Supreme Court Monthly Digest- December 2024 With Statute And Subject Wise Index

Acquittal

Court, while acquitting the accused, cannot order that he must be subjected to re-investigation for the same offence. P. Manikandan v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1018

Advocate

The appeal challenges adverse remarks made by the High Court against the appellant, a lawyer who was neither representing any party nor connected to the matter. The Supreme Court noted prior instances where the same High Court Judge had made unwarranted remarks against advocates. The Court emphasized adherence to natural justice principles, stating that no one can be condemned unheard. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's observations against the appellant were unsustainable as they were made without affording him an opportunity to be heard. The impugned remarks and directions to the Bar Council to initiate disciplinary proceedings were expunged. The appeal was allowed, and the contentious portion of the High Court judgment was deleted. Courts must exercise caution and adhere to the principles of natural justice while making adverse observations, particularly against individuals not party to the proceedings. Dushyant Mainali v. Diwan Singh Bora, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1001

Arbitration and Conciliation Act. 1996

Section 11 (6) - Arbitration clause - Interpretation - Pro-arbitration approach - Mutual Consent - Validity and interpretation of arbitration clause - The Supreme Court examined the arbitration clause in the Deed of Partnership dated 16.07.2016, which provided for disputes to be referred to arbitration. The clause stated arbitration as "optional" and required mutual consent for appointing an arbitrator. The Court held that the clause cannot be interpreted as making arbitration contingent solely upon mutual agreement at the time of the dispute. Instead, the clause reflects the intention of the parties to resolve disputes through arbitration. Tarun Dhameja v. Sunil Dhameja, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 996

Section 11 (6) - Non-Arbitrable Disputes - Payment of Wages and Industrial Disputes - Termination of Employment - Non-Disclosure Obligations - Abuse of Process - The appellant challenged the appointment of an arbitrator by the High Court on grounds that the dispute concerning his termination and non-payment of wages was governed by the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The respondent had terminated the appellant's employment, citing absenteeism during the COVID-19 pandemic, and later initiated arbitration proceedings despite ongoing statutory remedies sought by the appellant. Whether the dispute involving non-payment of wages and termination of employment is arbitrable. Whether the High Court's appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was appropriate given the pending statutory remedies. Held, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order appointing an arbitrator, holding that the disputes concerning non-payment of wages and termination were non-arbitrable as they fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of statutory authorities under the Payment of Wages Act and Industrial Disputes Act. The claim of a violation of the non-disclosure obligations was not substantiated by the respondent during initial disciplinary actions, making it an afterthought. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, dismissing the petition under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. The appellant was awarded costs of Rs. 5 lakhs, payable within three months. Dushyant Janbandhu v. Hyundai AutoEver India Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 981

Section 33 - Although the Arbitral Tribunal becomes functus officio after passing an award, it would still retain the limited jurisdiction to clarify or correct errors in an award. North Delhi Municipal Corporation v. S.A. Builders Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1010

Section 34 - Condonation of delay - Liberal interpretation - The appellant's land was acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956. The appellant filed an appeal before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, which was later dismissed as barred by limitation under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The appellant sought condonation of the period from 20.10.2011 to 20.01.2012 under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Whether the period from 20.10.2011 to 20.01.2012 should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act while calculating the limitation period for filing objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Held, Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which provides for the exclusion of the time spent in bona fide legal proceedings, applies to proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court emphasized a liberal interpretation of limitation provisions to secure the limited remedies available under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act. The Court allowed the exclusion of the period from 20.10.2011 to 23.02.2012, thereby restoring the Section 34 petition for reconsideration. The appeals were allowed, and the judgment of the High Court and the order of the District Judge were set aside. The Section 34 petition was restored to its original number for fresh adjudication. Kirpal Singh v. Government of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 970

Armed Forces

Army - Family Pension - "battle casualty" and "physical casualty" - The deceased, an Army personnel, died while on duty as part of an Area Domination Patrol near the Line of Control (LoC) under extreme climatic conditions. Initially classified as a "battle casualty," his death was later reclassified as a "physical casualty." The respondent, his widow, was granted a Special Family Pension but denied a Liberalised Family Pension (LFP). The Armed Forces Tribunal ruled in her favor, granting her LFP and an ex-gratia lump sum. Whether the death of the deceased qualifies as a "battle casualty" under Clause 1(g) of Appendix 'A' of Army Order 1 of 2003 and falls under Category E(f) of the Liberalised Pensionary Awards, 2001. Held, a soldier's death due to illness caused by extreme climatic conditions while serving in operational areas near the LoC qualifies as a "battle casualty," entitling the family to Liberalised Family Pension under relevant regulations. The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, ruling that the death of the deceased due to cardiopulmonary arrest caused by extreme climatic conditions while operating near the LoC qualified as a "battle casualty" under Clause 1(g) of Appendix 'A' of Army Order 1 of 2003. The death also fell under Category E(f) of the 2001 Pensionary Awards, covering deaths in war-like situations, including those caused by extreme climatic conditions near the LoC. The Court criticized the appellants for their lack of sympathy and unnecessary litigation against the widow of a deceased soldier. Reliance on precedents Kanchan Dua v. Union of India, (2020) 18 SCC 709 and Radhika Devi v. Union of India, (2020) 18 SCC 715 was held inapplicable due to differing facts. The appellants were directed to implement the Tribunal's order within three months and pay Rs. 50,000 as costs to the respondent within two months. Union of India v. Saroj Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 942

Grant of Permanent Commission to Short Service Commissioned (SSC) Officer in the Army Dental Corps (AD Corps) - Whether the appellant, a Short Service Commissioned officer, is entitled to parity with similarly situated officers who were granted permanent commission following the judgment in O.A. No. 111 of 2013 by the AFT, Principal Bench. Whether the exclusion of the appellant from consideration for permanent commission violated the principles of equality and non-discrimination. Held, the appellant, having acquired eligibility for a third chance for permanent commission prior to the amendment of Army Instructions (AI) No. 37/78 on March 20, 2013, is entitled to the same relief as granted to similarly situated officers in O.A. No. 111 of 2013. The exclusion of the appellant on the basis of not being a party to the earlier litigation is unjustified, as per the principle that similarly situated individuals should benefit from judicial declarations without being compelled to litigate individually. The delay in approaching the Tribunal is satisfactorily explained, given the appellant's personal and professional circumstances, including maternity leave and the COVID-19 pandemic. The appellant is granted Permanent Commission in the Army Dental Corps with retrospective effect from the date when similarly situated officers were granted the same pursuant to the judgment in O.A. No. 111 of 2013. All consequential benefits, including seniority, promotions, monetary benefits, and arrears, are directed to be extended to the appellant within four weeks. The judgment of the AFT, Regional Bench, Lucknow, dated January 5, 2022, in O.A. No. 241 of 2021, is quashed and set aside. The judgment reinforces the principle of equality in service matters and mandates the extension of benefits to all similarly situated individuals without the need for repeated litigation. It also emphasizes the application of Article 142 of the Constitution to ensure complete justice in unique circumstances. Lt. Col. Suprita Chandel v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 961

Arms Act, 1959

Sections 25, 54, and 59 - Arms Rules, 2016 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Defence Accounts Department (DAD) Notification dated 29th October 1980 - Whether possession of a buttondar knife by the appellant constituted an offense under Sections 25, 54, and 59 of the Arms Act, 1959 - Whether the prosecution sufficiently established that the knife's possession was for a purpose prohibited under the DAD Notification. Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the appellant's petition for quashing the FIR and related proceedings - The appellant was apprehended with a buttondar knife at Pravasi Park. The knife's dimensions (blade: 14.5 cm length, 3 cm width) exceeded the thresholds specified in the Arms Rules, 2016 but did not violate the DAD Notification unless intended for manufacture, sale, or test. The High Court rejected the appellant's petition under Section 482 CrPC to quash the FIR and subsequent proceedings. Held, the Supreme Court quashed the FIR, charge sheet, and related proceedings, holding that possession of the knife alone, without allegations of prohibited intent as per the DAD Notification, did not constitute an offense under the Arms Act. Under the DAD Notification, possession of certain knives is prohibited only when intended for manufacture, sale, or test. Prosecution must allege and establish prima facie that the knife was possessed for a prohibited purpose under the notification. Mere possession of a buttondar knife, absent allegations of prohibited intent, does not attract provisions of the Arms Act. The appeal was allowed, the FIR and charge sheet were quashed, and the High Court's order was set aside. Irfan Khan v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 945

Bail

Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999 (Maharashtra) – Bail – Delay in trial – Conditions for bail under MCOCA - Whether prolonged incarceration without trial violates the accused's right to a speedy trial under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Applicability of the twin conditions under Section 21(4) of MCOCA for grant of bail. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and granted bail to the appellant, noting that prolonged incarceration of approximately five years without even framing of charges amounted to a violation of the right to a speedy trial. The Court emphasized that such delays not only infringe on the rights of the accused but also affect the interests of justice for the victim. The twin conditions under MCOCA must be satisfied for bail, but prolonged incarceration without progress in trial was deemed a valid ground for deviation. Authorities were directed to devise a mechanism to ensure the timely production of accused persons for trial proceedings. This judgment underscores the constitutional mandate of a speedy trial and its interplay with stringent bail provisions under special statutes like MCOCA. It highlights judicial intervention to address systemic delays in the criminal justice process. Siddhant @ Sidharth Balu Taktode v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1026

Serious Offences - Commencement of Trial - Whether discrepancies between the victim's FIR and statement under Section 164 CrPC justify granting bail in a serious offence like rape - Conditions to be imposed on bail to prevent interference with witnesses or tampering with evidence - The petitioner (victim) challenged the High Court's order granting bail to Respondent No. 2 (accused) in a case involving offences under Sections 376D and 342 IPC. The High Court granted bail based on discrepancies between the FIR and the victim's Section 164 CrPC statement. Held, once a trial has commenced in serious offences, bail should not be granted based on evaluation of evidence, as it may influence the trial's outcome. While upholding the High Court's decision to grant bail, the Supreme Court imposed additional conditions to ensure fair trial conduct. This judgment underscores the principle that granting bail in serious offences like rape, based on preliminary evaluation of evidence, can adversely impact the trial. Courts must balance the rights of the accused with the need to preserve the integrity of the trial process. X v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 949

Bank

Credit Card - Charging of interest at rates ranging from 36% to 49% p.a. - For an act to constitute an "unfair trade practice" under the relevant provisions, it is necessary to examine whether the act involved false statements, misrepresentation, or deceptive practices. In this case, the Court found that the conditions for "deceptive practices" and "unfair methods" were not met. The Court observed that banks, in offering credit card facilities, duly inform customers of the applicable terms and conditions, including interest rates. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) confirmed no evidence of banks acting contrary to its directives or engaging in usurious practices. The Court also emphasized that the charging of interest rates, determined as per financial wisdom and RBI's guidelines, cannot be considered unconscionable or unilateral. Furthermore, the National Commission's authority to set aside unfair contracts does not extend to capping interest rates charged by banks, which are governed by the Banking Regulation Act and RBI's policies. Consequently, the Court set aside the National Commission's order and allowed the appeals, ruling in favor of the banks and the RBI. Appeals allowed, and the National Commission's judgment was set aside. Hongkong Andshanghai Banking Corp. Ltd. v. Awaz, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1034

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

Section 430(1) - Suspension of sentence - Procedural fairness concerning the pendency of appeals in the High Court. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court, which had rejected the appellant's second application for suspension of sentence. Noting that the appellant had already served 8 months of his 5-year sentence and that the appeal might not be heard expeditiously due to high pendency, the Court held that denying suspension of sentence was unjustified. The appellant's sentence was suspended until the disposal of his appeal before the High Court, and he was granted bail, subject to conditions imposed by the trial court. The Court clarified that the suspension of sentence and bail would not prejudice the merits of the appeal. The appellant must actively pursue his appeal before the High Court. The High Court may cancel the bail if the appellant fails to cooperate in the hearing of the appeal or breaches bail conditions. The respondent-State may request an early hearing of the appeal based on this order. This judgment emphasizes the importance of procedural fairness in cases involving prolonged incarceration and significant delays in the disposal of appeals. It underscores the responsibility of courts to balance the interests of justice with the rights of appellants awaiting the final adjudication of their cases. Abhay Jaiswal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 952

Building

Guidelines for Addressing Unauthorized Constructions and Violations of Building Plans - Legal Principles - Strict Adherence to Rules - State Responsibility - Directions and Enforcement - Unauthorized constructions or deviations from approved building plans are impermissible and must be curtailed with strict enforcement. Administrative failure or negligence cannot shield illegal constructions from action. Regularization of violations should be an exception and only permissible under stringent conditions in the larger public interest, considering environmental and urban development concerns. Builders must provide an undertaking not to hand over possession without a completion/occupation certificate. Approved plans must be displayed at construction sites and periodic inspections conducted by authorities. Service connections (electricity, water, sewerage) must only be granted upon production of a completion/occupation certificate. Unauthorized constructions or post-completion deviations must be acted upon promptly, with liability imposed on officials issuing wrongful certificates. Businesses cannot be conducted in unauthorized buildings, whether residential or commercial. Development must align with zonal plans and be environmentally sustainable. State and local authorities must cooperate in addressing unauthorized constructions, with erring officials subjected to disciplinary action. Appeals concerning completion certificates or regularization of deviations must be resolved within 90 days. Financial institutions should sanction loans only after verifying the completion/occupation certificate. Violation of the court's directions will result in contempt proceedings and prosecution under applicable laws. High Court order confirmed. Appellants directed to vacate and surrender the unauthorized property within three months. Respondent authorities to demolish unauthorized construction within two weeks of surrender. Criminal and departmental action to be initiated against erring officials, with a report filed before the Court. Deposited amount in SLP refunded with interest. Appeals dismissed. Rajendra Kumar Barjatya v. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1009

Caste

Unconstitutionality of the Notification - Inapplicability of Equitable Relief - Restoration of Original Service Record - Whether the State Government's notification merging the "Tanti" caste from the OBC list to the Scheduled Caste (SC) list was valid under Article 341 of the Constitution of India. Whether the respondent, originally categorized as OBC, could claim benefits under the SC category based on the impugned notification. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the Union of India, holding that the State Government's notification merging the Tanti caste from the OBC list to the SC list was unconstitutional and unsustainable in light of the decision in Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar Vichar Manch Bihar v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 472. The respondent was not entitled to benefits under the SC category as the said notification was void. The State Government lacked the authority under Article 341 of the Constitution to amend the Presidential list of Scheduled Castes. Any alteration to this list can only be made by Parliament through legislation. The respondent did not hold a long-standing appointment or benefit under the SC category to warrant equitable relief. The respondent must continue as an OBC candidate, as the notification merging Tanti caste with SC was declared illegal. The judgment of the High Court allowing the respondent's writ petition was set aside. The order of the Central Administrative Tribunal dismissing the respondent's application was restored. This judgment reinforces the constitutional mandate under Article 341, emphasizing that inclusion or exclusion of castes in the Scheduled Castes list is the exclusive domain of Parliament. The Court also clarified the limited scope of equitable relief in cases arising from unconstitutional government actions. Union of India v. Rohit Nandan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 994

CBI Investigation

The routine transfer of investigations to the CBI could overburden the agency and demoralize the State police officers. State of West Bengal v. Rebeka Khatun Molla @ Rebeka Molla, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1047

Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985

Pure coconut oil, packaged and sold in small quantities ranging from 5 ml to 2 litres, would be classifiable as 'Edible oil' for the purposes of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. It will be classifiable as "hair oil" if it is packaged and sold as a cosmetic. Commissioner of Central Excise v. Madhan Agro Industries (Pvt) Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1014

Citizenship Act, 1955

Section 4 and 5 - Foreigners Act, 1946; Section 9 – Burden of Proof – Applicability of Constitutional and Statutory Provisions - The burden of proving citizenship under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946, lies on the individual claiming Indian citizenship. Evidence concerning birth, parentage, and place of origin lies within the personal knowledge of the claimant, not the State. Determining citizenship is a factual inquiry requiring careful evidence scrutiny. In the present case, the appellant claimed citizenship through descent under Section 4 of the Indian Citizenship Act, 1955, and by registration under Section 5. The appellant's assertion was supported by references to the Central Government's intention, outlined in the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019, to provide citizenship to minorities from neighboring countries, exempting them from the definition of "illegal migrants." As no decision on the appellant's application was made within a reasonable time, the Court resolved the first contention in favor of the appellant. Basudev Dutta v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 957

