Supreme Court Monthly Digest- November 2024 With Statute And Subject Wise Index

Adverse Possession

The dispute involved the ownership and possession of land claimed by the respondents (plaintiffs) based on revenue records and challenged by the appellants (State of Haryana and PWD) on the grounds of adverse possession. The Supreme Court upheld the title of the plaintiffs, based on jamabandi entries, registered sale deeds, and mutation records, which carried a presumption of correctness under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The appellants' failure to deny the plaintiffs' title specifically amounted to an implied admission under Order VIII Rule 5 of the CPC. The Court reiterated that the State, being a welfare entity, cannot claim title over citizens' property through adverse possession and emphasizing the principle that such claims undermine constitutional rights. The appellants' acts of temporary occupation, such as storage of materials, lacked the elements of hostility, continuity, and requisite duration to substantiate adverse possession. The High Court was within its jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC to address substantial questions of law, including whether the plea of adverse possession implied an admission of the plaintiffs' title and whether findings of the First Appellate Court were perverse. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's judgment that restored the Trial Court's decree in favor of the plaintiffs, recognizing their ownership and granting possession. The plea of adverse possession by the State was rejected as being untenable in law. State of Haryana v. Amin Lal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 900

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Appointment of Arbitrators - Principles of Equal Treatment - The principle of equal treatment of parties applies at all stages of arbitration proceedings, including the appointment of arbitrators. The Arbitration Act permits Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) to maintain empanelled arbitrators, but arbitration clauses cannot compel the other party to select arbitrators exclusively from such panels. Clauses allowing unilateral appointment of a sole arbitrator raise justifiable doubts about the arbitrator's independence and impartiality and hinder equal participation in the appointment process. In three-member tribunals, requiring one party to select its arbitrator from a PSU-curated panel violates the principle of equal treatment, as it creates an imbalance in the appointment process. Unilateral appointment clauses in public-private contracts contravene Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The express waiver under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration Act permits parties to waive claims of bias against unilaterally appointed arbitrators after disputes arise, enabling them to consider the necessity of waiving the nemo judex rule. The judgment applies prospectively to arbitrator appointments made after its pronouncement, including appointments in three-member tribunals. Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. Eci Spic Smo Mcml (Jv), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 874

Section 11 - Applicability of Part I – Determination of the Seat of Arbitration – Jurisdiction of Indian Courts - Principles - Exclusion of Part I for Pre-2012 Agreements - Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Seat - Determination of the Seat - Role of Party Autonomy - Forum Non Conveniens - Residual Application of Closest Connection Test - Part I of the Act applies only to arbitrations where the seat is in India or the arbitration agreement is governed by Indian law. Agreements executed post-06.09.2012 with a foreign seat are outside the jurisdiction of Indian courts. For agreements executed prior to 06.09.2012, Part I is excluded if the parties explicitly designate a foreign seat or implicitly adopt foreign law as the governing law. Once the seat of arbitration is determined, it operates as an exclusive jurisdiction clause, rejecting concurrent jurisdiction. The "Closest Connection Test" is no longer applicable. Instead, if an arbitration agreement expressly designates a location as the seat (even if termed as "venue") or aligns with the curial law stipulated, such designation prevails unless contrary indicia exist. Courts must honor the parties' express and implied choices in the arbitration agreement and not impute inadvertence in their stipulations. Where multiple potential seats are designated, the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens may be applied to determine the most appropriate seat. Residual Application of Closest Connection Test is limited to cases where the arbitration agreement lacks express or implied designation of a seat or curial law. The petition under Section 11 of the Act was dismissed as the seat of arbitration was outside India, and the agreement was not governed by Indian law. Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Micromax Informatics Fze, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 871

Section 11 - Scope of inquiry - Prima facie determination of the existence of arbitrable disputes. Whether the High Court was justified in dismissing the application for appointment of an arbitrator. Held, the Supreme Court emphasized that at the stage of deciding an application under Section 11 the court's jurisdiction is limited to determining the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement and not to undertake a detailed examination of the merits or frivolity of the claims. The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by delving into the merits of the dispute, including the auditor's findings, and dismissing the arbitration application on the ground of alleged dishonesty of the appellant. The existence of an arbitration agreement (Clause 18.12 of the MSA) was not disputed, and the question of arbitrability or genuineness of the disputes should be left to the arbitral tribunal. Referring to the judgment in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 489, the Court reiterated that the referral court's role is limited to prima facie scrutiny of the arbitration agreement. The arbitral tribunal is competent to address issues of frivolity or dishonesty in claims, based on a comprehensive assessment of evidence. To balance the limited judicial interference under Section 11 with the prevention of abuse of arbitration proceedings, the arbitral tribunal may award costs against parties found to have initiated frivolous claims. The appeal was allowed, and the order of the High Court was set aside. All legal contentions and objections were kept open for consideration before the arbitrator. Goqii Technologies v. Sokrati Technologies, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 891

Section 11(6) – Maintainability and Limitation - A fresh application under Section 11 (6) is not maintainable if no liberty was granted at the time of withdrawal of the first application. A fresh application under Section 11(6) of the Act is subject to limitation, and if time-barred, such an application cannot be entertained. Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, does not benefit a respondent in such cases for exclusion of the period during which the first application was pending. Condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is also not available to the respondent in the absence of sufficient cause. Hpcl Bio-Fuels Ltd. v. Shahaji Bhanudas Bhad, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 879

Section 11 (6) – Scope and Limitation - The referral court's role under Section 11(6) is limited to determining whether the application for appointment of an arbitrator is within the statutory limitation period of three years. Intricate evidentiary inquiries into whether the claims are time-barred or on the merits of the disputes fall exclusively within the domain of the arbitral tribunal. The court emphasized that parties' inability to appeal Section 11 orders necessitates avoiding decisions that may leave claimants remediless. It clarified that the arbitral tribunal retains authority to adjudicate issues of limitation as preliminary matters and to impose costs if the claims are found frivolous or time-barred. In the present case, the petitions under Section 11(6) were filed within limitation, considering the invocation notice dated 23.01.2017 and the respondents' failure to comply within 30 days. Consequently, an arbitral tribunal was constituted to adjudicate disputes under the Shareholders Agreement. The court directed that all substantive issues, including whether the claims are barred by limitation, be resolved by the arbitrator. It was also observed that costs for unnecessary arbitration proceedings may be imposed on the party found to have abused the process. Petitions allowed; sole arbitrator appointed for adjudication of disputes. Aslam Ismail Khan Deshmukh v. Asap Fluids Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 868

Section 18 and 36 - Government or statutory bodies cannot claim any special privilege or differential treatment in arbitration proceedings or enforcement-related matters. International Seaport Dredging Pvt. Ltd. v. Kamarajar Port Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 852

Section 29A (4) and (5) – Extension of Arbitral Tribunal's Mandate – Sufficient Cause - Whether an application for extension of the mandate of an Arbitral Tribunal can be filed after the expiry of the statutory period under Section 29A(4). Whether the facts and circumstances of the case justify the extension of the mandate. Held, under Section 29A(4) of the Act the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal can be extended either prior to or after the expiry of the statutory period. The provision explicitly empowers the court to grant an extension even after the Tribunal's mandate has expired. On examining the facts, including the exclusion of the limitation period due to the COVID-19 pandemic as per the Court's earlier orders (In re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, (2022) 3 SCC 117), the Court found sufficient cause for granting an extension. The extension of time under Section 29A(5) is discretionary and contingent upon showing sufficient cause, which must align with the objective of efficient and effective dispute resolution. The statutory timeline for arbitration is not intended to frustrate proceedings but to ensure their expeditious conclusion. The concept of "sufficient cause" under Section 29A must be interpreted with flexibility, keeping in mind the peculiar circumstances of the case and the overarching goal of dispute resolution. This judgment clarifies the scope of Section 29A(4) and reinforces the principle that procedural timelines in arbitration must not impede the resolution of disputes, particularly in exceptional circumstances like a global pandemic. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's dismissal of the application, and extended the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal. Ajay Protech Pvt. Ltd. v. General Manager, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 915

Arms Act, 1959

Unlicensed Firearms - The Court highlighted the grave threat posed by unlicensed arms to the rule of law and public safety, emphasizing that the Constitution of India does not grant a fundamental right to bear arms, unlike the U.S. Constitution. Observing an increasing trend in crimes involving illegal arms, the Court directed States, Union Territories, and the Union of India to submit affidavits detailing the prevalence of unlicensed firearms, actions taken to curb their use, and statistical data on cases under the Arms Act, 1959. The Union of India and Amicus Curiae submitted detailed suggestions for strengthening the legal framework and enforcement mechanisms. Despite existing laws, the Court noted ineffective implementation and a rise in illegal manufacturing, smuggling, and use of firearms. To address these issues, the Court ordered the constitution of a five-member committee in each State and Union Territory, chaired by the Chief Secretary, to formulate and implement an action plan addressing illegal firearms. The committee's tasks include auditing arms factories, analyzing smuggling patterns, and preventing the use of illegal arms in crimes. The Court directed the Committees to submit their action plans within ten weeks and scheduled the matter for further consideration on 30.01.2025. Rajendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 885

Bail

High Courts should not impose time-bound schedules for the conclusion of trials when rejecting bail applications. Sangram Sadashiv Suryavanshi v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 936

Suspension of Sentence and Bail - High Court's Misreading - The appellant, convicted and sentenced to a maximum of four years, sought bail pending disposal of his appeal. The Court granted relief, citing the principle that in cases involving fixed-term sentences where appeals are unlikely to be heard before completion of the sentence, suspension of sentence and bail should normally be granted. The Supreme Court clarified that the High Court incorrectly interpreted its precedent in Atul alias Ashutosh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 93. The precedent does not mandate that bail is conditional upon the accused serving half of their sentence but emphasizes early relief in deserving cases where full sentence completion is likely before appeal disposal. Nanhe Lal Verma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 925

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

Section 479 - Implementation of - Release of undertrial prisoners subjected to prolonged incarceration - Identification and Reporting - Role of Undertrial Review Committees (UTRC) and Legal Services Authorities in identifying eligible undertrial prisoners - Non-compliance by certain States and Union Territories in submitting required reports to facilitate the release of eligible prisoners - Gender-Specific Considerations - Women Prisoners - Section 479 of BNSS provides for the release of undertrial prisoners who have served one-half of the maximum sentence for their alleged offense. For first-time offenders, release is mandated after serving one-third of the maximum period, subject to conditions. Cases involving heinous crimes (punishable by death or life imprisonment) are excluded from these provisions. Jail Superintendents and Legal Services Authorities must ensure continuous monitoring of undertrial prisoners to identify those eligible for release under Section 479. States/UTs must furnish detailed reports in a prescribed format, ensuring clarity and accuracy in the identification and processing of eligible cases. Special attention must be given to women prisoners to ensure they benefit from the provisions of Section 479. The order underscores the judiciary's commitment to uphold the right to liberty by ensuring timely implementation of legislative provisions aimed at addressing prolonged undertrial incarceration. It mandates proactive efforts by all stakeholders to ensure justice reaches the most marginalized prisoners. In Re-Inhuman Conditions In 1382 Prisons, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 908

