Supreme Court Monthly Digest- July 2024 With Statute And Subject Wise Index

Citations 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 435 to 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 537

Advocate

All miscellaneous amounts charged by Bar Councils for enrolment are 'enrolment fees'. Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 519

Bar Councils can't collect any amount exceeding fee specified under Section 24 of advocates act for enrolment. Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 519

Every advocate is expected to come to the Court in proper attire as per the Rules and behave in the Court. (Para 7) Bijon Kumar Mahajan v. State of Assam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 449

Exorbitant enrolment fees charged by state bar councils violate the right to profession, dignity and equality. Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 519

Social capital and networks play an important role in legal career; lawyers from marginalised sections face difficulties. Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 519

All India Tourist Vehicles (Permit) Rules, 2023

Object – The 2023 Rules have primarily two objects: Firstly, to make the movement of such tourist vehicles across the country through different States seamless and smooth; and secondly, the revenue to be generated by the Centre to be proportionately shared with the State Governments, also taking into account their previous revenue generation, and also, keeping in mind that their earlier revenue income was not reduced in any manner. The Rules, 2023 superseded the All-India Tourists Vehicles (Authorization/Permit) Rules, 2021. After the coming into of the Rules, 2023, the power of levying/collecting Border Tax/Authorization Fee by the State Governments at various border check posts from vehicles carrying All India Tourists Permit was to be done away with. (Para 4) Muthyala Sunil Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 450

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Dispute regarding full and final settlement of contract is arbitrable. (Para 59) SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 489

Judge hearing Section 34 application must apply mind to grounds of challenge. Kalanithi Maran v. Ajay Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 520

Section 11(6) - While deciding a Section 11(6) petition for an appointment of an arbitrator, the referral courts must not conduct an intricate evidentiary enquiry into the question of whether the claims raised by the applicant are time-barred and should leave that question for determination by the arbitrator. The referral court should limit its enquiry to examining whether the Section 11(6) application has been filed within the period of limitation of three years or not. (Para 131) SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 489

Section 19(1) – Applicability of Civil procedure Code, 1908 in arbitral proceedings – The legislature's intention is reflected in Section 19(1) of the Arbitration Act, which provides that an Arbitral Tribunal is not bound by the provision of the CPC. Hence, the provisions of the CPC have not been made applicable to the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37(1)(c). (Para 18) Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation v. Samir Narain Bhojwani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 445

Section 34(3) and Limitation Act of 1963; Section 2(j) & 4 – Bar of limitation – Three months from the date of receiving the arbitral award – Held, the prescribed period of limitation started from 1st July, 2022 and ended on 30th September. The three months provided by way of limitation expired a day before the commencement of the pooja vacation, which commenced on 1st October 2022. Therefore, the appellants were not entitled to take benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act which states that if the 'prescribed period' of limitation expires on the day court is closed, the limitation period can be extended to the day the court re-opens. Further, as per Section 34(3), the period of limitation was extended by a maximum period of 30 days which expired on 30th October, 2022 on which date the court was closed. The benefit of section 4 of Limitation Act is only applicable on the 'prescribed period' and not applicable on the extended 30 days. Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act makes it amply clear that the 'prescribed period' for making an application for setting aside an arbitral award is three months. Hence, even when the period of extended limitation expired on 30th October when the court was closed, the benefit of Section 4 for the extension of limitation to the day the court re-opens is not applicable. Held, as the petition was filed on 31st October 2022, the High Court was right in holding that the petition filed was beyond the period specified under Section 34(3). Hence, there is no merit in the appeal, and it is, accordingly, dismissed. (Para 10 & 11) State of West Bengal v. Rajpath Contractors and Engineers Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 454

Section 34 & 37 – Jurisdiction of the Appellate Court dealing with an appeal under Section 37 – Jurisdiction during appeal under Section 37 against the judgment in a petition under Section 34 is more constrained than the jurisdiction of the Court dealing with a petition under Section 34. It is the duty of the Appellate Court to consider whether Section 34 Court has remained confined to the grounds of challenge that are available in a petition under Section 34. The ultimate function of the Appellate Court under Section 37 is to decide whether the jurisdiction under Section 34 has been exercised rightly or wrongly. While doing so, the Appellate Court can exercise the same power and jurisdiction that Section 34 Court possesses with the same constraints. (Para 16) Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation v. Samir Narain Bhojwani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 445

Section 34 & 37 – Object of arbitral proceedings – The court directed the members of the Bar to show restraint by incorporating only legally permissible grounds in petitions under Section 34 and the appeals under Section 37. Held, arbitration must become a tool for expeditious, effective, and cost-effective dispute resolution. When members of the bar take up so many grounds in petitions under Section 34, which are not covered by Section 34, there is a tendency to urge all those grounds which are not available in law and waste the Court's time. The proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 are being treated as if the same are appeals under Section 96 of the CPC, making the arbitral procedure inefficient and unfair. Further held, everyone associated with the arbitral proceedings must remember that brevity will make the arbitral proceedings and the proceedings under Sections 34 and 37 more effective. (Para 23) Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation v. Samir Narain Bhojwani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 445

Section 34 & 37 – Power of the Appellate Court dealing with the appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act to pass an order of remand to Section 34 Court. Order of remand passed directing the learned Single Judge to hear the petition under Section 34 afresh is challenged – The remedy of an appeal will not be effective unless there is a power of remand vesting in the appellate authority. In the Arbitration Act, there is no statutory embargo on the power of the Appellate Court under Section 37(1)(c) to pass an order of remand. However, looking at the scheme of the Arbitration Act, the Appellate Court can exercise the power of remand only when exceptional circumstances make an order of remand unavoidable. Held, while deciding the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, the learned Single Judge has made a very elaborate consideration of the submissions made across the Bar. Hence, the finding of the Appellate Bench that the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge does not address several issues raised by the parties cannot be sustained at all. Further held, the remand was completely unwarranted, as the learned Single Judge has elaborately dealt with the merits of the challenge in the Section 34 petition. (Para 7, 17, 18 & 20) Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation v. Samir Narain Bhojwani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 445

The initiation of arbitration and criminal proceedings under Section 138 are separate and independent proceedings that arise from two separate causes of action. Therefore, the institution of the proceedings under Section 138 does not imply a 'continuing cause of action' for the purpose of initiating arbitration. (Para 9) Elfit Arabia v. Concept Hotel BARONS Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 494

Bail

In an application made under Section 439(2) of the CrPC or Section 483(3) of the BNSS or other proceedings filed seeking cancellation of bail, the power to grant an interim stay of operation of order to bail can be exercised only in exceptional cases when a very strong prima facie case of the existence of the grounds for cancellation of bail is made out. While granting a stay of an order of grant of bail, the Court must record brief reasons for coming to a conclusion that the case was an exceptional one and a strong prima facie case is made out. As a normal rule, the ex-­parte stay of the bail order should not be granted. The said power can be exercised only in rare and very exceptional cases where the situation demands the passing of such drastic order. Where such a drastic ex­-parte order of stay is passed, it is the duty of the Court to immediately hear the accused on the prayer for continuation of the interim relief. When the Court exercises the power of granting ex-­parte ad interim stay of an order granting bail, the Court is duty bound to record reasons why it came to the conclusion that it was a very rare and exceptional case where a drastic order of ex-­parte interim stay was warranted. (Para 20) Parvinder Singh Khurana v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 502

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 20(b)(ii)(c) - The High Court took notice of the fact that the petitioner had been in custody since 11th May 2022, and only one witness had been examined so far. In such circumstances, the High Court deemed it fit to order the release of the petitioner on bail, but only for a period of two months. Held, it is an incorrect order. If the High Court was of the view that the petitioner's right to a speedy trial had been infringed, then the High Court should have ordered the release of the petitioner on bail pending the final disposal of the trial itself. There was no good reason for the High Court to limit the period of bail. (2 - 5) Kishor Karmakar v. State of Odisha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 436

Penal Code, 1860; Section 366 (A) r/w. 34 - The High Court ordered the release of the petitioner on bail, but subject to the condition that the surety shall be the victim. It is the case of the petitioner that it was practically impossible to ask the victim to stand as a surety. In such circumstances, the petitioner preferred an application seeking modification of the condition. The modification application was rejected by the High Court. In such circumstances, the petitioner is before the Supreme Court. Held, it is very unfortunate to note that because of such an absurd condition imposed by the High Court, the petitioner, although ordered to be released on bail way back in July 2023, is still languishing in jail. The condition imposed by the High Court requiring the victim to stand as a surety is stayed from its operation. The petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to the terms and conditions that the trial court may deem fit to impose. (Para 2 - 9) Sharwan Kumar Yadav @ Sharwan Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 435