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Section 4 and 54; Order XX Rule 18 - Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886; Section 97, 100 and 154(1)(e) - The Regulation, 1886, allows revenue authorities to undertake partition only when all co-sharers consent. In cases of dispute, jurisdiction shifts to civil courts. The High Court erroneously interpreted Section 154(1)(e), concluding civil courts lack jurisdiction when revenue authorities entertain a partition application. This view contradicts the statutory framework and judicial precedents emphasizing the civil court's role in resolving title disputes. The High Court erred in holding that the civil court lacked jurisdiction. Disputes involving title or possession must first be resolved by a competent civil court before revenue authorities can proceed with partition. Abdul Rejak Laskar v. Mafizur Rahman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1043

Section 4 and 54; Order XX Rule 18 - Partition of Agricultural Lands - Section 54 of CPC mandates that the Collector handles partitions involving agricultural lands assessed to revenue. The Civil Court's role is limited to declaring rights and shares. The execution of partition, including delivery of possession, is solely within the Collector's domain. Abdul Rejak Laskar v. Mafizur Rahman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1043

Section 4 and 54; Order XX Rule 18 - Partition - Practical Implications - The division by metes and bounds includes both the physical partition and handing over possession. Where statutory constraints, such as anti-fragmentation laws, apply, the Collector must adhere to them while effecting partition. Civil Courts lack jurisdiction to direct how the Collector should execute the partition but may address grievances if the Collector's actions contravene the decree. This analysis underscores the structured approach to partition suits, balancing judicial determinations with administrative execution, ensuring both equity among parties and adherence to revenue laws. Abdul Rejak Laskar v. Mafizur Rahman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1043

Section 4 and 54; Order XX Rule 18 - Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886; Section 154(1)(e) - Civil Court Jurisdiction - Jurisdiction of civil courts to determine title is not ousted by Section 154(1). The Supreme Court clarified that the jurisdiction of civil courts under Section 154(1)(e) is barred only when a suit for imperfect partition is maintainable under Section 97 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886. For such maintainability, two conditions must be met: (i) The party seeking partition must be in actual possession of the property in question. (ii) Co-sharers must be unwilling to consent to the partition. If these conditions are unmet, the civil court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate partition claims based on title as a co-owner. The Court emphasized that while revenue authorities have exclusive jurisdiction over perfect partition of revenue-paying properties, civil courts retain the authority to: (i) Determine the rights and shares of parties in disputed properties. (ii) Declare entitlement to seek partition before revenue authorities. (iii) Adjudicate on title to immovable property. The Court also reiterated that perfect partition remains the exclusive domain of revenue authorities, but suits for declaration of title, right, or interest in immovable property are within the jurisdiction of civil courts. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the Civil Judge's order reinstated. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of. Abdul Rejak Laskar v. Mafizur Rahman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1043

Section 16 - Subject Matter Jurisdiction - Personal Obedience Principle - Specific Performance and Territorial Jurisdiction - Practical Impediments to Jurisdiction - Contractual Implications - The court reaffirms that under Section 16 CPC, suits concerning immovable property must generally be instituted in the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the property is situated. Relief sought in respect of immovable property can be entertained by a court outside the property's jurisdiction only if the relief can be entirely enforced through the personal obedience of the defendant. This principle is rooted in the maxim "equity acts in personam." A suit for specific performance and delivery of possession is covered under Section 16(d) of the CPC. Courts cannot assume jurisdiction over immovable property situated outside their territorial limits, even by agreement between the parties. When enforcing a decree for specific performance requires actions, such as registering a sale deed, in a jurisdiction where the property is located, such relief cannot be said to be entirely achievable through the personal obedience of the defendant. Even in the absence of an explicit prayer for the transfer of possession, if the nature of the contract implies such transfer, the suit remains one governed by Section 16(d) of the CPC. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court was correct in determining that the relief sought could not be entirely enforced through the personal obedience of the defendants, thus negating the applicability of the proviso to Section 16. Rohit Kochhar v. Vipul Infrastructure Developers Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 951

Section 89 - A dispute amicably settled by mediation under Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) should not be confused with the settlement of a dispute through Lok Adalat in terms of the repayment of Court fees where the latter provides 100% refund in the administration of justice. This is so because in the settlement of disputes by alternative dispute mechanisms, the refund of Court fees, if any, is incidental. Sanjeev Kumar Harakhchand Kankariya v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1022

Section 148A - Interpretation of - Caveator rights and procedural compliance - Caveators are entitled to a hearing only on interim relief and not at the stage of admission or grant of leave in appeals or Special Leave Petitions. Section 148A of the CPC obligates courts to issue notice to caveators in applications for interim relief. Saddam Hussain M.K. v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1049

Order 7 Rule 11 CPC – Limitation Act, 1963; Article 59 - Rejection of Plaint – Suit for cancellation of a registered sale deed - Limitation - Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC on the grounds of limitation - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment that rejected the plaint filed by the appellants challenging a registered sale deed dated 04.12.2004 on grounds of fraud. The appellants contended they became aware of the sale deed only in 2017. The Court held that the issue of limitation in cases involving allegations of fraud is a mixed question of law and fact, which should be determined during trial. The Court emphasized that the consideration of an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC must be confined to the averments in the plaint. The judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the order of the First Appellate Court was restored. The trial court was directed to expedite the disposal of the suit. This judgment clarifies that a plaint should not be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC based on limitation without a thorough examination of facts, especially in cases where the knowledge of the alleged fraudulent act is contested. It underscores that the determination of limitation should consider the specific circumstances and evidence presented during the trial. The appeal was allowed. Daliben Valjibhai v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1056

Order 7 Rule 11(d) - Applicability of Limitation and Rejection of Plaint - Legal Principles Discussed - Claims for possession and title to immovable property under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, must be initiated within twelve years. Where possession has been with adverse parties for over a century, the plaintiff's claim for possession and title is barred by limitation. Vague and unsubstantiated allegations of fraud do not suffice to overcome the bar of limitation. Fraud allegations must be specific and clearly articulated; otherwise, they cannot revive a time-barred claim. Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1041

Order 7 Rule 11(d) - Courts must reject a plaint at the threshold if it is evident from the plaint's averments that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. Reluctance to reject such plaints at an early stage results in unnecessary litigation and hardship for defendants. Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1041

Order 7 Rule 11(d) - The plaintiff sought possession and declaration of ownership of suit properties, relying on outdated government resolutions and alleging fraud in earlier compromise decrees. The possession of the properties had been with adverse parties for over a century, and the plaintiff failed to assert any rights within the limitation period. The plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d), CPC, as the claims were barred by limitation and constituted an abuse of the legal process. The appellate court's decision to allow the plaint to proceed was set aside, and the suit was dismissed at the threshold. The appeal was allowed, and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed as barred by limitation. Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1041

Order 9 Rule 13 - Restoration Applications - Counsel's Negligence - Procedural Fairness - Whether the High Court erred in dismissing a restoration application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC on hyper-technical grounds - Whether a separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is mandatory when a restoration application itself explains the delay - The Respondent filed a suit seeking a declaration that a sale deed executed by his grandfather in favor of the Appellant was null and void on grounds of fraud. An ex parte decree was passed in favor of the Respondent on 11.04.1994. The Appellant, alleging lack of knowledge of the decree and fraud by his previous counsel, filed a restoration application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC on 31.10.1994. The Trial Court allowed the restoration application, noting the Appellant's illiteracy and reliance on his previous counsel. The Revisional Court set aside the Trial Court's order, citing the absence of a Section 5 Limitation Act application and the time-barred nature of the restoration application. The High Court dismissed the Appellant's writ petition, affirming the Revisional Court's decision. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, emphasizing the following principles: (i) Courts should adopt a liberal approach to procedural delays, particularly when the delay is explained within the restoration application itself. (ii) An innocent litigant should not suffer due to the negligence or misconduct of counsel. (iii) A hyper-technical view of procedural requirements undermines the larger objective of justice. The Court restored the Trial Court's order allowing the restoration application and directed expedited disposal of the suit. Delay in filing restoration applications under Order IX Rule 13 CPC can be considered explained if the reasons for the delay are embedded within the application itself. A separate Section 5 Limitation Act application is not mandatory in such cases. Litigants should not bear the consequences of their lawyer's negligence or misconduct. Procedural rules should serve as instruments of justice, not as impediments to substantive adjudication. Appeal allowed. Trial Court's order restored. Directions issued for expeditious disposal of the suit. Dwarika Prasad v. Prithvi Raj Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1037

Order 18 Rule 1 - Circumstances under which a defendant gets the right to begin in a suit hearing - As per the CPC, the plaintiff has the right to begin. However, if the defendant admits the facts alleged by the plaintiff and argues that plaintiff is not entitled to relief due to certain additional facts or any point of law, then the defendant gets the right to begin. (Para 16) Jami Venkata Suryaprabha v. Tarini Prasad Nayak, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1015

Order 18 Rule 1 - Whether the High Court was justified in affirming the trial court's rejection of the plaintiff's application under Order XVIII Rule 1 CPC. Whether the defendants' written statement constituted an admission of the plaintiff's claim, thereby necessitating the defendants to lead evidence first. Held, the provision grants the plaintiff the right to begin unless the defendant admits the plaintiff's claims but raises legal or factual defenses. The defendants admitted the existence of the agreement for sale but characterized it as a sham transaction and denied agreeing to sell the property. This denial negated any alleged admissions by the defendants. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the written statement did not constitute an unequivocal admission of the plaintiff's claims. The application under Order XVIII Rule 1 CPC was rightly rejected, and there was no procedural infirmity in the trial court's or High Court's orders. Jami Venkata Suryaprabha v. Tarini Prasad Nayak, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1015

Order 18 Rule 1 - Court's Discretion - Procedural rules must be applied flexibly to serve justice. The trial court has discretion to decide which party should lead evidence first based on the circumstances of the case. No Party can insist that the other party should be asked to begin first. A court is concerned with the trial of a suit from the time when it is instituted. The hearing of a suit is only a part of the trial of the suit. The determination of the question as to which party has a right to begin is an integral part of the hearing itself. Order XVIII Rule 1 indeed provides for the plaintiff's right to begin the evidence but not the court's obligation to ask the plaintiffs to begin first. There is no impediment for the court to call upon either party to lead evidence first, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the issues framed. Neither party can insist that the other one should be asked to lead it first. It all depends upon what the Court deems proper in the circumstances. Where it finds that the defendant's plea strikes at the root of the case, there would be no hitch in asking him/her to prove such a plea first which can lead to disposal of the case. There can be no watertight compartmentalisation in matters of justice and all rules of procedure are designed and directed to achieve and secure ends of justice. (Para 17 & 18) Jami Venkata Suryaprabha v. Tarini Prasad Nayak, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1015

Order 20 Rule 18 - Nature and Scope of - Partition of Property - Order XX Rule 18 CPC governs decrees in suits for partition or separate possession of property. It distinguishes between partitions relating to estates assessed to government revenue (handled by the Collector as per Section 54 of CPC) and other immovable or movable properties, where the Court may pass a preliminary decree and appoint a Commissioner for further inquiry and division. Abdul Rejak Laskar v. Mafizur Rahman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1043

Order 20 Rule 18 - Preliminary and Final Decrees in Partition Suits - In partition suits, courts may issue: (i) Preliminary Decree: Declares parties' rights and shares in the property but leaves the actual division for subsequent proceedings. (ii) Final Decree: Executes the division of property by metes and bounds as per the preliminary decree. A composite decree, combining both preliminary and final decrees, may be issued where the division is straightforward or mutually agreed upon. Abdul Rejak Laskar v. Mafizur Rahman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1043

Order 20 Rule 18 - Role of the Collector and Commissioner - For estates assessed to government revenue, the Collector or a subordinate officer effects the partition. For other properties, a Commissioner appointed by the Court undertakes the division. The Collector's actions in partitioning revenue-assessed estates must adhere to the Court's declaration of rights. Abdul Rejak Laskar v. Mafizur Rahman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1043

Order 23 Rule 3 - Consent Decrees - Restoration as a Statutory Remedy - Under Order 23, Rule 3 CPC, a party retains the statutory right to seek restoration of a case if the terms of a compromise are not fulfilled, irrespective of specific liberty being recorded by the court in its order. The court recording a compromise bears the duty to examine its legality, including in cases alleging fraud or non-compliance, through recall applications. Navratan Lal Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 985

Order 23 Rule 3A - Consent Decrees - Bar on Fresh Suits and Appeals - As per Section 96 (3) and Order 23, Rule 3A of the CPC, neither appeals nor fresh suits are maintainable to challenge a consent decree or the legality of a compromise, leaving recall applications as the sole remedy. Navratan Lal Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 985

Order 23 Rule 3A - Compromise decrees cannot be challenged by third parties through a separate suit. The proper remedy is to approach the same court where the compromise decree was passed. Third parties are equally barred from challenging such decrees unless allowed by law. Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1041

Order 23 Rule 3 - Compromise of Suit - The appellant filed a suit for cancellation of power of attorney and sale deeds alleging forgery, which was dismissed by the Trial Court. During the pendency of the first appeal, the parties entered into a compromise, recorded in the High Court's order. The appellant sought restoration of the appeal upon the respondent's non-compliance and dishonor of cheques issued under the compromise. The High Court dismissed the restoration application, citing the absence of liberty for restoration in its earlier order. Held, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the statutory remedy of restoration under Order 23, Rule 3 cannot be curtailed by the absence of explicit liberty in a prior order. The matter was remanded to the High Court for adjudication on merits. The judgment reaffirms the primacy of statutory rights under the CPC and emphasizes the judiciary's role in ensuring access to justice and compliance with lawful agreements. It underscores the limited nature of remedies available against consent decrees and clarifies the procedural safeguards for parties alleging fraud or non-compliance. Navratan Lal Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 985

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Section 125 - Validity of the High Court's order restoring a petition under Section 125 CrPC for maintenance that was dismissed for non-prosecution. Procedural propriety of filing an appeal against a favorable High Court order. Oversight regarding voluminous pleadings filed by litigants appearing in person. The appellant obtained a divorce decree on grounds of cruelty in 2016. In subsequent legal proceedings, her application under Section 125 CrPC for maintenance was dismissed by the Family Court for non-prosecution. The High Court of Allahabad, by a Division Bench, restored the petition to its original number, directing the Family Court to decide the case on merits. The appellant challenged this order before the Supreme Court. Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, observing that the High Court's order was favorable to the appellant, as it merely restored her maintenance petition for adjudication on merits. Directly challenging this High Court order before the Supreme Court, instead of pursuing the matter before the Family Court, was improper. The Court expressed concern over lengthy, irrelevant submissions by litigants appearing in person and directed the Registry to exercise discretion in such cases. The appeal was dismissed, with the Supreme Court emphasizing that the High Court's restoration order was appropriate and beneficial to the appellant. Deepti Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1007

Section 125 - Priority of maintenance claims over secured creditors under statutory frameworks - Maintenance claims were held superior to the rights of secured creditors under laws such as the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and the SARFAESI Act, 2002. Maintenance ensures dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution. Apurva @ Apurvo Bhuvanbabu Mandal v. Dolly, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 977

Section 195 r/w. 340 - Whether a private complaint under Sections 193, 199, and 200 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) can be entertained for offenses allegedly committed before a Tribunal that is not classified as a "Court" under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), or if such a complaint requires prior sanction under Section 195 read with Section 340 Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and clarified that offenses under Sections 193, 199, and 200 IPC can be theoretically committed both within and outside a court. Where offenses are allegedly committed before a Tribunal that is not a "Court" under the Cr.P.C., prior sanction under Section 195 read with Section 340 Cr.P.C. is not required. In such cases, the remedy lies in filing a private complaint, as affirmed by the decision in Iqbal Singh Narang & Ors. v. Veeran Narang, (2012) 2 SCC 60. The High Court's order quashing the private complaint was set aside, and the Tribunal was directed to entertain the complaint, subject to its merits. This judgment reinforces the distinction between proceedings before a "Court" and a "Tribunal" for offenses under the IPC and clarifies the procedural route for complaints in such cases. Anil Kumar J. Bavishi v. Mahendra Kumar Jalan @ M.K. Jalan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1050

Section 197 – Objective of - Protection of Public Servants – Scope and Applicability - Legal Principles - The protection under Section 197 CrPC is intended to safeguard public servants from vexatious or frivolous prosecution for acts performed in their official capacity. However, its applicability depends on the specific facts and circumstances of each case. The provision aims to protect honest and responsible public servants from unwarranted criminal proceedings for actions undertaken in the discharge of their official duties, ensuring they are not demoralized in performing their duties. Om Prakash Yadav v. Niranjan Kumar Upadhyay, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 989