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Order 39 - Principles governing the grant of temporary injunction - No Mini-Trial at Interim Stage - Courts must refrain from conducting a mini-trial at the stage of deciding an application for temporary injunction. Essential Conditions for Grant - The plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case, which raises substantial questions requiring adjudication. This should be supported by evidence through affidavits or otherwise. However, prima facie case does not equate to establishing prima facie title, which requires evidence at trial. The court must be satisfied that non-interference would result in irreparable injury, meaning a material injury that cannot be adequately compensated by damages. The balance of convenience must favor the grant of the injunction, considering the comparative mischief or injury likely to be caused to either party by granting or refusing the injunction. Judicial Discretion and Status Quo - The court must exercise sound judicial discretion to determine whether maintaining the status quo pending trial is necessary to prevent substantial injury. In Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719, the Court emphasized weighing the potential harm to both parties before deciding on the injunction. The grant of temporary injunction is governed by the principles of prima facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience, requiring careful judicial discretion to protect the rights of the parties pending final adjudication. [Referred: Anand Prasad Agarwal v. Tarkeshwar Prasad, (2001) 5 SCC 568] Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Order 39 and 43 - Temporary Injunction - Appeal from orders - High Courts must not substitute their views for that of the trial court without finding specific deficiencies like perversity, capriciousness, or arbitrariness in the trial court's order. Observations based on extraneous factors, such as pending litigations or alleged misuse of power, are insufficient to override the trial court's discretionary orders unless they deviate from settled principles governing injunctions under Order 39 CPC. Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Order 43 - Appeal from orders - Failure of the High Court to Justify Its Decision - The High Court's order failed to address pivotal issues raised by the plaintiffs and instead relied on general observations, undermining the appellate scrutiny required for interlocutory orders. The High Court's urgency in vacating the trial court's order, without adequate reasoning, led to complications, including the creation of third-party rights on the suit property. Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Order 43 - Appeal from orders - Scope of Interference - Appealability - Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the CPC permits appeals against orders made under Rules 1, 2, 2A, 4, and 10 of Order 39 CPC - Principles Governing Appellate Interference - Appellate courts should not substitute their discretion for that of the trial court unless the trial court's discretion is exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or contrary to settled principles of law. Ignoring relevant facts also constitutes a ground for interference. (Referred: Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727, Printers (Mysore) v. Pothan Joseph, (1960) SCC Online SC 62). Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Order 43 - Appellate Interference - Test of Perversity - Appellate interference requires demonstration of perversity in the trial court's order, not mere disagreement with its findings. (Referred : Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd. (2016) 2 SCC 672, Mohd. Mehtab Khan v. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan, (2013) 9 SCC 221) Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Order 43 - Role of the Appellate Court - Appellate courts must adhere to the principles laid down in Wander Ltd; 1990 Supp SCC 727 and ensure they do not reassess facts or usurp the jurisdiction of the trial court unless necessary. The appellate court's role is to examine the correctness of the trial court's order within the scope of settled principles, ensuring the hierarchy of courts is respected. The appellate court must not usurp the trial court's role in applying tests such as prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. (Referred : Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. v. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 634; Monsanto Technology LLC v. Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. (2019) 3 SCC 381). Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Order 43 - Appeal from orders - Scope of Jurisdiction - The appellate court must confine its review to determining whether the trial court's order adheres to established legal principles, avoiding unwarranted interference in interlocutory matters. This judgment solidifies the principle that appellate courts exercise limited jurisdiction in appeals from discretionary orders and underscores the importance of avoiding unwarranted interference in the trial court's findings. Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Maintainability of a second complaint or second protest petition - the principles governing such maintainability depend on the manner and grounds on which the earlier complaint against the negative final report was dismissed. There's no bar on the maintainability of the second complaint against the negative Final Report/Charge Sheet if the magistrate believes that the core of both complaints is different. If the earlier disposal of the complaint was on merits, the second complaint on “almost identical facts” that were raised in the first complaint would not be maintainable. There's no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts but it will be entertained only in exceptional circumstances i.e., where the earlier dismissal order suffers from any infirmity. Subrata Choudhury @ Santosh Choudhury v. State of Assam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 856

Section 82 - Proclaimed Offender - Anticipatory Bail - A proclamation under Section 82, Cr.P.C., does not invariably bar the consideration of anticipatory bail applications. Asha Dubey v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 889

Section 164 - Admissibility and Utility of Statements - A statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC is not a substantive piece of evidence but holds significant evidentiary value for corroboration and contradiction under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Such statements, recorded by a Judicial Magistrate, carry greater credibility than statements under Section 161 CrPC and are not constrained by the limitations of Section 162 CrPC. The primary objectives of recording a statement under Section 164 CrPC are to deter the witness from retracting or altering their version and to ensure accountability under law. These statements gain importance, especially when witnesses are susceptible to influence due to their association with the accused or the influence of the accused. The reliability and weight of these statements depend on the witness's consistency and the surrounding circumstances, including any retraction and its reasons. The ultimate test of such statements lies in the trial process, where their reliability is assessed in conjunction with other evidence. Vijaya Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 928

Section 195 - Bar under Section 195(1)(b) - De Novo Trial - Whether appellant has locus standi to prefer this appeal? Whether the High Court rightly held the proceedings to be barred under Section 195(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C.? Whether the High Court was justified in ordering de novo steps against the appellant? The Court reaffirmed that locus standi under Article 136 of the Constitution can be extended to third parties with a bona fide interest in the matter, provided the appeal advances substantial justice. The Court held that the appellant, a socially spirited individual connected to the matter, had locus standi to maintain the appeal, especially given the grave allegations of interference with judicial processes. The Court observed that the High Court erred in quashing the proceedings based on Section 195(1)(b). The initiation of the proceedings stemmed from judicial directions and not from a private complaint. The Court emphasized that judicial or administrative orders by a subordinate court are sufficient to overcome the statutory bar under Section 195(1)(b). The Court upheld the High Court's direction for a de novo trial, citing the principles in Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab, (2022) 2 SCC 89 and emphasizing that retrial is permissible in exceptional circumstances to avert miscarriage of justice. Locus standi under Article 136 is context-dependent and must be exercised with vigilance to prevent abuse. The bar under Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. applies only when offences are committed with respect to documents in judicial custody and not prior. Retrial is justified in rare cases where procedural or substantive lapses lead to miscarriage of justice. M.R. Ajayan v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 905

Section 197 - Applicability - Both the respondents, being civil servants, were public servants removable only with the sanction of the Government. Their alleged acts—allocation of water (by the second respondent) and allotment of land (by the first respondent)—were purportedly committed in the discharge of their official duties, thereby necessitating prior sanction under Section 197 CrPC. The Court upheld the High Court's decision quashing the orders of cognizance against the respondents due to the absence of prior sanction under Section 197 CrPC. The appeals by the Directorate of Enforcement were dismissed, affirming the High Court's view that prior sanction was necessary for prosecuting the respondents, who were public servants acting in the discharge of official duties. Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 940

Section 197 - Legal Principles - The protection under Section 197 CrPC aims to safeguard public servants from frivolous prosecution for acts performed in good faith during official duties, while not shielding acts of corruption or malfeasance. The requirement of sanction applies only when there is a reasonable connection between the alleged act and the discharge of official duties. Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 940

Section 197 - Timing of Sanction Plea - The Court reaffirmed that the issue of prior sanction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, including post-cognizance. Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 940

Section 319 - Applicability of - Standard for Invoking Section 319 - Criteria for summoning additional accused based on evidence - Role of Cross-Examination - The second respondent filed an application under Section 319 CrPC, relying on the deposition of two prosecution witnesses (PW-2 and PW-4), alleging that the appellant struck the deceased with a spade. The trial court rejected the application. However, the High Court reversed this decision and summoned the appellant as an additional accused. The Court reiterated that the test under Section 319 CrPC is whether the evidence, if unrebutted, would lead to conviction. It emphasized that the satisfaction required for invoking Section 319 CrPC is higher than a prima facie case needed for framing charges. Since the application under Section 319 CrPC arose after the cross-examination of the witnesses, the Court held that the omissions in their cross-examination, amounting to contradictions, must be considered. The allegations in the examination-in-chief were contradicted in cross-examination. No prima facie case or satisfaction necessary under Section 319 CrPC could be recorded. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in allowing the application under Section 319 CrPC and reinstated the trial court's order rejecting the application. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order was set aside. The observations on evidence were confined to the scope of Section 319 CrPC and would not affect the trial on merits. Hetram @ Babli v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 930

Section 482 - Whether the High Court was correct in quashing criminal proceedings based on affidavits indicating a settlement without verifying their genuineness and securing the personal presence of the victim. Whether affidavits executed by an illiterate victim without proper endorsement explaining their contents can be relied upon in quashing criminal proceedings for serious offences. Held, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order quashing criminal proceedings and remanded the matter for further inquiry into the authenticity of the alleged settlement and affidavits. In cases involving serious offences under IPC and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the High Court must verify the genuineness of any alleged settlement before exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The personal presence of the victim, particularly an illiterate one, is critical for the Court to verify whether affidavits or settlements are genuine and made with informed consent. In absence of an endorsement indicating that the contents of an affidavit were explained to the affirming party, especially when illiterate, such affidavits cannot be relied upon without further inquiry. The case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration, requiring the personal presence of the appellant and an inquiry into the affidavits. The High Court was directed to consider whether the settlement was genuine and, if so, whether the power to quash proceedings could be exercised in light of the seriousness of the allegations. Appeal partly allowed. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. XYZ v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 887

Section 482 - Indian Penal Code, 1860; Sections 376(2)(n), 503, and 506 Quashing of FIR - breakup in a consensual relationship - Allegations of Rape and Criminal Intimidation - Legal Provisions - The relationship between the appellant and the complainant was consensual and lacked the ingredients of coercion or false promises to marry. The complainant, an educated adult, willingly engaged in the relationship despite its eventual breakdown, which cannot retrospectively criminalize consensual acts. The continuation of proceedings would constitute an abuse of the process of law. A consensual relationship does not amount to rape unless consent was vitiated by false promises or coercion. Allegations of criminal intimidation require clear evidence of threats causing alarm or coercion, which was absent in this case. The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings, observing that a breakup in a consensual relationship does not constitute grounds for criminal prosecution. The FIR and associated proceedings were declared an abuse of judicial process. Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 904

While considering the application for discharge, only that document is to be considered which forms part of the charge sheet, and not the ones which were never part of the charge sheet. Rajnish Kumar Biswakarma v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 937

Constitution

A statute can be struck down only for the violation of Part III or any other provision of the Constitution or for being without legislative competence. The constitutional validity of a statute cannot be challenged for the violation of the basic structure of the Constitution. The reason is that concepts such as democracy, federalism, and secularism are undefined concepts. Allowing courts to strike down legislation for violation of such concepts will introduce an element of uncertainty in our constitutional adjudication. Recently, this Court has accepted that a challenge to the constitutional validity of a statute for violation of the basic structure is a technical aspect because the infraction has to be traced to the express provisions of the Constitution. Hence, in a challenge to the validity of a statute for violation of the principle of secularism, it must be shown that the statute violates provisions of the Constitution pertaining to secularism. (Para 55) Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 854

Madarsa Education - The High Court erred in holding that a statute is bound to be struck down if it is violative of the basic structure. Invalidation of a statute on the grounds of violation of secularism has to be traced to express provisions of the Constitution. Further, the fact that the State legislature has established a Board to recognise and regulate Madarsa education is not violative of Article 14. The Madarsa Act furthers substantive equality. (Para 73) Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 854

The Madarsa Act to the extent to which it seeks to regulate higher education, including the 'degrees' of Fazil and Kamil, is beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature since it conflicts with Section 22 of the UGC Act. Entry 25 of List III, pursuant to which the Madarsa Act has been enacted, has been expressly made subject to Entry 66 of List I. The UGC Act governs the standards for higher education and a state legislation cannot seek to regulate higher education, in contravention of the provisions of the UGC Act. (Para 99) Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 854