Special courts power to grant bail in cases of inordinate delay – If a bail application is made to the Special Court with a grievance regarding inordinate delay in the disposal of pending cases, the Special Court will be empowered to exercise power to grant bail. (Para 11.1) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441

The Supreme Court granted bail to Trinamool Congress (TMC) leader Anubrata Mondal in the case registered by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in relation to an alleged India-Bangladesh border cattle smuggling scam stating that the "trial is unlikely to commence soon". However, Mondal will remain in jail as he was arrested by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) which is also investigating the matter along with CBI. Anubrata Mondal @ Kesto v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 528

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 11 – Bar of res judicata – Object of the principle of res judicata is to avoid parties to litigate on the same issue which has already been adjudicated upon and settled. The matter which is directly and substantially in issue in the previous litigation ought not to be permitted to be raised and adjudicated upon in the subsequent suit. Title and possession over the disputed land is claimed – Held, the judgment and order of the previous suit which is final and conclusive, in no specific terms adjudicates upon the right, title and interest of the suit land. The suit, was dismissed simpliciter without adjudication of any rights of the plaintiff-appellant over the suit land vis-à-vis the Cantonment Board. Hence, the principle of res judicata would not be attracted as the issue in the present suit was neither directly or indirectly in issue in the previous suit. The suit is not barred by res judicata. (Para 21, 23, 25) Har Narayan Tewari v. Cantonment Board, Ramgarh Cantonment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 446

Section 11 – Applicability of res judicata between co-defendants – It is a settled law that the principle of res judicata is applicable not only between the plaintiff and the defendants but also between the co-defendants. In applying the principle of res judicata between the co-defendants, primarily three conditions are necessary to be fulfilled, namely, (i) there must be a conflict of interest between the co-defendants; (ii) there is necessity to decide the said conflict in order to give relief to plaintiff; and (iii) there is final decision adjudicating the said conflict. Once all these conditions are satisfied, the principle of res judicata can be applied inter se the co-defendants. Held, there was no conflict of interest between the co-defendants in the earlier Suit. None of the above stated conditions between co-defendants stood fulfilled for applying res judicata. Hence, the principle of res judicata would not be attracted as the there was no conflict of interest between the co-defendants in the said previous suit which if any never came to be adjudicated upon. The suit is not barred under Section 11 CPC. (Para 23 & 25) Har Narayan Tewari v. Cantonment Board, Ramgarh Cantonment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 446

Section 100 – Second appeal – Whether substantial question of law is involved? – Held, the substantial question of law arising in the second appeal was - Whether the suit as setup by the plaintiff-appellant was barred by principle of res judicata in view of the decision in the earlier Suit. (Para 17) Har Narayan Tewari v. Cantonment Board, Ramgarh Cantonment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 446

Order 2 Rule 2 – Bar to subsequent suit on same cause of action – Observing that the suit for recovery of possession is different from the suit for arrears of rent and damages, the Supreme Court held that there's no bar to file a separate suit for arrears of rent and damages after a suit for possession. Held, a plea of a bar under 0. 2. R. 2, Civil Procedure Code can be established only if the defendant files in evidence the pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the Court the identity of the cause of action in the two suits. Hence, both the causes of action being separate, the second suit was clearly maintainable. (Para 17) Uniworld Logistics Pvt. Ltd. V. Indev Logistics Pvt. Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 469

Order 21 Rule 90 - A person aggrieved by an auction sale conducted by the public functionary in gross violations of the mandatory provisions of law cannot be called upon to establish the dual conditions stipulated in Order XXI Rule 90 CPC for setting aside the auction sale. Al-Can Export Pvt. Ltd. v. Prestige H.M. Polycontainers Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 453

Order 23 Rule 3 - Compromise of Suit - For a valid compromise in a suit there has to be a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties which would then require it to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. In the present case, neither the compromise deed has been reduced to writing, nor it is recorded by the court. Mere statements of the parties before court about such said compromise, cannot satisfy the requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC. Therefore, the compromise decree is not valid. (Para 20 & 23) Amro Devi v. Julfi Ram, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 482

Written Statement - A party whose right to file a written statement in a case has been forfeited cannot introduce his case indirectly through evidence or written submission. Such a party can still participate in the proceedings and cross-examine the complainant, but cannot indirectly introduce his case. (Para 18) Kaushik Narsinhbhai Patel v. S.J.R. Prime Corporation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 497

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Conviction in question – Held, the Court had appropriately appreciated the evidence on record and convicted accused Nos.1 and 2 upon satisfying itself that the ingredients to attract the offence punishable under Section 494 I.P.C., have been made out by the appellant. Hence, no more narrative on the correctness of the reversal of the by the High Court is required as it is indisputable that its reversal was accepted by accused Nos.1 and 2 and they had undergone the sentence imposed by the High Court consequent to the reversal judgment. (Para 10) Baba Natarajan Prasad v. M. Revathi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 474

Framing of charge – Requirements – The standard of test and judgment which is finally applied before recording a finding of conviction against an accused is not to be applied at the stage of framing the charge and just a very strong suspicion, based on the material on record, would be sufficient to frame a charge. The strong suspicion should be the one emerging from the materials on record brought by the prosecution. It is within the jurisdiction of the Court concerned to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused concerned has been made out. Held, the question of framing the charge would arise only in a case where the court upon such exercise satisfies itself about the prima facie case revealing from “the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith” against the accused concerned. Hence, the intention embedded is to ensure that an accused will be made to stand the ordeal of trial only if 'the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith' discloses ground for proceeding against him. Further held, there is no ground for a prima facie case revealed from the materials produced by the prosecution. (Para 14, 15, 19 & 32) Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 475

Section 125 – A divorced Muslim woman is entitled to file a petition for maintenance against her ex-husband under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This right of a Muslim woman is in addition to the right under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986. Mohd Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 452

Section 227 – Discharge of accused in criminal cases – When an application for discharge is filed under Section 227, Cr.PC, the Court concerned is bound to disclose the reason(s), though, not in detail, for finding sufficient ground for rejecting the application or in other words, for finding prima facie case, as it will enable the superior Court to examine the challenge against the order of rejection. (Para 22) Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 475

Section 294 - Calling upon the accused to admit or deny the genuineness of the documents produced by the prosecution alongwith the list under Section 294 of Cr.P.C., could not be said to be in any way prejudicial to the right of the accused, nor could it be said to be compelling him to be a witness against himself as contemplated under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. However, the Court deleted the observations made in paragraph 56 of the impugned order, which suggested that deliberate denial of a document's genuineness could be considered an aggravating circumstance during sentencing. The petitioner is allowed to raise all legally permissible contentions during the trial. (Para 2 - 4) Ashok Daga v. Directorate Of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 480

Section 311 - A conjoint reading of Section 311 CrPC and Section 165 of the Evidence Act makes it clear that the trial Court is under an obligation not to act as a mere spectator and should proactively participate in the trial proceedings, so as to ensure that neither any extraneous material is permitted to be brought on record nor any relevant fact is left out. It is the duty of the trial Court to ensure that all such evidence which is essential for the just decision of the case is brought on record irrespective of the fact that the party concerned omits to do so. (Para 48) Gaurav Maini v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 471

Section 313 – Conviction of accused challenged on grounds of violation of Section 313 – Section 313 embodies principle of natural justice viz., audi alteram partem, empowering the Court to examine the accused thereunder to give the accused concerned an opportunity to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution evidence. Questioning under Section 313(1)(a), Cr.PC, is discretionary but the questioning under Section 313(1)(b) thereof is mandatory. Held, if a fatal non-compliance in the matter of questioning resulted in 'material prejudice' to any convict in a criminal case, the trial concerning that convict should stand vitiated. The examination of the appellant under Section 313, Cr.PC, reveals that both the incriminating circumstances were not directly or even indirectly put to the appellant while being examined under Section 313, Cr.PC. Held, the twin incriminating circumstances were not put to the appellant while he was being questioned under Section 313, Cr.PC, and they ultimately culminated in his conviction, it is clear that the appellant was 'materially prejudiced' and it had resulted in blatant miscarriage of justice. The failure as above is not a curable defect and it is nothing but a patent illegality vitiating the trial qua the appellant. Hence, the conviction of the appellant could not be sustained. (Para 19, 20, 24 & 26) Naresh Kumar v. State of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 443

Section 321 – Permission for withdrawal of the prosecution against an accused is challenged – Held, the Trial Court's has taken a casual approach towards the accusations against the then sitting Member of Legislative Assembly in allowing withdrawal of his prosecution and merely because an accused person is elected to the Legislative Assembly cannot be a testament to their image among the general public. Matters of a gruesome crime akin to the double murder in the present case do not warrant withdrawal of prosecution merely on the ground of good public image of an accused named in the charge sheet after thorough investigation. Contrary to the Trial Court's view, such withdrawal cannot be said to be allowed in public interest in cases of involvement of influential people. Hence, it is of paramount importance to ensure progression of the trial without further delay. (Para 12) Shailendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 476