Section 197 – Interpretation of "Official Duty" - Reasonable Connection Test - Excess of Duty - Quality of the Act - The expression “acting or purporting to act in the discharge of official duty” must be interpreted to strike a balance—construing strictly for the scope of duties but liberally for the nature of the act once connected to official responsibilities. For Section 197 to apply, there must be a direct and reasonable connection between the alleged act and the official duty, such that the public servant can reasonably claim the act was performed in virtue of their office. Acts exceeding official duties may still attract protection if a reasonable nexus exists between the act and the official capacity. The quality of the act must be evaluated. An opportunity provided by an official position does not suffice unless the act is integrally connected to official duties. Om Prakash Yadav v. Niranjan Kumar Upadhyay, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 989

Section 197 – Prohibited Acts - Limitations of Protection - Actions such as lodging false cases, fabricating evidence, conducting illegal detentions, or engaging in criminal conspiracies do not fall under the protective umbrella of Section 197, as they lack reasonable connection with official duties. The provision is not a shield for public officials to misuse their office for unlawful purposes. The protection must not extend to acts that are a facade for illegal activities. In conclusion, the applicability of Section 197 CrPC is determined by examining whether the act complained of has a reasonable nexus with the discharge of official duties. If such a connection is absent, the protection cannot be claimed, as misuse of the provision would undermine its intent. Om Prakash Yadav v. Niranjan Kumar Upadhyay, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 989

Section 197 – Requirement of Sanction – Determination and Timing - Legal Principles - Sanction May Arise at Any Stage - Role of Defence in Establishing Official Duty - Consideration Beyond Allegations in Complaint - Caution Against Premature Quashing - The need for sanction may not always be evident at the stage of the complaint or police report but could become apparent as facts emerge during the proceedings. Hence, the requirement for sanction can be determined at any stage of the case, depending on the circumstances that unfold. In some cases, a conclusive determination on the requirement of sanction may necessitate granting the defence an opportunity to present evidence. The accused may bring forth material during the trial to demonstrate that the acts complained of were integrally connected with their official duties, warranting protection under Section 197 CrPC. Courts are not restricted to the allegations in the complaint when deciding the issue of sanction. They may examine the entire material on record at the stage when the question arises for consideration. Courts should avoid prematurely staying or quashing criminal trials at the initial stages, as doing so could lead to loss or damage to crucial evidence that may be critical to the adjudication of the case during the trial. In conclusion, the question of sanction is dynamic and context-specific, requiring a careful examination of the evolving facts and evidence to ensure justice while protecting the legitimate interests of public servants. Om Prakash Yadav v. Niranjan Kumar Upadhyay, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 989

Section 197 – Sanction for Prosecution – Scope and Applicability - The appellant, a District Town Planner (Enforcement), was accused of unauthorized demolition of a building belonging to the respondent college. The demolition was undertaken pursuant to a notification declaring the area as controlled and subsequent restoration orders issued under the relevant statute. The respondent's allegations of malafide intent and illegal demolition were challenged by the appellant on the grounds of the demolition being within the scope of her official duties. Held, The appellant acted within her authority and in discharge of official duties. The pendency of an application for regularization of construction did not bar the demolition since it was carried out under lawful orders. The initiation of criminal proceedings without prior sanction under Section 197 CrPC vitiates the process, rendering the complaint and summoning order invalid. Liberty was, however, reserved for the respondent to seek appropriate sanction in accordance with law. Appeals Allowed. Summoning order and consequent trial proceedings quashed. Gurmeet Kaur v. Devender Gupta, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 983

Section 197 - Validity of subsequent sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, based on the same material previously considered - Quashing of criminal proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Held, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's view that a subsequent sanction based on the same material as an earlier declined sanction is not legally sustainable. The Court set aside the High Court's quashing of charges under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120B IPC, noting the chargesheet had been filed after investigation and the High Court did not consider the merits of these charges. The matter was remitted to the High Court for reconsideration of the charges under the IPC. Appeals partly allowed. The judgment underscores the principle that a subsequent sanction for prosecution cannot be sustained if it is based on the same materials considered during the earlier refusal. It also emphasizes the necessity of judicial scrutiny of the merits of charges under the IPC before quashing proceedings. State of Telangana v. C. Shobha Rani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 955

Section 303 and 304 - Right to Legal Aid – Fundamental Right under Article 21 – Duty of Trial Courts - The right to legal aid is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Section 303 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) ensures every accused the right to be defended by a pleader of their choice, while Section 304 mandates the provision of free legal aid to accused persons lacking sufficient means to engage an advocate. It is the duty of the trial court to inform the accused of their right to free legal aid in cases where they have not engaged counsel or are unable to afford one. Failure to fulfill this obligation infringes upon the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that a legal aid lawyer is appointed to espouse the cause of the accused. Ashok v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 941

Section 311 - Whether the trial court erred in recording the examination-in-chief of a prosecution witness in the absence of the accused's advocate during the pandemic through video conferencing. Whether the application under Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. recalling the witness for cross-examination was rightly rejected by the trial court and the High Court. The appellant faced charges under Sections 363, 366, and 376 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the POSCO Act. Examination-in-chief of PW1, the complainant, was recorded on February 15, 2021, via video conferencing during the pandemic. Neither the appellant nor his advocate was present. The trial court closed the cross-examination of PW1 on July 27, 2021, due to the absence of the appellant's advocate. The appellant sought to recall PW1 under Section 311 Cr.P.C. on May 16, 2023. The trial court rejected the application, and the High Court upheld this decision. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned orders of the trial court and the High Court. Recording evidence in the absence of the appellant and his advocate violated the principles of a fair trial. The trial court and the High Court adopted a hyper-technical approach, ignoring the prejudice caused to the appellant. The public prosecutor failed in their duty to ensure a fair trial by opposing the application to recall PW1. PW1 is to be recalled for cross-examination by the appellant's advocate, with necessary summons to be issued by the trial court. The judgment reaffirms the importance of upholding the principles of natural justice and fair trial, especially in cases where procedural lapses cause prejudice to the accused. Nadeem v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1048

Section 313 - Failure to Comply with Section 313 CrPC – Prejudice to the Accused – Material Circumstances Not Explained – Acquittal on Procedural Grounds - When material circumstances appearing in evidence are not put to the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) in a language understood by him, it causes prejudice, impairing his ability to decide whether to lead a defense. In this case, the failure to put critical evidence, including the date and place of the alleged crime, to the appellant during his examination violated the procedural safeguards under Section 313, CrPC. Despite the passage of over 15 years since the incident and the appellant's incarceration for more than 12 years, the defect cannot be rectified at this stage. Consequently, the appellant is entitled to acquittal. The imposition of the death penalty by the Trial Court, overlooked by both the Trial Court and High Court despite the procedural lapse, was held to be a grave miscarriage of justice, warranting acquittal. Ashok v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 941

Section 313 - Role of the Public Prosecutor – Duty to Ensure Compliance with Section 313, CrPC – Fair Trial Obligations Under Section 313(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (or Section 351(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), the Court may seek the assistance of the Public Prosecutor and defense counsel in preparing questions for the accused's examination. The Public Prosecutor plays a crucial role in ensuring a fair trial by drawing the Court's attention to the necessity of putting all incriminating material before the accused. It is the Public Prosecutor's duty to be present during the accused's examination and actively assist the Court in compliance with legal requirements. Ashok v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 941

Section 439 - Whether the victim has a right to be heard during bail proceedings under Section 439(1A) of the CrPC and Section 15A(3) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - Whether the High Court erred in granting bail without complying with the mandatory statutory requirements. The appeals arose from orders of the High Court granting bail to the accused in FIR registered under Sections 323, 363, 376DA, 506, and 392 of the IPC, Sections 5(g) and 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012, and Sections 3(2) and 5(A) of the SC/ST Act, 1989. The appellant, a victim in the case, was neither made a party to the bail proceedings nor informed of the same, contrary to statutory provisions. The Supreme Court observed that both Section 439(1A) of the CrPC and Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act mandate the presence of the informant or victim in certain bail proceedings and the duty of the Public Prosecutor to inform the victim. The High Court's orders granting bail were passed in violation of these mandatory provisions and without assigning cogent reasons, despite the seriousness of the alleged offenses. The High Court's orders granting bail were set aside. X v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1002

Section 482 - Change of law can legitimately be regarded as a vital change in circumstance clothing the high court with the power, competence and jurisdiction to entertain the subsequent petition notwithstanding the fact that the earlier petition was withdrawn without obtaining any leave, subject to the satisfaction recorded by the high court that the order prayed for in the subsequent petition ought to be made, inter alia, either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. (Para 19) Muskan Enterprises v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1051

Section 482 - Distinction between quashing proceedings under Section 482 CrPC/Article 226 and discharge applications under the Code of Criminal Procedure - Whether the High Court erred in dismissing a writ petition for quashing criminal proceedings on the grounds of infructuousness post-filing of the charge-sheet - Held, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned one-line order of the High Court, which dismissed the writ petition for quashing criminal proceedings as infructuous upon the filing of a charge-sheet. The filing of a charge-sheet does not render such a writ petition infructuous. The Court emphasized the broader scope of a quashing petition, which allows challenges on grounds like abuse of process of law and reliance on documents beyond the charge-sheet. Such grounds are not available in discharge applications. The High Court's failure to consider the merits of the writ petition warranted interference. Appeal allowed. Mukesh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 960

Company

Listing of Shares - Shareholder Approval - The Supreme Court dismissed the statutory appeal filed by Jyoti Limited challenging the order of the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT), which upheld the Bombay Stock Exchange's (BSE) refusal to list additional equity shares allotted to Asset Reconstruction Private Limited (RARE). Held, under Section 62(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013, shareholder approval through a special resolution is mandatory when a company proposes to increase its subscribed capital. In this case, Jyoti Limited's Board of Directors passed a resolution to convert part of its debt into equity shares in favor of RARE, but the shareholders' approval was not obtained, rendering the proposal non-compliant with statutory requirements. Section 9(1) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, which permits secured creditors like RARE to convert debt into equity, does not override the requirements of the Companies Act. The BSE's rejection of the listing application was also valid under Regulation 28 of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, which necessitates prior approval from the stock exchange for issuing additional shares. The Court found no illegality or error in the decisions of the BSE or SAT. It emphasized that the appellant initiated the process for listing and increasing share capital, making compliance with the Companies Act mandatory. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed as devoid of merit. Jyoti Ltd. v. BSE Ltd. 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1003

Constitution of India

Article 14 - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal of Noida Toll Bridge Company Ltd. (NTBCL) seeking to reimpose tolls on the Delhi-Noida Direct (DND) Flyway. The Court upheld the 2016 Allahabad High Court decision, which had invalidated the concessionaire agreement, noting that NTBCL had already recouped its investment and earned substantial profits. The Court criticized the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) for exceeding its authority by allowing NTBCL to levy fees, leading to unjust enrichment at the public's expense. The Court emphasized that the agreement's terms were crafted to perpetuate toll collection indefinitely, resulting in undue public burden and violating Article 14 of the Constitution. Additionally, the absence of competitive bidding in awarding the agreement to NTBCL was deemed arbitrary and unconstitutional. Noida Toll Bridge Company v. Federation of Noida RWA, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1027

Articles 14, 19, and 21 - Human Dignity - Rights of Women - Judicial Responsibility - Gender-based violence and accusations of witchcraft - Procedural lapses in investigation and prosecution - Legal Principles - Special emphasis was placed on addressing the vulnerability of women, particularly in rural areas, and the need for prompt and sensitive legal action in cases involving gender-based violence - The Court emphasized the duty of courts and law enforcement to act with sensitivity and urgency in cases involving heinous crimes, avoiding mechanical decisions. Rajeev Kumar Upadhyay v. Srikant Upadhyay, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1019

Articles 14, 19, and 21 - Human Dignity - Rights of Women - Judicial Responsibility - Gender-based violence and accusations of witchcraft - The case arose from an incident where a woman was accused of witchcraft, physically assaulted, disrobed, and subjected to degrading treatment. The FIR was registered under multiple sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and the Witch (Daain) Act. Despite the gravity of the allegations, the chargesheet implicated only one individual, leaving out others against whom direct allegations were made. The complainant sought intervention under Section 156(3) of the CrPC after local police failed to act. The ACJM took cognizance of the case against all accused persons. A stay was granted by the High Court, which was challenged in the Supreme Court. The Court criticized the investigatory and prosecutorial lapses, questioning the selective filing of the chargesheet. It expressed concern over the High Court's non-speaking order granting a stay on proceedings, which undermined justice for the victims. Highlighting the constitutional imperative to protect human dignity and ensure justice, the Court called for prompt and effective action at all levels. Rajeev Kumar Upadhyay v. Srikant Upadhyay, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1019

Articles 14, 19, and 21 - Human Dignity - Rights of Women - Judicial Responsibility - Gender-based violence and accusations of witchcraft - The Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to equality and justice, stressing the need for robust mechanisms to protect vulnerable sections of society, particularly women, from gender-based violence and societal exploitation. This judgment underscores the fundamental importance of the right to dignity as an intrinsic aspect of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. It highlights the duty of the State and citizens under Article 51A to foster harmony and renounce practices derogatory to women. The Court addresses the pervasive issue of witchcraft-related violence, emphasizing its roots in superstition, patriarchy, and caste-based discrimination, and its catastrophic impact on women, particularly widows, the elderly, and marginalized groups. The judgment also references international obligations under instruments like the CEDAW, UDHR, and ICCPR, which mandate the elimination of discrimination and violence against women. Through a review of judicial pronouncements and international resolutions, the Court recognizes witchcraft-related allegations as a violation of human dignity, calling for robust legislative and societal action. It mandates expedited trial proceedings in the present matter, stressing that observations made in this judgment should not prejudice the ongoing trial. This decision reaffirms the judiciary's role in safeguarding constitutional values against discriminatory and harmful practices while ensuring due process and accountability. Rajeev Kumar Upadhyay v. Srikant Upadhyay, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1019

Articles 14 and 21 - Whether relief can be denied solely on the grounds of delay and laches in cases involving enforcement of Fundamental Rights - Impact of delay on third-party rights, public inconvenience, and official respondents' ability to defend - Held, Relief cannot be denied solely on grounds of delay in cases alleging breach of Fundamental Rights unless: (i) A third party accrues parallel rights. (ii) Grant of relief causes public inconvenience or unsettles longstanding matters. (iii) Delay prejudices the respondents' defense due to loss of records or evidence. Fundamental Rights cannot be lost due to non-exercise or waived by inaction. Courts must exercise their duty to safeguard breached Fundamental Rights even in delayed claims if no factual disputes exist and relief would have otherwise been granted. Ram Autar Singh Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 993

Articles 14 and 21 - The appellant, an 83-year-old retired Constable, saved members of the public by killing a dacoit 38 years ago and approached the Court seeking direction to authorities to act on his Gallantry Award recommendation. The High Court denied his prayer on the ground that he had approached belatedly. Held, the High Court erred in dismissing the appellant's writ petition on grounds of delay. The Supreme Court emphasized that judicial discretion must be exercised judiciously, particularly in enforcing Fundamental Rights. In this case, the appellant's act of valor warranted recognition, and the Court directed the State to award an additional sum of Rs. 5,00,000, ensuring acknowledgment with dignity and honor. The High Court's order was set aside, and the appeal allowed. The judgment underscores the judiciary's role as the guardian of the Constitution, urging courts to consider all relevant factors before dismissing petitions on the grounds of delay and laches. Ram Autar Singh Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 993

Article 32 - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 341, 323, 325, 326, 307, 354, 354A, 504, 506, 34 - CBI Investigation - Whether the investigation into FIR lodged against the petitioner, should be transferred to an independent agency like the CBI. Whether the local police could fairly investigate allegations involving politically sensitive issues and personnel from the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). The petitioner, an advocate and political spokesperson for the BJP, alleged harassment by his former father-in-law, a sitting MP from the ruling TMC party in West Bengal. FIRs were lodged against the petitioner alleging cognizable offenses. He contended that the FIRs were politically motivated. A politically charged environment and alleged misuse of state machinery raised concerns about the impartiality of the local police. CISF security was provided to the petitioner, and its personnel were also implicated in the events leading to the FIRs. Held, the politically charged atmosphere in West Bengal and the allegations of bias against the local police warranted the transfer of the investigation to an independent agency. The Court noted the necessity of a credible and impartial investigation, particularly in cases involving political and administrative conflicts. The investigation was transferred to the CBI to ensure fairness and public confidence in the administration of justice. The Court emphasized that investigations must not only be fair but also appear to be so. Exceptional circumstances, including political rivalry and the involvement of CISF personnel, justified the exercise of the Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 32. The writ petition was allowed, and the investigation was transferred to the CBI. Kabir Shankar Bose v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 950

