting bail, the Courts can curtail the freedom of the accused only to the extent required for imposing the bail conditions warranted by law and cannot be so onerous as to frustrate the order of bail itself. (Para 7 & 7.1) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : AIR 2024 SC 3418 : (2024) 8 SCC 415 : 2024 CriLJ 3297
Section 437(3) – Constitution of India; Article 21 – Validity of bail condition – The condition of dropping pin on google map – Bail condition of dropping a PIN on Google Map gives an impression that the condition will enable to monitor the movements of the accused on a realtime basis, which will be violative of the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Held, this cannot be a condition of bail and deserves to be deleted and ordered accordingly. (10, 10.2) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : AIR 2024 SC 3418 : (2024) 8 SCC 415 : 2024 CriLJ 3297
Section 437(3) – Validity of Bail condition – The condition of furnishing certificate of the embassy – It is not necessary that in every case where bail is granted to an accused in an NDPS case who is a foreign national on the ground of long incarceration of more than 50% of the minimum sentence, the condition of obtaining a 'certificate of assurance' from the Embassy/High Commission should be incorporated. It will depend on the facts of each case. Held, grant of such a certificate by the Embassy/High Commission is beyond the control of the accused to whom bail is granted. Therefore, when the Embassy/High Commission does not grant such a certificate within a reasonable time, the accused, who is otherwise held entitled to bail, cannot be denied bail on the ground that such a condition, which is impossible for the accused to comply with, has not been complied with. Hence the condition is deleted. (Para 11.1 & 12) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441 : AIR 2024 SC 3418 : (2024) 8 SCC 415 : 2024 CriLJ 3297
Section 439 - Bail decisions must consider relevant factors such as the nature of accusations, the accused's role, potential tampering of evidence, and risk of flight. It was held that the learned Single Judge erred by not adequately addressing these factors. Moreover, despite the respondent's six-month incarceration, the economic offense's gravity, involving the siphoning of Society funds affecting numerous individuals, justified canceling bail. The Court underscored that bail orders based on irrelevant or insufficient material are open to interference. Although bail was revoked, the Court granted liberty to the respondent to reapply for bail if circumstances change, ensuring the trial court remains uninfluenced by the present judgment. Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 619 : AIR 2024 SC 4078
Section 439 – To set aside Bail order – Grant of bail in serious offences like murder – The power to grant bail under Section 439 CrPC although is discretionary power of the court, it has to be exercised in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Where a court considering an application for bail fails to consider relevant factors, an appellate court may justifiably set aside the order granting bail. An appellate court is thus required to consider whether the order granting bail suffers from a non-application of mind or is not borne out from a prima facie view of the evidence on record. Held, it is evident that the High Court failed to assign any reasons for the exercise of its discretion in favour of the accused, knowing fully well that he is involved in a serious offence like murder and was absconding for a couple of years. Further held, here an order refusing or granting bail does not furnish the reasons that inform the decision, there is a presumption of the non-application of mind which may require the intervention of this Court. Hence, bail order is set aside. (Para 14 & 16) State of Jharkhand v. Anil Ganjhu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 459
Section 451 - Mines and Minerals Act, 1957 - Proceedings for confiscation - Release of seized vehicle - Keeping a vehicle like a Tipper Lorry idle is not serving anybody's interest. It is resulting in damage to the stationary vehicle which is kept within the Magistrate Court complex. Public spaced is also occupied. (Para 6) Perichi Gounder v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 498
Section 464 - Conviction cannot be challenged based on conversion of charges unless 'failure of justice' is proved. Baljinder Singh @ Ladoo v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 748
Section 482 - FIRs can be quashed even after a charge-sheet is filed if continuing the proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law. Shaileshbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 635
Section 482 - Inherent Jurisdiction of High Court – Scope of Powers - This provision enables the court to quash criminal proceedings at various stages—whether at the stage of issuing process, committal, or framing of charges—prior to the commencement of trial. Quashing should only be exercised with caution. The High Court must ensure that the material produced by the accused is of "sterling and impeccable quality," ruling out the prosecution's case without needing to conduct a trial. This power may be exercised even when a discharge application is pending before a trial court. Further, the court reiterated that the inherent powers under Section 482 can be used by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law or secure the ends of justice. Specifically, criminal proceedings may be quashed if the allegations are absurd, inherently improbable, or based on mala fides. (Para 18) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606
Supreme Court orders CBI inquiry into alleged illegalities in Chandigarh police's arrest of dentist. Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Mohit Dhawan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 601
The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed a Transfer Petition seeking to transfer certain criminal proceedings from the State of West Bengal. During the hearing, it was observed that the petition contained disparaging allegations against the judiciary of West Bengal, suggesting a hostile environment in the state's courts. The Court expressed disapproval of such remarks from a central investigative agency. Central Bureau of Investigation v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 732
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order declaring the appellant's petition to quash the First Information Report (FIR) as infructuous following the appellant's arrest. The Court criticized the High Court's approach, stating that the writ petition for quashing the FIR should have been addressed on its merits, regardless of the appellant's detention status. Vidhu Gupta v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 735
There is no prohibition against quashing criminal proceedings even after the charge sheet has been filed. Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 753
While deciding an appeal against the acquittal, it would be impermissible for the Appellate Courts to reverse a well-reasoned judgment rendered by the trial court. A clear finding ought to be recorded by the Appellate Court while reversing the trial court's judgment. Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 718
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974
Section 3 - The High Court had previously dismissed the appellant's writ petition, which claimed that relevant documents were not supplied, impairing the detenue's right to make an effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Held, the grounds for detention were nearly identical to those in a prior case where the High Court quashed the detention orders due to the non-supply of similar documents, particularly WhatsApp chats. The Court emphasized the necessity for judicial discipline and adherence to precedent within the same High Court, ruling that the second Division Bench should have followed the earlier decision. Quashed the detention order and its confirmation, reinstating the rights of the detenue. Shabna Abdulla v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 588
Constitution of India
Article 21 - A constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused-undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part. (Para 32) Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : AIR 2024 SC 3579 : (2024) 8 SCC 293
Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - If the alleged offence is a serious one, it is all the more necessary for the prosecution to ensure that the trial is concluded expeditiously. When a trial gets prolonged, it is not open to the prosecution to oppose bail of the accused-undertrial on the ground that the charges are very serious. Bail cannot be denied only on the ground that the charges are very serious though there is no end in sight for the trial to conclude. (Para 22) Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : AIR 2024 SC 3579 : (2024) 8 SCC 293
Article 21 and Criminal procedure Code, 1973 – Right to a speedy trial – Application for bail on grounds of delay in trial of 4 years – Held, bail is not to be withheld as a punishment – If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime. Further held, the court is inclined to exercise the discretion in favour of the appellant for reasons: (i) The appellant is in jail as an under-trial prisoner past four years; (ii) Till this date, the trial court has not been able to even proceed to frame charge; and (iii) As pointed out by the counsel appearing for the State as well as NIA, the prosecution intends to examine not less than eighty witnesses. As it cannot be assumed by what time the trial will ultimately conclude, howsoever serious a crime may be, an accused has a right to speedy trial as enshrined under the Constitution of India. The appellant is ordered to be released on bail subject to the terms and conditions. (Para 7, 8, 9, 19 & 23) Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 437