Section 357 - The appellant, convicted under Sections 409 and 201 of the IPC and sentenced to four years and six months of rigorous imprisonment, was ordered by the High Court to deposit 50% of the Rs. 2.86 crore compensation to obtain bail and suspension of sentence. The Supreme Court, referencing the principles of Section 357 Cr.P.C. and the case of Dilip S. Dahanukar v. Mahindra Co. Ltd. (2007), found the High Court's condition unjustified and allowed the appeal, removing the requirement to deposit 50% of the compensation. Nikhil v State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 478

Section 389 – Suspension of substantive order of sentence of life imprisonment – Held, if a sentence imposed by trial court is for a fixed term, ordinarily, the appellate court may exercise its discretion to suspend the operation of the same liberally unless there are any exceptional circumstances emerging from the record to decline. However, when it is a case of life imprisonment, the only legal test which the Court should apply is to ascertain whether there is anything 'palpable' or 'apparent on the face of the record' on the basis of which the court can come to the conclusion that the conviction is 'not sustainable in law' and that the convict has very fair chances of succeeding in his appeal. Further held, the offence is prima facie established against the appellant before the trial court. Hence, the High Court is at no fault in declining to suspend the substantive order of sentence of life imprisonment. (Para 7 & 8) Bhupatji Sartajji Jabraji Thakor v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 438

Section 418 (1) – Proportionality of sentence with respect to the offence committed – To claim enhancement of punishment for conviction for the offence – Held, it is the solemn duty of the Court to strike a proper balance awarding sentence proportionate to the gravity of the offence committed by the accused concerned upon his conviction for serious offence(s). The offence under Section 494 I.P.C., has to be treated as a serious offence, hence, the imposition of 'imprisonment till the rising of the court' is not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule of proportionality. Further held, imposition of sentence of 'imprisonment till the rising of the court' upon conviction for an offence under Section 494 I.P.C., on them was unconscionably lenient or a flea-bite sentence. Hence, it appropriate to use our judicial discretion to modify the sentence imposed under the impugned judgment to six months each, making the nature of the sentence as simple imprisonment for the said period. (Para 14, 15, 17 & 19) Baba Natarajan Prasad v. M. Revathi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 474

Section 437(3) and Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 37 & 52 – Applicability of Section 437(3) in cases of NDPS Act – Once a case is made out for a grant of bail in accordance with Section 37, the conditions of bail will have to be in terms of Section 437(3) of the CrPC. The reason is that because of Section 52 of the NDPS Act, the provisions of the CrPC apply to the arrests made under the NDPS Act insofar as they are not inconsistent with the NDPS Act. (Para 4) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441

Section 437(3) – Bail – Object of imposing conditions of bail – It is to ensure that the accused does not interfere or obstruct the investigation in any manner, remains available for the investigation, does not tamper with or destroy evidence, does not commit any offence, remains regularly present before the Trial Court, and does not create obstacles in the expeditious conclusion of the trial. (Para 7) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441

Section 437(3) – Bail conditions – Held, bail conditions cannot be fanciful, arbitrary or freakish and must be within the four corners of Section 437(3). The bail conditions must be consistent with the object of imposing conditions. While imposing bail conditions, the Constitutional rights of an accused, who is ordered to be released on bail, can be curtailed only to the minimum extent required. In case of the accused whose guilt is yet to be established, the presumption of innocence is applicable and such person cannot be deprived of all his rights guaranteed under Article 21. Further held, Courts must show restraint while imposing bail conditions. Hence, while granting bail, the Courts can curtail the freedom of the accused only to the extent required for imposing the bail conditions warranted by law and cannot be so onerous as to frustrate the order of bail itself. (Para 7 & 7.1) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441

Section 437(3) – Constitution of India; Article 21 – Validity of bail condition – The condition of dropping pin on google map – Bail condition of dropping a PIN on Google Map gives an impression that the condition will enable to monitor the movements of the accused on a real­time basis, which will be violative of the right to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Held, this cannot be a condition of bail and deserves to be deleted and ordered accordingly. (10, 10.2) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441

Section 437(3) – Validity of Bail condition – The condition of furnishing certificate of the embassy – It is not necessary that in every case where bail is granted to an accused in an NDPS case who is a foreign national on the ground of long incarceration of more than 50% of the minimum sentence, the condition of obtaining a 'certificate of assurance' from the Embassy/High Commission should be incorporated. It will depend on the facts of each case. Held, grant of such a certificate by the Embassy/High Commission is beyond the control of the accused to whom bail is granted. Therefore, when the Embassy/High Commission does not grant such a certificate within a reasonable time, the accused, who is otherwise held entitled to bail, cannot be denied bail on the ground that such a condition, which is impossible for the accused to comply with, has not been complied with. Hence the condition is deleted. (Para 11.1 & 12) Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 441

Section 439 – To set aside Bail order – Grant of bail in serious offences like murder – The power to grant bail under Section 439 CrPC although is discretionary power of the court, it has to be exercised in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Where a court considering an application for bail fails to consider relevant factors, an appellate court may justifiably set aside the order granting bail. An appellate court is thus required to consider whether the order granting bail suffers from a non-application of mind or is not borne out from a prima facie view of the evidence on record. Held, it is evident that the High Court failed to assign any reasons for the exercise of its discretion in favour of the accused, knowing fully well that he is involved in a serious offence like murder and was absconding for a couple of years. Further held, here an order refusing or granting bail does not furnish the reasons that inform the decision, there is a presumption of the non-application of mind which may require the intervention of this Court. Hence, bail order is set aside. (Para 14 & 16) State of Jharkhand v. Anil Ganjhu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 459

Section 451 - Mines and Minerals Act, 1957 - Proceedings for confiscation - Release of seized vehicle - Keeping a vehicle like a Tipper Lorry idle is not serving anybody's interest. It is resulting in damage to the stationary vehicle which is kept within the Magistrate Court complex. Public spaced is also occupied. (Para 6) Perichi Gounder v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 498

Constitution of India

Appointment of Vice Chancellors (VC) – Power to decide on dispute regarding appointment of (VC) – Held, in case(s) where the Chief Minister of the State has objected to the inclusion of any name in the panel and such objection is not acceptable to the Chancellor or where the Chancellor has an objection against empanelment of any particular name for which he has assigned his own reasons, all such files shall be put up before the Supreme Court. The final decision in this regard shall be taken by the Supreme Court after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the objectors. (Para 22) State of West Bengal v. Dr. Sanat Kumar Ghosh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 440

Article 12 and 13 - The Army Welfare Education Society cannot be considered as "State" under Article 13 of the Constitution. The High Court committed an egregious error in entertaining the writ petition filed by the respondents herein holding that the appellant society is a “State” within Article 12 of the Constitution. Undoubtedly, the school run by the Appellant Society imparts education. Imparting education involves public duty and therefore a public law element could also be said to be involved. However, the relationship between the respondents herein and the appellant society is that of an employee and a private employer arising out of a private contract. If there is a breach of a covenant of a private contract, the same does not touch any public law element. The school cannot be said to be discharging any public duty in connection with the employment of the respondents. (Para 42) Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 464

Article 21 - Right to Speedy Trial - If the alleged offence is a serious one, it is all the more necessary for the prosecution to ensure that the trial is concluded expeditiously. When a trial gets prolonged, it is not open to the prosecution to oppose bail of the accused-undertrial on the ground that the charges are very serious. Bail cannot be denied only on the ground that the charges are very serious though there is no end in sight for the trial to conclude. (Para 22) Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486

Article 21 and Criminal procedure Code, 1973 – Right to a speedy trial – Application for bail on grounds of delay in trial of 4 years – Held, bail is not to be withheld as a punishment – If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the crime. Further held, the court is inclined to exercise the discretion in favour of the appellant for reasons: (i) The appellant is in jail as an under-trial prisoner past four years; (ii) Till this date, the trial court has not been able to even proceed to frame charge; and (iii) As pointed out by the counsel appearing for the State as well as NIA, the prosecution intends to examine not less than eighty witnesses. As it cannot be assumed by what time the trial will ultimately conclude, howsoever serious a crime may be, an accused has a right to speedy trial as enshrined under the Constitution of India. The appellant is ordered to be released on bail subject to the terms and conditions. (Para 7, 8, 9, 19 & 23) Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 437

Article 32 – Writ petition – Double taxation challenged – Legality of different State Governments levying and collecting Authorization Fee/Border Tax in violation of All India Tourist Vehicles (Permit) Rules, 2023 in question – Held, the State enactments, rules and regulations being not under challenge, it cannot be said that the demand of Border Tax/Authorization Fee at the borders by the respective State Governments is bad under law. The petitioners, in order to succeed, have to first consider challenging the State provision contained in the Act. (Para 10) Muthyala Sunil Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 450