Article 13 (2) - The entire statute does not need to be struck down each time that certain provisions of the statute are held to not meet constitutional muster. The statute is only void to the extent that it contravenes the Constitution. (Para 101) Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 854

Article 30 (1) - Interpretation of - Minority Educational Institutions – Universities established before Constitution - Dual Nature of Article 30(1) - Proof of Establishment - Definition of Minorities - Retention of Minority Character - Criteria for Establishment by Minorities - Validity of Reference - Overruling of Azeez Basha - Impact on Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) - The reference in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya regarding the correctness of the decision in Azeez Basha was valid, adhering to the parameters laid down in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community. Article 30(1) serves as both an anti-discrimination and a special rights provision. It prohibits discrimination against religious or linguistic minorities in establishing or administering educational institutions and guarantees greater administrative autonomy to such institutions. Religious or linguistic minorities must prove that they established the institution for it to qualify as a minority educational institution under Article 30(1). Article 30(1) rights extend to universities established before the Constitution's commencement. The right under Article 30(1) applies to minorities as defined at the Constitution's commencement. No new right-bearing groups can be identified for pre-Constitution institutions. Incorporation of a university does not automatically result in the loss of its minority character. Courts must assess the surrounding circumstances and statutory provisions to determine if the minority character was relinquished upon incorporation. The idea, purpose, and implementation of the institution must originate from the minority community. The administrative setup must affirm the institution's minority character and its purpose to protect minority interests. The view that a minority cannot establish an institution if it derives its legal character through a statute is overruled. The minority status of AMU must be determined based on the principles laid down in this judgment. Reference disposed of. Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 869

Article 30 (1) guarantees the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice to religious and linguistic minorities. However, the State has an interest in ensuring that the minority educational institutions impart secular education along with religious education or instruction. The constitutional scheme allows the State to strike a balance between two objectives: (i) ensuring the standard of excellence of minority educational institutions; and (ii) preserving the right of the minority to establish and administer its educational institution. The State generally strikes a balance by enacting regulations accompanying the recognition of minority educational institutions. The High Court erred in holding that education provided under the 2004 Act is violative of Article 21A because (i) The RTE Act which facilitates the fulfilment of the fundamental right under Article 21 – A contains a specific provision by which it does not apply to minority educational institutions; (ii) The right of a religious minority to establish and administer Madarsas to impart both religious and secular education is protected by Article 30; and (iii) the Board and the state government have sufficient regulatory powers to prescribe and regulate standards of education for the Madarsas. (Para 79) Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 854

Article 31C - The provision of Article 31C, as upheld in Kesavananda Bharati v. Union of India, remains operative. Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 855

Article 39 (b) - Interpretation of - The majority judgment in Ranganatha Reddy explicitly distanced itself from the minority opinion of Justice Krishna Iyer. Consequently, the reliance on this minority view in Sanjeev Coke was erroneous. Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 855

Article 39 (b) - Observation in Mafatlal - The single-sentence observation in Mafatlal Industries—stating that “material resources of the community” include privately owned resources—is not part of its ratio decidendi and is therefore not binding. Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 855

Article 39 (b) - Material Resources of the Community: The phrase “material resources of the community” in Article 39(b) may theoretically include privately owned resources. However, the Court rejects the broad interpretation in Justice Krishna Iyer's minority judgment and emphasizes that not all privately owned resources qualify as “material resources of the community” merely by serving material needs. Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 855

Article 39 (b) - Context-Specific Inquiry - Determining whether a resource falls under Article 39(b) requires a context-specific analysis based on factors such as: The nature and characteristics of the resource; Its impact on community well-being; Its scarcity; and Potential consequences of private ownership concentration. The Public Trust Doctrine may guide this determination. Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 855

Article 39 (b) - Scope of 'Distribution' - The term “distribution” under Article 39(b) has a broad meaning. It encompasses various state mechanisms, including vesting resources in the state or nationalization, provided the distribution serves the common good. Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 855

Articles 217 and 221 - High Court Judges – Equality in Service Benefits and Pension – Non-discrimination based on Recruitment Source – Financial Independence and Judicial Independence - High Court judges, regardless of their source of appointment (from the Bar or district judiciary), are holders of constitutional offices in equal measure. They form a homogeneous class under the Constitution, and any differentiation in their service conditions or retiral benefits based on the source of appointment violates Articles 217 and 221 of the Constitution. Judicial independence, a fundamental aspect of the Constitution's basic structure, is intrinsically linked to the financial independence of judges. Ensuring parity in salaries, allowances, and pensions for all High Court judges is essential to uphold judicial independence. The Constitution mandates non-discrimination in the determination of service conditions and benefits for High Court judges. Conditions of service, including pension benefits, must be uniform and cannot be affected by the source of recruitment. The communication dated 30 December 2022, which excluded judges appointed from the district judiciary under a contributory pension scheme from subscribing to the General Provident Fund, was quashed as unconstitutional. Directions were issued to ensure that all High Court judges, irrespective of their recruitment source, are treated equally with respect to the General Provident Fund and retiral benefits. Contributions to the General Provident Fund are to commence from their date of appointment, and amounts credited under the New Pension Scheme are to be refunded. Communication dated 30 December 2022 is quashed. Petitioners are entitled to equality in pension and service benefits as High Court judges. Justice Shailendra Singh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 872

Article 368 - Challenge to the insertion of the words "socialist" and "secular" in the Preamble of the Constitution by the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976. Allegation that the amendment was unconstitutional due to its enactment during the Emergency period and the extended tenure of the Lok Sabha. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitions, holding that the Parliament has the power to amend the Preamble under Article 368 of the Constitution, provided the amendment does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution. The inclusion of "socialist" and "secular" in the Preamble reflects the evolving ethos of the Constitution as a living document. These terms represent the principles of economic and social justice and the commitment to equal respect for all religions, both of which are consistent with the constitutional framework. The challenge to the amendment nearly four decades after its enactment was deemed untenable, as the additions had attained widespread acceptance and had not restricted legislative or policy actions within the constitutional framework. The Court reiterated its earlier rulings in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973), S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), and other landmark cases that secularism and socialism are integral to the Constitution's basic structure. The argument regarding the amendment's retrospectivity was rejected, as the Constitution permits amendments to its provisions without being constrained by the date of adoption. The Court emphasized that "socialism" in the Indian context does not mandate a specific economic model but underscores a welfare state's commitment to equity and social justice. The writ petitions and related applications were dismissed for lack of merit and absence of a valid cause of action. The constitutional position regarding the Preamble's amendment remains unambiguous and upheld. Dr. Balram Singh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 917

Article 341 - Determination of Scheduled Caste Status Post-Conversion to Christianity - Whether an individual who has converted to Christianity can continue to claim Scheduled Caste status for availing reservation benefits under the Constitution. Upon conversion to Christianity, an individual loses their caste identity, as Christianity does not recognize caste distinctions. The appellant, who was baptized and actively practices Christianity, cannot claim Scheduled Caste status while professing Christian faith. The principle of reconversion to Hinduism and resumption of caste membership requires evidence of both a genuine conversion ceremony and acceptance by the original caste community. The appellant failed to meet these requirements. The appellant's claim to Scheduled Caste status, while maintaining adherence to Christianity, amounts to misrepresentation and undermines the constitutional policy of reservation. The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the appellant, a practicing Christian, could not legally identify as a member of a Scheduled Caste for the purpose of availing reservation benefits. C. Selvarani v. Special Secretary cum District Collector, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 923

Contract

Contract Act, 1872 - Section 207 and 208 - Power of Attorney - Implied Revocation of – Limitation and Validity of Sale Deeds - Equitable Relief - Principal's Rights - Execution of a subsequent sale deed by the principal, acting independently of the agent, constitutes implied revocation of the Power of Attorney under Section 207 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. Such revocation becomes effective as per Section 208 when the agent and third parties gain knowledge of the principal's independent actions. In suits seeking to challenge sale deeds, the limitation period of three years under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, begins either from the date of execution or the date of knowledge of the disputed transaction. If the plaintiff lacks contemporaneous knowledge of the sale deed, the right to sue accrues when such knowledge is established. A sale deed executed by an agent after implied revocation of authority is void ab initio. Furthermore, absence of consideration renders the transaction invalid. Where co-owners are in dispute, equity may demand valuation and compensation in lieu of partition. Courts may direct valuation of the disputed property and permit settlement through compensation based on the market value of the co-owner's share. The principal retains the authority to act independently of the agent, even during the subsistence of a Power of Attorney, without requiring the agent's consent. This includes entering into transactions that override the agent's authority. The appeal was allowed, the impugned judgment set aside, and the matter remanded for determination of market value and equitable resolution concerning the appellant's share in the property. Thankamma George v. Lilly Thomas, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 893

Tender Process – Absence of Concluded Contract – Right of Bidder – Authority of Tender Evaluation Committee – Validity of Auction Cancellation - In the absence of an allotment letter and acceptance of the highest bid, no relief can be granted to the bidder as there is no concluded contract. The bidder has no vested right beyond fair treatment and cannot insist on further negotiations. The terms of the Notice Inviting Tender (NIT), particularly the clause empowering the authority to accept or reject any or all bids, must be adhered to. In this case, the cancellation of the auction was based on valid reasons, including rectification of an erroneous minimum rate, as noted in the report of the Divisional Commissioner of the Indore Development Authority (IDA). The decision to cancel the auction and issue a second NIT was within the authority's rights. The reliance on precedent where the auction cancellation was found arbitrary was distinguishable, as the cancellation here was justified and undertaken in accordance with the rule of law. The High Court's interference in fixing the price and overriding the auction process was unwarranted. Consequently, the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court was set aside. The IDA was directed to issue a fresh NIT for the disposal of the land, ensuring that the process generates maximum revenue and adheres to public auction principles. Appeal allowed. Fresh NIT to be issued, and the land to be disposed of only through public auction. Indore Vikas Praadhikaran (IDA) v. Shri Humud Jain Samaj Trust, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 931

Customs Act, 1962

Section 28 - Jurisdiction of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) to issue show cause notices - Held, the Court affirmed that officers of the DRI and other similar authorities are proper officers under Section 28 of the Customs Act, 1962, empowered to issue show cause notices. Notifications and circulars empowering DRI officers were not considered in the earlier decision in Canon India Pvt. Ltd., rendering its conclusions regarding jurisdiction erroneous. The Canon India decision failed to account for statutory provisions under Sections 2(34) and 5 of the Customs Act. Commissioner of Customs v. Canon, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 867

Section 28 (11) - Retrospective Operation of - The Court set aside the Delhi High Court's decision in Mangali Impex, holding that Section 28(11) and Explanation 2 to Section 28 operate in distinct fields and do not conflict. Commissioner of Customs v. Canon, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 867

Section 28 - Finance Act, 2022; Section 97 - Constitutional validity of - The Court upheld the retrospective validation of show cause notices under Section 97 of the Finance Act, 2022, rejecting challenges based on arbitrariness or overbreadth. Commissioner of Customs v. Canon, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 867

Section 28 - Observations on Limitation Period - The Court clarified that it did not review the findings in Canon India Pvt. Ltd. regarding the limitation period for issuing show cause notices, which remain undisturbed. Commissioner of Customs v. Canon, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 867

Section 28 - Guidance for Pending Cases - The Court provided directives for adjudication of pending cases before various judicial and quasi-judicial forums, ensuring uniform application of this judgment. Review petitions allowed on the issue of jurisdiction. Decision in Canon India Pvt. Ltd. partially overruled. Decision in Mangali Impex set aside. Constitutional validity of Section 97 of the Finance Act, 2022, upheld. Pending cases to be disposed of in light of this judgment. Commissioner of Customs v. Canon, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 867