Criminal Jurisprudence
Howsoever stringent the penal law may be, the over-arching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly. (Para 20) Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 437
The presumption of innocence comes to an end when an accused is put to trial and is held guilty of the offence with which he is charged. (Para 6) Bhupatji Sartajji Jabraji Thakor v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 438
Criminal Trial
The Supreme Court expressed concern that despite the decision of the Constitution Bench in High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P. & Ors. 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177, High Courts were issuing directions for expeditious trials without considering the existing pendency of criminal cases in the State of Bihar. Santosh Kumar @ Santosh v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 505
Custodial Death
Supreme Court delivers split verdict on police officers' convictions in decades-old custodial death case. Manik v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 747
Defamation
Supreme Court sets aside Delhi High Court Order quashing summons to 'the Wire' in ex-JNU Professor's criminal defamation case. Amita Singh v. Wire, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 534
Demolition
Alleged involvement in crime no ground to demolish legally constructed property, such demolitions against rule of law. Javedali Mahebubmiya Saiyed v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 691
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
Section 6 - Stridhan is the exclusive property of the woman, and her father cannot claim recovery of Stridhan from in-laws without explicit authorisation from her. Mulakala Malleshwara Rao v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 621 : AIR 2024 SC 4067
Section 6 - The Supreme Court reiterated that it cannot be assumed that dowry and traditional presents given at the time of marriage are entrusted to the parents-in-law of the bride and would attract the ingredients of Section 6 of the Act. Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act provides that any dowry received by a person other than the woman in connection with her marriage must be transferred to her within the specified period. It further states that such dowry, until transferred, is to be held in trust for the benefit of the woman. Failure to transfer is punishable with imprisonment and/or fine. (Para 15, Referred : Bobbili Ramakrishna Raja Yadad v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2016) 3 SCC 309). Mulakala Malleshwara Rao v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 621
Section 6 - Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 406 - Allegations that the appellants, former in-laws of the complainant's daughter, had not returned the "stridhan" (gifts, including gold ornaments) given at the time of marriage. Key facts include the unsuccessful marriage of the complainant's daughter, her divorce in the U.S. in 2016, and subsequent remarriage in 2018. The complaint, filed in 2021, alleged the failure of the appellants to return the "stridhan." The Supreme Court found no evidence supporting the claim of "stridhan" possession by the appellants, emphasizing that the complainant had no locus standi to initiate proceedings on behalf of his daughter without her express authorization. The Court reiterated established jurisprudence on the absolute ownership of "stridhan" by a married woman and highlighted that delay in filing the FIR raised questions about the complainant's motives. The appeal was allowed, and the proceedings were quashed on the grounds of insufficient evidence, unexplained delay, and abuse of the legal process. Mulakala Malleshwara Rao v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 621
Evidence Act, 1872
A witness who gives an incriminating statement cannot take a shield under proviso of Section 132 of the Evidence Act to claim immunity from prosecution if there exists other substantial evidence or material against him proving his prima facie involvement in the crime. Raghuveer Sharan v. District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 686 : AIR 2024 SC 4390
Confessional statements recorded by the Police Officers which are part of the charge-sheet cannot remain a part thereof and the same must be ignored. Sanju Bansal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 467
Credibility of a witness – Statement of witness has substantial variations with his testimony in court, giving rise to doubts as to the veracity of his testimony. Held, the threshold for disbelieving a witness must not be mere discrepancy or inconsistency but material discrepancy and inconsistency, which renders the account narrated by the witnesses so highly improbable that the same may safely be discarded altogether from consideration. Further held, it cannot be expected that all the witnesses, when under attack by the accused persons, possess stellar memories with an accurate recollection of the events. Although, there are a few inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses, they are minor and not substantial, so as to erode the credibility of such witnesses. Hence, the credibility and reliability of the witnesses is unshaken. (Para 13, 15 & 16) Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 448
Dock Identification – It is an identification made by witness in Court during trial. (Para 12) P. Sasikumar v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 460
Don't accept black and white photographs without permission of court - Supreme court directs registry. Savita Rasiklal Mandan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 682
Eyewitness Testimony – Credibility of Prosecution Witness – FIR Registration Discrepancies – Independent Witness and Police Conduct - The absence of a timestamp on the FIR and its delayed entry into the court record further fueled suspicions that the FIR was a post-investigation document, undermining its credibility. Possible manipulation or concealment of the original complaint by the prosecution. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : AIR 2024 SC 4201
Hostile Witness – A witness cannot be disbelieved on the sole ground of him turning hostile, the hostility of such witness does not particularly dent the prosecution's case. Held, merely because a witness resiled from his statement given to the police, the entire case presented by the prosecution cannot be unreliable. (Para 18) Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 448
Onus of proof – Held, the onus to establish the prejudice or miscarriage on account of non-questioning or inadequate questioning on any incriminating circumstance(s), during the examination under Section 313, Cr.PC, is on the convict concerned. (Para 21) Naresh Kumar v. State of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : AIR 2024 SC 3233 : 2024 CriLJ 3224
Murder Trial - Eyewitness Testimony – Role of Independent Witness in corroborating the prosecution's version of the events - Discussed. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : AIR 2024 SC 4201
Recovery of a bloodstained weapon without connecting evidence is insufficient for conviction. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : AIR 2024 SC 4201
Section 9 – Conviction challenged – On grounds that identification of accused is not correct as the test identification parade (TIP) is not conducted – Where accused is a stranger to a witness and there has been no Test Identification Parade (TIP), the trial court should be very cautious while accepting the dock identification by such a witness. Held, not conducting a TIP was a fatal flaw in the police investigation and in the absence of TIP, the dock identification of the present appellant remains doubtful. The prosecution has not been able to prove the identity of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the appellant could not have been convicted on the basis of a doubtful evidence as to the appellant's identity. Conviction is set aside. (Para 12, 13, 16) P. Sasikumar v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 460
Section 26 - Confessions made by the accused to the medical officer were inadmissible, as they were made while in police custody. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562 : AIR 2024 SC 4201
Section 27 - Disclosure Statements and Link Evidence – Acquittal – Prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act were not proved as per law, and no credible discovery resulted from them, as the link evidence ensuring safe custody of the recovered articles from seizure until reaching the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) was absent. The investigating officer's testimony on disclosure statements was vague and unacceptable, and the FSL reports were rendered insignificant. The Court set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts due to improper appreciation of evidence and perverse findings. The appellants were acquitted, and their convictions by the Trial Court and High Court were quashed. Appeals allowed. Convictions set aside. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562
Section 106 - Accused can't be asked to discharge burden of proof when prima facie case wasn't established by prosecution. Manharan Rajwade v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 531
Section 106 of the Evidence Act also put burden on the husband who went to sleep with her in the same room, but escaped unscathed to explain as to how the death had occurred as it was within the special knowledge within the meaning of said Section. (Para 8) Damodar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 607