Article 142 (1) – Supreme Court's Power to Do Complete Justice - Legal Principle - Irretrievable breakdown of marriage - Limitations - Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court to pass any decree or order necessary to ensure complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. This decree or order is enforceable throughout the territory of India, as prescribed by Parliament or, in its absence, as directed by the President. The phrase "complete justice" under Article 142(1) is broad in scope and permits the Court to grant reliefs beyond statutory limitations, ensuring equitable outcomes in specific cases. In Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 375 the Constitution Bench clarified that Article 142(1) allows the Supreme Court to grant decrees of divorce in cases of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, even if one spouse opposes, provided it ensures complete justice. The Court emphasized exercising this discretionary power with caution, considering factors such as: (i) Duration of marriage and separation. (ii) Attempts at reconciliation through mediation. (iii) Allegations and their cumulative impact on the relationship. (iv) Welfare of children, alimony, and economic provisions for dependents. The Court discouraged direct petitions for divorce under Article 32 or Article 226 of the Constitution, reinforcing the importance of procedural hierarchy and jurisdictional propriety. The power under Article 142(1) is fact-sensitive and must balance equitable considerations with the individual circumstances of the case to achieve justice, particularly in marital disputes. Rinku Baheti v. Sandesh Sharda, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1021

Article 254 - Applicability of - to resolve inconsistencies between Central and State legislation under the Concurrent List - Validity of a notice of ejectment issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as amended by Parliament in 2002, vis-à-vis an earlier amendment made by the Uttar Pradesh State Legislature in 1954. Held, the Parliamentary amendment to Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, with effect from 31.12.2002, supersedes the earlier amendment made by the Uttar Pradesh State Legislature in 1954. This is due to the doctrine of implied repugnancy under Article 254(1) and the supremacy of Parliamentary law as provided under the proviso to Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The Court directed the High Court to consider the tenant's revision petition on its merits rather than awaiting the decision of a larger Bench on a related reference. The impugned order of the High Court was set aside. The High Court was requested to decide the case on its merits expeditiously. Naeem Bano Alias Gaindo vs Mohammad Rahees, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1011

Article 254 - Inconsistencies between Parliamentary and State laws on subjects in the Concurrent List are resolved in favor of Parliamentary law unless the State law has received Presidential assent. However, even if Presidential assent is granted, a subsequent Parliamentary law can override the State law. Naeem Bano Alias Gaindo vs Mohammad Rahees, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1011

Article 254 - Doctrine of Implied Repeal - When a subsequent law by Parliament occupies the same field as an earlier State amendment and produces inconsistent legal results, the State law stands impliedly repealed. Naeem Bano Alias Gaindo vs Mohammad Rahees, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1011

Contempt of Court

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Section 19 - Whether an appeal against an order dismissing a contempt application is tenable - Scope of appellate jurisdiction in contempt proceedings when the High Court has not made any determination on the merits of the underlying dispute. The Supreme Court quashed the Division Bench's order of the High Court and held that the appeal filed by the respondent before the Division Bench was not tenable. Relying on the Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Chunilal Nanda, (2006) 5 SCC 399, the Court reiterated that an appeal under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act is maintainable only against an order imposing punishment for contempt. Orders declining to initiate contempt proceedings or exonerating the contemnor are not appealable under Section 19. A party aggrieved by such an order may seek recourse under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Single Judge of the High Court, in dismissing the contempt application, unequivocally held that no case of contempt was made out. The appeal filed by the respondent before the Division Bench challenging this order was contrary to Clause II of the principles laid down in Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd. The respondent's reliance on Clause V of the Midnapore judgment was misplaced, as the Single Judge had not adjudicated on the merits of the underlying dispute. The impugned order of the Division Bench was set aside. If the respondent files a special leave petition challenging the order of the Single Judge, the period spent in pursuing proceedings before the Division Bench and the Supreme Court shall be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Appeal allowed. Division Bench order set aside. Deepak Kumar v. Devina Tewari, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 963

Contempt jurisdiction is not confined only to violation of express judicial directions but also extends to acts which are intended to frustrate court proceedings or bypass the eventual judgment. The Contempt jurisdiction of the court extends beyond the mere direct disobedience of explicit orders or prohibitory directions issued by the court. Even in the absence of such specific mandates, the deliberate conduct of parties aimed at frustrating court proceedings or circumventing its eventual decision may amount to contempt. This is because such actions strike at the heart of the judicial process, undermining its authority and obstructing its ability to deliver justice effectively. The authority of courts must be respected not only in the letter of their orders but also in the broader spirit of the proceedings before them. Thus, the mere conduct of parties aimed at frustrating the court proceedings or circumventing its decisions, even without an explicit prohibitory order, constitutes contempt. Such actions interfere with the administration of justice, undermine the respect and authority of the judiciary, and threaten the rule of law. The act of a borrower transferring the property to a third party during the pendency of proceedings before the Court amounted to contempt of court. Any contumacious conduct of the parties to bypass or nullify the decision of the court or render it ineffective, or to frustrate the proceedings of the court, or to enure any undue advantage therefrom would amount to contempt. Attempts to sidestep the court's jurisdiction or manipulate the course of litigation through dishonest or obstructive conduct or malign or distort the decision of the courts would inevitably tantamount to contempt sans any prohibitory order or direction to such effect. Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 991

Contempt jurisdiction cannot be invoked to execute a decree or implement an order. The contempt power can be invoked only if it is established that there was a wilful disobedience. Even while exercising such power, the Court has to restrict the scope of its enquiry to the directions which are explicitly specified in the judgment/order. Chaduranga Kanthraj v. P. Ravikumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 971

Legality of actions by law enforcement officers contrary to court orders prohibiting coercive measures against the petitioner - The Supreme Court noted that allowing filing of charge sheets against individuals protected by orders of "no coercive action," is illegal. The apology tendered by the implicated officers was accepted, discharging the notice of contempt. This judgment underscores the binding nature of judicial orders and reiterates that non-compliance by public authorities invites contempt jurisdiction. It also emphasizes the necessity for law enforcement policies to align with judicial directives. Satish Kumar Ravi v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 943

Customs Act, 1962

Sections 28 and 125 - Whether the appellant, as a subsequent purchaser of an imported vehicle, can be held liable for customs duty and subjected to proceedings under Sections 28 and 125 of the Customs Act, 1962. Whether the appellant qualifies as an "owner" under the Customs Act or the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Held, the appellant, being a subsequent purchaser of the vehicle and not the importer, cannot be treated as an "importer" under Section 28 of the Customs Act or an "owner" under Section 125 of the same Act. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the appellant is not the registered owner of the vehicle, as the registration certificate is in the name of the original importer. The liability to pay customs duty and redemption fines under the Customs Act falls on the importer or the lawful owner. The term "importer" under the Customs Act applies to individuals involved in the import process or owning the goods during their importation. The appellant did not meet the statutory definitions of "owner" under either the Customs Act or the Motor Vehicles Act. Proceedings initiated against the appellant for recovery of customs duty and fines were thus unlawful. The High Court judgment, Show-Cause Notices, and confiscation orders against the appellant were quashed. The Appellate Tribunal's order in favor of the appellant was restored. The Department was granted liberty to proceed against the lawful importer. This judgment clarifies the liability of subsequent purchasers under the Customs Act and upholds the importance of statutory definitions in determining ownership and liability in customs matters. Nalin Choksey v. Commissioner of Customs, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 962

Death Sentence

Principles and Procedural Guidelines on Delay in Execution of Death Sentence and Clemency Petitions - Legal Principles - Delay as Grounds for Commutation - Effect of Clemency Petition Delays - Judicial Oversight - Executive Responsibility - Role of Sessions Courts - Operative Guidelines Issued - Dedicated Cells for Mercy Petitions - Transparent Communication - Execution Warrant Procedures - Judicial Compliance Monitoring - Inordinate, undue, and unexplained delay in executing a death sentence may entitle a convict to seek commutation to life imprisonment under Article 32. The delay must be examined post-confirmation of the death sentence, focusing on its impact on the convict's rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Prolonged consideration of mercy petitions by constitutional authorities causes physical and psychological distress to the convict, infringing upon Article 21 rights. Such delays cannot be justified by the gravity of the offense alone. Courts, including High Courts under Article 226, have the authority to intervene in cases of inordinate delay in execution or processing of mercy petitions. There is no fixed standard for what constitutes "inordinate delay"; it must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The Executive must promptly process mercy petitions under Articles 72 and 161 and ensure timely forwarding to the appropriate constitutional functionaries. Sessions Courts must actively monitor the status of appeals, review petitions, and clemency proceedings to avoid delays in issuing execution warrants. State Governments and Union Territories must establish dedicated cells for prompt processing of mercy petitions, with specified responsibilities and timelines. Prisons, police, and authorities must ensure timely communication and sharing of essential information to expedite clemency processes. Sessions Courts must ensure detailed monitoring of cases post-confirmation of the death sentence and provide adequate notice to the convict before issuing warrants. A minimum gap of 15 days must be maintained between the issuance of the execution warrant and the actual execution date. Compliance reports from State Governments and High Courts must be submitted periodically, ensuring adherence to the guidelines. The judgment underscores the importance of upholding convicts' fundamental rights even at the execution stage, balancing the gravity of crimes with humane considerations under Articles 21, 32, and 226. These comprehensive guidelines aim to prevent procedural delays and ensure a fair and efficient justice delivery system. State of Maharashtra v. Pradeep Yashwant Kokade, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 997

Delay

The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition filed by the State challenging the High Court's refusal to condone an inordinate delay of 5 years, 10 months, and 16 days in filing a second appeal regarding valuable government land disputes. The Court emphasized that the expression "sufficient cause" under limitation law requires a party to provide an adequate and plausible explanation for the delay, especially within the prescribed limitation period. Negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides cannot justify condonation of delay, irrespective of whether the litigant is a private party or the State. The Court criticized the State's lackadaisical approach and attributed the delay to systemic inefficiencies, including delayed communication and decision-making by officials. The Court directed the State to streamline its legal machinery, hold erring officials accountable, and take measures to prevent such lapses in the future. Costs of ₹1,00,000/- were imposed on the State for filing the appeal without substantial grounds and for misusing the Court's time. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed with costs, and the Court cautioned against filing appeals without proper justification, emphasizing judicial efficiency and accountability in government litigation. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Kumar Choudhary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 953

Whether the High Court was justified in condoning an inordinate delay of 1184 days in filing the criminal appeal based on a subsequent change in law - Whether the change in legal precedent can override an acquittal already based on additional independent grounds. Held, a subsequent change in law does not provide sufficient justification to condone an inordinate delay in filing an appeal, especially where the acquittal is based on multiple grounds independent of the earlier legal precedent. The High Court's order condoning the delay was found unsustainable. The appeal arose from the order of the High Court condoning a delay of 1184 days in filing a criminal appeal against the acquittal of the appellant, which was primarily based on the judgment in Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab, (2018) 17 SCC 627 and other factual findings. The High Court had condoned the delay on the ground that the subsequent judgment in Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi), (2020) 10 SCC 120 clarified the position of law, holding that the same individual could act as both informant and investigator. The Supreme Court observed that the State's application for condonation of delay lacked a valid explanation for the substantial delay. It emphasized that the change in law alone does not justify reopening a concluded matter unless the case is still pending adjudication. Referring to Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 415 the Court reiterated that a change in law cannot be retroactively applied to disturb final judgments. Since the acquittal was also based on prosecutorial failure to establish a chain of evidence linking the seized contraband to the accused, the condonation of delay by the High Court was unwarranted. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order condoning the delay and restoring the appellant's acquittal. Hyder v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1016

Doctrine

Henderson Doctrine - This doctrine mandates that all issues arising from the same subject matter must be addressed in a single suit, thereby preventing re-litigation of matters that could have been raised earlier. Re-agitating issues previously settled constitutes an abuse of the judicial process, underscoring the necessity for finality in litigation. Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 991

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940

Sale of "aromatic tincture of cardamom" - The appellants, proprietors of medical shops, contended that the restrictions imposed by the Respondents were without jurisdiction and infringed their fundamental right to conduct a lawful business under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. They argued that the aromatic tincture of cardamom, a licensed medicinal preparation, was not classified as a prohibited drug under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, and that the Central Government had not issued any notification banning its sale. The Respondent authorities argued that the tincture had high alcohol content and was being misused as an intoxicant, causing health hazards and revenue loss. They justified their actions under Section 22 of the D&C Act, 1940, which allows inspection and regulatory measures to prevent misuse. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned orders of the High Court and quashing the restrictions imposed by the Respondent authorities. The Court held that the prohibition or restriction on a drug's sale must be issued by the Central Government under Section 26A of the D&C Act, 1940, and in the absence of such a notification, the actions of the Respondent authorities were unsustainable. The Court reaffirmed the appellants' right to conduct their business lawfully under their valid license, free from unwarranted interference. Civil Appeals allowed. High Court orders and the Respondents' orders are set aside. Respondent authorities are directed not to impose any limitations on the appellants' business without a valid prohibition under the D&C Act, 1940. Bhagwati Medical Hall v. Central Drugs Standard Control Organization, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1055

Environment

In addressing an application concerning the protection of "sacred groves" in Rajasthan, the Supreme Court commended Piplantri village for its initiative of planting 111 trees upon the birth of every girl child. This practice, initiated by a former Sarpanch, has led to the plantation of over 4 million trees, raising the water table by approximately 800-900 feet and reducing the local temperature by 3-4 degrees Celsius. The Court highlighted the model's environmental, economic, and social benefits, including biodiversity improvement, job creation (particularly for women), and the promotion of gender equality. The Court directed the Rajasthan Forest Department to conduct detailed on-ground and satellite mapping of each sacred grove, completing the survey and notification process across all districts. These groves are to be classified as forests, irrespective of their size, as recommended by the Centrally Empowered Committee in 2005. Additionally, the Court suggested granting these areas protection under the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972, particularly through Section 36(c), to recognize their role in biodiversity conservation and cultural practices. In Re : T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1013

Whether the National Green Tribunal (NGT) violated the principles of natural justice by proceeding against the appellant without impleading it as a party or providing an opportunity to be heard. Held, the Supreme Court quashed the orders passed by the NGT, holding that the principles of natural justice were violated as the appellant was neither impleaded as a party respondent nor provided an opportunity to be heard before adverse findings were made. It was further held that the NGT erred in basing its decisions solely on the report of a Joint Committee, which lacked independent analysis by the Tribunal. The NGT's approach in deciding the matter without impleading the affected party amounts to condemning a person unheard, violating natural justice. A tribunal must independently consider the facts and circumstances of the case and cannot solely rely on an outsourced opinion from experts. The impugned orders were set aside, and the matters were remitted back to the NGT for fresh consideration. The NGT was directed to ensure that the appellant is impleaded as a party respondent in any subsequent proceedings. Appeals allowed. [Reliance on : Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha (2022) 13 SCC 401 and Kantha Vibhag Yuva Koli Samaj Parivartan Trust v. State of Gujarat. 2022 SCC OnLine SC 120]. Grasim Industries v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 946

Eviction

Eviction proceedings of unauthorized occupants of 'public premises' ought to be carried out under the statutory provisions. The eviction proceedings initiated under the statute must continue without any interference unless the proceedings violate principles of natural justice. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Vivek V. Gawde, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1017

Evidence Act, 1872

Section 106 - In a case relying on circumstantial evidence, the court emphasized adherence to the principles laid out in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, ensuring the circumstances establish guilt conclusively and exclude all other hypotheses. The evidence against the appellant included: (i) Last Seen Doctrine: The appellant was seen taking the four-year-old victim under the pretext of buying ice cream, and the deceased was last in the appellant's company. (ii) Presence at Crime Scene: The appellant was near the crime scene at the relevant time, corroborated by multiple witnesses. (iii) Injuries on the Accused: Medical evidence revealed injuries on the appellant's genitalia consistent with the nature of the crime. (iv) Conduct: The appellant led investigators to the victim's clothing, demonstrating knowledge of the crime scene. (v) Serological Evidence: Matching blood group evidence linked the appellant to the victim. The court held that the absence of a DNA test was not fatal to the prosecution's case, given the robust chain of circumstantial evidence. It reiterated the principle under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, emphasizing the appellant's failure to provide a plausible explanation for critical facts within his knowledge. The conviction was upheld based on the cogency of the evidence and the complete chain of circumstances pointing to the appellant's guilt. Sambhubhai Raisangbhai Padhiyar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1004