Article 32 & 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition in Supreme Court – Held, the petitioners ought to have first approached their jurisdictional High Courts to challenge their respective State enactments. Court is not inclined to enter into the merits of the matter at the present stage. (Para 9 & 10) Muthyala Sunil Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 450

Article 131 - Scope of - Explained - CBI under administrative control and superintendence of Union Govt. - The State's suit against the Union over the registration of cases by the CBI despite revocation of its general consent is maintainable. State of West Bengal v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 451

Article 142 – Action of forfeiture of security deposit is challenged to be punitive – Claiming re-commencement of the e-auction process on grounds of bona fide mistake – Held, the system pop-up gives only one option to the bidder to submit the bid with the digital signature with no scope of rectification or retraction. There was no opportunity available on the platform for the appellant to rectify the error in the bid, having once entered it. Even if the bidder had realized that the bid amount requires to be rectified, it could not have done so because of the system not permitting such a course. Further held, it can be inferred from the circumstances that the mistake in entering the bid was committed inadvertently and the appellant on discovery of the error or mistake acted promptly in informing the authority concerned for rectification of the bid. Held, applying the balancing test to the factual matrix of the present case, it is clear that the forfeiture of entire security deposit of the appellant as against evident human error is punitive. (Para 10, 14, 21) Omsairam Steels & Alloys Pvt. Ltd. v. Director of Mines and Geology, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 477

Article 142 – Negligence in competitive bidding process – E-auction in process was a competitive bidding process which demanded a high degree of caution and care on the part of the appellants. The human error envinces a degree of remiss and carelessness the result of which is bound to cost the public exchequer heavily in terms of time, effort and expense. Held, on account of the appellant's failure to act with the required degree of care, the liberty granted to conduct fresh e-auction is confirmed. Hence, the appellant id directed to pay to the first respondent Rs 3,00,00,000/- (Rupees three crore only) within a month from date. (Para 25) Omsairam Steels & Alloys Pvt. Ltd. v. Director of Mines and Geology, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 477

Article 142 – Power to constitute Search­cum­Selection Committee for selection of VC– Held, to do complete justice the Supreme Court may pass a common order for constitution of Search­cum­Selection Committee for all the subject Universities. Further held, the court resolves to constitute Search­cum­Selection Committee(s) of the same composition so as to avoid any confusion, irrespective of the fact that the relevant provision of the Statute of the concerned University may contain slight variations. While shortlisting the experts for composition of the Search­cmSelection Committee, the nature of subjects and disciplines in which education is being imparted in different Universities can be focused on. (Para 10 & 11) State of West Bengal v. Dr. Sanat Kumar Ghosh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 440

Article 341 – Power to amend list of schedule caste – The list of scheduled caste can be amended, altered only by law made by Parliament. The Resolution extending benefit of Scheduled Castes to the members of the “Tanti-Tantwa” community by merging it with 'Pan, Sawasi, Panr' community under Entry 20 of the list of Scheduled Castes, was patently illegal, erroneous as the State Government had no competence/ authority/power to tinker with the lists of Scheduled Castes published under Article 341 of the Constitution. “TantiTantwa” Caste, which does not appear in the list of Scheduled Castes of Bihar cannot be issued Scheduled Castes Certificates treating them to be 'Pan, Sawasi, Panr'. Hence, whether synonymous or not, any inclusion or exclusion of any caste, race or tribe or part of or group within the castes, races or tribes has to be, by law made by the Parliament, and not by any other mode or manner. Further held, that that such posts of the Scheduled Castes Quota which had been filled up by members of “Tanti-Tantwa” community availing benefit on the basis of Resolution may be returned to the Scheduled Castes category and such candidates of “Tanti-Tantwa” community be accommodated by the State in their original category of Extremely Backward Classes by taking appropriate measures. (Para 2, 3, 36 & 42) Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar Vichar Manch v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 472

Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Section 2(1)(d) – Purchase for “commercial purpose” – Ordinarily “commercial purpose” is understood to include manufacturing/industrial activity or business-to-business transactions between commercial entities. Further, the purchase of the goods should have a close and direct nexus with a profit generating activity. If it is found that the dominant purpose behind purchasing the goods was for the personal use and consumption of the purchaser and/or their beneficiary, or was otherwise not linked to any commercial activity, the question of whether such a purchase was for the purpose of “generating livelihood by means of self-employment” need not be looked into. Held, the appellants had failed to prove that the dominant purpose or dominant use of the car in question was for commercial purpose or that the purchase of the car had any nexus or was linked with any profit generating activity of the respondent company. (Para 16 & 29) Daimler Chrysler India Pvt. Ltd. v. Controls & Switchgear Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 447

Section 2(1)(r) – “Unfair trade practice” – A trade practice which for the purpose of promoting the sale of any goods by adopting deceptive practice like falsely representing that the goods are of a particular standard, quality, style or model, would amount to “unfair trade practice”. Held, incomplete disclosure or non-disclosure of the complete details with regard to the functioning of the airbags at the time of promotion of the car, has rightly been considered by the National Commission as the “unfair trade practice” on the part of the appellants, and awarded compensation towards it. The National Commission also rightly awarded compensation towards the deficiency in service on account of the frontal airbags of the car having not deployed at the time of accident. Further held, since the National Commission has considered in detail the evidence and the material on record adduced by the both the parties, the judgment passed does not warrant any interference. (Para 37, 38 & 39) Daimler Chrysler India Pvt. Ltd. v. Controls & Switchgear Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 447

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Section 20 - the action for contempt should be brought within a year, and not beyond, from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. (Para 56) S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 503

The compliance of an order under threat of contempt cannot take away the right of the party to challenge the same order. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Kopparla Santhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 516

Contract

The sanctity of contracts is a fundamental principle that underpins the stability and predictability of legal and commercial relationships. When public authorities enter into contracts, they create legitimate expectations that the State will honour its obligations. Arbitrary or unreasonable terminations undermine these expectations and erode the trust of private players from the public procurement processes and tenders. Once a contract is entered, there is a legitimate expectation that the obligations arising from the contract will be honoured and that the rights arising from it will not be arbitrarily divested except for a breach or non-compliance of the terms agreed thereunder. (Para 127) Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour v. Chief Executive Officer, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 455

Criminal Jurisprudence

Howsoever stringent the penal law may be, the over-arching postulate of criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly. (Para 20) Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 437

The presumption of innocence comes to an end when an accused is put to trial and is held guilty of the offence with which he is charged. (Para 6) Bhupatji Sartajji Jabraji Thakor v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 438

Criminal Trial

The Supreme Court expressed concern that despite the decision of the Constitution Bench in High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P. & Ors. 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177, High Courts were issuing directions for expeditious trials without considering the existing pendency of criminal cases in the State of Bihar. Santosh Kumar @ Santosh v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 505

Customs Act, 1962

Importer would be liable to pay customs duty in addition to fines and other charges upon redeeming the confiscated goods. Navayuga Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 504

Defamation

Supreme Court sets aside Delhi High Court Order quashing summons to 'the Wire' in ex-JNU Professor's criminal defamation case. Amita Singh v. Wire, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 534

Disability

Persons With Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection Of Rights And Full Participation) Act, 1995; Section 33 – Exemption of posts from application of reservation - IRS (C&E) and IRS (IT) posts were excluded from the reservation for the VI category – Held, a notification excluding these two categories for VI category candidates has not been issued in terms of the proviso to Section 33 of the PWD Act, 1995. Therefore, in absence of such a notification, the reservation will have to be provided to the VI category candidates in these two categories as well. (Para 10) Union of India v. Pankaj Kumar Srivastava, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 444

Persons With Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection Of Rights And Full Participation) Act, 1995; Section 36 – Vacancies not filled up to be carried forward –Respondent no.1 has been made to run from pillar to post to get an appointment, though there is a large backlog of vacancies in various PWD categories. The appellant has taken a stand which defeats the very object of enacting laws for the benefit of persons with disability. Held, by applying the principles governing Section 36 of the PWD Act, 1995, the cases of respondent no.1 and the other 10 candidates who are above him in merit could have been considered, especially when there is a gross default on the part of the appellant (Union of India) in promptly implementing the provisions of the PWD Act, 1995. Hence, it is a fit case to exercise jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Respondent shall be considered for appointment against the backlog vacancies of PWD candidates either in IRS (IT) or in other service/branch. (Para 9, 14 & 15) Union of India v. Pankaj Kumar Srivastava, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 444