Section 134 – Sole witness – Conviction on grounds of sole witness testimony is challenged – Held, no particular number of witnesses is required, in any case, to prove a fact. It is the quality of evidence and not the quantity that matters. If the evidence of a solitary witness appeals to the court to be wholly reliable, the same can form the foundation for recording a conviction. Hence, the conviction of the appellant does not call for interference based on the sole testimony which is found to be reliable. (Para 17) Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 448
The investigating officer had inspected the house and found no direct material, except some make-up articles. Admittedly, another woman was also residing in the same portion of the house. The High Court did take note of this fact but explained it away by observing that since that woman was a widow, the make-up articles could not have belonged to her as there was no need for her to put on make-up being a widow. In our opinion, the observation of the High Court is not only legally untenable but also highly objectionable. A sweeping observation of this nature is not commensurate with the sensitivity and neutrality expected from a court of law, specifically when the same is not made out from any evidence on record. Be that as it may, mere presence of certain make-up articles cannot be a conclusive proof of the fact that the deceased was residing in the said house, especially when another woman was admittedly residing there. (Para 27 & 28) Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 746
Usually in matters involving criminality, discrepancies are bound to be there in the account given by a witness, especially when there is a conspicuous disparity between the date of the incident and the time of deposition. However, if the discrepancies are such that they create serious doubt on the veracity of a witness, then the Court may deduce and decline to rely on such evidence. This is especially true when there are variations in the evidence tendered by prosecution witnesses regarding the sequence of events as they have occurred. Courts must exercise all the more care and conscientiousness when such oral evidence may lean towards falsely implicating innocent persons. (Para 13, Referred : Andhra Pradesh v. Pullagummi Kasi Reddy Krishna Reddy, (2018) 7 SCC 623. Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 622
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
If a child is residing with a person who has injured, exploited or abused the child or has violated any other law for the time being in force meant for the protection of the child, the said child becomes a child in need of care and protection. Thus, if a child who is a victim of an offence under the POCSO Act is residing with the accused, the child becomes a child in need of care and protection. Even a child who has a parent or guardian and if such parent or guardian is found to be unfit to take care of the child, in such a case, the child is covered by the definition under sub-section (14) of Section 2 of the JJ Act. Therefore, the CWC has to exercise the power to provide basic needs and protection to such children in need of care and protection. (Para 28.2) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004
Juvenile cannot be denied bail without recording finding that proviso to Section 12(1) Juvenile Justice act is applicable. Juvenile in Conflict with Law V v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 582
Section 12(1) - The Supreme Court granted bail to a juvenile who had been in custody for over a year, criticizing the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB), trial court, and the Rajasthan High Court for failing to record a specific finding justifying the denial of bail under the proviso to Section 12(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act. The Court emphasized that, absent such a finding, bail could not be denied. Citing a Psychological Assessment Report indicating the juvenile was not high-risk, the Court set aside previous orders and directed the juvenile's immediate release on bail without surety, with supervision instructions to be issued to the Probation Officer. Juvenile in Conflict with Law V v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 582
Section 30 - The Child Welfare Committee (CWC) cannot wait till the children in need of care and protection are produced before it. (Para 29.1) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004
Sections 36, 39, and 46 - Inquiry, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare - Section 36 mandates the Child Welfare Committee (CWC) to conduct a social investigation and pass orders for the child's placement in a children's home, fit facility, or foster care. Section 39 emphasizes the process of rehabilitation and social reintegration based on individual care plans, aiming for family-based care or institutional placement. Section 46, supported by Rule 25, provides financial support to children leaving institutional care upon reaching 18 years to ensure their reintegration into society. The Court underscored the importance of these provisions in ensuring that children receive necessary support and opportunities for education, vocational training, and self-sufficiency. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004
Section 46 r/w. Rule 25 - The failure to implement these provisions, particularly Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act, denies victims the fundamental right to dignity and protection guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It directed strict implementation of these provisions to prevent victims from facing situations where their right to make informed choices about their future is compromised. The State is duty-bound to provide shelter, support, and financial assistance to victims, ensuring their reintegration into society and protecting their right to lead a dignified life. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985
Section 20(b)(ii)(B) and Section 50 – The respondent was convicted by the Trial Court for possession of 2.05 kgs of Ganja. The High Court acquitted the respondent, holding the search and seizure illegal due to non-compliance with Section 50. The State appealed to the Supreme Court. Held: The Supreme Court restored the conviction, holding that Section 50 formalities do not apply to recoveries from a bag. The respondent, who had already served four years, four months, and 21 days in prison, was sentenced to the period already undergone. Judgment of acquittal set aside. Conviction restored with modification of sentence to the period already undergone. The fine of Rs. 50,000 was upheld with a default imprisonment clause. Appeal allowed. State of Kerala v. Prabhu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 640
Sections 20 and 29 - The appellant had been convicted by the Trial Court for possession of 1.25 kg of "charas" and sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. The appellant contested the conviction based on discrepancies in the police logbook, which showed that the police were at a different location at the time of the alleged seizure. Held, the High Court had erred in brushing aside crucial documentary evidence (the logbook) and statements of the police witnesses, which contradicted the prosecution's case. Given the absence of independent witnesses and the unreliability of the prosecution's evidence, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant of all charges. Prakash Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 616
Section 37(1)(b)(ii) - Bail - HIV positive - Legality of granting bail - The High Court granted bail considering HIV-positive status as the sole ground. Subsequently, the accused was granted bail again in connection with FIR involving a commercial quantity of heroin without due consideration of the stringent requirements under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. Held, In cases involving commercial quantities of narcotics, bail can only be granted if both conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act are met: reasonable grounds for believing the accused is not guilty and that they are unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. It reiterated that these conditions are cumulative, not alternative. The High Court's decision to grant bail solely based on the accused's HIV-positive status, without adherence to Section 37(1)(b)(ii), was erroneous and warranted interference. Consequently, the impugned bail order was set aside, directing the accused to surrender before the trial court within a week, with instructions to expedite the trial as per Section 34(2) of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (Prevention and Control) Act, 2017. State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 492
Section 50 – Whether recovery from a bag requires compliance with Section 50 - The Court reiterated that compliance with Section 50 is not mandatory when the recovery of contraband is made from a bag carried by the accused, not from the person of the accused. (Referred : Ranjan Kumar Chadha v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 856). State of Kerala v. Prabhu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 640
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Principles of compounding of offences - It is to be remembered that dishonour of cheques is a regulatory offence which was made an offence only in view of public interest so that the reliability of these instruments can be ensured. A large number of cases involving dishonour of cheques are pending before courts which is a serious concern for our judicial system. Keeping in mind that the 'compensatory aspect' of remedy shall have priority over the 'punitive aspect', courts should encourage compounding of offences under the NI Act if parties are willing to do so. (Para 6) New Win Export v. A. Subramaniam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 490