Gift Deed

Gift deed which is conditioned upon perpetual rendering of services, without any remuneration would amount to a “begar” or forced labour, even slavery and therefore it is not just wrong or illegal but even unconstitutional. Naresh Kumari v. Chameli, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 980

Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Section 2(2) - Hindu Law and Inheritance in Relation to Scheduled Tribes – Application of Justice, Equity, and Good Conscience - Exclusion of Scheduled Tribes from Hindu Succession Act (HSA), 1956 - Principle of Notification - Application of Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875 - Recommendation for Legal Reform - The parties to the dispute identified as Hindus and sought to be governed by Hindu law for inheritance matters. However, they belong to the Sawara tribe, a Scheduled Tribe under Article 342 of the Constitution. Section 2(2) of the HSA explicitly excludes Scheduled Tribes from its application unless directed otherwise by the Central Government through a notification. Scheduled Tribes' inclusion or exclusion is dependent upon notifications issued under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution. No notification was produced to demonstrate the Sawara tribe's de-notification, affirming their status as a Scheduled Tribe. The High Court's decision to provide inheritance rights to Mardan's daughters was grounded in the principle of justice, equity, and good conscience. Since Mardan's death occurred before the enactment of the HSA, the Central Provinces Laws Act, 1875, and its principles of justice, equity, and good conscience were appropriately applied. The Court reiterated the need for legislative reform to extend equal inheritance rights to female members of Scheduled Tribes, ensuring parity with non-tribal communities under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment on inheritance rights based on justice, equity, and good conscience, with recommendations for statutory amendments to address gender equality in succession laws for Scheduled Tribes. Tirith Kumar v. Daduram, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1020

Section 14 – Interpretation – Interplay between sub-sections (1) and (2) – Need for clarity and certainty – Referral to a larger bench. The Supreme Court observed that multiple decisions interpreting Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act are inconsistent, with some judgments adopting contrary views by distinguishing facts or disregarding binding precedents. Recognizing the necessity for clarity in the interpretation of the provision, the Court directed the Registry to place the matter before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for the constitution of an appropriate larger bench to reconcile the principles and restate the law governing the interplay between sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14. Tej Bhan v. Ram Kishan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 966

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

Interpretation of Clause 5(iii) of the Deed of Hypothecation (DoH) in Light of the MSTA Provisions — Relevance of Nomenclature and Contractual Obligations - The Supreme Court clarified that the title or nomenclature of a legal document, such as the "Deed of Hypothecation," is not decisive of its true nature or the obligations it imposes. An overall interpretation of the document's terms and the rights and liabilities arising therefrom is essential. Under Clause 5(iii) of the DoH, executed in favor of Security Trustees acting on behalf of secured lenders, the Corporate Debtor undertakes a dual obligation: (a) hypothecation of its assets and (b) an express promise to discharge liabilities of third parties (borrowers RCom and RTL) in case of default. This second obligation constitutes a contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. The Court emphasized that the intent and effect of such contractual provisions must be discerned holistically, prioritizing substance over nomenclature. China Development Bank v. Doha Bank OPSC, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1029

Impact of Moratorium on Contingent Claims - The imposition of a moratorium under Section 14(1) of the IBC does not extinguish the claims of creditors but imposes a temporary prohibition on certain recovery actions. While creditors cannot enforce security interests or recover amounts during the moratorium period, their claims remain valid and can be submitted. Additionally, contingent claims arising under contractual arrangements remain intact, provided they fall within the definition of a "claim" under Section 3(6) of the IBC. China Development Bank v. Doha Bank OPSC, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1029

Preservation of Contractual Provisions in Deed of Hypothecation (DoH) - Provisions of a DoH remain enforceable unless explicitly invalidated. Severability clauses, such as those in sub-clause (vi) of clause 16 of the DoH, ensure that unenforceable provisions do not affect the validity of the remaining contract. The judgment upholds the order of the NCLT, emphasizing that the NCLAT's reasoning was unsustainable. Contingent claims and rights of Financial Creditors are preserved under the IBC framework, subject to its procedural safeguards and prohibitions during the moratorium period. The appeal is allowed, and the NCLT's earlier decision is reinstated. China Development Bank v. Doha Bank OPSC, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1029

Requirement of Occurrence of 'Default' under IBC - A financial debt, as defined under Section 5(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), does not necessitate the occurrence of a default for its classification as financial debt. Under Section 5(7), a person to whom a financial debt is owed qualifies as a Financial Creditor, irrespective of any default in payment. The definition of 'default' under Section 3(12) becomes relevant only when invoking Section 7(1) for initiating Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against the Corporate Debtor. Thus, a Financial Creditor is entitled to submit claims even in the absence of an actual default. China Development Bank v. Doha Bank OPSC, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1029

Section 5(8)(i) - Applicability of - Guarantee as Financial Debt - Interpretation under IBC — The determination of whether a Corporate Debtor qualifies as a guarantor for financial debts hinges on the definition of "financial debt" under Section 5(8) of the IBC. A financial debt includes any liability arising from a guarantee for amounts borrowed, as per Section 5(8)(i). A guarantee, as defined under Section 126 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, constitutes a contract to perform the promise or discharge the liability of a third person in case of their default. For a guarantee to be valid, consideration provided to the principal debtor may suffice under Section 127 of the Contract Act. The appellants, claiming to be financial creditors, must establish that the guarantee executed by the Corporate Debtor is linked to the financial facilities advanced by them to RCom entities. It is not mandatory for the financial creditor to have directly disbursed funds to the Corporate Debtor; a liability under the guarantee suffices to classify the creditor as a financial creditor under the IBC. China Development Bank v. Doha Bank OPSC, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1029

Judiciary

Judicial Discretion and Format of Bail Orders - Non-Compliance with Directions - Unwarranted Strictures Against a Judicial Officer - Judicial Oversight and Administrative Actions - Whether directions issued by the High Court regarding the incorporation of antecedents in a prescribed tabular format in bail orders are mandatory - Whether the High Court's observations and actions against the appellant, a Sessions Judge, for non-compliance with such directions were justified - Held, the High Court's directions regarding the inclusion of antecedents in a specific tabular format in bail orders are not binding but merely suggestive. Constitutional Courts may set principles for granting bail but cannot dictate the format of judicial orders, as such interference undermines the discretion of trial courts. The Supreme Court noted that non-compliance with the directions cannot amount to judicial indiscipline or contempt. The directions were at best advisory and not enforceable as mandatory judicial instructions. The High Court's actions, including calling for explanations and reports from the appellant regarding compliance, were deemed unwarranted and an inappropriate use of judicial time. Adverse observations against the appellant, including comments on indiscipline and contempt, were unjustified and contrary to principles laid down in precedents. Superior courts must exercise restraint in criticizing judicial officers, and personal remarks should be avoided without affording an opportunity of being heard. Any explanation or administrative accountability of judicial officers must be sought on the administrative side and not through judicial orders in individual cases. Conclusion: The Supreme Court set aside the adverse observations and directions issued against the appellant by the High Court and clarified that the guidelines are not binding. It emphasized the need for superior courts to exercise restraint and respect judicial discretion at the trial level. This judgment reiterates the autonomy of trial courts in exercising judicial discretion, underscores the boundaries of judicial oversight, and advocates restraint in making adverse remarks against judicial officers. Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1005

Land

Allotment of government land to Medinova Regal Co-operative Housing Society (MRCHS) - Allegations of nepotism and procedural violations - Application of Land Revenue (Disposal of Government Land) Rules, 1971 and Government Regulations dated 09.07.1999 (“GR 1999”) - The Supreme Court addressed an appeal by Proposed Vaibhav Cooperative Housing Society Limited challenging the High Court's dismissal of their writ petition against the State allotment of land to MRCHS. The Court scrutinized the procedural irregularities and favoritism in the allotment process, noting that MRCHS, which initially applied for a different plot, was ultimately allotted another plot under discretionary powers without proper compliance with the applicable rules and regulations. The Court highlighted the lack of transparency and due process, including the failure to disclose reasons for the discretionary allotment, as required under Clause 12(8) of GR 1999. It was found that MRCHS changed its membership multiple times to meet eligibility criteria, undermining the initial objective of providing housing for doctors at Tata Memorial Hospital. The Court underscored the necessity of adherence to procedural safeguards in government land allotment to ensure fairness and prevent arbitrary decisions. The appeal was allowed, and the allotment to MRCHS was set aside. Proposed Vaibhav Cooperative Housing Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 984

Applicability of amendments made by the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland (Amendment) Act, 2018, to pending applications for converting paddy land to non-agricultural purposes. Whether the amendments, effective from December 30, 2017, would retrospectively affect applications filed before that date. The Court upheld the High Court's decision that the amended provisions would apply only to applications submitted after December 30, 2017. Applications filed before this date would be adjudicated under the unamended statutory framework. The Court clarified that the legal position established in Revenue Divisional Officer v. Jalaja Dileep, (2015) 11 SCC 597 regarding the conversion of paddy land, remained unaffected. The appeals were dismissed with the Court affirming the High Court's interpretation, emphasizing the prospective application of the 2018 Amendment Act. Tehsildar and Another v. Renjith George, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1052

Constructive and Implied Notice - For the Nangli Kota lands, the State Government failed to serve individual notices and did not paste notices in conspicuous areas, though the notice was published in the Official Gazette. Despite this, the participation of landowners in the proceedings was deemed sufficient to satisfy the objectives of the notice, rendering the acquisition valid. For the Moongaska lands, there was complete non-compliance with the requirements of individual notices and conspicuous postings. Additionally, some landowners and their legal heirs were not given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings, prejudicing their rights. Consequently, the notification for the acquisition of the Moongaska lands was held invalid. Constructive notice through publication in the Official Gazette and implied notice inferred from the participation of landowners in the proceedings were considered valid forms of notice for the Nangli Kota lands. However, absence of participation by some landowners in the Moongaska case invalidated the acquisition due to lack of actual or constructive notice. Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1008

Delay in Filing Writ Petitions – Exceptional Circumstances Justifying Condonation - Where a writ petition is filed with an inordinate delay, courts must assess whether the delay can be condoned based on the facts and circumstances of the case. The Supreme Court emphasized that delay and laches cannot bar relief in cases involving continuing causes of action, breach of fundamental rights, or actions that shock judicial conscience. Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1008

Land Acquisition – Non-payment of Compensation within Statutory Timelines – Invalidity of Acquisition - Improper Service of Notice and Invalidity of Notification - Premature Possession Transfer - Delayed Payment of Compensation - Held, the acquisition of the Nangli Kota lands was invalid as the compensation was not paid within the statutory period prescribed under Section 60A(4) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959, as amended. The improper service of notice under Section 52(2) rendered the notification under Section 52(1) for the Moongaksa land invalid. Possession of the Nangli Kota lands was handed over to the appellant Trust before depositing the compensation amount, in violation of Section 52(7). Compensation was deposited with the reference court in 1997, despite the requirement under Section 60A(4) to make payment within six months from 1 August 1987. The Court found the delay of over 10 years unjustified and in breach of the respondents' rights under Article 300A of the Constitution. Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1008

Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 18 and 28A - Claim for re-determination of enhanced compensation cannot be denied merely because it was based on the High Court's decision to enhance compensation instead of the Reference Court's decision under Section 18 of the Act. To claim re-determination of compensation under Section 28A, it is not necessary to rely solely on the Reference Court's decision. A party can also seek re-determination based on a High Court decision that increases the compensation. Banwari v. HSIIDC, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 995

Right to be Heard and Article 300A of the Constitution - The right to property, though no longer a fundamental right, is a constitutional right under Article 300A. Any expropriation of property must strictly adhere to statutory provisions. Failure to comply with procedural requirements, especially the right to be heard, can vitiate the entire acquisition process. Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1008

Right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution, coupled with procedural safeguards, necessitates a high threshold of fairness in State acquisition. Procedural irregularities, such as failure to serve notice, premature possession without compensation, and non-compliance with statutory timelines, warrant judicial intervention despite the delay. In this case, the High Court entertained the writ petition filed after 21 years, recognizing significant procedural lapses in land acquisition and the importance of protecting constitutional rights. The Court reiterated that addressing patent illegality and preventing injustice takes precedence over the principle of finality, especially where individual rights to property are at stake. Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1008

Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1972; Sections 36, 37, and 38 - Acquisition and release of land designated for public purposes - The suit land, originally shown in private ownership in the 1978 and 1981 Layout Plans, was reserved for "public purpose" under the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act. However, no acquisition proceedings or agreements were initiated within the statutory 3-year period prescribed by Section 38 of the Act. Consequently, the land was deemed released from reservation, and the original owner retained the right to transfer ownership. The planning authority failed to acquire the land within the stipulated time. Subsequent revisions in the Layout Plan in 2005 designated the land as a "mixed residential area." Thus, the appellants, as transferees, lawfully acquired the suit property without violating any statutory provisions or zoning restrictions. The First Appellate Court was correct in dismissing the suit. The Trial Court's and High Court's findings were set aside. Appeal allowed. Pradhan Babu and Ors. v. Nachimuthu Nagar Kudiyiruppor Nala Sangam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1057

Validity of Notification for Land Acquisition under Section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement (RUI) Act, 1959 - Mandatory Requirements under Section 52(2) - Non-Compliance with Procedural Requirements - The State Government is required to serve individual notices to landowners and publish the notice in the Official Gazette, as well as paste it in a conspicuous area in the locality where the land is situated. These procedural safeguards are intended to ensure that landowners and interested parties are adequately notified and given an opportunity to object or make representations regarding the acquisition. The notification for acquisition under Section 52(1) is valid if the notice requirements under Section 52(2) are substantially complied with, ensuring that landowners are informed and heard. Non-compliance causing prejudice to landowners, as in the Moongaska case, renders the acquisition invalid. Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1008

Violation of Right to Property as a Human Right - Fair Procedure in Acquisition - Right to property is a constitutional and human right. Timely and adequate compensation is integral to protecting this right. The Court reiterated that the process of land acquisition must be fair, transparent, and in strict compliance with statutory provisions. The appeals were dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision, with the Supreme Court holding that the acquisition was not conducted lawfully and compensation was not determined and paid in a fair or timely manner. Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1008

Legal Aid

Duty of Courts - Public Prosecutors and Legal Aid Advocates in Ensuring Fair Trial - Court's Duty to Provide Legal Aid - Continuity and Competence of Legal Representation - Courts must ensure accused persons are informed of their right to free legal aid at all material stages, including remand, framing of charges, and recording of evidence. Public Prosecutors must highlight the need for legal aid when an accused is unrepresented and ensure the trial proceeds lawfully and fairly. They must assist the Court in framing questions during the accused's examination and highlight any omissions. Legal aid advocates must possess adequate experience and knowledge of criminal, evidentiary, and procedural laws. In cases involving potential life or death sentences, only advocates with at least ten years of criminal practice should be appointed. State Legal Services Authorities must ensure training and effective monitoring of legal aid advocates. The same legal aid advocate should represent the accused throughout the trial unless compelling reasons necessitate a change. Courts may appoint senior advocates for complex cases to ensure effective representation. Effective legal aid is integral to Article 21 of the Constitution. Providing inadequate or incompetent legal aid infringes on the accused's fundamental rights. The judgment emphasizes the need for effective implementation of legal aid measures and directs its dissemination to all State Legal Services Authorities. Ashok v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 941

Limitation Act, 1963

Amendment of Pleadings at the Stage of First Appeal and Applicability of Limitation Act - Whether the suit for possession, as amended at the first appellate stage, was time-barred under the Limitation Act, 1963, and whether Article 58 or Article 65 of the Act governs the limitation period for such a suit - The trial court recognized the plaintiffs as the absolute owners of the suit property but dismissed the suit due to the failure to seek possession. At the appellate stage, the plaint was amended to include a prayer for possession. Article 58 of the Limitation Act prescribes a three-year limitation for declaratory reliefs from when the right to sue first accrues, while Article 65 provides a 12-year limitation for possession based on title, starting from when the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Article 113 applies to suits with no specific limitation, with a three-year period from the accrual of the right to sue. The Supreme Court analyzed the interplay between Articles 58 and 65 of the Limitation Act, emphasizing that the specific article applicable depends on the nature of the relief sought and the accrual of the right to sue. The court further clarified the distinction between the limitation regimes under the Limitation Act, 1908, and the current framework under the Act of 1963. The court's deliberation centered on determining whether the amended relief sought for possession at the appellate stage adhered to the limitation provisions. Amendments to include a recovery of possession claim are permissible even at the appellate stage if such claims align with the title and do not contravene limitation principles. The distinction between substantive and ancillary relief must guide limitation considerations. The judgment aligns with the principle that procedural rules are tools for justice, not technical barriers. Mallavva v. Kalsammanavara Kalamma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1031