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - Need for inclusive and respectful portrayal of persons with disabilities in visual media - Language Sensitivity: Terms that perpetuate negative stereotypes or devalue persons with disabilities, such as "cripple" and "spastic," should be avoided as they contribute to societal discrimination and negative self-image. Accurate Representation: Creators must avoid misleading portrayals of medical conditions, as such representations can perpetuate misinformation and stereotypes. Inclusivity in Representation: Media should portray persons with disabilities as multidimensional individuals with diverse realities, challenges, and successes, moving away from simplistic or "ableist" characterizations. Avoiding Stereotypes: Stereotypical portrayals, such as depicting persons with disabilities as "super cripples" with extraordinary abilities, should be avoided, as they do not reflect the varied experiences of individuals. Participation and Consultation: The principle "nothing about us, without us" should be followed, meaning that persons with disabilities should be actively involved in decision-making processes and consulted in matters affecting them, including the portrayal in visual media. Training and Sensitization: The Court recommended implementing training programs for media professionals to ensure accurate, empathetic, and respectful portrayals of persons with disabilities. Nipun Malhotra v. Sony Pictures Films India Private Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 439

Doctrines

Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation - Features of - a. First, legitimate expectation must be based on a right as opposed to a mere hope, wish or anticipation; b. Secondly, legitimate expectation must arise either from an express or implied promise; or a consistent past practice or custom followed by an authority in its dealings; c. Thirdly, expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be treated as a legitimate expectation; d. Fourthly, legitimate expectation operates in relation to both substantive and procedural matters; e. Fifthly, legitimate expectation operates in the realm of public law, that is, a plea of legitimate action can be taken only when a public authority breaches a promise or deviates from a consistent past practice, without any reasonable basis. f. Sixthly, a plea of legitimate expectation based on past practice can only be taken by someone who has dealings, or negotiations with a public authority. It cannot be invoked by a total stranger to the authority merely on the ground that the authority has a duty to act fairly generally. (Para 48) Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 464

Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation / Promissory Estoppel - In situations, if the previous executive decision is withdrawn, modified or amended in any manner in exercise of legislative power in larger public interest, then the earlier promise upon which the party acts, cannot be enforced as a right and neither can the authorities be estopped from withdrawing its promise, as such an expectation does not give any enforceable right to the party. (Para 27) Rewa Tollway P. Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 495

Doctrine of Merger - If Special Leave was not granted and the petition was dismissed by a reasoned or unreasoned order, the order against which such Special Leave Petition is filed would not merge with the order of dismissal. However, once leave has been granted in a Special Leave Petition, regardless of whether such appeal is subsequently dismissed with or without reasons, the doctrine of merger comes into play resulting in merger of the order under challenge with that of the appellate forum, and only the latter would hold the field. Consequently, it is the decision of the superior court which remains effective, enforceable, and binding in the eyes of the law, whether the appeal is dismissed by a speaking order or not. (Para 43) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Virendra Bahadur Katheria, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 481

Drugs (Price Control) Order (DPCO), 1995

The intent and purpose thereof are to control the prices at which medicinal drug formulations are made available to the common man by holding out the threat of recovery of the higher prices charged for such drug formulations by those involved in their manufacture and marketing. Given the laudable objective underlying the provision, it cannot be subjected to a restricted or hidebound interpretation. (Para 11) Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 487

Education

Even if the function being performed by a private educational institution in imparting education may be considered as a public function, the relationship between the administration of such an institution and its employees remains a contractual one, falling within the ambit of private law. (Para 50) Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 464

Environmental Law

Issues relating to the regulation and oversight of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in India - Judicial Review - Permissibility - The Bench reached a consensus that the decision-making processes of bodies concerned with GMOs are subject to judicial review - Directions Issued. Gene Campaign v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 501

Issues relating to the regulation and oversight of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in India - Directions - National Policy on GM Crops: The Union of India is directed to formulate a comprehensive National Policy on GM crops concerning research, cultivation, trade, and commerce. This policy must be developed in consultation with relevant stakeholders, including experts in agriculture and biotechnology, state governments, and representatives of farmers. National Consultation: The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC) is instructed to conduct a national consultation within four months to facilitate the development of the National Policy. State governments are to be involved in this process. Verification of Experts: The Union of India must verify the credentials of all experts involved in the decision-making process and address any potential conflicts of interest. Rules with statutory force may be developed for this purpose. Compliance with FSSA, 2006: The Respondent must comply with Section 23 of the Food Safety and Standards Act (FSSA), 2006, regarding the packaging and labeling of GM food, especially GM edible oil. Difference of Opinion on DMH-11 Approval: Given the differing opinions on the conditional approval for the environmental release of GM mustard (DMH-11) by the Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC) and the MoEF, the matter is to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for the constitution of an appropriate Bench for further consideration. Gene Campaign v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 501

NGT has duty to ensure environmental clearance is lawfully granted. Santosh Kumar Singh v. State Level Environmental Impact Assessment Authority, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 526

Pollution Control Board - Instead of making an effort to regularly appoint the staff members, the Government seems to have adopted a short cut method of appointing contractual employees. This practice needs to be deprecated. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 510

Supreme Court sets aside NGT orders allowing construction of Tiracol bridge in Goa's querim beach. Goa Foundation v. Goa State Environment Impact Assessment Authority, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 535

The State has the constitutional duty to not only protect water bodies within the state but also to restore those water bodies which have been illegally filled in. Mirza Abid Beg v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 488

Evidence Act, 1872

Credibility of a witness – Statement of witness has substantial variations with his testimony in court, giving rise to doubts as to the veracity of his testimony. Held, the threshold for disbelieving a witness must not be mere discrepancy or inconsistency but material discrepancy and inconsistency, which renders the account narrated by the witnesses so highly improbable that the same may safely be discarded altogether from consideration. Further held, it cannot be expected that all the witnesses, when under attack by the accused persons, possess stellar memories with an accurate recollection of the events. Although, there are a few inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses, they are minor and not substantial, so as to erode the credibility of such witnesses. Hence, the credibility and reliability of the witnesses is unshaken. (Para 13, 15 & 16) Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 448

Confessional statements recorded by the Police Officers which are part of the charge-sheet cannot remain a part thereof and the same must be ignored. Sanju Bansal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 467

Dock Identification – It is an identification made by witness in Court during trial. (Para 12) P. Sasikumar v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 460

Hostile Witness – A witness cannot be disbelieved on the sole ground of him turning hostile, the hostility of such witness does not particularly dent the prosecution's case. Held, merely because a witness resiled from his statement given to the police, the entire case presented by the prosecution cannot be unreliable. (Para 18) Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 448

Onus of proof – Held, the onus to establish the prejudice or miscarriage on account of non-questioning or inadequate questioning on any incriminating circumstance(s), during the examination under Section 313, Cr.PC, is on the convict concerned. (Para 21) Naresh Kumar v. State of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 443

Section 9 – Conviction challenged – On grounds that identification of accused is not correct as the test identification parade (TIP) is not conducted – Where accused is a stranger to a witness and there has been no Test Identification Parade (TIP), the trial court should be very cautious while accepting the dock identification by such a witness. Held, not conducting a TIP was a fatal flaw in the police investigation and in the absence of TIP, the dock identification of the present appellant remains doubtful. The prosecution has not been able to prove the identity of the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the appellant could not have been convicted on the basis of a doubtful evidence as to the appellant's identity. Conviction is set aside. (Para 12, 13, 16) P. Sasikumar v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 460

Section 106 - Accused can't be asked to discharge burden of proof when prima facie case wasn't established by prosecution. Manharan Rajwade v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 531

Section 134 – Sole witness – Conviction on grounds of sole witness testimony is challenged – Held, no particular number of witnesses is required, in any case, to prove a fact. It is the quality of evidence and not the quantity that matters. If the evidence of a solitary witness appeals to the court to be wholly reliable, the same can form the foundation for recording a conviction. Hence, the conviction of the appellant does not call for interference based on the sole testimony which is found to be reliable. (Para 17) Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 448

Family Law

Maintenance or permanent alimony should not be penal but should be for the purposes of ensuring a decent living standard for the wife. (Para 32) Kiran Jyot Maini v. Anish Pramod Patel, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 485

Foreigners Act, 1946

Authorities cannot randomly ask people to prove Indian citizenship on mere suspicion without sharing any material. Md. Rahim Ali @ Abdur Rahim v. State of Assam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 462

Indian citizenship should not be doubted due to minor variations in name spellings in electoral rolls or govt records. Md. Rahim Ali @ Abdur Rahim v. State of Assam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 462

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Section 13(1)(ib) and 13(1A)(ii) – Divorce petition – A divorce petition can be presented on the ground that there has been no restitution of conjugal rights between the parties to the marriage for a period of one year and more after passing the decree for restitution of conjugal rights – Held, the desertion of the appellant at least from 2008 till the date of filing the divorce petition in 2013 continued without any reasonable cause. Therefore, a decree for divorce on the ground of desertion under Section 13(1)(ib) ought to have been passed. It is a case of a complete breakdown of marriage for the last 16 years and more. (Para 14) X v. Y, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 458