Section 138—Discrepancies in the interest rate were insufficient to discredit the principal amount due, especially when the respondent admitted to issuing the cheque. (Para 17 & 18) Sri Sujies Benefit Funds Ltd. v. M. Jaganathuan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : AIR 2024 SC 3827
Sections 138, 139, 118(a) - Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 391; Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2003 (Tamil Nadu) — Discrepancies in interest rates and the partial repayments did not sufficiently rebut the statutory presumption of liability—Respondent failed to demonstrate that the cheque was not for a legally enforceable debt—Even if the interest charged exceeded the rate allowed under the Tamil Nadu Act, this was not a ground to invalidate the entire debt. (Para 17 & 18) Sri Sujies Benefit Funds Ltd. v. M. Jaganathuan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : AIR 2024 SC 3827
Section 138 and 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 320 and 482 – Compounding of Offence – Consent of Complainant – Mandatory Requirement. A.S. Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. Nayati Medical Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 608
Section 143A - An authorized signatory of the company could not be considered as a 'drawer' of cheque, and therefore, could not be directed to pay the interim compensation to the complainant. (Para 30) Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 513
Penal Code, 1860
Criminal Conspiracy – To constitute even an accusation of criminal conspiracy, first and foremost, there must at least be an accusation of meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act, which is not illegal in itself, by illegal means. (Para 27) Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 475 : AIR 2024 SC 3540 : 2024 CriLJ 3639
Section 120B, 409, 420, 468, 471 - Bail - Criminal Conspiracy - Misuse of Educational Funds - The appellants were involved in managing various educational institutions in Madhya Pradesh. FIRs were lodged against them for allegedly engaging in fraudulent activities related to the management of school funds, particularly in connection with the sale of textbooks and fee hikes. Whether the appellants' involvement in the sale of textbooks and fee hikes constitutes offenses under the IPC. Whether the rejection of bail by the Trial Court and High Court was justified. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and granted bail to the appellants. The allegations made against the appellants were almost identical and pertained to their educational activities, which included managing the sale of textbooks and raising fees. These activities, per se, could not constitute criminal offenses under the IPC. Further, the investigation was still incomplete, and the prolonged incarceration of the appellants was unwarranted. The Court directed the release of the appellants on bail, subject to conditions. Fr. Abraham Thazhathedathu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 591
Section 148, 302, and 324 - The case was based on the testimony of the deceased's widow who claimed to have identified the assailants in dim moonlight during a power cut. However, the Court found significant inconsistencies and contradictions in her deposition, particularly when compared to her earlier complaint. These contradictions raised reasonable doubts regarding the reliability of her testimony. The Court further noted that the assault occurred in a chaotic environment, complicating the identification of the attackers. Given the dubious nature of the evidence and the appellants' prolonged incarceration, the Court granted the benefit of doubt to the appellants and acquitted them of all charges. Saheb v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 716 : AIR 2024 SC 4466
Section 149 - Accused presence and active role within the assembly, despite a lack of direct assault or recovery of the weapon, was sufficient for his conviction. Constructive liability under Section 149 does not require personal commission of an offence; mere membership in an assembly with a shared unlawful intent suffices. Nitya Nand v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : AIR 2024 SC 4259
Section 193 - Mere denial of the complainant's allegations does not constitute perjury. Prosecution for perjury requires clear evidence of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and should only be initiated when expedient in the interest of justice. James Kunjwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : AIR 2024 SC 3965
Section 300 – Conviction for the offence of murder is challenged – Whether the nature of offensive act comes within the purview of section 300? – Held, the appellant caused such bodily injury, which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. The appellant participated in a premeditated attack on the victim, armed with a deadly weapon and stabbed the unarmed victim on a vital organ causing his death. The conduct of the appellant is covered by both clauses (1) and (3) of section 300, IPC. The intention to cause death can easily be discerned from the conduct of the appellant and the nature of fatal injury inflicted, which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. Fulfilment of any one condition of section 300, IPC is enough to convict the appellant under section 302 thereof, and in the present case not one but two conditions have clearly been shown to exist to nail the appellant for murder. Further held, prosecution has been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the person who stabbed the victim during the course of the attack by the accused persons leading to his death. Hence, conviction of appellant is affirmed. (Para 20, 24, 26 & 27) Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 448
Section 304 II - Conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC modified to the period already undergone, considering the emotional tension and spur-of-the-moment nature of the incident. Hussainbhai Asgarali Lokhandwala v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 584 : AIR 2024 SC 3832
Section 304A and 338 - For conviction under Section 304(A) and Section 338 of the IPC, there is no minimum sentence prescribed but the term of sentence may extend to 2 years. The sentence can also be limited to fine without any term of imprisonment. George v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 661
Section 304B - For a conviction under Section 304-B IPC, mere allegations of dowry demand are insufficient. There must be credible evidence of harassment or cruelty directly linked to dowry demands and occurring “soon before” the death, fulfilling the essential ingredients required to invoke Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Shoor Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 726 : AIR 2024 SC 4551
Section 304B - When dowry demand isn't established, conviction for dowry death under S.304B IPC is unsustainable. Chabi Karmakar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 679
Section 304B and 498A - Dowry death - The High Court reversed the acquittal passed by the trial court, holding that the death occurred within seven years of marriage due to 100% burn injuries at the matrimonial home. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's conviction, emphasizing the presumption of dowry death under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, and held that the appellants failed to discharge their burden of proof. The appeal was dismissed. Damodar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 607
Section 307 – Acquittal restored due to lack of convincing evidence - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction under Section 307 of the IPC, restoring the acquittal of the appellant by the Trial Court. The Court held that the High Court's decision to convict was based on weak and inconsistent evidence, including contradictory witness testimonies and absence of key eyewitnesses from the investigation. The prosecution's case was undermined by discrepancies in the roles attributed to the accused, the nature of injuries inflicted, and the medical evidence presented. The Court reiterated that an appellate court should not overturn a well-reasoned acquittal unless there is a manifest error in the trial court's findings. Accordingly, the conviction was deemed unsafe, and the appellant was acquitted. Appeal allowed, acquittal restored. Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 622
Section 307 – The appellants were charged under Section 307 IPC for an alleged knife attack on the victims. The trial court acquitted the appellants in 1995, but the High Court reversed the acquittal in 2009, sentencing them to seven years of rigorous imprisonment. Whether the conviction of the appellants under Section 307 IPC is justified in light of the inconsistencies in the prosecution's case. Held, the Supreme Court, upon reviewing the evidence, found significant contradictions between the FIR, witness testimonies, and medical reports. The absence of key eyewitnesses and discrepancies in the prosecution's narrative weakened the case. The court reiterated the principle that a conviction under Section 307 IPC requires clear intent and overt acts by the accused, which was not established beyond reasonable doubt in this case. The Court emphasized that an appellate court should not overturn an acquittal without compelling reasons. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the trial court's acquittal was restored. The appeal was allowed, and the appellants were acquitted. Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 622