Matrimonial Law

Divorce - Mental Cruelty - Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage - Permanent Alimony - Maintenance - The Supreme Court upheld the decree of divorce granted by the High Court in favor of the respondent husband, dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant wife. The judgment emphasized the grounds of mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA), prolonged separation, and irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The Court found the appellant's conduct—including filing false and baseless complaints—constituted mental cruelty and caused immense distress to the respondent. The prolonged separation of over two decades and the failure of reconciliation efforts further substantiated the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The Court invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to dissolve the marriage and awarded permanent alimony of ₹50,00,000 to the appellant wife and an additional ₹50,00,000 for the welfare and future expenses of their daughter, including her education and marriage. Appeal dismissed. Maintenance and alimony granted. Amutha v. A.R. Subramanian, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1030

Interim visitation rights of the father in the context of a minor child's welfare - Best interest and well-being of a two-year-old child in light of parental disputes - Modification of visitation venue to minimize hardship to the child - Held, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal, modifying the judgment of the High Court which directed visitation at Karur. Considering the best interest and welfare of the minor child, the Court ordered that visitation take place in Madurai, where the appellant-mother resides, rather than Karur. The Court emphasized: (i) The paramount importance of the minor child's health and welfare over the convenience of either parent. (ii) While the father's right to visit his child is recognized, it cannot come at the cost of compromising the child's well-being. (iii) Serious allegations of domestic violence and threat to life are matters for detailed trial and do not preclude interim visitation rights. The father is permitted to visit the child every Sunday from 10:00 AM to 2:00 PM in Madurai. The visitation should occur in a public park or temple premises, with the appellant present at a distance of approximately 10 feet. The child must be handed over to the father at the designated location in Madurai at 10:00 AM and returned to the mother by 2:00 PM. The appeal was allowed to the extent of modifying the place of visitation, ensuring the minor child's best interest remains the priority. Appeal partly allowed, with directions for revised visitation arrangements. Sugirtha v. Gowtham, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1042

Maintenance and Alimony – Equalisation of Wealth and Determining Factors - Legal Principle - Post-Separation Financial Dynamics - Adjustments in Maintenance - The objective of the law of maintenance is to empower the economically weaker spouse, ensure social justice, and preserve the dignity of the individual. Maintenance or alimony is not intended as an equalisation of wealth between spouses but is aimed at ensuring that the dependent spouse can live a life of dignity comparable to the standard of living they were accustomed to during the marriage. Parties seeking maintenance often demand equalisation of wealth, emphasizing the spouse's assets and income without considering their own needs or contributions. This approach is inconsistent, as demands for equalisation are selectively made when the spouse is wealthy, and not when their financial status has deteriorated post-separation. Determining Alimony: Maintenance should be based on several factors, including: (i) The reasonable needs of the dependent spouse. (ii) Their income and residential rights. (iii) Circumstances such as inflation, health issues, or loss of income. It is not linked solely to the paying spouse's income or prior alimony payments to another individual (e.g., an ex-spouse). A husband's obligation to maintain his wife does not require sustaining her lifestyle based on his improved financial status post-separation. Conversely, if the husband's financial situation worsens post-separation, the wife cannot claim equalisation of wealth in such circumstances. The law allows adjustments in maintenance: (i) Reduction, if the husband's financial obligations change. (ii) Enhancement, if the dependent spouse's circumstances worsen due to inflation, illness, or other factors. In this case, the petitioner-wife's claim for equalisation of wealth with both her ex-husband and his former wife was deemed untenable. The Court emphasized that alimony must be determined individually, accounting for her specific circumstances and needs, rather than drawing comparisons with others or solely focusing on the respondent's income. Rinku Baheti v. Sandesh Sharda, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1021

Permanent Alimony and Maintenance – Dissolution of marriage - Financial Capacity of Appellant – Settlement of Pending Claims – Standard of Living -. The appellant, a high-earning CEO with significant assets, and the respondent, an unemployed homemaker, had a son who recently completed his engineering degree. The Court considered the appellant's substantial financial capacity, including a monthly salary of approximately Rs. 10-12 Lakhs and ownership of properties worth several crores. The Court underscored the principle that permanent alimony should ensure a decent standard of living for the wife without penalizing the husband. Taking into account the financial stability of the appellant, the duration of the marriage, and the lifestyle enjoyed during the marital period, the Court awarded a one-time settlement of Rs. 5 crores to the respondent and Rs. 1 crore for the son's maintenance and higher education. The amount was deemed fair and reasonable to support the respondent's living standards and the son's future needs. The Court directed that the total settlement amount be paid within four months and granted a decree of divorce under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, concluding the appeals with specific instructions for the settlement's execution. Parvin Kumar Jain v. Anju Jain, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 969

Medical Education

Counselling Process and Validity of Admission - Principle of Negative Equality - Completion of Educational Programs - Admission to educational programs in violation of regulatory guidelines, including the counselling process, is generally impermissible. However, peculiar circumstances may warrant deviation. While negative equality is not a ground for granting relief under Article 226 of the Constitution, equitable considerations may arise if similarly situated persons are granted benefits. Courts may consider regularizing admissions where students have completed their courses and withholding recognition would render their education futile. The appellants completed their Bachelor of Dental Surgery (BDS) courses outside Madhya Pradesh and pursued Master of Dental Surgery (MDS) in dental colleges within Madhya Pradesh. Their admissions were cancelled by the Regulatory Authority for not participating in the counselling process and in violation of a Supreme Court order dated March 17, 2016. The cancellation was upheld by the Appellate Authority and subsequently by the High Court. However, the appellants completed their MDS courses during the pendency of proceedings. The Supreme Court quashed the orders of the High Court, Regulatory Authority, and Appellate Authority. The appellants' admissions were directed to be regularized, and authorities were instructed to issue the necessary degrees. The Court acknowledged that admissions of similarly situated students who completed their BDS in Madhya Pradesh were not disturbed. Recognizing the dearth of super-specialty doctors, the Court emphasized that denying degrees would render the appellants' education wasteful. The judgment was based on the "peculiar facts and circumstances" of the case and is not to be treated as a precedent. Appeal allowed; admissions regularized. Irfan Akbani v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1000

Medical Negligence

The appellant, a cataract surgery patient, suffered from severe complications, including endophthalmitis, leading to complete loss of vision in the operated eye. Despite multiple post-operative visits and complaints, the respondent-doctor failed to diagnose and address the infection. Expert medical opinions confirmed negligence in post-operative care. The State Consumer Commission awarded compensation, which was overturned by the NCDRC citing contributory negligence by the appellant. Whether the respondent-doctor was negligent in post-operative care. Applicability of the principle of res ipsa loquitur in cases of medical negligence. Held, the Supreme Court restored the findings of the State Commission, holding the respondent-doctor liable for medical negligence. It was observed that the respondent failed to exercise reasonable care despite multiple complaints of severe pain and lack of vision. The infection (endophthalmitis) was attributable to the respondent's failure to diagnose and treat it timely. The principle of res ipsa loquitur applied as negligence was apparent from the facts and expert opinions. The respondent-doctor was directed to pay compensation of ₹3,50,000 with interest at 12% per annum in case of default in payment within two months. This judgment underscores the duty of care owed by medical professionals during post-operative treatment and the applicability of res ipsa loquitur in establishing medical negligence when negligence is evident from the circumstances. Bherulal Bhimaji Oswal v. Madhusudan N. Kumbhare, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1044

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

Attendant Charges – Assessment for Full-Time Skilled Care in Cases of Severe Disability - In cases involving severe physical and mental disabilities, where the claimant is entirely dependent on an attendant for lifelong care, compensation must account for full-time skilled assistance. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's assessment based on part-time, unskilled attendant charges was erroneous. Relying on the principles established in Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and Master Ayush v. Divya Rani, the Court emphasized the necessity of applying the multiplier method to ensure just compensation. In the present case, based on the minimum wages for skilled workers in Delhi at the time of the accident (Rs. 4,358 per month) and a multiplier of 18, the compensation under this head was enhanced to Rs. 9,42,000/-. The judgment underscores the importance of adopting realistic and fair compensation mechanisms tailored to the claimant's specific needs and lifelong dependency. Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 978

Compensation for Disability – Determination of Loss of Income – Assessment of Notional Income and Future Prospects – Application of Legal Principles - The appellant, a seven-year-old girl at the time of the accident, suffered 75% disability due to moderate mental retardation, severe apathy, and lack of bladder control. Upon reviewing the medical evidence, the Court deemed her disability effectively 100% for practical purposes. Rejecting the Tribunal's reliance on the Motor Vehicles Act to assess notional income at Rs. 15,000 per annum, the Court held that the minimum wage for a skilled worker in Delhi at the time of the accident (Rs. 4,358/month) should form the basis for calculation. Applying the principles laid down in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680] and Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 4 SCC 413 the Court included a 40% addition for future prospects and applied a multiplier of 18 based on the appellant's age. Consequently, the compensation for loss of income due to disability was recalculated at Rs. 13,18,000. This judgment underscores the need for a realistic approach in determining compensation for minors with permanent disabilities, ensuring adherence to established legal precedents and equitable relief for the victim. Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 978

Compensation for Pain and Suffering – Assessment in Cases of Permanent Disability – Liberal Approach Mandated for Just Relief - In cases involving 100% physical and mental disability, courts must adopt a liberal approach when awarding compensation for pain and suffering. The Supreme Court emphasized that compensation under this head must account for the claimant's lifelong physical and mental condition, loss of life's pleasures, and complete dependence on others. Relying on precedents such as Kajal v. Jagdish Chand (2020) 4 SCC 413 and Master Ayush v. Divisional Manager, New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2022) 7 SCC 738 the Court noted that a sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- is an appropriate benchmark for cases involving severe disability, loss of amenities, and profound impact on quality of life. The Court rejected the High Court's enhancement of only Rs. 1,00,000/- (from Rs. 50,000/- awarded by the Tribunal) as insufficient, recognizing the appellant's lifelong challenges, including dependence and inability to enjoy normal life activities. This judgment underscores the principle that compensation for pain and suffering must be holistic and equitable, reflecting the gravity of the claimant's condition and ensuring just restitution. Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 978

Evidentiary Requirements in Motor Accident Claims - Delayed FIR - Hospital Records and Police Investigation - Whether the High Court was justified in overturning the Tribunal's dismissal of a motor accident claim in the absence of corroborative evidence of a motor accident, relying solely on a delayed FIR. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the insurance company, setting aside the High Court's order awarding compensation to the respondent (injured claimant). The Court held that there was no credible evidence to establish that the injuries sustained by the respondent were caused by a motor accident. The delayed FIR, combined with hospital records indicating that the injuries resulted from a skid and fall, supported the Tribunal's original dismissal of the claim. The High Court's reliance on the delayed FIR was deemed unsustainable. A claim must be substantiated by credible evidence linking the injuries to a motor accident. Absence of such evidence undermines the claim, regardless of procedural aspects like FIR timing. While a delayed FIR does not automatically disqualify a claim, its relevance increases in cases where other evidence contradicts the claim of a motor accident. Discharge summaries indicating a skid and fall and a police closure report concluding no motor accident carry significant probative value. The petition by New India Assurance Co. Ltd. was allowed, and the High Court's judgment awarding Rs. 11.5 lakhs with interest at 7.5% per annum to the respondent was set aside. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Velu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 998

Future Medical Treatment – Enhancement of Compensation for Ongoing and Potential Medical Needs - In cases involving severe disabilities requiring long-term medical care, future medical treatment must be adequately accounted for in the compensation award. The Supreme Court highlighted that the appellant, suffering from severe apathy and potential convulsions, would require continuous medical assistance, including medicines and other care items, to maintain a relatively comfortable life. Based on expert testimony, the Court recognized the need for financial support to address both current and potential medical conditions. As a result, the compensation under the head of future medical treatment was enhanced to Rs. 5,00,000/- to provide for the appellant's ongoing medical needs. This judgment underscores the importance of ensuring that compensation for future treatment is sufficient to cover the long-term medical care requirements of individuals with severe and life-altering injuries. Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 978

Loss of Marriage Prospects – Assessment of Non-Pecuniary Damages in Cases of Severe Disability - The appellant, suffering from severe mental and physical disabilities equivalent to the cognitive level of a 2nd Standard child, is unable to form or maintain marital or familial bonds. Marriage and companionship, integral aspects of human life, are rendered impossible for the appellant due to her condition, leading to the loss of both childhood and adult life experiences. The Tribunal failed to award compensation under this head, and the High Court inadequately granted only Rs. 1,00,000/-. Recognizing the profound and irreversible impact on the appellant's life, the Supreme Court enhanced the compensation for loss of marriage prospects to Rs. 5,00,000/-. This judgment emphasizes the need for courts to fairly assess non-pecuniary damages, especially in cases involving the loss of fundamental life experiences, ensuring equitable and just restitution for the victim. Baby Sakshi Greola v. Manzoor Ahmad Simon, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 978

Miscellaneous Application

Maintainability of Miscellaneous Applications in Disposed Matters - Whether a miscellaneous application can be entertained in a matter already disposed of by the Court - Scope of jurisdiction in reviving proceedings based on subsequent events. Held, a miscellaneous application is not maintainable in disposed proceedings unless it pertains to correcting clerical or arithmetical errors or addresses rare cases where the original order, being executory in nature, has become impossible to implement due to subsequent events or developments. The Court emphasized finality in legal proceedings, stating that reopening disposed matters on the basis of a fresh cause of action would lead to chaos and undermine judicial efficiency. The Registry was directed to ensure that any miscellaneous application in disposed matters is accompanied by a solemn affirmation that the necessity arises due to the executory nature of the original order becoming unenforceable because of subsequent events. Litigants were advised to seek appropriate remedies through fresh petitions under relevant provisions of law. The miscellaneous application filed by the petitioner seeking protection during pending appeal proceedings was dismissed as non-maintainable. The Court clarified that any apprehensions of threat should be addressed by filing a writ petition before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The miscellaneous application and related applications were dismissed with liberty to pursue appropriate remedies before the relevant forum. Ajay Kumar Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 973

Mohammedan Law

Partition of Property during owner's lifetime impermissible in Mohammedan law. The Supreme Court reiterated that the partition of a property via gift deed during an owner's lifetime cannot be validated under Mohammedan Law. The concept of partition is not recognized under Mohammedan Law, and thus, a 'partition of property' through a gift deed cannot be upheld as valid due to the absence of a clear and unequivocal 'declaration' by the donor of the intention to make a gift. Mansoor Saheb v. Salima, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1023

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

Addressing the Menace of Drug Abuse and Illicit Drug Trade in India - The Court, while adjudicating cases related to the cancellation of bail and the investigation of offenses under the NDPS Act, expressed grave concern over the proliferation of substance abuse and its profound impact on Indian society. Recognizing the constitutional mandate under Article 47, the judgment emphasizes the State's duty to combat drug abuse and protect the nation's youth from its devastating consequences. The extensive impact of drug abuse on public health, national security, and socio-economic stability, exacerbated by the lucrative nexus between drug trafficking and terrorism. Statistical insights from the MoSJE 2019 Report reveal alarming rates of substance use disorders, with millions affected, particularly by opioids and cannabis. Root causes of juvenile addiction, such as peer pressure, academic stress, and familial dysfunction, demand a multi-stakeholder intervention strategy. The role of parents, educational institutions, local communities, NGOs, and legal authorities is pivotal in prevention, awareness, and rehabilitation efforts. The Court urges a balanced approach that focuses on rehabilitation rather than stigmatization of victims, fostering constructive citizenship among the youth to resist the allure of drugs and its glorification in popular culture. The judgment underscores the urgency for collaborative action, policy implementation, and community engagement to curb the menace of drug abuse and safeguard the future of India's youth. Ankush Vipan Kapoor v. National Investigation Agency, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 999

Interpretation of the NDPS Act - The NDPS Act must be interpreted strictly, focusing on its purpose, object, and societal impact. A literal interpretation is necessary to avoid frustrating the Act's objectives. The judgment addresses several key points regarding the interpretation and application of provisions under the NDPS Act. Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1033

Section 37 - Consideration of Bail Applications - Mandatory Nature of - Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which outlines conditions for granting bail, is mandatory. Courts must record findings as required under this section before granting bail to the accused. Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1033