Section 25 – Alimony – Held, the appellant has offered to pay the respondent a lump sum alimony of Rs. 30 lakhs which can be accepted as a one time lump sum alimony. (Para 15) X v. Y, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 458

Income Tax Act, 1961

Section 206C - Any vendor who buys liquor from state manufacturers without obtaining it through auction and sells in retail at a fixed price would be excluded from the definition of 'buyer' under Section 206C of the Income Tax Act. Such a trade would be exempted from TCS (Tax Collected at Source). (Para 14.5) Excise Commissioner Karnataka v. Mysore Sales International Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 496

Section 206C - Before an order is passed under Section 206C of the Income Tax Act, it is incumbent upon the assessing officer to put the person concerned to notice and afford him an adequate and reasonable opportunity of hearing, including a personal hearing. (Para 19) Excise Commissioner Karnataka v. Mysore Sales International Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 496

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Sections 29 and 34 - Penalty for breach of settlement or award - Section 29 is applicable when any person commits a breach of any term of any settlement or award binding on him under the ID Act. Therefore, in the complaint alleging the commission of an offence punishable under Section 29 of the ID Act, there must be a specific averment regarding the existence of a settlement or award binding on the accused under the ID Act and how the same has been breached. (Para 5 & 6) Yugal Sikri v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 537

Industrial Policy, 2003

'Market fees' collected under the Punjab Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 and the 'Rural Development fees' collected under the Punjab Rural Development Act are distinct. Market Fees could not be equated with Rural Development Fees for the purposes of exemption under the 2003 Policy. (Para 29) State of Punjab v. Punjab Spintex Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 484

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Section 7 - Indian Contract Act, 1872; Section 140 - Subrogation – Liability and Rights of Surety - Section 140 grants the surety the right to be subrogated to the creditor's rights upon payment or performance of all that he is liable for under a guarantee. The Court emphasized that when the surety fulfills his liability, he acquires the right to recover from the principal debtor to the extent of the payment made. In this case, where the appellant had paid a sum of Rs.38.87 crores under the corporate guarantee in the CIRP (Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process) of the guarantor (ACIL), the Court held that the subrogation rights of the appellant extend only to the amount actually paid. The financial creditor's right to recover the balance debt from the principal debtor remains unaffected. Additionally, the Court reiterated that the assets of a subsidiary company cannot form part of the CIRP process of its holding company, and a financial creditor can file separate applications under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code against both the corporate debtor and the corporate guarantor. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the view taken by the NCLAT (National Company Law Appellate Tribunal). (Para 24 - 29) BRS Ventures Investments Ltd. v. SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 508

Judicial Service

Requirement that judicial officers must be adept at local language is valid. Legal Attorneys and Barristers Law Firm v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 529

Seventh National Judicial Pay Commission (SNJPC) recommendations - Implementation of. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 536

Supreme Court refuses to entertain plea to include Tribunals in national judicial data grid. Kishan Chand Jain v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 530

Land Acquisition

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 23(1) – Land acquisition – Quantum of compensation granted to the landowners is challenged to be inadequate – Held, there exists no direct piece of evidence to determine fair and just compensation in the instant cases hence, courts must resort to the settled principle of guesstimation. While the Court can use the principle of guesstimation in reasonably estimating the value of land in the absence of direct evidence, the Court must embrace a holistic view and consider all 'relevant factors' and existing evidence, even if not directly comparable, to arrive at a fair determination of compensation. Such relevant factors can be divided into three categories: (i). Characteristics of the land, (ii). Future potentiality of the land, (iii). Factors denoting market sentiment. Further held, compensation could be determined applying the principle of guesstimation, based on the circle rate after granting a marginal increase over the same. It would be appropriate to apply a 15% escalation for one year to the price fixed at INR 350 per sq. yd., bringing the total guesstimate to INR 403 per sq. yd.. It stands conclusively surmised that the landowners are entitled to an enhancement in the compensation awarded. (Para 32, 33, 34, 42 & 43) New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Harnand Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 456

Is interest on solatium payable from date of land acquisition or date of 'sunder' judgment? The supreme court refers to a 3-judge bench. Executive Engineer, Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. V. Saraswathiammal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 523

Principle of guesstimation – It is a heuristic device that enables the court, in the absence of direct evidence and relevant sale exemplars, to make a reasonable and informed guess or estimation of the market value of the land under acquisition, and concomitantly the compensation payable by the appropriate Government. This principle accentuates the fundamental understanding that determining compensation for land is not a matter of exact science but involves a significant element of estimation. Indeed, this holds true for valuation of land in general, which is affected by a multitude of factors such as its location, surrounding market conditions, feasible uses etc. Accordingly, while evidence and calculations can aid in estimating the land value, they ultimately serve as tools for approximation rather than precision. (Para 31 & 32) New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Harnand Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 456

Seeking parity with Bir Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh where compensation was enhanced to INR 449 per sq. yd – Held, enhanced compensation was awarded relying on the sale deed which noted the value of land as INR 400 per sq. yd which was founded on a bona fide factual error. The figure of 400 actually denoted the area and size of the plot and not its sale value. Further held, the decision was not revisited by this Court likely on account of the practical difficulties in recovering the excess compensation amount already paid to the expropriated land owners and given the larger interest of justice. Hence, the judgement would not be binding and market value of land in question is to be determined independently. (Para 21) New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Harnand Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 456

Limitation Act, 1963

Article 65 - Suit for Possession - Land was donated to the State in 1958 for the construction of a veterinary hospital. The Court criticized the plaintiff for filing a vague plaint, lacking essential details, and attempting to circumvent the law of limitation through clever drafting. The suit was barred by limitation under Article 65, as it was filed more than 40 years after the hospital's construction and well beyond the 12-year period from when the plaintiff had knowledge of the hospital's existence. The burden of proof in a possession suit lies on the plaintiff, and mere entries in revenue records do not confer title. The lethargy of the State in not updating revenue records did not diminish its rights under the gift deed. The appeal by the State was allowed. (Para 18 - 32) State of Punjab v. Bhagwantpal Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 479

Section 12(1) – Exclusion of the day from which the limitation period is to be reckoned – The period of limitation under Section 34 will have to be reckoned from 30th June 2022, when the appellants received the award. Held, in view of Section 12(1), 30th June, 2022 will have to be excluded while computing the limitation period. Hence, the period of limitation starts from 1st July, 2022. (Para 7) State of West Bengal v. Rajpath Contractors and Engineers Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 454

Maternity Benefit Act, 1961

Menstrual Leave Policy - Petition seeking direction to the Union and State Governments to implement policies for granting menstrual leave under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 - Petitioner had previously submitted a representation to the Union Ministry of Women and Child Development, which was not responded to - Court observed that the issue raised involved multiple policy considerations and should be attended to by the Union and the States - Petitioner permitted to make another representation to the Secretary, Union Ministry of Women and Child Development - Court requested the Secretary to examine the matter at a policy level in consultation with all stakeholders, and consider framing a model policy - Writ Petition disposed of with liberty to the States to independently take appropriate action. Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 509

Mines and Minerals

States have the power to levy tax on mineral rights and that the Union law - Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act 1957 - do not limit such power of the States. Mineral Area Development v. Steel Authority of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 512

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

It is for the Tribunal in a given case to make a decision as to whether the entire amount has to be released or if it is to be released in part. Law Association v. Director General of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 499

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985

Section 37(1)(b)(ii) - Bail - HIV positive - Legality of granting bail - The High Court granted bail considering HIV-positive status as the sole ground. Subsequently, the accused was granted bail again in connection with FIR involving a commercial quantity of heroin without due consideration of the stringent requirements under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. Held, In cases involving commercial quantities of narcotics, bail can only be granted if both conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act are met: reasonable grounds for believing the accused is not guilty and that they are unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. It reiterated that these conditions are cumulative, not alternative. The High Court's decision to grant bail solely based on the accused's HIV-positive status, without adherence to Section 37(1)(b)(ii), was erroneous and warranted interference. Consequently, the impugned bail order was set aside, directing the accused to surrender before the trial court within a week, with instructions to expedite the trial as per Section 34(2) of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (Prevention and Control) Act, 2017. State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 492

NEET

Supreme Court refuses to cancel NEET-UG 2024, says there's no material to show systemic breach. Vanshika Yadav v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 525

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Principles of compounding of offences - It is to be remembered that dishonour of cheques is a regulatory offence which was made an offence only in view of public interest so that the reliability of these instruments can be ensured. A large number of cases involving dishonour of cheques are pending before courts which is a serious concern for our judicial system. Keeping in mind that the 'compensatory aspect' of remedy shall have priority over the 'punitive aspect', courts should encourage compounding of offences under the NI Act if parties are willing to do so. (Para 6) New Win Export v. A. Subramaniam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 490