Section 307 - When the sentencing court doesn't deem fit to impose a life sentence for committing an offence of attempt to murder, then the maximum sentence that can be imposed on the convict for committing an offence of attempt to murder could not extend beyond the period of 10 years. (Para 7) Amit Rana @ Koka v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 500 : AIR 2024 SC 3477
Section 308 and 354B - Bail - The petitioner, a former Private Secretary to the Chief Minister of Delhi, faced allegations of assault against a Member of Parliament. While noting the investigation's completion and the petitioner's 100-day custody, the Court addressed concerns over witness influence due to the petitioner's political standing. Balancing the right to liberty with a fair trial, the Court granted bail with specific conditions to ensure witness protection and trial integrity. Key conditions included restrictions on the petitioner's official assignments, entry into the Chief Minister's residence, and public commentary on the case. The petition was disposed of, with instructions for the trial court to expedite the examination of vulnerable witnesses. Bibhav Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 646
Section 353 - Mere jostling and pushing while resisting arrest did not amount to criminal use of force. Mahendra Kumar Sonker v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 570
Section 364, 302 r/w. 34 - Murder – Appeal Against Conviction – Reversal of Acquittal – Standard of Proof – Testimony of Eyewitnesses – Interested and Chance Witnesses – Circumstantial Evidence – High Court's Approach in Reversing Acquittal – Requirements for Sustaining Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence - The charge of abduction was based on direct evidence, while the charge of murder was based on circumstantial evidence. The Court scrutinized the credibility of the testimonies of eye witnesses (PW-2, PW-4, PW-5, and PW-18), who were challenged by the appellants as being interested and chance witnesses. It was observed that there was no satisfactory explanation for their presence at the crime scene, and inconsistencies were found in their accounts, particularly regarding crucial details such as the existence of a pistol allegedly used by the accused. The investigation conducted by PW-21 was found to be questionable, especially when considered against the statements of defence witnesses (DW-3 and DW-4), who were senior police officers supervising the investigation. The Court noted the non-examination of natural witnesses and the improbable conduct of the eye witnesses, which cast doubt on their testimonies. Additionally, the Court held that the High Court's approach in reversing the acquittal of A-6 and A-7 was flawed, as it did not identify any illegality, perversity, or complete unsustainability in the Trial Court's findings. The reversal of acquittal should meet a higher threshold, recognizing the presumption of innocence reinforced by the initial acquittal. The prosecution failed to provide convincing evidence of the residence of the deceased, and the post-mortem report raised doubts about the time of death, which was inconsistent with the prosecution's case. Held, the conviction by the High Court was unsustainable due to unreliable evidence and an improper approach in reversing the acquittal. The presumption of innocence in favor of the appellants was not displaced. Appeal allowed; acquittal restored. Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 746
Section 375 - In view of “sixthly” in Section 375 of the IPC, penetrative intercourse with a woman under eighteen years of age, with or without her consent, constitutes an offence of rape. Therefore, whether such offence arises from a romantic relationship is irrelevant. (Para 19) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004
Section 406 and 420 - Difference Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - In a criminal breach of trust, there is an entrustment of property, where the accused dishonestly misappropriates or uses the property in violation of the trust placed in him. In contrast, cheating involves a fraudulent or dishonest inducement from the beginning of the transaction, where the accused deceives the victim into delivering property or taking action they would not have otherwise taken. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531
Section 406 and 420 - Difference Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - Criminal breach of trust requires that the property entrusted must belong to someone other than the accused, who holds it in trust. Cheating, on the other hand, is based on false representations made at the inception of the transaction. Both offences, while involving dishonest intent, are mutually exclusive. The accused cannot be charged with both for the same transaction unless distinct elements of each offence are present. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531
Section 406 and 420 - Difference Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - Mere breach of contract does not give rise to a criminal offence unless fraudulent or dishonest intent at the inception is demonstrated. A civil remedy is appropriate where the dispute arises from non-payment after a sale of goods, as the sale transfers ownership to the buyer, eliminating the possibility of criminal breach of trust. Prosecution under criminal breach of trust cannot be sustained without the essential element of entrustment. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531
Section 406 and 420 - Judicial Oversight in Distinguishing Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - the Supreme Court expressed concern over the casual approach of the lower courts in distinguishing between the offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating. The Court emphasized the magistrates' duty to thoroughly examine complaints and ascertain whether the ingredients of the specific offences are met. It also criticized the police's routine practice of registering both offences without proper application of mind. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531
Section 406 and 420 - The Court called for proper legal training for police officers across the country to prevent wrongful prosecution under these distinct offences. It further directed that the judgment be sent to the Union Ministries of Law & Justice and Home Affairs for appropriate action, highlighting the need for systemic reforms. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531
Section 406 and 420 - Mere non-performance of a contractual obligation, such as failure to register the sale, does not constitute cheating or criminal breach of trust. Radheyshyam v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 595
Sections 418 and 420 - The complainant purchased a BMW 7 Series vehicle and reported a defect. A complaint was lodged for alleged offences under Sections 418 and 420 of the IPC, naming the manufacturer, Managing Director, and other directors as accused. The High Court concluded that the ingredients of the offence of cheating were not established based on the contents of the FIR. Having come to this conclusion, there was no justification for the High Court thereafter to direct the manufacturer to replace the vehicle with a new BMW 7 Series. Held, the High Court correctly quashed the criminal proceedings, as the ingredients of cheating were not established based on the FIR. The Court deemed it unnecessary to continue prosecution, given the nature of the dispute and the elapsed time. Exercising jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court directed BMW India Private Limited to pay Rs 50 lakhs to the complainant in full settlement. (Para 10 - 15) State of Andhra Pradesh v. BMW India P.Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 466
Section 494 - Conviction in question – Held, the Court had appropriately appreciated the evidence on record and convicted accused Nos.1 and 2 upon satisfying itself that the ingredients to attract the offence punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., have been made out by the appellant. Hence, no more narrative on the correctness of the reversal of the by the High Court is required as it is indisputable that its reversal was accepted by accused Nos.1 and 2 and they had undergone the sentence imposed by the High Court consequent to the reversal judgment. (Para 10) Baba Natarajan Prasad v. M. Revathi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : AIR 2024 SC 3348 : (2024) 7 SCC 531 : 2024 Cri LJ 3281
Section 494 - Bigamy - The offence under Section 494 I.P.C., has to be treated as a serious offence, hence, the imposition of 'imprisonment till the rising of the court' is not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule of proportionality. Baba Natarajan Prasad v. M. Revathi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : AIR 2024 SC 3348 : (2024) 7 SCC 531 : 2024 Cri LJ 3281
Section 498A, 323, 504, 506 r/w. 34 - Need for clear and specific allegations to proceed in criminal cases, especially in matrimonial disputes. The Court reiterated its concern over the abuse of criminal processes through general and omnibus allegations, noting that such claims, without specific details or evidence, can lead to the misuse of legal provisions intended to protect against genuine harm. When criminal proceedings are used as instruments of harassment or revenge, the judiciary has the power to intervene and prevent the miscarriage of justice by quashing such proceedings. Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 753
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