Consumer

The Court noted that the judgment in Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha (1995) 6 SCC 651, which brought medical practitioners under the purview of the Act, requires reconsideration but was not relevant to the present case. The question of whether other professionals (excluding legal professionals) could be covered under the Act was left open for consideration in appropriate cases with specific factual foundations. The appeals were disposed of in terms of the above findings. The reference to a larger Bench was deemed unnecessary. Bar of Indian Lawyers v. D.K.Gandhi PS National Institute of Communicable Diseases, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 897

Delay

The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions filed by the petitioners challenging the decisions of the High Court. The case arose from the dismissal of a civil suit filed by the petitioners, along with the allowance of the respondent's counterclaim. The petitioners sought condonation of a 534-day delay in filing an appeal, which was granted by the first appellate court but subsequently overturned by the High Court. The Supreme Court held that negligence on the part of the petitioners' advocate does not absolve them of their responsibility to be vigilant about their legal proceedings. It emphasized that litigants must act diligently and cannot entirely shift the blame to their counsel. The Court reaffirmed the principle that condonation of delay should not be granted lightly, particularly when the litigant has not approached the court with clean hands. The High Court rightly set aside the condonation of delay, highlighting that the petitioners deliberately suppressed facts and unfairly blamed their previous counsel. The Supreme Court reiterated that statutes of limitation aim to ensure timely action and discourage stale claims. The principle of "vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt" (the law assists those who are vigilant) was applied. The petitions were dismissed, and the decision of the High Court was upheld. Rajneesh Kumar v. Ved Prakash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 912

Demolition

Legality of the demolition of the petitioner's ancestral house without due process. Procedural safeguards required for actions against alleged encroachments. State accountability for high-handed and unauthorized actions. The petitioner alleged that his ancestral home in Maharajganj, Uttar Pradesh, was unlawfully demolished during a road widening project for National Highway 730. The demolition was carried out without written notice, based solely on public announcements. The NHRC and Commissioner's reports revealed procedural lapses, including lack of demarcation, absence of land acquisition, and demolition beyond the alleged encroachment. No evidence was presented by the State to establish the width of the highway or the extent of encroachment. The demolition exceeded the purported encroachment of 3.70 meters, going up to 8 meters in some areas. No compensation was provided, and the State failed to follow due process as mandated by law. The demolition was declared illegal, high-handed, and violative of procedural safeguards under Article 300A of the Constitution, which protects the right to property. The Court emphasized the requirement of due process, written notice, and proper demarcation before taking actions against alleged encroachments. State authorities were ordered to adopt procedural safeguards, including written notice, demarcation, and compensation, before initiating demolitions. Disciplinary and criminal proceedings were recommended against officials involved in unauthorized actions. The principle of “justice through bulldozers” was condemned as incompatible with the rule of law and constitutional guarantees. The Court held that any demolition of private property must strictly adhere to legal procedures to uphold constitutional protections and ensure public accountability. Arbitrary actions by the State undermine the rule of law and cannot be justified in a civilized society. In Re Manoj Tibrewal Akash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 878

Doctrine of per incuriam

Per incuriam application - Scope of per incuriam - Doubts about precedent - Demonstrably wrong reasoning - A decision is per incuriam only when a central statutory provision or legal precedent, which could have altered the outcome, is overlooked. The omission must be glaring and inconsistent. The doctrine applies strictly to the ratio decidendi, not to obiter dicta. If a court questions the correctness of a precedent, it must either follow it or refer it to a larger Bench for reconsideration. The doctrine applies when it is shown that a part of the decision is based on demonstrably wrong reasoning, or if a statutory provision or binding authority was overlooked due to an obvious inadvertence. Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 859

Education

Medical Seats - Interim Order - Provisional Admissions and Vacant Seats - Restitution and Financial Loss - The primary question in this case is whether the appellant colleges are entitled to a direction requiring the respondent authorities to create a compensatory seat in the ensuing academic year due to the interim orders that left seats vacant. The interim order directing seats to be kept vacant lacked a prima facie assessment, balance of convenience, or irreparable harm analysis. Established judicial principles mandate a brief examination of these factors before granting interim relief. Medical seats are year-specific and cannot be carried forward beyond the prescribed academic schedule or cut-off dates (as per Faiza Choudhary v. State of J&K, (2012) 10 SCC 149 and S. Krishna Sradha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2020) 17 SCC 465). Exceptionally, additional seats can be created in rare cases where a candidate has suffered due to no fault of their own, provided such relief is sought promptly and within strict timelines. Provisional admissions or directions to keep seats vacant should not be granted casually. Courts must exercise caution and ensure that the petitioner has a "cast iron case" or where errors by authorities are gross and apparent. Vacant seats result in financial loss to institutions and are deemed a national wastage of resources (Index Medical College v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 11 SCC 570). The principle of restitution applies to mitigate losses suffered by colleges due to interim orders found unsustainable. This includes allowing colleges to recoup losses via adjustments in future fee structures (Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal, (2020) 8 SCC 129 and Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437). Given the facts, the Court denied the creation of additional compensatory seats for the ensuing academic year, as it would contravene established regulations and precedents. Instead, the Court allowed the appellant colleges to approach the Fee Fixation Committee / Authority to recoup the financial deficit caused by the vacant seats. This measure aims to distribute the financial impact equitably across future batches without unduly burdening stakeholders. The appeals were partly allowed, granting liberty to the appellant colleges to seek fee adjustments while reaffirming the principles governing the management of medical seats and interim relief. Ramkrishna Medical College Hospital v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 877

The purpose of education is to provide for the intellectual, moral, and physical development of a child. A good education system is correlated to the social, economic, and political needs of our country. (Para 77) Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 854

The State has an interest in maintaining the standards of education in minority educational institutions. Affiliation or recognition of minority educational institutions by the Government secures the academic interests of students studying in such institutions to pursue higher education. (Para 62) Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 854

Uttar Pradesh Board of Madarsa Education Act, 2004 - The Madarsa Act secures the interests of the minority community in Uttar Pradesh because: (i) it regulates the standard of education imparted by the recognised Madarsas; and (ii) it conducts examinations and confers certificates to students, allowing them the opportunity to pursue higher education. The Madarsa Act is consistent with the positive obligation of the State to ensure that students studying in the recognised Madarsas attain a minimum level of competency which will allow them to effectively participate in society and earn a living. Therefore, the Madarsa Act furthers substantive equality for the minority community. (Para 72) Anjum Kadari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 854

Election

Unjust removal of an elected Sarpanch - Administrative high-handedness and violation of natural justice principles - Gender-based discrimination against female elected representatives - The appellant, a 27-year-old woman elected as Sarpanch of Sajbahar Gram Panchayat, undertook developmental projects under the Mahatma Gandhi Rural Industrial Park Scheme (RIPA). The Chief Executive Officer issued a delayed Work Order, rendering its timeline unfeasible. The appellant was accused of project delays, leading to her removal without proper inquiry. The High Court rejected her appeal on technical grounds, prompting the present proceedings. Held, the Court quashed the appellant's removal, emphasizing a lack of adherence to principles of natural justice. The appellant faced systemic administrative bias and unwarranted harassment, particularly as a female elected representative in a rural area. Administrative authorities failed to support grassroots democracy and instead sought to undermine the appellant's initiatives. The appellant was reinstated as Sarpanch for the remainder of her term. The State of Chhattisgarh was directed to pay ₹1,00,000 as costs to the appellant for the harassment faced, with liberty to recover the amount from erring officials post-inquiry. The Court underscored the need for administrative reform to support women in governance and curb misuse of authority. This judgment reaffirms the importance of natural justice, highlights the challenges faced by women in local governance, and stresses the need for administrative accountability in promoting grassroots democracy. Sonam Lakra v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 929

Electricity

Press release issued by the Government of India about certain changes in the mega power policy did not constitute 'law' and 'change in law' in terms of a Power Purchase Agreement. Nabha Power Ltd. v. Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 861

Section 56 - Liability arising out of the electricity bill dues which accrued before the enforcement of the 2003 Act would not be barred by the 2-year old limitation period prescribed under Section 56 of the 2003 Act. Once a liability is judicially crystallised and remains unchallenged, the person is bound by the principle of estoppel. Madhya Pradesh Madhya Kshetra Vidyut Vitran Company v. Bapuna Alcobrew, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 862

Environment

The Supreme Court expressed disapproval of an order passed by the National Green Tribunal(NGT) which imposed penalty for environmental damages on a company based on its revenue. The Court observed that there was no nexus between the revenue generation of the company and the ascertainment of penalty for violation of environmental laws. Benzo Chem Industrial v. Arvind Manohar Mahajan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 938

Evidence Act, 1872

Sections 25, 26, and 27 - Legality of confessional statements - Admissibility of eyewitness testimony - Reliability of circumstantial evidence, including CCTV footage and recovery of the deceased's body parts. The sole eyewitness failed to identify the accused or provide consistent testimony. Significant omissions and contradictions between her court testimony and her statement under Section 161 CrPC rendered her evidence unreliable. Non-examination of her husband, an alleged eyewitness, resulted in adverse inferences against the prosecution. CCTV footage lacked admissibility due to the absence of a certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. Neither the footage nor the CD containing it was authenticated or properly marked, and the trial and High Courts failed to view the footage. Recovery evidence, including parts of the deceased's body, was deemed insufficient to establish guilt without corroborating evidence. The trial court improperly admitted confessions made by the accused to police officers in custody, violating Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. Under Section 27, only information distinctly leading to the discovery of facts is admissible. The prosecution failed to adhere to this principle, rendering the confessions inadmissible. The prosecution failed to establish a complete and consistent chain of evidence. The prosecution's reliance on inadmissible and inconsistent evidence, coupled with procedural lapses, led to the failure to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction was unsustainable and consequently set aside. Randeep Singh @ Rana v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 914

Recovery of incriminating materials based on a statement given by the accused en route the police station before the recording of the statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act at the police station is not admissible. Suresh Chandra Tiwari v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 932

Family

Maintenance – Legal Principles - Interim Maintenance Quantum – Determination Based on Income and Standard of Living - Whether the interim maintenance amount of ₹80,000/- per month fixed by the High Court was justified. Whether the quantum of maintenance should reflect the respondent husband's actual income and the appellant wife's standard of living during the marriage. The Supreme Court restored the Family Court's order directing the respondent husband to pay ₹1,75,000/- per month as interim maintenance. Maintenance must reflect the standard of living enjoyed by the wife during the marriage. All sources of income, including rental and property income, must be considered to determine a fair quantum of maintenance. The burden of proof lies on the respondent to establish claims of reduced income or financial incapacity. The appellant wife sought interim maintenance of ₹2,50,000/- per month, citing the respondent husband's substantial income as a cardiologist and property owner. The Family Court awarded ₹1,75,000/- per month, but the High Court reduced it to ₹80,000/- based on limited income evidence. Held, The High Court erred by excluding significant sources of income identified by the Family Court, including the respondent's ownership of multiple properties and inheritance rights. Considering the appellant's sacrifice of her career and the standard of living during the marriage, the Family Court's order of ₹1,75,000/- per month was reasonable. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of maintaining the spouse's standard of living in interim maintenance cases and directed the respondent to comply with the Family Court's order. The appeal of the wife was allowed, and the husband's appeal was dismissed. Dr. Rajiv Verghese v. Rose Chakkrammankkil Francis, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 902

Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Sections 14(1) and 14(2) - Applicability of - Whether property granted to a Hindu widow under a partition deed becomes her absolute property. Validity of a will executed by the widow in favor of one party in the presence of a conflicting partition deed and pre-existing rights of other family members. The dispute involved succession rights to property between the descendants of two branches of the same family. The step-brothers disputed the rights of their stepmother over certain properties granted to her under a 1933 partition deed. The respondents argued that the property was to be equally divided between the two branches after her lifetime, while the appellants contended that her rights under the deed matured into absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Held, the Court reiterated that a Hindu widow's pre-existing right to maintenance could transform property granted in lieu of maintenance into absolute ownership under Section 14(1). However, such transformation does not extend to property where the deed explicitly creates a restricted estate. A restricted estate created under a partition deed, without recognition of pre-existing rights, does not mature into absolute ownership. The property in question, except for 2.09 acres already granted in absolute terms, retained its restrictive character. The Court invalidated the Will executed by her for properties where she held only a life interest, affirming that these properties must devolve as per the terms of the partition deed. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court and Trial Court findings that the restricted estate created under the 1933 partition deed did not confer absolute ownership. Consequently, the properties were to be equally divided between the two branches of the family. Kallakuri Pattabhiramaswamy v. Kallakuri Kamaraju, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 906

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Override of SEZ Act by IBC - Operational Creditor's Claim - Fair and Liquidation Valuation - Challenge to the approval of a Resolution Plan by the NCLT and its affirmation by the NCLAT, which granted a reduced amount (INR 50 Lakhs) against an admitted claim of INR 6.29 Crores - Dispute regarding valuation methodology and its compliance with regulatory provisions under the IBC - Applicability of Section 238 of IBC, asserting its overriding effect on conflicting provisions of the SEZ Act, 2005. Held, the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) is paramount in approving a resolution plan, and its decisions are non-justiciable except for violations under Section 30(2) of the IBC. The Court upheld the valuation process, finding it based on relevant materials, and affirmed that objections related to valuation were fact-based and non-interferable. It was ruled that IBC overrides the SEZ Act, 2005, making the exemptions granted in the Resolution Plan binding despite objections by the appellant. The Court emphasized that statutory dues not forming part of the Resolution Plan are extinguished upon its approval under Sections 30 and 31 of the IBC. The appeals by NOIDA Special Economic Zone Authority were dismissed, reaffirming the orders of the NCLT and NCLAT approving the Resolution Plan. The Court reiterated the sanctity of the insolvency resolution mechanism under IBC, 2016, as a time-bound and creditor-driven process. Appeals dismissed. Noida Special Economic Zone Authority v. Manish Agarwal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 858

Unnecessary delay caused in implementation of the Resolution Plan would also lead to the assets of the corporate debtor diminishing in value. Therefore, there is no doubt that the timely implementation of the Resolution Plan is also one of the underlying objectives of the IBC, 2016. State Bank of India v. Consortium of Mr. Murari Lal Jalan and Mr Florian Fritsch, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 866

Judicial Service

Judicial Observations and Strictures – Boundaries and Restraints - In the exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, while superior courts have the authority to critique judicial orders and rectify errors, adverse personal remarks or strictures against Judicial Officers should be avoided unless absolutely necessary for deciding the matter. Such remarks, if made without providing an opportunity for the affected officer to be heard, violate principles of natural justice and may irreparably harm the officer's dignity and career. Courts must distinguish between permissible criticism of erroneous decisions and impermissible personal criticism of Judicial Officers. High Courts, as custodians of the subordinate judiciary, should exercise their supervisory role with a balance of authority and restraint, fostering a supportive environment rather than one of undue criticism. Adverse observations should ideally be addressed administratively, allowing the Judicial Officer to respond and clarify. Judicial pronouncements must reflect sobriety, moderation, and judicial propriety, avoiding unnecessary personal commentary. The Supreme Court expunged adverse remarks made against the appellant in the impugned order, emphasizing that such observations should not have been made in a judicial pronouncement. The Court directed that such matters, if necessary, be addressed administratively to uphold the dignity of the judicial office and ensure fairness. Appeals allowed. Sonu Agnihotri v.Chandra Shekhar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 910

Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services - Directions Issued - Separate Qualifying Marks - Category-Specific Cut-Offs - Horizontal Reservation - Compliance and Rule Conformity - Prospective Application - High Courts / Public Service Commissions (PSCs) must provide separate qualifying marks in preliminary and mains exams for candidates with benchmark disabilities (PwBD), equivalent to or lower than SC/ST candidates as per relevant rules. Separate cut-offs to be prescribed for PwBD candidates across disability categories (e.g., blindness, low vision, deafness, locomotor disabilities) in preliminary and mains exams to ensure adequate representation in further stages. PwBD candidates qualifying on merit or through reservation to be recruited under horizontal reservation, ensuring proportional representation. High Courts directed to align their recruitment rules with these guidelines and report compliance. Directions to be implemented prospectively in all judicial service recruitments. Matters listed for further hearing after two weeks. This order underscores the judiciary's commitment to inclusivity, ensuring fair opportunities for persons with disabilities in judicial services. In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial Services, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 873

Hate Speech

Offence of hate speech cannot be equated to the act of wrong assertions or false claims that one may make. Hindu Sena Samiti v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 935

Labour

Abandonment of Service - Termination - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), setting aside the High Court's decision to reinstate the respondent who had been terminated on grounds of abandonment of service. Whether the termination of the respondent for abandonment of service under Regulation 39(4)(iii) of the LIC Staff Regulations, 1960, was valid. Whether the High Court erred in granting relief to the respondent without considering his suppression of material facts. The respondent, employed as an Assistant Administrative Officer by the LIC, was absent from duty without informing his employer since September 25, 1995. Multiple notices issued to the respondent went unanswered, and postal remarks indicated he had abandoned his job. The respondent was terminated on June 25, 1996, under Regulation 39(4)(iii) of the LIC Staff Regulations, treating his prolonged absence as abandonment of service. The respondent later secured employment with the Food Corporation of India (FCI) on April 14, 1997, a fact not disclosed in his writ petition challenging the termination. Held, the LIC acted within its authority under Regulation 39(4)(iii) to terminate the respondent, as he had failed to respond to notices and had not informed the employer of his whereabouts. The respondent's suppression of his subsequent employment with the FCI disentitled him to equitable relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court erred in reinstating the respondent without considering the full factual matrix, including his abandonment of service and subsequent conduct. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order granting relief to the respondent was quashed. Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Om Parkash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 899

Employment under the rehabilitation scheme - Termination - Whether the appellant, as the son-in-law of a land-loser whose land was acquired was entitled to employment under the rehabilitation scheme and whether the termination of his services was legally justified. The appellant was appointed as a Helper in the respondent Corporation under a rehabilitation scheme based on a certificate asserting his status as the son-in-law of a land-loser. Matrimonial disputes arose, leading to the appellant's divorce from the land-loser's daughter. Allegations of fraud regarding the appellant's marital status led to his termination. The Labour Court held the termination illegal, ordering reinstatement with back wages. The Writ Court overturned the Labour Court's award, finding misrepresentation by the appellant. Held, the factual findings of the Labour Court, based on substantial evidence, should not have been disturbed without compelling reasons. The Writ Court erred in overlooking crucial evidence, including the divorce proceedings and documents confirming the appellant's marriage. The appeal was allowed. Ganapati Bhikarao Naik v. Nuclear Power Corporation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 898

Land

Land Allotment - Government's policy of preferential land allotment to housing societies comprising MPs, MLAs, judges, civil servants, defence personnel, and journalists - The Court deemed this policy arbitrary, unreasonable, and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to equality. The Court annulled the 2005 Government Orders (GOs) that categorized these groups as a distinct class eligible for land allotment at basic rates. The Court also nullified subsequent GOs from 2008 that facilitated such allotments, concurring with a 2010 High Court judgment. The Court criticized the policy for perpetuating inequality by favoring privileged groups, thereby undermining the principles of fairness and equality enshrined in the Constitution. It emphasized that state resources should be allocated in a manner that benefits all citizens, particularly the marginalized and socio-economically disadvantaged, rather than a select elite. This ruling underscores the judiciary's commitment to upholding constitutional principles and ensuring that government policies do not arbitrarily favor certain sections of society at the expense of others. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Dr Rao VBJ Chelikani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 918

Land Acquisition and Integrated Development Plan – Yamuna Expressway Project – Legality of Urgency Clause – Compensation Enhancement Issues Considered - The Court addressed the following key issues: (i) Whether the land acquisition is part of the integrated development plan for the Yamuna Expressway under Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA) (ii) Whether the invocation of urgency provisions under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was justified, thereby dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. (iii) Whether the judgment in Kamal Sharma correctly interpreted the law, or if the judgment in Shyoraj Singh was valid in relying on Radhy Shyam to quash the acquisition proceedings. Held, the land acquisition was an integral part of the Yamuna Expressway project, involving the development of adjoining areas for industrial, residential, and recreational purposes, forming a unified development scheme. The invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) was deemed lawful and justified in light of the project's scale and public purpose. The Court affirmed the view in Kamal Sharma, which upheld the acquisition and urgency clause application, and declared Shyoraj Singh per incuriam for failing to consider prior precedents. The Court upheld the Allahabad High Court's grant of a 64.7% enhanced compensation as a "No Litigation Bonus" under a Government Order dated November 4, 2015. It directed that this enhancement apply uniformly to all affected landowners, with no further increase warranted. The question of the final award's non-issuance remains open for separate adjudication. The integrated development plan and the urgency clause invocation are valid, the acquisition proceedings stand upheld, and enhanced compensation at 64.7% is confirmed. Appeals by landowners dismissed; YEIDA's appeals allowed. Kali Charan v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 922

Medical Negligence

Medical Negligence – Determination of liability of a qualified doctor and medical institution for adverse post-surgical outcomes. Applicability of the Bolam test in medical negligence claims. Duty of care and proof of breach in medical treatment cases. The case involved allegations of medical negligence against a Doctor for a surgery performed on a minor patient to correct congenital ptosis (drooping eyelid). The complainants alleged that the surgery worsened the patient's condition, leading to impaired vision and double vision, and sought compensation. The State Commission dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence of negligence. On appeal, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) partly allowed the complaint, holding the doctor and the Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education & Research, Chandigarh (PGI) jointly liable for Rs. 3,00,000 in compensation and costs. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the Doctor and PGI, setting aside the NCDRC's judgment and restoring the State Commission's order. Civil Appeal filed by the Doctor and PGI – Allowed. Civil Appeal No. filed by the complainants – Dismissed. The Supreme Court concluded that there was no evidence of actionable negligence by the doctor or PGI, and therefore, no compensation was warranted. Neeraj Sud v. Jaswinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 863

Medical Negligence - Standard for - The Court reiterated that actionable negligence in the medical profession requires: Duty to exercise due care; Breach of such duty; Consequential damage. Neeraj Sud v. Jaswinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 863

Medical Negligence – Bolam Test - Following Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee, English Law (1957) 1 WLR 582 and Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1 the Court held that a doctor cannot be held liable for negligence if they acted in accordance with accepted medical practices. Neeraj Sud v. Jaswinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 863

Medical Negligence – Burden of Proof - The complainants failed to produce evidence establishing negligence or any deviation from accepted medical standards. Adverse outcomes alone do not constitute negligence. Neeraj Sud v. Jaswinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 863

Medical Negligence – Post-Surgery Complications - Deterioration or failure of surgery does not automatically imply medical negligence unless the complainants demonstrate a breach of duty or lack of skill. Neeraj Sud v. Jaswinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 863