Section 37, 52A and 54 - Statutory Presumptions - Bail Decisions and Compliance with Section 37 - Courts must consider the statutory presumptions under Section 54 of the NDPS Act alongside other evidence before deciding on bail. The High Court's order granting bail, based merely on non-compliance with Section 52A, disregards the mandatory provisions of Section 37. The Court remanded the case for fresh consideration of the bail application in accordance with the law, with specific instructions to evaluate the merits and mandatory requirements. Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1033

Section 37, 52A and 54 - Quashing of High Court Order - Remand Directions - Extension of Interim Bail - The High Court's order granting bail solely on delayed compliance with Section 52A, without adherence to Section 37, was held erroneous. The matter has been remanded for fresh consideration. The High Court must reconsider the bail application on its merits, strictly adhering to the law, within four weeks. The matter should be placed before a different bench for impartial reconsideration. Interim bail for the respondent has been extended for four weeks, subject to the High Court's decision on the application within the stipulated period. The appeal has been allowed, and the High Court's bail order has been set aside, emphasizing strict adherence to the statutory framework of the NDPS Act in deciding bail matters. Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1033

Section 42, 43, 44, and 58 – Abuse of Power – Violation of Principles of Natural Justice - The appellant, along with other police officers, was found liable under Section 58 of the NDPS Act for maliciously fabricating a prosecution case involving the recovery of a commercial quantity of opium, allegedly planted in conscious possession of an accused. The trial court observed that the actions of the officers, including the then Superintendent of Police, Deputy Superintendent of Police, and Investigating Officer, were vexatious and lacked bona fide exercise of powers under Sections 42, 43, and 44 of the Act. Held, the judgment was legally unsustainable due to multiple legal infirmities, procedural lapses, and gross violation of the principles of natural justice, thereby rendering the conviction and subsequent actions untenable. Separate notices issued under Section 58 of the NDPS Act for proceedings against the concerned police officers set aside. Bharti Arora v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 986

Section 50 – Bail – Procedural Compliance – Commercial Quantity - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent in a case involving recovery of 500 grams of heroin (commercial quantity). The High Court had held that the use of the term "any Gazetted Officer" instead of "nearest Gazetted Officer" in the notice under Section 50 of the NDPS Act contravened the provision. The Supreme Court clarified that the intent of Section 50 is to inform the suspect of their right to be searched before an independent authority, such as a Gazetted Officer or Magistrate, without unnecessary delay. Strict compliance was observed in this case, and the respondent had not exercised the option. The Court noted the respondent's involvement in another NDPS case and emphasized the seriousness of the offense. Directions were issued for the respondent to surrender, failing which the authorities were instructed to ensure his detention. The trial was directed to proceed expeditiously, and liberty was granted to the respondent to seek bail in case of prolonged trial due to reasons not attributable to him. Appeal allowed. Bail order set aside. Directions for respondent's surrender and expeditious trial issued. State of NCT of Delhi v. Mohd. Jabir, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 956

Section 52A - Purpose of - Impact of Procedural Irregularities - Section 52A was introduced to facilitate the early disposal of seized contraband as part of India's compliance with international conventions on narcotics. Delays or procedural lapses under Section 52A are treated as procedural irregularities and do not vitiate the trial or automatically justify bail. Procedural lapses during search, seizure, or compliance with Section 52A do not render evidence inadmissible or invalidate the trial. Courts must consider the overall evidence and assess if serious prejudice has been caused to the accused. Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1033

Section 58 - Violation of Principles of Natural Justice – Impact of Adverse Observations without Hearing – Necessity for Opportunity to be Heard - The judgment emphasized the foundational principle that justice must not only be done but also be seen to be done. Adverse findings or observations against an individual, particularly in a quasi-judicial context, without affording them notice or an opportunity to be heard, are in direct violation of natural justice. In this case, the Special Judge recorded findings implicating the appellant under Section 58 of the NDPS Act solely based on arguments presented during the final hearing, without prior notice or hearing, thereby breaching the principles of fairness and impartiality. The court reiterated that such actions undermine the integrity of judicial processes, referencing established precedents that prohibit courts from passing disparaging remarks against individuals or authorities without due process. Strict adherence to natural justice is indispensable to maintain public confidence in the judicial system. Bharti Arora v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 986

Section 58 - Judicial Determination – Predetermined Actions and Non-Application of Mind – Quashing of Proceedings - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and the orders of the Special Judge, finding that the latter acted in a predetermined manner, failing to consider critical facts such as pending appeals against the conviction/acquittal judgment. Observations made in the earlier judgment and the subsequent proceedings initiated under Section 58 of the NDPS Act were quashed due to a lack of proper reasoning and non-application of mind. The Court underscored the principle that judicial orders must reflect impartiality and adherence to due process. This decision reaffirms the importance of fairness, procedural propriety, and the avoidance of prejudgment by judicial authorities. Bharti Arora v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 986

Section 69 – Protection of Actions taken in Good Faith – Scope and Presumption - Section 69 of the NDPS Act provides immunity from legal proceedings to the Central and State Governments, their officers, or any person acting under the Act, for actions done in good faith. The Court observed that good faith, as defined under Section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act, requires acts to be performed honestly, even if negligently, provided there is no malice, ill will, or intention to deceive. Good faith is presumed unless rebutted by cogent and clinching evidence. The Court emphasized that immunity applies only to official acts performed with genuine belief and due care, free from malice or ill motive. For immunity to be dislodged, there must be material attributing unreasonable or malicious intent to the act. The presumption of good faith cannot be negated by merely alleging wrongdoing or erroneous decisions unless supported by substantive evidence indicating bad faith or improper motives. Immunity under Section 69 protects official actions in good faith unless clear evidence demonstrates malice or malicious intent. Bharti Arora v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 986

National Investigation Agency Act, 2008

Section 6 (5) and 8 - Scope of Investigation by the NIA - Held, the National Investigation Agency (NIA), while investigating a Scheduled Offence under Section 6(5) of the NIA Act, is empowered under Section 8 to also investigate any other offence committed by the accused, provided there exists a connection or nexus between the Scheduled Offence and the other offence. The expression “the accused” in Section 8 should be interpreted expansively to include not only the primary accused but also any other accused who emerges during the investigation and is alleged to have committed an offence connected with the Scheduled Offence. The NIA's jurisdiction to investigate other offences is subject to: (i) Establishing a connection between the Scheduled Offence and the other offence. (ii) Submission of a report by the NIA to the Central Government. (iii) The Central Government's direction under Section 6(5) read with Section 8 to investigate the other accused. Section 8 of the NIA Act is offence-centric rather than accused-centric. Its primary objective is to facilitate comprehensive investigation into Scheduled Offences and their connected offences, ensuring effective prosecution at the national level while avoiding duplicity of investigation. The NIA cannot initiate an investigation into a connected non-scheduled offence independently; such investigation must arise during the investigation of a Scheduled Offence. A restrictive interpretation of Section 8 is contrary to the object and purpose of the NIA Act, which aims to provide a robust mechanism for investigating and prosecuting Scheduled Offences and related matters. The expansive interpretation of the term “the accused” and the connection between Scheduled and non-scheduled offences aligns with the statutory intent of ensuring effective and holistic investigation of offences at a national level, avoiding duplicity, and maintaining the integrity of the NIA Act's framework. Ankush Vipan Kapoor v. National Investigation Agency, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 999

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Section 138 – Requirement of Account Maintenance by the Accused – Liability in Individual Capacity v. Representative Capacity - In the present case, the accused was prosecuted in his individual capacity under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, for a dishonoured cheque drawn on an account maintained by a Company, where he acted as Director. The Court held that Section 138 imposes criminal liability only if the dishonoured cheque was drawn on an account maintained by the accused personally. The accused's mere signing of the cheque as Director does not meet this requirement. The Court reaffirmed that penal provisions must be strictly construed and cannot be extended to situations or persons not expressly covered under the statute. Prosecution against the accused in his individual capacity for a cheque issued on the company's account was deemed untenable. Despite dismissing the appeal, the Court observed that the accused's conduct raised questions of dishonest intent and left open the possibility for the complainant to file an FIR for cheating under the Indian Penal Code. Appeal dismissed. Liability under Section 138 of the NI Act not established against the accused in his individual capacity. Complainant permitted to pursue appropriate remedies under criminal law for cheating. Bijoy Kumar Moni v. Paresh Manna, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1035

Sections 138, 143A, 148—Liability of authorised signatory vis-à-vis the "drawer of the cheque" - Whether an authorised signatory of a cheque issued by a company can be treated as the "drawer of the cheque" for the purpose of imposing liability under Sections 143A and 148 of the NI Act. Held, Sections 143A and 148 empower courts to direct interim or additional compensation payments during proceedings under Section 138, NI Act. These provisions distinguish between the "drawer of the cheque" and other parties, such as authorised signatories or company officers. The term "drawer" under Sections 143A and 148 refers specifically to the "drawer of the cheque concerned." An authorised signatory of a company issuing the cheque does not automatically qualify as the "drawer" unless liability is extended under Section 141 of the NI Act. Appellate Courts must consider exceptional circumstances before directing the deposit of compensation under Section 148(1), as held in Jamboo Bhandari v. Madhya Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 776. The High Court's order imposing a condition to deposit 20% of the fine amount under Section 148(1) was quashed. The appellant, being an authorised signatory and not the "drawer," was exempted from the deposit condition. Appellate Courts must evaluate the facts and circumstances of each case to determine liability for compensation under Sections 143A and 148. The First Appellate Court was directed to expedite the disposal of the pending appeals. Appeal Allowed. Bijay Agarwal v. Medilines, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 948

Penal Code, 1860

Section 34 – Applicability of - Sentencing – Doctrine of Parity – Individual Culpability of Co-Accused – The appellant argued for sentence reduction on grounds of parity with co-accused, citing the acquittal of one co-accused and the reduced sentence of another. Held, the doctrine of parity applies only when co-accused share similar levels of culpability and involvement in the crime. The evidence established that the appellant's actions were distinct and more culpable. While the co-accused wielded sticks and caused non-fatal injuries, the appellant alone used a knife to inflict fatal injuries on the deceased, signifying a deliberate escalation of violence. There was no evidence to show a common intention among the accused to commit murder, precluding the application of vicarious liability under Section 34 IPC. The reduced sentence of one co-accused was based on the lesser nature of his involvement, while another was acquitted due to lack of evidence. The Court emphasized that parity in sentencing is not automatic and must consider the qualitative differences in actions and intent among co-accused. The appellant's role, marked by clear intent and use of a deadly weapon, warranted a distinct and more severe sentence. The principle of parity was inapplicable given the appellant's materially different and more culpable conduct. Appeal for sentence reduction dismissed. Kunhimuhammed @ Kunheethu v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 964

Section 300 - Murder - Findings on Grounds for Reduction of Sentence – Lack of Intent and Fatal Injuries - Nature of Fatal Injuries - Expert Testimony - The appellant argued that the fatal incident arose from a spontaneous scuffle between rival factions and lacked premeditation or intent to commit murder. Despite this defense, the Trial Court and High Court rejected the claim, relying on substantial evidence, including a post-mortem report and witness testimonies. The deceased sustained multiple incised penetrating wounds to vital organs such as the lungs and heart, inflicted with a sharp-edged knife. The medical expert (PW-6) opined that the injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, corroborated by the recovery of the weapon and consistent witness accounts. Held, lacking intention to commit murder irrelevant if bodily injury is caused with lethal weapon, likely to cause death. The Court emphasised that the intention to cause fatal injuries can be inferred from the severity of injuries, the use of a lethal weapon, and the circumstances of the act. The evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to cause injuries sufficient to result in death, disqualifying the claim of absence of intent and supporting the conviction under Section 300 IPC. Kunhimuhammed @ Kunheethu v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 964

Section 300 - Murder – Intention and Knowledge under Section 300 IPC – Spontaneity and Premeditation – Culpability Established - The Court examined the appellant's defense of the absence of intent to commit murder, contending that the fatal act arose spontaneously during a scuffle. However, intent and knowledge under Section 300 IPC were inferred from: (i) The nature and location of the injuries inflicted, targeting vital organs such as the heart and lungs. (ii) The use of a sharp-edged knife, indicating a deliberate escalation of violence. (iii) Testimonies corroborating that the injuries were inflicted with considerable force. The Court reiterated that under clause 3 of Section 300 IPC: (i) An act causing bodily injury, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, qualifies as murder, even absent specific intent to kill or knowledge of fatal consequences. (ii) Spontaneity or lack of premeditation does not absolve liability when the injuries inflicted reflect clear knowledge of their likely outcome. The deliberate targeting of vital organs and the fatal nature of the injuries supported the conclusion of intent or knowledge requisite for murder. The appellant's plea for leniency based on spontaneity was dismissed, affirming the liability for murder. The appellant's act constituted murder under Section 300 IPC. Appeal dismissed. Kunhimuhammed @ Kunheethu v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 964

Section 300 Exception 2 – Right of Private Defence – Plea of Exceeding the Right of Defence – Aggressor's Conduct and Proportionality of Force - The appellant invoked the right of private defence under Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC, claiming the act of stabbing was carried out under a perceived threat to his life. The Court analyzed the plea under the following criteria: (i) The accused must not be at fault in initiating the altercation. (ii) There must be an imminent peril to life or grave bodily harm. (iii) Injuries sustained and inflicted must be proportional to the threat faced. (iv) The accused must not have had reasonable recourse to public authorities. Upon review: (i) The appellant's injuries were minor and did not pose any real or imminent threat, as evidenced by medical reports. (ii) The testimony of eyewitnesses and the sequence of events established that the appellant and co-accused were the aggressors. (iii) The excessive and deliberate use of force, including stabbing vital organs, far exceeded the bounds of lawful defence. (iv) The Court reiterated that aggressors cannot claim the right of private defence, as the appellant's conduct was neither proportional to the perceived threat nor justified. The plea of private defence and exceeding its bounds was dismissed. The appellant's actions were deliberate and culpable, and Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC was not applicable. Appeal dismissed. Kunhimuhammed @ Kunheethu v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 964

Section 302 – Sentencing – Plea of Old Age and Deteriorating Health – Consideration of Personal Circumstances Versus Severity of Crime – The appellant sought a reduction in sentence on the grounds of advanced age and severe health issues, including a history of stroke and partial paralysis. Held, compassion for personal circumstances, including old age and medical conditions, must be balanced against the nature and severity of the offence. In cases of murder under Section 302 IPC, involving premeditation and deliberate targeting of vital organs in a group attack, the gravity of the crime supersedes mitigating factors related to the appellant's personal hardships. The Court emphasized that such heinous crimes, particularly those arising from political rivalry, have far-reaching societal implications, including undermining the rule of law and public order. The minimum sentence for murder under Section 302 IPC is life imprisonment, which cannot be reduced based on grounds such as parity, leniency, old age, or health concerns. The appellant's plea for sentence reduction was dismissed. The conviction and life imprisonment sentence were upheld, reinforcing the principle of accountability and the seriousness of the offence. Kunhimuhammed @ Kunheethu v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 964

Section 306 and 498A - Abetment of suicide - Mere harassment is not sufficient to hold an accused guilty of abetment of suicide under Section 306IPC. The Court found no proximate link between the appellants' actions and the deceased's suicide. It emphasized the necessity of proving an active or direct role in instigating or aiding the suicide with clear mens rea. The alleged acts of harassment, including the selling of gold ornaments, occurred nearly a year before the suicide and did not demonstrate intent to provoke or incite the act. As such, the charge under Section 306, IPC could not be sustained, and the appellants were discharged from this offence. Appeal partly allowed. Appellants discharged under Section 306, IPC. Trial under Section 498A, IPC to proceed. Jaydeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 979

Section 498A - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 — Quashing of FIR - Held, specific and concrete allegations required for criminal prosecution under matrimonial disputes. Courts must prevent misuse of legal processes and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent individuals. Allegations in FIR were vague, lacking specific details or evidence of harassment or dowry demands. No prima facie case established against the appellants. FIR found to be a retaliatory measure filed after the husband initiated divorce proceedings. Family members of the husband, living in separate locations, cannot be implicated in a matrimonial dispute in the absence of specific allegations indicating active involvement. Misuse of Section 498A IPC to settle personal grievances undermines its purpose to protect women subjected to cruelty. Courts must exercise caution to prevent abuse of legal provisions. High Court erred in not quashing the FIR under Section 482 CrPC despite observing lack of custodial interrogation necessity. Appeal allowed; FIR, charge sheet, and trial proceedings quashed. Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 968

Sections 498A - Merely because the wife didn't file a complaint under S. 498A IPC for many years doesn't mean there was no cruelty by the husband. Jaydeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 979