It is the settled convention in such cases that the Trap Laying Officer makes efforts to verify the factum of demand of bribe by the public servant before initiating the trap proceedings. The factum of demand of bribe can also be verified by recording the telephonic conversation between the decoy and the suspect public servant. Often, a recording device is secretly placed on the person of the decoy to record the conversation which would transpire during the course of acceptance of bribe by the public servant. (Para 31) Mir Mustafa Ali Hasmi v. State of A.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 468 : AIR 2024 SC 3356 : 2024 Cri LJ 3102
Section 19 and Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 319 – Summon order challenged – Sanction under Section 19 of PC Act is Necessary to Summon Public Servant as Additional Accused – Held, courts cannot take cognizance against any public servant for offences committed under the PC Act on an application under section 319 of the CrPC, without first following the requirements of Section 19 of the P.C Act. The correct procedure should have been for the prosecution to obtain sanction under Section 19 of the P.C Act from the appropriate Government, before formally moving an application before the Court under Section 319 of CrPC. Hence, on absence of the sanction the entire procedure remains flawed. High Court's order of setting aside the order of Summon is upheld. (Para 11) State of Punjab v. Partap Singh Verka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 461 : AIR 2024 SC 3299
Section 19 (1) - Sanction won't be rendered invalid merely because it was granted after the trial court had taken cognizance of the chargesheet. Shivendra Nath Verma v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 518
The allegations against the appellants primarily pertained to a civil dispute arising from contractual obligations rather than criminal misconduct. The investigation initiated by the CBI, based on an incomplete CAG report, was flawed, and there was no basis to conclude that the appellants had engaged in any criminal conspiracy or wrongful conduct. The CBI's investigation relied on an audit report that had not been finalized, and the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate criminal intent. The Karnataka High Court had previously ruled favorably for the appellants in related proceedings, which the CBI ignored. There was no evidence to support the claims that the appellants had caused financial loss to the state or wrongfully profited from the disposal of coal rejects. As a result, the Supreme Court quashed the order framing charges and set aside the proceedings, concluding that the matter was of a civil nature, devoid of criminal elements. Appeals allowed, and charges against the appellants quashed. Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954
Section 7 r/w Section 16 – Conviction for use of permitted food colour – Tartrazine yellow colour permissible under Rule 28 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 – Erroneous conviction set aside. Mahesh Chander @ Mahesh Chand v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 610
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
Arvind Kejriwal is an elected leader and the Chief Minister of Delhi, a post holding importance and influence. We have also referred to the allegations. While we do not give any direction, since we are doubtful whether the court can direct an elected leader to step down or not function as the Chief Minister or as a Minister, we leave it to Arvind Kejriwal to take a call. Larger Bench, if deemed appropriate, can frame question(s) and decide the conditions that can be imposed by the court in such cases. (Para 86) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463
Continued custody is unnecessary once investigation and charge sheet are complete. Bail granted under the principle that prolonged pre-trial incarceration should not amount to punishment without trial. Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 614 : AIR 2024 SC 4247
ED can't arrest after court takes cognizance' : Supreme Court grants anticipatory bail to Odisha officer in money laundering case. Bijay Ketan Sahoo v. Enforcement Directorate, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 532
Here the accused is lodged in jail for a considerable period and there is little possibility of trial reaching finality in the near future. The liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution does not get abrogated even for special statutes where the threshold twin bar is provided and such statutes, in our opinion, cannot carve out an exception to the principle of bail being the rule and jail being the exception. The cardinal principle of bail being the rule and jail being the exception will be entirely defeated if the petitioner is kept in custody as an under-trial for such a long duration. This is particularly glaring since in the event of conviction, the maximum sentence prescribed is only 7 years for the offence of money laundering. (Para 12) Vijay Nair v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 644
In order to avail the right to fair trial, the accused cannot be denied the right to have inspection of the documents including the “un-relied upon documents. Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 563 : AIR 2024 SC 4053
No assertion in ED complaint that scheduled offences generated proceeds of crime - grants bail. Bhagwan Bhagat v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 576
Provisions of PMLA will prevail over Cr.P.C. in relation to the summoning of a person. Abhishek Banerjee v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 674
Section 19 - Power to arrest under Section 19(1) is not for the purpose of investigation. Arrest can and should wait, and the power in terms of Section 19(1) of the PML Act can be exercised only when the material with the designated officer enables them to form an opinion, by recording reasons in writing that the arrestee is guilty. (Para 41) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463
Section 19 - (a) Whether the “need and necessity to arrest” is a separate ground to challenge the order of arrest passed in terms of Section 19(1) of the PML Act? (b) Whether the “need and necessity to arrest” refers to the satisfaction of formal parameters to arrest and take a person into custody, or it relates to other personal grounds and reasons regarding necessity to arrest a person in the facts and circumstances of the said case? (c) If questions (a) and (b) are answered in the affirmative, what are the parameters and facts that are to be taken into consideration by the court while examining the question of “need and necessity to arrest”? Questions referred to the larger bench. (Para 84) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463
Section 24 - Foundational Facts and Legal Presumption of involvement in money laundering - Held, this presumption only arises once three basic facts are established by the prosecution: (i) the commission of a scheduled offence, (ii) the property in question being derived from the criminal activity, and (iii) the involvement of the accused in any process or activity related to the proceeds of crime. Once these foundational facts are established, a legal presumption arises that the proceeds of crime are involved in money laundering. However, the presumption is rebuttable, and the accused has the opportunity to disprove their involvement by presenting evidence within their personal knowledge. This presumption is not conclusive, and the accused must be given a fair opportunity to rebut it through cross-examination, presenting evidence, or under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The provision, therefore, balances the burden of proof between the prosecution and the accused, ensuring that the presumption under Section 24(a) of the PMLA is neither unreasonable nor unconstitutional. (Para 14) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286
Section 24 - Significance of the Counter to Bail Application under PMLA - The counter must establish a cogent case by demonstrating the three foundational facts required under Section 24 of the Act: (i) the commission of a scheduled offence, (ii) the derivation of proceeds of crime from that offence, and (iii) the accused's involvement in any process or activity related to those proceeds. Only after these foundational facts are prima facie established does the presumption under Section 24 arise, shifting the burden to the accused to rebut the same. The counter affidavit must crystallize the material relied upon, thereby assisting the court in making an informed decision at the bail stage under Section 45 of PMLA. It enables the court to assess whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty, aligning with the framework laid down in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 633. (Para 15) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286
Section 45 – Bail - In cases where there has been a delay in trial and the accused has spent a long period in custody, right to bail shall be read into Section 439 Cr.P.C. and Section 45 PMLA. The same will however depend on the nature of allegations, as well. Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 563 : AIR 2024 SC 4053
Section 45 gives primacy to the opinion of the Directorate of Enforcement (DoE) when it comes to grant of bail. DoE should act uniformly, consistent in conduct, confirming one rule for all. (Para 79) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463