Mines and Minerals

Computation of royalty within executive's domain - Courts' interference barred unless decision-making process is illegal. Kirloskar Ferrous Industries v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 880

Motor Vehicle Act, 1988

Determination of just compensation - Assessment of future prospects and non-pecuniary damages, including "pain and suffering" and future medical expenses - The appellant sustained severe injuries leading to 100% functional disability in a road accident in 2008. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) awarded compensation of ₹58,09,930 with interest at 6% per annum, which was enhanced to ₹78,16,390 by the High Court. The appellant sought further enhancement, citing errors in calculating future prospects and inadequacy of compensation under "pain and suffering" and future medical expenses. The Court emphasized that under National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 a 50% addition for future prospects applies to individuals under 40 with permanent employment. The appellant's loss of future income was recalculated, enhancing compensation to ₹87,29,241. Recognizing the severity and lifelong impact of the injuries, the Court increased the compensation under this head to ₹10,00,000, aligning with precedents such as Benson George v. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd., (2022) 13 SCC 142. The Court revisited future medical expenses and enhanced the amount to ₹10,00,000, in line with the principles established in cases like Parminder Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2019) 7 SCC 217. Just compensation aims to restore the claimant as closely as possible to their pre-accident state (restitutio ad integrum). Non-pecuniary damages, particularly for "pain and suffering," require a contextual and individualized approach, acknowledging their subjective and intangible nature. The Supreme Court enhanced the total compensation to ₹97,29,241, providing detailed reasoning for the recalculations under various heads. This judgment reinforces the principles of just compensation and the nuanced assessment of non-pecuniary damages. K.S. Muralidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 916

Driving a motor vehicle is a complex task requiring both practical skills and theoretical knowledge. Safe driving involves not only technical vehicle control but also proficiency in various road conditions, including managing speed, turns, and spatial awareness relative to other vehicles. Additionally, handling road gradients demands skill, particularly with brakes and maneuvering. Effective driving requires awareness of road signs, adherence to traffic rules, and a focus on the road free from distractions. The core skills expected of all drivers apply universally, regardless of whether the vehicle falls into transport or non-transport categories. Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 859

Eligibility criteria for heavy vehicles - Additional eligibility criteria for driving 'transport vehicles' in the MV Act and Rules apply only to vehicles with a gross vehicle weight exceeding 7,500 kg, such as medium and heavy goods and passenger vehicles. Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 859

Road safety - Empirical data - Concerns about road safety are often shaped by individual biases without the opinion being founded on any empirical data. Moreover, no empirical data has been produced before us to show that road accidents in India have increased as a direct result of drivers with LMV license, plying a transport vehicle of LMV class of vehicles whose gross weight is within 7500 Kg. Road safety is indeed an important objective of the MV Act but our reasoning must not be founded on unverified assumptions without any empirical data. The dangers of reasoning without empirical data and beyond the statutory scheme of the Act must be avoided. We are able to reach such a conclusion as none of the parties in this case has produced any empirical data to demonstrate that the LMV driving licence holder, driving a 'Transport Vehicle', is a significant cause for road accidents in India. Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 859

Section 3(1) and Section 2(21) - Interpretation of - The second part of Section 3(1), mandating specific requirements for driving a 'Transport Vehicle,' does not override the definition of LMV in Section 2(21) of the MV Act. Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 859

Section 10 (2) (d) and (e) - Eligibility to operate Transport Vehicles - A driver holding a Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) license under Section 10(2)(d) of the MV Act, for vehicles with a gross vehicle weight under 7,500 kg, is permitted to operate a 'Transport Vehicle' without additional authorization under Section 10(2)(e). LMVs and Transport Vehicles are not entirely separate classes, with some overlap. Special eligibility requirements remain for certain vehicles like e-carts, erickshaws, and those carrying hazardous goods. Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 859

Sections 166 and 168 – Compensation for motor accident claim – Determination of contributory negligence – Application of multiplier and future prospects - Compensation Recalculated - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, modifying the compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT) and the High Court. Claimant-appellant and his wife were involved in a motor accident caused by two rashly driven tractors. The appellant sustained severe injuries, while his wife died on the spot. The claimants sought compensation of ₹12,00,000/- before the MACT. The Tribunal awarded ₹1,01,250/- after holding both parties equally negligent. The High Court enhanced the compensation by applying a multiplier of 14 instead of 9 but upheld the finding of contributory negligence. Held, mere attempt of overtaking on the road cannot by itself mean rash and negligent driving. The Supreme Court found the Tribunal's apportionment of 50% contributory negligence against the claimant unjustified, as the evidence suggested that the primary negligence lay with the tractor driver. Applied the correct multiplier of 15 as per Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation (2009) 6 SCC 121, considering the deceased's age. Added 25% to the deceased's income for future prospects as per National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680. Monthly income of ₹5,000/- with 25% future prospects resulted in an annual income of ₹75,000/-. Applying a multiplier of 15, the total compensation was recalculated as ₹11,25,000/-. Interest rate reduced to 8% per annum from the Tribunal's 12%. The appeals were allowed, and the compensation was enhanced to ₹11,25,000/-, with other directions of the Tribunal undisturbed except for the interest rate modification. Prem Lal Anand v. Narendra Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 892

Section 168 - Motor Accident Claims - Principles of standardization for assessing just compensation – Applicability of Future Prospects for Fixed Salary or Self-Employed Individuals - Whether dependents of deceased individuals earning a fixed salary or self-employed are entitled to compensation for future prospects. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by claimants and restored the awards passed by the respective Tribunals, which had included future prospects in determining compensation. The Court dismissed the appeals by the Insurance Company challenging the inclusion of future prospects in cases involving fixed salary employees or self-employed individuals. The Court emphasized that ignoring future earning potential disregards economic realities and the human drive for financial improvement. An addition of 40% to the income of individuals below 40 years and 25% for those aged between 40-50 years was deemed reasonable to account for future prospects. The principle of standardization ensures fairness and aligns with the legislative intent under Section 168. The High Court orders disallowing future prospects were set aside, and the Tribunal's decisions were restored. Appeals by the Insurance Company were dismissed. Kavita Nagar v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 894

The decision in Mukund Dewangan, (2017) 14 SCC 663 is upheld, with clarifications provided in this judgment. The decision is not per incuriam, despite certain provisions of the MV Act and Rules not being considered.Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 859

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

Sections 22(c), 29 and 67 - Conviction based on inadmissible evidence - Acquittal - The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellant under Sections 22(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act due to the absence of legal evidence. The prosecution failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the psychotropic substance (pentazocine) transported by the co-accused was supplied by the appellant or that the appellant was part of a criminal conspiracy. The appellant's statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, being inadmissible as per Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1, could not be relied upon. Additionally, the non-examination of crucial witnesses and the lack of recovery of incriminating material from the appellant further weakened the prosecution's case. The Court emphasized that the charge framed did not include allegations under Section 29, and no evidence of conspiracy was produced. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges. Statements recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act are inadmissible as confessions (Tofan Singh principle). Failure to establish the appellant's involvement in transportation or conspiracy necessitates acquittal. Non-framing of charges under Section 29 was irrelevant due to the lack of evidence of conspiracy. Ajay Kumar Gupta v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 888

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Section 139 – Presumption of Legally Enforceable Debt - Contradictions in complainant's statements regarding the issuance and presentation of the cheque - Failure to establish financial capacity or evidence of loan advancement - Rebuttal of statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act. Held, the Appellant failed to substantiate the existence of a legally recoverable debt, as contradictions in his statements and lack of documentary evidence (e.g., Income Tax Returns reflecting the loan) undermined his claims. The Respondent successfully rebutted the presumption under Section 139 by demonstrating inconsistencies in the Appellant's evidence and creating a shadow of doubt regarding the alleged loan. The Trial Court's and High Court's findings that the Appellant could not prove financial capacity or valid advancement of a loan were upheld. The mere admission of signature on the cheque and agreement was insufficient to establish liability in the absence of cogent evidence supporting the claim. Appeal dismissed; findings of the Trial Court and High Court affirmed. Dattatraya v. Sharanappa, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 890

Partnership Act, 1932

Sections 37, 42(b), 44(g) and 48 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order XX Rule 15 - Whether the accounts and profits of a dissolved partnership firm can include periods beyond the date of dissolution. Validity of the final decree passed based on reports and evidence deemed unreliable and without providing an opportunity to the parties to challenge the same. The plaintiff (respondent) filed a suit in 1978 for dissolution, settlement of accounts, and distribution of assets of the partnership firm. The trial court dissolved the firm effective 07.10.1978 and dismissed the suit against the fourth defendant (appellant company), directing accounts to be taken till the date of dissolution. On appeal, the High Court revised the dissolution date to 15.11.1978 and directed the commissioner to take accounts while considering Sections 37 and 48 of the Indian Partnership Act. A final decree in 2004 awarded the plaintiff ₹1,10,815 with interest but relied on reports considered unreliable and without cross-examination of key witnesses. The High Court remanded the matter to the trial court, holding the final decree untenable as it relied on inadmissible evidence and failed to provide proper opportunities for examination and objections. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's remand order, emphasizing the need to adhere to the preliminary decree and provisions of Section 37 of the Indian Partnership Act. The plaintiff, as an outgoing partner, is entitled to seek accounts and profits derived from the firm's assets until final settlement. The matter requires further evidence to determine the extent of business derived from the firm's assets. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, maintaining the remand order for reconsideration of evidence and accounts. It refrained from expressing any binding opinion on the merits of the parties' claims. Appeals dismissed. Crystal Transport v. A Fathima Fareedunisa, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 881

Penal Code, 1860

Section 306 - Simple refusal to marry not abetment to suicide. Kamaruddin Dastagir Sanadi v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 933

Sections 376, 420, 504, and 506 - False Promise to Marry - Delay in Allegations - Consensual relationship - Abuse of process - Long-term relationships - A promise to marry that is not made from the outset with the intention to deceive cannot attract the penal provisions of Section 375 IPC, punishable under Section 376 IPC. The absence of early protest or objection by the complainant, and the continuation of a prolonged consensual physical relationship, indicates the lack of a false promise from the beginning. A decade-long consensual physical relationship without insistence on marriage reflects mutual understanding rather than coercion or deceit. The complainant's awareness of the appellant's marital status undermines claims of naivety or susceptibility to deceit. Allegations raised after the discontinuation of financial support rather than immediate protest weaken the claim of a false promise of marriage. Prolonged consensual relationships, if criminalized belatedly, may result in misuse of criminal law to address civil disputes. Observations are case-specific, emphasizing that human relationships are dynamic and influenced by individual circumstances, requiring decisions tailored to the specific facts of each case. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered against the appellant under Sections 376, 420, 504, and 506 IPC. It held that continuing the criminal proceedings would constitute an abuse of the process of law. The court clarified that the complainant retains the right to pursue other remedies under the law. Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 921

Sections 441, 442, and 452 - "house trespass" - Restaurant did not qualify as a "human dwelling" or a place for "custody of property". Hence, the essential ingredient of "house trespass" was not established. Sonu Choudary v. State of NCT Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 882

Section 498A - The Supreme Court cautioned lower courts to avoid over-implicating distant relatives of husbands in exaggerated domestic cruelty cases under Section 498A of the IPC. In a case where the husband's cousin and his wife were wrongly implicated, the Court emphasized the need for careful scrutiny of such allegations, especially when the accused are not closely related to the complainant. The Court highlighted the duty of courts to prevent undue suffering and avoid abuse of the legal process in matrimonial disputes. Payal Sharma v State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 924