Section 143A - An authorized signatory of the company could not be considered as a 'drawer' of cheque, and therefore, could not be directed to pay the interim compensation to the complainant. (Para 30) Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 513

Partition

Chandigarh (Sale of Sites and Buildings) Rules, 1960 - There cannot be partition of property by metes and bounds at Chandigarh. Hence, the only resolution in a suit seeking partition of joint property is sale by way of auction. Rajinder Kaur v. Gurbhajan Kaur, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 514

Penal Code, 1860

Criminal Conspiracy – To constitute even an accusation of criminal conspiracy, first and foremost, there must at least be an accusation of meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act, which is not illegal in itself, by illegal means. (Para 27) Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 475

Section 300 – Conviction for the offence of murder is challenged – Whether the nature of offensive act comes within the purview of section 300? – Held, the appellant caused such bodily injury, which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. The appellant participated in a premeditated attack on the victim, armed with a deadly weapon and stabbed the unarmed victim on a vital organ causing his death. The conduct of the appellant is covered by both clauses (1) and (3) of section 300, IPC. The intention to cause death can easily be discerned from the conduct of the appellant and the nature of fatal injury inflicted, which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. Fulfilment of any one condition of section 300, IPC is enough to convict the appellant under section 302 thereof, and in the present case not one but two conditions have clearly been shown to exist to nail the appellant for murder. Further held, prosecution has been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the person who stabbed the victim during the course of the attack by the accused persons leading to his death. Hence, conviction of appellant is affirmed. (Para 20, 24, 26 & 27) Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 448

Section 307 - When the sentencing court doesn't deem fit to impose a life sentence for committing an offence of attempt to murder, then the maximum sentence that can be imposed on the convict for committing an offence of attempt to murder could not extend beyond the period of 10 years. (Para 7) Amit Rana @ Koka v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 500

Sections 418 and 420 - The complainant purchased a BMW 7 Series vehicle and reported a defect. A complaint was lodged for alleged offences under Sections 418 and 420 of the IPC, naming the manufacturer, Managing Director, and other directors as accused. The High Court concluded that the ingredients of the offence of cheating were not established based on the contents of the FIR. Having come to this conclusion, there was no justification for the High Court thereafter to direct the manufacturer to replace the vehicle with a new BMW 7 Series. Held, the High Court correctly quashed the criminal proceedings, as the ingredients of cheating were not established based on the FIR. The Court deemed it unnecessary to continue prosecution, given the nature of the dispute and the elapsed time. Exercising jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court directed BMW India Private Limited to pay Rs 50 lakhs to the complainant in full settlement. (Para 10 - 15) State of Andhra Pradesh v. BMW India P.Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 466

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

It is the settled convention in such cases that the Trap Laying Officer makes efforts to verify the factum of demand of bribe by the public servant before initiating the trap proceedings. The factum of demand of bribe can also be verified by recording the telephonic conversation between the decoy and the suspect public servant. Often, a recording device is secretly placed on the person of the decoy to record the conversation which would transpire during the course of acceptance of bribe by the public servant. (Para 31) Mir Mustafa Ali Hasmi v. State of A.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 468

Section 19 and Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 319 – Summon order challenged – Sanction under Section 19 of PC Act is Necessary to Summon Public Servant as Additional Accused – Held, courts cannot take cognizance against any public servant for offences committed under the PC Act on an application under section 319 of the CrPC, without first following the requirements of Section 19 of the P.C Act. The correct procedure should have been for the prosecution to obtain sanction under Section 19 of the P.C Act from the appropriate Government, before formally moving an application before the Court under Section 319 of CrPC. Hence, on absence of the sanction the entire procedure remains flawed. High Court's order of setting aside the order of Summon is upheld. (Para 11) State of Punjab v. Partap Singh Verka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 461

Section 19 (1) - Sanction won't be rendered invalid merely because it was granted after the trial court had taken cognizance of the chargesheet. Shivendra Nath Verma v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 518

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Arvind Kejriwal is an elected leader and the Chief Minister of Delhi, a post holding importance and influence. We have also referred to the allegations. While we do not give any direction, since we are doubtful whether the court can direct an elected leader to step down or not function as the Chief Minister or as a Minister, we leave it to Arvind Kejriwal to take a call. Larger Bench, if deemed appropriate, can frame question(s) and decide the conditions that can be imposed by the court in such cases. (Para 86) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463

ED can't arrest after court takes cognizance' : Supreme Court grants anticipatory bail to Odisha officer in money laundering case. Bijay Ketan Sahoo v. Enforcement Directorate, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 532

Section 19 - Power to arrest under Section 19(1) is not for the purpose of investigation. Arrest can and should wait, and the power in terms of Section 19(1) of the PML Act can be exercised only when the material with the designated officer enables them to form an opinion, by recording reasons in writing that the arrestee is guilty. (Para 41) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463

Section 19 - (a) Whether the “need and necessity to arrest” is a separate ground to challenge the order of arrest passed in terms of Section 19(1) of the PML Act? (b) Whether the “need and necessity to arrest” refers to the satisfaction of formal parameters to arrest and take a person into custody, or it relates to other personal grounds and reasons regarding necessity to arrest a person in the facts and circumstances of the said case? (c) If questions (a) and (b) are answered in the affirmative, what are the parameters and facts that are to be taken into consideration by the court while examining the question of “need and necessity to arrest”? Questions referred to the larger bench. (Para 84) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463

Section 45 gives primacy to the opinion of the Directorate of Enforcement (DoE) when it comes to grant of bail. DoE should act uniformly, consistent in conduct, confirming one rule for all. (Para 79) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 463

Supreme Court relaxes Section 45 PMLA conditions, grants bail citing long custody and time needed to complete trial. Ramkripal Meena Versus Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 527

The Supreme Court grants bail to money laundering accused considering age and custody period. Humayun Suleman Merchant v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 521

Property Law

Revenue records are for tax purposes and do not confer ownership. Merely because the name of the plaintiff continued in the revenue records it would not confer any title upon him. (Para 27) State of Punjab v. Bhagwantpal Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 479

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and Registration Act, 1908 - A vendor who has executed a sale deed cannot execute another deed with respect to the same plot just because the first sale deed is pending registration. The moment a deed is executed, the vendor loses all rights over the property and he cannot claim any right just because the deed has not been registered. The only consequence of non-registration is that the purchaser cannot produce such a deed as evidence. (Para 33.13) Kaushik Premkumar Mishra v. Kanji Ravaria @ Kanji, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 493

Right to Information Act, 2005

Section 12(4) – Validity of Central Information Commission (Management) Regulations, 2007 framed by the Chief Information Commissioner (CIC) under Section 12(4) of the RTI Act – Powers of the CIC – Held, the use of the words “superintendence, direction and management” in Sections 12(4) of the RTI Act clearly provides the CIC an ambit of power wide enough to frame its own Regulations and to delegate its power to a committee formed by it. While the RTI Act does not explicitly grant CIC the authority to frame Regulations, a purposive interpretation of Section 12(4) reveals that the powers of "superintendence, direction and management" are intended to be comprehensive, enabling the CIC to adopt measures, including the framing of Regulations, that ensure transparency, accountability, and efficient handling of its responsibilities. The Chief Information Commissioner's powers to frame Regulations pertaining to constitution of Benches of the Commission are upheld. (Para 22 & 25) Central Information Commission v. DDA, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 465

Section 12(4) and Central Information Commission (Management) Regulations, 2007; Regulation 22 – Powers of the CIC to constitute Benches within the Commission. Held, Sections 12(4) RTI Act, grants the CIC wide-ranging powers to manage the Commissions' affairs, including the ability to constitute benches. This interpretation aligns with the purpose and objective of the RTI Act, which aims to facilitate the efficient disposal of cases and the effective implementation of the right to information. The absence of an explicit provision for Benches does not negate the CIC's authority to constitute them, as such powers are implicitly included within the scope of the CIC's general superintendence and management responsibilities. The formation of Benches allows for the efficient allocation of work and ensures the timely disposal of cases, which is crucial for upholding the right to information. (Para 15, 16, 17, 18 & 19) Central Information Commission v. DDA, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 465

Service Law

Bihar City Manager Cadre (Appointment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2014 - The candidate, who applied for the position of City Manager scored 22.575 marks (32.14%) out of 70, which exceeded the required 32% threshold. However, her candidature was rejected due to having zero work experience. The BSSC had considered work experience as part of the minimum qualifying marks, thus counting her total score out of 100 marks instead of just the written examination score. The Supreme Court, upholding the High Court's findings, ruled that the BSSC's approach was contrary to the statutory rules, and clarified that while work experience marks should be considered in the final merit list, the candidate's qualifying score in the written exam entitled her to be included in the merit list. The appeal by the BSSC was dismissed. (Para 16) Bihar Staff Selection Commission v. Himal Kumari, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 483

Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) - Termination of Employment for Suppression of Information in Verification Roll - Whether Justified ? The respondent had deliberately withheld material information regarding a pending criminal case, despite having knowledge of it, and had made false statements in his Verification Roll and during disciplinary proceedings. Upholding the employer's decision to terminate the respondent's employment, the Court emphasized the importance of maintaining high moral standards, particularly in law enforcement agencies, where credibility and trustworthiness are paramount. (Para 24 - 25) Union of India v. Shishu Pal @ Shiv Pal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 507

Guidelines sanctioning award of excess bonus marks on a differential basis is challenged to be discriminatory and ultra vires the Rules – Bonus marks fixed for applicants with project experience and other applicants are different – Guidelines for the selection were issued before the advertisement for the post – Held, the experience gathered from project work stood on a higher pedestal because it was in tune with the nature of the work of the position of appointment – Hence, there is no illegality in the prescription of additional marks for those applicants who had experience of working in projects, while recruiting Prabhodhaks. (Para 29 & 40) Mahesh Chand Bareth v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 442

It is true that an employee engaged on daily wages has no legally vested right to seek regularisation of his services. However, if the competent authority takes a policy decision within the permissible framework, its benefit must be extended to all those who fall within the parameters of such a policy. Authorities cannot be permitted to pick and choose in such circumstances. (Para 5) State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shyam Kumar Yadav, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 515

Pension is a right and not a bounty. It is a constitutional right for which an employee is entitled on his superannuation. However, pension can be claimed only when it is permissible under the relevant rules or a scheme. If an employee is covered under the Provident Fund Scheme and is not holding a pensionable post, he cannot claim pension, nor the writ court can issue mandamus directing the employer to provide pension to an employee who is not covered under the rules. (Para 35) U.P. Roadways Retired Officials and Officers Association v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 517

Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Prabodhak Service Rules, 2008; Rule 13(v) which provides for age relaxation to the persons serving under educational projects is challenged to be discriminatory and contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution of India – Fixing of minimum and maximum age requirement is a policy decision – There was a valid classification based on intelligible differentia which distinguished applicants with project experience and those who lacked project experience. Further the differentia had a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Rules. Held, the historical background leading to the enactment of the Rules itself provides a justification for granting relaxation to the persons serving under the educational project, if they fulfil the condition that they were within the age limit when they were initially engaged. Hence, relaxation provided for in Rule 13(v) is not arbitrary or unreasonable. (Para 22, 24 & 25) Mahesh Chand Bareth v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 442

Retrospective Promotion - A promotion shall be effective from the date on which it is granted and not from the date when a vacancy occurs on the subject post or when the post itself is created. (Para 18) Bihar State Electricity Board v. Dharamdeo Das, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 506

Slum Rehabilitation

Slum rehabilitation scheme not to be seen as a real estate development project, it's linked to right to life. Yash Developers v. Harihar Krupa Co-operative Housing Society Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 524

Specific Relief Act, 1963

Section 16(c) - Mandatory requirement of demonstrating readiness and willingness - Relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary relief. As such, the Courts, while exercising power to grant specific performance of contract, need to be extra careful and cautious in dealing with the pleadings and the evidence in particular led by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs have to stand on their own legs to establish that they have made out a case for grant of relief of specific performance of contract. The Act, 1963 provides certain checks and balances which must be fulfilled and established by the plaintiffs before they can become entitled for such a relief. The pleadings in a suit for specific performance have to be very direct, specific and accurate. A suit for specific performance based on bald and vague pleadings must necessarily be rejected. Section 16(C) of the 1963 Act requires readiness and willingness to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The said provision has been widely interpreted and held to be mandatory. (Para 22(i)) P. Ravindranath v. Sasikala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 491

Section 19(b) – Specific performance of the suit agreement – Held, the defendants, who are subsequent purchasers, fail to prove that they entered into the sale deed in good faith and without notice of earlier suit agreement. Hence, in view of Section 19(b), a decree for specific performance of the sale agreement can be passed against such defendants. (Para 16) Maharaj Singh v. Karan Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 473

Standards of Weight & Measures (Packaged Commodity) Rules, 1977

Rule 2(x)(iii) & 29 and Central Excise Act, 1944; Section 4A –Wholesale package – Rule 29 does not require a declaration of sale price on the wholesale package. The respondent is selling HDPE bags containing 100 poly packs each to the distributors and dealers. The Commissioner held that an HDPE bag containing 100 poly packs does not contain a declaration of selling price and therefore, it would be a wholesale package. Rule 29 do not require the display of price on such HDPE bags. Held, HDPE bags would be covered by the definition of 'wholesale package' as defined in clause (iii) of Rule 2(x) of the said Rules. Hence, duty under Section 4A(1) of the Excise Act was not applicable to the goods and subject matter of the show cause notices, cannot be faulted with. (Para 17 & 18) Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur -II v. Miraj Products Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 470

Rule 2(q) – “Retail sale” – to attract the definition of retail sale, a commodity has to be sold, distributed, or delivered for consumption by an individual, a group of individuals, or any other consumer. Thus, the sale or distribution of a commodity to a dealer who, in turn, sells the commodity to retail dealers will not be a retail sale. (Para 11) Commissioner of Central Excise, Jaipur -II v. Miraj Products Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 470

Stay

If an interim protection order passed by a High Court stood automatically vacated pursuant to Asian Resurfacing but the trial has not been concluded, the vacation of stay shall be invalid and inoperative from the date of overruling. Pawan Agarwal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 511

Tax

Tamil Nadu Entertainment Tax Act not applicable to the online cinema ticket booking charges. Commercial Tax Officer v. PVR Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 533

Vodafone Idea is not liable to deduct tds on charges paid to non-resident telecom operators. Deputy Director of Income Tax v. Vodafone Idea Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 522

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Section 3 Explanation 1 and Registration Act 1908; Section 17(2) – Constructive notice of sale agreement – Under the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act 1976, clause (v) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act 1908 was amended, which made an agreement for the sale of an immovable property, a compulsorily registerable document in the State. Held, in view of explanation 1 to Section 3 of the TP Act, the second to fourth defendants shall be deemed to have knowledge of the suit agreement, which was duly registered in view of the constructive notice. Hence, it cannot be said that they paid money in good faith to the first Defendant. Therefore, the second to fourth defendants can never be held to be bona-fide purchasers who have paid consideration in good faith without the notice of the suit agreement. (Para 13) Maharaj Singh v. Karan Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 473

Section 52 – Doctrine of lis pendens – Lis pendens does not render all transfers pendente lite to be void ab-initio, it merely renders rights arising from such transfers as subservient to the rights of the parties to the pending litigation and subject to any direction that the Court may pass thereunder. The mere fact that the registered sale deed was executed during the pendency of the Underlying Suit does not automatically render it null and void. Held, there exists no bar to the impleadment of transferees pendente lite with notice. Permitting the impleadment of a transferee pendente lite is, in each case, a discretionary exercise undertaken to enable a purchaser with a legally enforceable right to protect their interests especially when the transferor fails to defend the suit or where there is a possibility of collusion. Further held, the Appellant has a registered sale deed in his favour and in the interest of justice the appellant is entitled to impleadment in the Underlying Suit in order to protect his interests, if any, in the Subject Land. Hence, the Appellant is directed to be added as a party defendant in the Underlying Suit. (Para 16, 17, 21 & 22) Yogesh Goyanka v. Govind, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 457

Section 54 – Zamindari Abolition Act; Section 154B - Prohibition of the sale or transfer of agricultural lands to a person who is not an agriculturalist – Section 154-B permits the sale of agricultural land to a non-agriculturalist with the permission of the State Government for the purposes specified in clause (i) to (v) of clause (h). Held, an 'agreement for sale' does not transfer the property subject matter of the agreement to the purchaser and does not create any interest in the property subject matter of the agreement. Therefore, the embargo created by sub-section (1) of Section 154-B will apply only to the execution of the sale deed and not to the execution of the agreement for sale. Further held, a decree enjoining the defendants to obtain permission to sell the suit property can be passed and a decree for the specific performance can be passed contingent upon the grant of the permission. (Para 17 & 18) Maharaj Singh v. Karan Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 473

Unlawful Activities(Prevention) Act, 1967

A constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused-undertrial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed. In that event, such statutory restrictions would not come in the way. Even in the case of interpretation of a penal statute, howsoever stringent it may be, a constitutional court has to lean in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part. (Para 32) Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486

In the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to grant bail. But it would be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted. It would run counter to the very grain of our constitutional jurisprudence. (Para 32) Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486

The judgement in the case of NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1 cannot be cited as a precedent to deny bail in UAPA cases where the accused has suffered long incarceration. (Para 28) Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486