Section 45 – Bail - Interpretation and Application - Court must balance the statutory twin conditions required for bail with the fundamental principle that "bail is the rule and jail is the exception." Even in cases under PMLA, the overarching principle of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution prevails, ensuring that statutory conditions for bail should not override constitutional safeguards. Thus, courts should be guided by the higher constitutional mandate of speedy trial and personal liberty, especially where prolonged incarceration occurs without the conclusion of trial. (Para 11) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286
Section 45 - Scope of Inquiry - In assessing bail applications under Section 45 of the PMLA, the Court need not delve deeply into the merits of the case. The inquiry is limited to determining whether there are "reasonable grounds for believing" that the accused is guilty, based on the material collected during the investigation. This does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt, but rather an assessment of the broad probabilities of the case. Thus, Section 45 requires the Court to assess the genuineness of the case against the accused, but not to conclusively determine guilt at this stage. (Para 13) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286
Section 45 (1) - Proviso to Section 45(1) of PMLA extends special treatment to women, regardless of their social status or qualifications. Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 614 : AIR 2024 SC 4247
Section 45 (1) - Refusal to grant bail - The appellant, a political figure, sought bail after being charged with offenses related to money laundering. The appellant contended that since the investigation was complete and the charge sheet had been filed, her continued custody was unnecessary. Additionally, it was argued that the appellant, being a woman, was entitled to special treatment under the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA, as affirmed in Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 563. Held, detailed discussions on the merits of the case should be avoided at the bail stage to prevent prejudice during trial. The Court rejected the High Court's reasoning, which had denied the benefit of the proviso to Section 45(1) based on the appellant's educational qualifications and social standing, finding that the lower court misinterpreted the provision as applicable only to "vulnerable women." The Supreme Court reiterated that the statutory provision mandates special treatment for women, and such benefit should not be denied unless specific reasons are provided. The Court set aside the High Court's order, granted bail to the appellant, and imposed conditions to prevent tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses. Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 614 : AIR 2024 SC 4247
Section 50 - When an accused is in custody under PMLA irrespective of the case for which he is under custody, any statement under Section 50 PMLA to the same Investigating Agency is inadmissible against the maker. The reason being that the person in custody pursuant to the proceeding investigated by the same Investigating Agency is not a person who can be considered as one operating with a free mind. It will be extremely unsafe to render such statements admissible against the maker, as such a course of action would be contrary to all canons of fair play and justice. (Para 32) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286
Section 50 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 30 - Enforcement Directorate cannot start with a statement of a co-accused to implicate the accused. An incriminating statement of a co-accused would not amount to substantive evidence. (Para 37) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : AIR 2024 SC 4286
Section 197(1) of CrPC, which provides that prior sanction from the government is required to prosecute public servants and judges for offences alleged while discharge of public duties, will apply to cases under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act. Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 670
Supreme Court relaxes Section 45 PMLA conditions, grants bail citing long custody and time needed to complete trial. Ramkripal Meena Versus Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 527
The Supreme Court grants bail to money laundering accused considering age and custody period. Humayun Suleman Merchant v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 521
Preventive Detention
Each day's delay matters in cases of personal liberty - representation against preventive detention must be decided soon. Jaseela Shaji v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 690 : AIR 2024 SC 4721
Failure to furnish documents relied on by detaining authority violates Article 22(5). Jaseela Shaji v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 690 : AIR 2024 SC 4721
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012
Create awareness about the POCSO act among children, implement sex education programs. Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 728
Desire to sexually exploit children inherent in the act of watching child sexual exploitative materials. Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 728
Don't use the term 'child pornography', instead use 'child sexual exploitative & abuse material'. Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 728
Governments have the obligation to impart sex education and create awareness among the general public about the statute. Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 728
Issue of victim support and rehabilitation under the POCSO Act and the Juvenile Justice (JJ) Act - The Court observed the failure of the State machinery under the JJ Act in fulfilling its obligations toward the victim and emphasized the need for remedial actions. It directed the formation of a team of experts, including a clinical psychologist and a social scientist, to meet the victim and help her make an informed choice regarding her future. The team is to carefully ascertain the victim's needs and any support she might be receiving from the accused and his family. The Court emphasized that the process must be handled with sensitivity to avoid causing further insecurity to the victim. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004
Knowingly watching child pornography over the internet without downloading amounts to 'possession' under POCSO act. Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 728
Section 4 and 6 - Indian Penal Code, 1860; Sections 376 (2) and 506 - Continued use of the "two-finger test" on rape survivors, despite previous rulings condemning the practice - Referred to its earlier decisions in Lillu alias Rajesh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 643 and State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai, (2022) 14 SCC 299, which decried the test as regressive and invasive. A circular issued by the Government of Meghalaya on June 27, 2024, prohibiting the test and mandating disciplinary action for non-compliance, was noted and placed on record. The circular directs all government doctors and medical practitioners in Meghalaya to cease conducting the test immediately, with strict disciplinary actions, including suspension and penalties, to be imposed for non-compliance. It also mandates adherence to medico-legal guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare and emphasizes the importance of compassionate care for sexual assault survivors. After reviewing the case, found no merit to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court dismissed the petition on merits, upholding the conviction, and urged full compliance with the circular. (Para 4 - 8) Sunshine Kharpan v. State of Meghalaya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 654
Section 19(6) - The Court expressed concern over the failure of the State machinery to follow the mandatory rehabilitation provisions under Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act. Emphasizing the importance of victim rehabilitation, the Court directed the formation of a committee comprising experts from NIMHANS or TISS to assist the victim in making an informed choice regarding her future. The State was instructed to provide the committee with details of the benefits available to the victim. The Court also directed all States and Union Territories to implement the provisions of Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act and Section 46 of the Juvenile Justice Act and submit compliance reports. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004
Section 33 (5) - Recall of Witness under Section 311 of Cr.P.C – Protection of Child from Repeated Testimony – a child should not be repeatedly called to testify to protect them from further trauma. Mechanical recall of the victim would defeat the protective purpose of the POCSO Act. Madhab Chandra Pradhan v. State of Odisha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 615
Sex education is not a western concept, misconception that it encourages promiscuity among youth. Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 728
Storage of child pornography without deletion or reporting indicates intention to transmit, constitutes POCSO Act offence. Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 728
The accused was not an adolescent, but his age was about twenty-five years on the date of the commission of the offence, and the victim was only fourteen years old. When such offences of rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault are committed, by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and/or Section 482 of the Cr.PC, the High Court cannot acquit an accused whose guilt has been proved. Even if the accused and the victim (who has now attained majority) were to come out with a settlement, the High Court could not have quashed the prosecution. (Para 21 & 23.1) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004