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Sections 7, 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) and Section 20 – Demand and acceptance of bribe – Triviality under Section 20(3) - Acquittal by High Court reversed - Held, the trial court had rightly convicted the respondent under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) r/w Section 13(2) of the Act based on oral and documentary evidence. The High Court's acquittal, premised on an erroneous reliance on A. Subair's case, was unsustainable as it misinterpreted the requirement of pending work to prove the offense. The Court clarified that once demand and acceptance of illegal gratification are proved, the presumption of corrupt motive under Section 20 is drawn unless rebutted by the accused with concrete evidence. The provision granting discretion to disregard presumption in cases of trivial amounts must be exercised judiciously, considering the proportionality of the amount to the act sought. In this case, the discretion was not applicable. Where the recovery of the bribe and the elements of demand and acceptance are established beyond reasonable doubt, the High Court's contrary view is deemed perverse and warrants interference. The Court restored the trial court's judgment, directing the respondent to undergo the remaining sentence and pay the fine imposed. Appeal allowed. State of Karnataka v. Chandrasha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 926

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Section 65 makes the provisions of the CrPC applicable to all proceedings under the PMLA, provided the same are not inconsistent with the provisions contained in the PMLA. The words 'All other proceedings' include a complaint under Section 44 (1)(b) of the PMLA. Held, considering the object of Section 197(1) of the CrPC, its applicability cannot be excluded unless there is any provision in the PMLA which is inconsistent with Section 197(1). Therefore, the provisions of Section 197(1) of CrPC are applicable to a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA. Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 940

Section 71 - Overriding Effect - While Section 71 of the PMLA provides overriding authority, it does not negate the procedural requirements of prior sanction for prosecution under CrPC when acts are integrally connected to official duties. Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 940

Property

Marumakkathayam Law - Whether property acquired by a Hindu woman post-partition, without legal heirs, constitutes her separate property or remains joint family property. Held, property obtained by a Hindu woman post-partition, in the absence of legal heirs, becomes her separate property. Partition transforms joint ownership into individual ownership, thereby dissolving the joint nature of the property. Ramachandran v. Vijayan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 913

Settlement Deed - Consideration need not be monetary - The Supreme Court upheld a property transfer based on a settlement deed requiring the transferee to care for the transferors and perform charitable work. The Court rejected the argument that the consideration can only be in money. Instead, it justified the consideration of taking care of the transferor and doing charity work as a valid consideration for the transfer of the immovable property. Ramachandra Reddy v. Ramulu Ammal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 895

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

Section 4 - Indian Penal Code, 1860; Sections 376D and 354 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 389, 357A and 357B - The appellant was convicted by the Sessions Court for gang rape (Section 376-D IPC), outrage of modesty (Section 354 IPC), and sexual offences against a minor under the POCSO Act, receiving a cumulative sentence of 20 years imprisonment with fines. The High Court dismissed his application for suspension of sentence and bail under Section 389 CrPC. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. Whether the appellant should be granted suspension of sentence and bail. Whether the Sessions Court erred in not awarding victim compensation under Section 357A CrPC and POCSO Rules. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, granting suspension of sentence and bail, citing: The appellant had already served over half of his sentence. Co-accused had been granted similar relief by the High Court. Low probability of sentence enhancement by the High Court. The Court also directed : Sessions Courts to mandatorily consider awarding victim compensation under Section 357A CrPC and POCSO Rules in cases involving sexual offences, particularly against minors and women. High Courts to ensure implementation of victim compensation schemes, such as Maharashtra's "Manodhairya Scheme." Expedited consideration of interim compensation for the victim in the present case under the POCSO Rules. The Court emphasized the need for uniform and prompt implementation of victim compensation schemes across the judiciary. Appeal allowed, and the appellant was granted bail. Directions were issued for enhancing victim compensation mechanisms. Sahiba Noor Mohammad v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 860

Whether a compromise between the accused and the complainant in a case involving serious offenses under the POCSO Act can justify quashing criminal proceedings under Section 482, Cr. P.C. Whether such offenses can be treated as private disputes capable of settlement. Held, offenses under the POCSO Act, particularly those involving allegations of pressure to prevent reporting of crimes, cannot be treated as private disputes or minor compoundable offenses. A compromise between the accused and the complainant's family cannot justify quashing proceedings when the alleged offense has serious societal implications. The power under Section 482, Cr. P.C., cannot be invoked to quash proceedings for heinous offenses, as deterrence and societal interest must be prioritized. The POCSO Act was enacted to safeguard children from sexual offenses, and offenses under its purview are not merely private matters but have significant social ramifications. The statement of the complainant indicating pressure from the accused to refrain from lodging a report further justifies the continuation of criminal proceedings. Reliance was placed on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan to emphasize that heinous offenses cannot be quashed solely on the basis of compromise. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order quashing the FIR and criminal proceedings was set aside. The investigation and proceedings were directed to continue in accordance with the law. The Court reiterated that a victim's parent cannot settle disputes involving serious offenses on behalf of the victim. Courts must safeguard children's interests and ensure justice is not compromised by private settlements. Ramji Lal Bairwa v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 865

Receiver

Whether the High Court was justified in appointing a court receiver concerning the suit-scheduled property. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order appointing a court receiver, and restored the Civil Court's order rejecting the appointment of a receiver. The Civil Court had previously restrained the defendants from creating third-party interest in the suit property but rejected the prayer for appointing a receiver, finding an injunction sufficient. The High Court's decision to appoint a court receiver lacked sufficient reasoning, with no compelling circumstances demonstrated to justify such an appointment. The Supreme Court reiterated that appointing a receiver is an exceptional remedy requiring specific circumstances, which were absent in the present case. Hitesh Bhuralal Jain v. Rajpal Amarnath Yadav, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 903

Recruitment

Recruitment Process - Eligibility Criteria - Precedent - Recruitment Procedures - Binding Nature of Rules - Right to Appointment - The recruitment process begins with the issuance of an advertisement inviting applications and concludes with the filling of vacancies. Eligibility criteria specified at the start of the recruitment process cannot be altered midway unless permitted by the applicable rules or the advertisement itself, provided such changes comply with Article 14 of the Constitution and the principle of non-arbitrariness. The ruling in K. Manjusree, (2008) 3 SCC 512 establishes valid law and is distinct from Subash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220 as the former pertains to the right to be included in the Select List, while the latter addresses the right to appointment from the Select List. Recruitment bodies may adopt procedures consistent with the rules to conclude the process, provided such procedures are transparent, non-discriminatory, and rationally connected to the objective. Statutory rules governing recruitment are binding. In the absence of such rules or if they are silent, administrative instructions may be applied to fill procedural gaps. Inclusion in the Select List does not guarantee an indefeasible right to appointment. While the State or its instrumentalities may choose not to fill vacancies for bona fide reasons, they cannot arbitrarily deny appointment to eligible candidates within the Select List if vacancies exist. Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 864

Registration Act, 1908

Section 89 (4) - Whether the issuance of the sale certificate under Section 89(4) of the Registration Act, 1908 mandates registration. Whether a sale certificate issued following a court-ordered auction requires payment of stamp duty under the Stamp Act, 1899. Exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution despite the availability of alternate remedies. Held, a sale certificate issued in pursuance of a court-ordered auction is not compulsorily registrable under Section 17(2)(xii) of the Registration Act, 1908. Payment of stamp duty becomes relevant only when the sale certificate is used for purposes requiring registration or other legal validation under the Stamp Act. The High Court's exercise of writ jurisdiction was justified, given the limited scope of the controversy and established legal principles. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment directing the issuance of the sale certificate without the immediate imposition of stamp duty and refund of previously deposited stamp duty. State of Punjab v. Ferrous Alloy Forgings, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 920

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016

Airport Accessibility - The petitioner, a person with benchmark disability under the Act, 2016, sought enforcement of inclusive accessibility guidelines at airports and training for airport staff to sensitively assist passengers with disabilities. The petitioner invoked Article 32 of the Constitution, raising concerns over the implementation of accessibility standards and discriminatory practices during security screening. Held, the Supreme Court, emphasizing the assimilation of persons with disabilities into mainstream society, mandated the enforcement of detailed guidelines proposed by the Union of India. These include: Development of a real-time wheelchair availability mobile application. Mandatory mechanized wheelchairs at designated airport points. Coding of boarding passes with disability-specific identifiers and severity scales. Integration of the Unique Disability Identity Database (UDID) into ticket booking systems for seamless verification. Installation of specialized kiosks with voice recognition for enhanced accessibility. Regular sensitization training for airport staff, categorized into frequent training for frontline staff and periodic training for others. The Court extended these guidelines to include elderly and injured passengers requiring assistance and clarified that physical assistance currently provided at airports must continue alongside the new measures. Writ Petition disposed of with the above guidelines made mandatory. Arushi Singh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 907

Several guidelines under Rule 15 of the RPWD Rules, 2017, are recommendatory and inconsistent with the mandatory compliance mechanism envisaged under the RPWD Act, 2016. Rule 15(1) was declared ultra vires to the legislative intent of the Act. The Union Government was directed to delineate mandatory rules under Section 40 of the Act within three months, segregating non-negotiable rules from the current guidelines, in consultation with stakeholders. The principles of accessibility—universal design, comprehensive inclusion across disabilities, assistive technology integration, and ongoing stakeholder consultation—were emphasized for this process. The Union Government was further directed to ensure strict implementation of mandatory rules, backed by penalties under Sections 44, 45, 46, and 89 of the Act. Rajive Raturi v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 875

Medical Education - Accessibility and Inclusion in Medical Education for Persons with Disabilities - Allocation of Supernumerary Seat - Applicability In Rem - Directions - Guidelines for Admission - Revised Disability Assessment Protocols - Reasonable Accommodation as a Right - Inclusion in Healthcare - Accessibility Database and NEET Information - Enabling Units in Medical Colleges - The High Court judgment and the AIIMS Nagpur Disability Assessment Board's report dated 13 August 2024 were quashed for non-compliance with statutory and regulatory standards. AIIMS Nagpur is directed to create a supernumerary seat for the appellant, subject to their non-allocation elsewhere. Colleges must implement recommendations to support the appellant's pursuit of the MBBS program, ensuring protection against victimization. The judgment shall have universal applicability. New disability-inclusive guidelines for medical admissions must be formulated by a committee including disability experts, aligned with contemporary disability justice principles. The Disability Assessment Boards must move beyond a benchmark model, ensuring fairness, transparency, and inclusion of health professionals with disabilities. Denial of reasonable accommodation constitutes discrimination, violating equality principles under Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. Encouraging persons with disabilities in the medical profession enhances healthcare quality and promotes fraternity. A database on college accessibility and accommodations must be created, with NEET applicants informed of such provisions. These units must facilitate clinical accommodations for students with disabilities. The appeal is allowed. Pending applications are disposed of, and the judgment is transmitted to relevant governmental authorities for compliance. Om Rathod v. Director General of Health Services, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 857

Sale Agreement

Not every plaintiff must prove the execution of a sale agreement if another plaintiff with knowledge of the transaction proves the execution. A plaintiff's absence should not be viewed adversely, as testimony from another plaintiff present can substantively support the claims of absent plaintiffs. Shyam Kumar Inani v. Vinod Agrawal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 883

Service

Compassionate Appointment — Time-Barred Claims and Ex-Gratia Compensation — In this case, the Supreme Court addressed the rejection of a claim for compassionate appointment made by the son of a deceased government employee, who had attained the age of majority 11 years after his father's demise. The appellant's claim was rejected on the basis of Haryana Government instructions dated 22.03.1999, which stipulated that a minor dependent must attain the age of majority within three years from the date of the employee's death to qualify for compassionate appointment. The Court held that compassionate appointment is not a vested right but an exception to the general rule of public employment. It emphasized that such appointments are aimed at alleviating immediate financial distress caused by the death of a government employee. The Court further clarified that equality under Article 14 of the Constitution cannot be invoked to perpetuate an illegality or irregularity, such as extending benefits beyond the scope of applicable rules or policies. However, recognizing the prolonged pendency of the appellant's claim and the lack of timely communication by the State regarding his mother's entitlement to ex-gratia compensation, the Court directed the State to allow the appellant's mother to submit a representation seeking lump sum ex-gratia compensation under the relevant rules. The State was instructed to decide on the representation within six weeks, failing which interest at the rate of 6% per annum would apply to any compensation granted. The appeal was disposed of with no order as to costs. Tinku v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 886

Disciplinary Proceedings - Natural Justice - Major Penalty - Oral Evidence - Legal Principles - Whether disciplinary proceedings imposing a major penalty without recording oral evidence violate the principles of natural justice and statutory rules. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the Tribunal's decision quashing the disciplinary authority's penalty order. Held, the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant were vitiated as they failed to comply with Rule 7(vii) of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servant (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999. No oral evidence was recorded by the Inquiry Officer, despite the charges constituting a major penalty. The Court reinstated the Tribunal's decision, quashing the penalty order issued by the disciplinary authority and granting the appellant all consequential benefits. Disciplinary inquiries involving major penalties must adhere to procedural safeguards, including the mandatory recording of oral evidence in the presence of the charged officer. Mere reliance on documentary evidence without proving its contents through witnesses violates the principles of natural justice. Satyendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 896

Experience marks cannot be denied solely because a candidate worked as an outsourced manpower. If the candidate performed duties aligned with the sanctioned post, they are eligible for marks, even if the candidate was not appointed on the sanctioned post.

Reinstatement of Candidates in Select List with Certificate of 80 Hours Course on Computer Concepts (CCC Certification) – Whether the termination of candidates from the select list dated 14th July 2015, who had produced CCC certificates at the time of their interviews, was legally sustainable. Held, the termination of candidates who produced CCC certificates on the date of the interview was held to be improper. Such candidates were entitled to reinstatement. Candidates who obtained CCC certification after the interview date were not entitled to relief, as this would contravene the requirements of the advertisement and the 1995 Regulations. Mukul Kumar Tyagi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 876

Disciplinary Proceedings Post-Retirement - No disciplinary proceedings can be initiated against an employee after their retirement or the conclusion of their extended period of service. The employer lacks jurisdiction to commence or continue such proceedings beyond the employee's tenure unless expressly permitted by statutory or contractual provisions. This judgment underscores the principle of finality in employment relationships upon retirement and reinforces the sanctity of procedural timelines in disciplinary matters. State Bank of India v. Navin Kumar Sinha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 901

Retrospective Promotion - Right to Consideration vs. Promotion - Administrative Delays - Whether a government employee, recommended for promotion before retirement but unable to assume the post due to administrative delays, is entitled to notional financial benefits for the promotional post post-retirement - Applicability of Rule 54(1)(a) of the West Bengal Service Rules in denying retrospective financial benefits without assuming the duties of the higher post. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the Government of West Bengal, holding that Rule 54(1)(a) of the West Bengal Service Rules stipulates that an employee must assume the duties and responsibilities of a higher post to be eligible for the corresponding financial benefits. As respondent No. 1 retired before assuming such duties, he could not be granted financial benefits retrospectively. While the right to be considered for promotion is a fundamental right under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, the right to promotion itself is not absolute. Promotion becomes effective only upon the assumption of duties. Although the delay in processing the promotion was caused by the appellants' inaction, it does not override the statutory bar on retrospective promotions or the requirement of assuming the post's duties. Promotion becomes effective from the date an employee assumes charge of the higher post, not from the vacancy date or recommendation date. Retrospective promotions are not permissible unless explicitly enabled by statutory provisions. The impugned judgments of the High Court and the Administrative Tribunal were set aside. Respondent No. 1 was not entitled to notional financial benefits post-retirement. Government of West Bengal v. Dr. Amal Satpathi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 927

Specific Relief Act, 1936

Section 10 and Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act (Pre-2018 Amendment) - Discretion and Readiness to Perform – Errors in Prior Findings - The Supreme Court analyzed whether the petitioner was entitled to a decree for specific performance under the Specific Relief Act, considering pre-amendment Section 10, which allowed courts discretion in granting such relief. The Court acknowledged its discretionary power under pre-2018 Section 10 to decree specific performance when monetary compensation was inadequate or no standard existed to ascertain damages. The statutory presumption that compensation is inadequate for immovable property transactions was emphasized, with no evidence to rebut this presumption. Under Section 16(c), the petitioner demonstrated readiness and willingness to perform the contract by paying 75% of the sale consideration, despite the remaining balance being unpaid due to circumstances beyond their control. The Court clarified that tendering money is not essential unless mandated by the court. The prior judgment erroneously concluded that time was of the essence and the petitioner was not ready to perform, based on misinterpretation of contract clauses and reliance on incomplete evidence. The evidence of the respondent's failure to produce requisite documents, as confirmed by trial and appellate courts, was overlooked. The Court held that the petitioner was ready and willing to perform and that specific performance was warranted. It noted the absence of any contractual stipulation or evidence negating the statutory presumption under Section 10. The petitioner is entitled to specific performance, and the discretion under Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act (pre-2018 amendment) must be exercised in favor of enforcing the contract. Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Section 19(b) - Specific performance of an unregistered oral agreement of sale - Validity of subsequent transfer to bona fide purchasers - Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the subsequent purchasers (appellants) and upheld the High Court's judgment granting specific performance to the original plaintiff. The High Court rightly concluded that the appellants failed to prove themselves as bona fide purchasers under Section 19(b) - The appellants, subsequent purchasers, failed to demonstrate good faith in their purchase, including due inquiry regarding the possession and title of the suit property. Evidence revealed collusion between the original owner and the appellants. The Court emphasized that bona fide purchasers must act with due care, honesty, and diligence. The appellants' failure to inquire about the possession of the plaintiff's husband, who was a mortgagee in possession, constituted wilful abstention, leading to constructive notice of the plaintiff's equitable rights. The original plaintiff was permitted to execute the decree for specific performance. The appeal was dismissed, reaffirming the High Court's finding that the appellants were not bona fide purchasers under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. Manjit Singh v. Darshana Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 919

Readiness and Willingness – Jurisdictional Fact – Maintainability of Suit - Interpretation of Agreement Clauses - In a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale, the written agreement between the parties assumes paramount importance, and its terms must be reasonably ascertainable. Clauses in the agreement must be read harmoniously to ascertain the intention of the parties. Here, the obligation to vacate tenants and the buyer's obligation to pay within a specified timeframe were interlinked. Time was not of the essence since the property's vacant possession delayed the buyer's obligations. The buyer failed to demonstrate readiness and willingness to perform the contract. Evidence indicated financial incapacity, reluctance to pay the balance consideration despite reminders, and unjustified delays in returning the advance payment. The court emphasized the importance of jurisdictional facts in determining the trial court's authority to grant relief. A higher court may assess the existence of such facts even if the trial court omits to frame issues specifically addressing them. Discretionary relief of specific performance was denied due to the buyer's conduct, which lacked bona fides and failed to inspire confidence. The appeal was allowed, restoring the Trial Court's dismissal of the suit. The buyer was entitled to a refund of the advance payment but not specific performance. R. Kandasamy v. T.R.K. Sarawathy, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 911

Tax

Mobile service providers (MSPs) could avail the benefit of Central Value Added Tax/CENVAT Credit over excise duties paid on items such as mobile towers and prefabricated buildings. Since mobile towers and PFBs could be detached and relocated, they qualified as movable properties and accessories in enhancing the functionality of the mobile service antenna attached on top of the tower. Thus, the items qualified as 'capital goods' or 'inputs' which were indispensable to provide effective mobile services (output) and MSPs can get a credit set-off on these items. Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 909

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Section 52 - Doctrine of Lis Pendens and Interim Injunctions - While Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act protects against pendente lite transfers, it may not fully safeguard the plaintiff's interests in specific cases. Courts are empowered under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC to grant interim injunctions restraining transfers during litigation to prevent undue hardship and maintain the status quo. Examples include cases where third-party bona fide purchasers may complicate equitable relief like specific performance. (Sm. Muktakesi Dawn v. Haripada Mazumdar, AIR 1988 Cal 25; Promotha Nath Roy v. Jagannath Kisore Lal Singh Deo, (1912) 17 Cal LJ 427). Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Section 52 - The High Court's order was set aside for failing to meet the standards of appellate scrutiny. Respondents are directed to maintain the status quo concerning the suit property, avoiding further encumbrances or transfers. Any future transfers will be subject to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, even if lis pendens is not formally registered. This judgment underscores the necessity for appellate courts to exercise caution and adhere to established principles in reviewing interlocutory orders, while also emphasizing the importance of interim protections in property disputes. Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Section 52 - Doctrine of Lis Pendens and Its Applicability - This judgment examines the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which prohibits the transfer of immovable property during the pendency of litigation where the property is directly and specifically in question. The Court reiterated the conditions for the application of the doctrine, emphasizing that: The suit or proceeding must be pending in a competent court. The suit should not be collusive. The right to the immovable property must be directly in question. Any transfer by a party to the suit or proceeding must affect the rights of other parties involved. The Court rejected the argument that the doctrine does not apply because the review petition was lying in the registry in a defective state. It clarified that the doctrine of lis pendens is triggered at the stage of "institution" of proceedings, not when the court issues notice. Thus, any transfer made after the institution of a review petition, even if the petition is later perfected, is subject to the outcome of the litigation. The judgment underscores the purpose of lis pendens: to prevent the subversion of judicial processes and protect the integrity of the court's authority over the property in question. Transfers made during the pendency of litigation, unless authorized by the court, bind third parties to the ultimate outcome of the proceedings. Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 870

Words and Phrases

"Perverse" - Meaning of the Expression "Perverse" - Definition and Scope of - A "perverse" order is one that consciously violates pleadings and established legal principles. It is defined as being against the weight of evidence, or contrary to the evidence entirely (Moffett v. Gough (1878) 1 LR 1r 331; Godfrey v. Godfrey 106 NW 814). Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

"Perverse" - Dictionary Interpretations - Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary: Deliberately behaving in a way deemed wrong, unreasonable, or unacceptable. Longman Dictionary: Deliberately deviating from what is normal and reasonable. The New Oxford Dictionary of English: A verdict against the weight of evidence or judicial direction on a legal point. New Webster's Dictionary: Purposely deviating from accepted behavior; stubborn or wicked. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary: A verdict not only against the weight of evidence but altogether contrary to it. Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

"Perverse" - Judicial Interpretation of Perversity - A perverse finding arises from a complete misreading of evidence, reliance on conjectures, or baseless surmises (Damodar Lal v. Sohan Devi, (2016) 3 SCC 78). The "reasonable man" test applies: If a conclusion on the facts is plausible to a reasonable person, it is not perverse. If it is implausible or unsupported by evidence, it qualifies as perverse. Exclusions from Perversity: Merely inadequate evidence or a different interpretation of evidence does not constitute perversity. This judgment clarifies that a finding is perverse when it is not grounded in evidence or rational interpretation, deviates from accepted judicial principles, or results from arbitrary reasoning. Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939