The State had a duty to provide care and protection to the victim of an offense under the POCSO Act. Despite the legal framework in place, the State failed in its responsibilities. The court emphasized that under Section 19 of the POCSO Act, police must report such cases to the Child Welfare Committee (CWC) within 24 hours. Similarly, under Section 29 of the Juvenile Justice Act, the CWC is empowered to ensure the care and protection of children in need. The court further underscored the obligations of the CWC to act swiftly in cases of sexually abused children and take suo motu cognizance where necessary. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
Alteration / modification / revocation of an order passed under Section 12 of the DV Act can be sought through Section 25(2) only on the basis of change of circumstances which took place subsequent to the passing of the order. S. Vijikumari v. Mowneshwarachari C., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 745
The Act is a piece of Civil Code which is applicable to every woman in India irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social background for a more effective protection of her rights guaranteed under the Constitution and in order to protect women victims of domestic violence occurring in a domestic relationship. S. Vijikumari v. Mowneshwarachari C., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 745
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
Section 3(1)(r) - Whether mere knowledge of the complainant's caste identity is sufficient to attract the offence - Held, mere knowledge of the complainant's Scheduled Caste identity is not sufficient to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act. The offence must be committed "on the ground" or "for the reason" that the person belongs to a Scheduled Caste. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557
Section 3(1)(r) - The Court emphasized that penal statutes must be interpreted strictly, and the intent to humiliate or insult the complainant must be based on their caste identity. The Court noted that where the legislature intended mere knowledge to be sufficient, it had expressed so in clear terms in other sections of the Act. As the allegations in the present case did not establish that the insult was made because of the complainant's caste, the requirements of Section 3(1)(r) were not met. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557
Section 3(1)(r) - Meaning of the expression "intent to humiliate" - Held, the phrase "intent to humiliate" under Section 3(1)(r) must be interpreted within the context of caste-based discrimination. Insult or intimidation must be linked to the caste identity of the victim, arising from practices such as untouchability or entrenched caste hierarchies. Not every insult or intimidation against a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes qualifies as an offence under this provision; it must be motivated by the intention to humiliate based on caste. For the offence to be made out, caste-based remarks or actions reinforcing systemic humiliation must be present. The mere fact that the complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe does not automatically trigger the offence. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557
Section 3(1)(r) - An offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act requires a caste-based intent to humiliate, not just ordinary insult or intimidation. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557
Section 3(1)(r) - For an offence to be made out under this provision, certain specific ingredients must be present. These include intentional insult or intimidation directed at a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe with the intent to humiliate, and this act must occur in a place within public view. Mere insult or intimidation of a person belonging to SC/ST community, without any caste-based motivation, does not suffice to attract Section 3(1)(r). Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557
Section 3(1)(r) - Insult or intimidation does not constitute an offence under the Act unless it is specifically aimed at humiliating the victim because of their caste. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557
Section 3(1)(u) - Whether any offence under Section 3(1)(u) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, is prima facie made out in the present FIR/complaint. Held, no prima facie case was made out under Section 3(1)(u) of the Act, 1989. To constitute an offence under this provision, the accused must promote or attempt to promote enmity, hatred, or ill-will against members of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes as a group, through words, signs, or visible representation. The Court found that the video in question did not target Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes as a group but was directed solely against the complainant as an individual. Therefore, the essential ingredients of Section 3(1)(u) were not satisfied. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557
Section 18 - Anticipatory Bail – When can it be said that a prima facie case is made out in an FIR/complaint? A prima facie case, which translates to "at first sight" or "based on first impression," is made out in an FIR or complaint when the necessary ingredients to constitute an offence under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 are evident upon a plain reading of the allegations. If such ingredients are absent, no prima facie case is established, and courts are not precluded from granting anticipatory bail despite the bar under Section 18 of the Act. However, when the FIR or complaint does disclose the essential elements of the offence, anticipatory bail becomes unavailable. Its duty is to ensure that the allegations in the complaint are evaluated for their sufficiency in establishing the offence, free from external influence. Additionally, in cases involving digital or social media content, courts may examine the materials referenced in the complaint to assess if the prima facie case is made out. If the ingredients of the offence are not found, the bar under Section 18 does not apply. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557
Section 18 - Anticipatory Bail – Significance of the Expression "Arrest of Any Person" - Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, 1989 does not impose an absolute restriction on anticipatory bail; rather, it applies when a valid arrest under CrPC provisions can be made. For an arrest to be lawful under Section 41 of the CrPC, there must be a reasonable belief, credible information, or reasonable suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, and the arrest must be necessary for purposes like preventing further offences or ensuring proper investigation. Thus, the bar on anticipatory bail under Section 18 only applies if prima facie evidence points to the commission of an offence under the Act. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557
Section 18 – Anticipatory Bail – Absolute Bar on Grant of Anticipatory Bail – Constitutionality - The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Section 18 imposes an absolute bar on the grant of anticipatory bail for offenses under the Act. The provision does not violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, as the offenses under the Act form a separate class arising from the historical practice of untouchability and systemic oppression against SC/ST communities. Section 18 was upheld as it is necessary to prevent potential threats and intimidation by the accused, ensuring victims are not obstructed in pursuing justice. The Court acknowledged concerns of misuse but emphasized that the provision aligns with the object of the Act to protect vulnerable sections of society and uphold their dignity. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : AIR 2024 SC 4557
Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967
'Bail is the rule, jail is the exception' even in special statutes like the UAPA. If the conditions in the special statute for the grant of bail are met, then bail should be granted. Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : AIR 2024 SC 4380
The judgement in the case of NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 cannot be cited as a precedent to deny bail in UAPA cases where the accused has suffered long incarceration. (Para 28) Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : AIR 2024 SC 3579 : (2024) 8 SCC 293
The validity of sanction should be challenged at the earliest instance available, before the Trial Court. If such a challenge is raised at an appellate stage it would be for the person raising the challenge to justify the reasons for bringing the same at a belated stage. Such reasons would have to be considered independently so as to ensure that there is no misuse of the right of challenge with the aim to stall or delay proceedings. Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : AIR 2024 SC 4684
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) (Recommendation & Sanction of Prosecution) Rules, 2008 - The timelines mentioned in Rules 3 & 4 of the 2008 Rules are couched in mandatory language and, therefore, have to be strictly followed. This is keeping in view that UAPA being a penal legislation, strict construction must be accorded to it. Timelines imposed by way of statutory Rules are a way to keep a check on executive power which is a necessary position to protect the rights of accused persons. Independent review by both the authority recommending sanction and the authority granting sanction, are necessary aspects of compliance with Section 45 of the UAPA. Fuleshwar Gope v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 729 : AIR 2024 SC 4684