Sections 498A and 306 – Husband and In-laws Charged with Cruelty and Abetment of Suicide – A prima facie case of cruelty is made out against the appellants. Evidence includes repeated physical and mental harassment of the deceased, corroborated by witness statements, including allegations of selling her streedhan and subsequent harassment. The Court held that cruelty under Section 498A must involve intentional acts likely to cause grave injury or drive the victim to suicide or meet unlawful demands. These allegations sufficiently constitute a case under Section 498A, and the appellants must face trial for this offence. Jaydeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 979

Sections 498A, 504, 109 - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of criminal proceedings - Held, a girlfriend or a woman with whom a man has had romantic or sexual relations outside marriage does not qualify as a "relative of the husband" under Section 498A of IPC. To attract Section 498A IPC, the ill-treatment must be connected to the non-fulfilment of a demand for dowry. In this case, no such connection was established in the FIR or charge sheet against the appellant. The allegations against the appellant, including claims of past relations with the complainant's husband and use of abusive language, did not constitute harassment related to dowry demands. The Court concluded that the continuation of criminal proceedings against the appellant would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Appeal allowed. Criminal proceedings quashed. Dechamma IM @ Dechamma Kaushik v . State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 988

Sections 498A, 376, 377, and 506 - Criminal Proceedings Between Spouses and Their Impact on Marital Ties - Misuse of Criminal Law Provisions in Matrimonial Disputes - Judicial Scrutiny in Matrimonial Cases - Judicial Observations on Marital Harmony - Impact of Criminal Proceedings on Marital Relationships - Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage - Exercise of Article 142 of the Constitution - The criminal law provisions intended for protecting women, such as Sections 498A, 376, 377, and 506 of the IPC, are at times misused by some women as a tool for personal vendetta, extortion, or coercion, often leading to undue harassment of the husband and his family, including elderly and unrelated members. Courts and law enforcement must exercise caution to prevent such misuse. Vague and sweeping allegations without specific evidence or detailed accusations cannot form the basis of prosecution. Courts must ensure that frivolous criminal complaints do not escalate minor disputes into irreparable marital discord. Matrimonial disputes should be approached with tolerance and efforts for reconciliation. Petty quarrels should not be exaggerated into criminal complaints. The intervention of law enforcement should be a measure of last resort and reserved for genuine cases of cruelty and harassment. Initiating criminal proceedings often destroys the possibility of reconciliation, leading to irreversible breakdowns of marriage. Such actions, especially when driven by ulterior motives, exacerbate bitterness and hinder the resolution of disputes. In cases where mutual respect and marital commitments are irreparably eroded, dissolution of marriage on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown may be justified. The absence of children from the wedlock further supports the necessity of allowing the parties to part ways without affecting innocent lives. The Supreme Court, under Article 142(1), can dissolve a marriage where efforts to reconcile have failed, and continued marital ties serve no purpose, especially when the relationship has ceased to exist in substance. This Judgment summarizes judicial perspectives on balancing the protection of women's rights with the prevention of misuse of laws, emphasizing the need for caution and fairness in matrimonial disputes. Rinku Baheti v. Sandesh Sharda, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1021

Section 498A – Quashing of Proceedings – Abuse of Process of Law – Prima Facie Case – Misuse of Section 498A - The complaint was filed two years after the alleged incidents, coinciding with a divorce notice, and appeared to be an attempt to pressurize the appellants. No specific acts of cruelty or evidence supporting the allegations of miscarriage were established. The Court reiterated concerns over misuse of Section 498-A IPC, especially in matrimonial disputes, and underscored the importance of ensuring legal processes are not weaponized for personal vendetta. The appeal was allowed, and the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants were quashed to prevent abuse of the judicial process. High Court erred in dismissing the petition for quashing. Criminal proceedings quashed as they constituted an abuse of process of law. Digambar v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1025

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Public Interest in Economic Offences - Whether criminal proceedings under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and the Indian Penal Code, 1860, can be quashed based on a settlement between the parties - Whether the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC can be invoked for quashing an FIR and chargesheet in cases involving economic offences and public interest - The appellants, directors of M/s Sun Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. and employees of State Bank of India (respondent no. 3), sought quashing of an FIR and chargesheet alleging diversion of loan funds and reduction in collateral value without bank consent. Consent terms were filed before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT), and the loan account was settled. The High Court dismissed the writ petition under Section 482 CrPC, holding that the appellants had alternative remedies. Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that: Economic offences have broader societal implications and cannot be quashed merely on the basis of a settlement. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is a special statute, and offences under it are distinct, having significant repercussions on public confidence and financial stability. The High Court correctly declined to exercise its inherent jurisdiction as the offences involved public interest and financial misconduct. The appeals were dismissed, affirming the High Court's refusal to quash the criminal proceedings. The Court underscored that economic offences impact public interest and financial systems, warranting strict adherence to the law. Anil Bhavarlal Jain v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1039

Sections 7, 13, and 19 (3) - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 465 - Errors and irregularities in proceedings - Sanction and Failure of Justice - Presumption under Section 20 - Remand for Reconsideration - Whether irregularities in the sanction for prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, vitiate the trial and conviction - Determination of "failure of justice" due to such irregularities - The respondent was charged under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, based on a trap case involving demand and acceptance of a bribe in 1994. The Special Judge convicted the respondent, sentencing him to two years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine. The High Court upheld the findings of demand and acceptance of a bribe but acquitted the respondent on the ground of an irregular sanction for prosecution. Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 465 of the CrPC emphasize that errors or irregularities in sanction do not automatically vitiate proceedings unless they result in a failure of justice. The High Court erred in setting aside the conviction solely on the ground of irregular sanction without examining whether it caused a failure of justice. The High Court rightly held that the prosecution had proved demand and acceptance of bribe and that the defense had failed to rebut the presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The issue of whether the irregularity in sanction caused a failure of justice is remanded to the High Court for reconsideration, allowing the respondent an opportunity to contest the matter. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment to the extent it acquitted the respondent on the ground of irregular sanction. The matter was remanded to the High Court to assess whether the irregularity in the sanction resulted in a failure of justice. This judgment reaffirms the principle that procedural irregularities, including in the sanction for prosecution, do not vitiate criminal proceedings unless they lead to a demonstrable failure of justice. The case balances the procedural safeguards for public servants with the need to ensure accountability under anti-corruption laws. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Jagat Ram, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 974

Prevention of Dangerous Activities

Whether the detention of the appellant under the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities (MPDA) Act, 1981, based on alleged bootlegging activities, amounted to a breach of public order or merely a law and order issue. The appellant was detained under Section 3(2) of the MPDA Act by the District Magistrate for alleged bootlegging activities. The detention was based on six cases registered by the State Excise Department, and statements from two unnamed witnesses. The appellant challenged the detention order, arguing a lack of nexus between his activities and public order. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing the detention order and the subsequent confirmation by the High Court. The Court emphasized the distinction between 'public order' and 'law and order', citing the absence of any impact on public tranquility or fear among the general public due to the appellant's actions. The Court held that the alleged activities did not constitute a threat to public order and could be addressed under ordinary law enforcement mechanisms. The impugned judgment of the High Court and the detention orders were set aside. The appellant was ordered to be released immediately unless required in any other case. Arjun Ratan Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 982

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Propriety of granting bail under PMLA - Consideration of prolonged pre-trial detention and its impact on personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Assessment of the risk of tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses - The appellant, a Member of the West Bengal Legislative Assembly and former State Education Minister, was implicated in a recruitment scam involving corruption and money laundering. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Enforcement Directorate (ED) initiated investigations based on allegations of corrupt practices in the recruitment of teachers and staff, leading to the arrest of the appellant. Substantial cash and incriminating documents were recovered from the appellant's associate's premises. The Supreme Court, while acknowledging the appellant's prolonged incarceration and health issues, balanced these considerations against the gravity of the allegations and the risk of evidence tampering. The Court directed that the trial court expedite proceedings, particularly the examination of key witnesses. The appellant be released on bail subject to conditions ensuring cooperation and non-interference with the trial process. The appellant shall not hold any public office during the pendency of the trial. This judgment emphasizes the principle of personal liberty under Article 21, while also underscoring the importance of preventing interference in judicial processes in cases involving serious allegations of corruption and money laundering. Partha Chatterjee v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 987

Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the summons issued to the respondent merely on the premise that the respondent was discharged in the predicate offence. The permissibility of continuing proceedings under the PMLA, despite the discharge in the predicate offence. Held, the issuance of summons cannot be quashed solely because the respondent has been discharged in the predicate offence. The question of whether the respondent can be arrayed as an accused in the PMLA proceedings is to be addressed at a subsequent stage. The respondent retains the right to challenge his potential arraignment as an accused under the PMLA by raising all relevant contentions, including reliance on the quashing of the predicate offence. The Court clarified that the present matter pertains only to the issuance of summons and does not preclude the respondent from raising objections during later stages of the proceedings. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the High Court and allowed the appellant to proceed pursuant to the summons. The respondent, however, was directed not to be arrested, provided he continues to cooperate with the investigation. Director, Enforcement Directorate v. Vilelie Khamo., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1045

Whether the observations made by the Special Court regarding the conduct of the Enforcement Directorate (ED) and its Public Prosecutors require clarification - Held, Public Prosecutors must act fairly and in accordance with binding precedents but may oppose bail petitions if the ED is not at fault for trial delays. The ED or its Director cannot dictate the conduct of Public Prosecutors beyond providing case-specific facts. The Special Court's observations (Paragraph 7.20 of its order) were clarified to ensure Public Prosecutors retain independence in their duties as officers of the court. Masih Zeeshan Haider v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 992

Protection of Children from Sexual offences Act, 2012

Sections 4, 6, 29 and 30 - Presumption under the POCSO Act – Applicability and Conviction - Sentence Modification - Socio-Economic Considerations - Parole Denial - The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant under Sections 302, 364, and 377 of IPC and Sections 4 and 6 of the POCSO Act for the aggravated penetrative sexual assault and murder of a four-year-old child. Foundational facts, including the post-mortem evidence and circumstantial factors, justified the presumption under Sections 29 and 30 of the POCSO Act, with the accused failing to rebut this presumption. The Court emphasized the diabolic nature of the crime, which involved enticing the child under false pretenses, brutal sexual assault, and merciless strangulation. While affirming the conviction, the Court set aside the death penalty imposed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court, holding that the case did not fall within the "rarest of rare" category. Considering mitigating factors, including the appellant's mental health challenges, socio-economic background, and good conduct in prison, the sentence was modified to rigorous imprisonment for a period of 25 years without remission. The Court applied the principle of proportionality, emphasizing the need to balance public confidence in justice with the possibility of reformation. The fine amounts imposed by the lower courts were waived in light of the appellant's financial constraints. The concurrent nature of the sentences under various sections was maintained, reflecting an approach that aligns with the principle of justice tempered with humanity. A related Special Leave Petition challenging the denial of parole was dismissed as the judgment rendered the issue moot but left room for the appellant to seek remedies as per law. Sambhubhai Raisangbhai Padhiyar v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1004

Registration Act, 1908

Section 17(2)(vi) - A compromise decree that asserts a pre-existing right, title, or interest over a property does not constitute a conveyance under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, and is not liable for registration or stamp duty under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The appellant filed a civil suit asserting ownership and long-standing possession of the subject property. The suit was resolved through a compromise decree, affirming the appellant's pre-existing rights over the property. The respondent alleged collusion to evade stamp duty, but no evidence of collusion or rival ownership claims by third parties was presented. Held, a compromise decree is exempt from registration under Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, provided: (i) It is based on a genuine compromise without collusion. (ii) It pertains to the subject property in the suit. (iii) It asserts pre-existing rights without creating new rights. Revenue records do not confer ownership but can reflect possession and pre-existing rights. The compromise decree in this case did not create any new rights but affirmed the appellant's pre-existing rights, thus exempting it from stamp duty under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The High Court's decision upholding stamp duty liability was set aside, and the appellant's entitlement to mutation in the revenue records was confirmed. Appeal allowed. The authority concerned was directed to effect the mutation in favor of the appellant. Mukesh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1036

Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002

Circumstances under which a sale of property by auction or other means under the SARFAESI Act can be set-aside after its confirmation - Mere procedural irregularities or deviation from rules are not grounds to set aside a confirmed sale unless such errors are fundamental in nature, such as fraud, collusion, inadequate pricing or underbidding. Any sale by auction or other public procurement methods once already confirmed or concluded ought not to be set-aside or interfered with lightly except on grounds that go to the core of such sale process, such as either being collusive, fraudulent or vitiated by inadequate pricing or underbidding. Mere irregularity or deviation from a rule which does not have any fundamental procedural error does not take away the foundation of authority for such proceeding. The Supreme Court advised Courts to not entertain challenges to confirmed sale which could have been raised before the confirmation of the sale or where the irregularities do not result in substantial injury. In such cases, courts in particular should be mindful to refrain entertaining any ground for challenging an auction which either could have been taken earlier before the sale was conducted and confirmed or where no substantial injury has been caused on account of such irregularity. In the present case, the Court noted that apart from the lack of any 15-days gap between the notice of sale and the notice of auction, no other illegality has been imputed to the auction proceedings. It was also not the case of the Borrower that due to the absence of the aforesaid statutory period, any prejudice was caused or that it was prevented from effectively exercising its rights due to such procedural infirmity. Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 991

In the case concerning the auction sale of a property conducted under the SARFAESI Act, the appellant, as the highest bidder, purchased the property at an auction conducted by the Bank (respondent No.1) and was issued a sale certificate. Respondent No.2 challenged the auction, claiming prior unregistered transactions and possessory rights over the property. The High Court ruled in favor of respondent No.2, setting aside the auction and sale certificate. The Supreme Court held that respondent No.2's claims were based on unregistered documents, which do not constitute valid conveyance under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The Bank, having conducted the auction in compliance with the SARFAESI Act, was not deemed to have knowledge of these unregistered transactions. The Court found no irregularity or illegality in the auction process that would warrant setting aside the sale. The Appellate Tribunal's order in favor of the appellant was restored, and the High Court's order was set aside. The Bank was directed to hand over possession to the appellant, and respondent No.2 was allowed to withdraw any deposited amounts. Appeal allowed; High Court's order set aside. Sanjay Sharma v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1054

Right of a borrower to redeem the secured asset can be exercised only till a notice for the sale of the mortgaged property is published in terms of Rule 9(1) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002. Till the 2016 amendment to the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act), the borrower had the right to redeem the mortgaged property till the sale or transfer of such secured asset. However, after the amendment to Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, the right of redemption can be exercised only till the publication of sale notice. Sanjay Sharma v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1054

Sale by way of public auction cannot be set aside until there is any material irregularity and/or illegality committed in holding the auction or if such auction was vitiated by any fraud or collusion. Sanjay Sharma v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1054

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

Section 3(1)(x) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 239 - Whether the alleged utterances by the appellant constitute an offense under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC & ST (POA) (as it stood before its amendment on January 26, 2016) - Whether the location of the alleged incident qualifies as a "place within public view" under the SC & ST (POA) Act. The appellant challenged the orders of the High Court and the Additional Sessions Judge rejecting his discharge application. The case involved allegations of the appellant insulting and intimidating the second respondent, a member of a Scheduled Caste, in the backyard of the appellant's private house. Held: For the offense under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC & ST (POA) Act, the alleged insult or intimidation must occur "in any place within public view." The backyard of a private house does not qualify as a "place within public view," and the presence of laborers accompanying the second respondent does not constitute "public" for the purposes of the Act. Relying on the principles laid down in Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710, the Court held that the allegations did not establish an offense under the SC & ST (POA) Act. The orders of the High Court and the Additional Sessions Judge were set aside. The appellant was discharged from the offenses alleged against him. This judgment reaffirms the requirement of "public view" under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC & ST (POA) Act and emphasizes the distinction between private and public spaces in the context of alleged offenses. Rabindra Kumar Chhatoi v. State of Odisha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 975

Service

Age of Superannuation – Applicability of AICTE and UGC Regulations - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal challenging retirement at the age of 60 from the CSI Institute of Technology (CSIIT), a private unaided minority institution affiliated with Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University (JNTU), Telangana. The appellant, initially appointed as Lecturer in JNT University in 1985 and later promoted to Director of CSIIT in 1998, contended that his superannuation age should be 65 years as per the 2010 amendments to AICTE and UGC regulations. The appellant's retirement at 60, effective from August 14, 2018, was challenged in writ proceedings, which were dismissed by the High Court. Whether the amended AICTE and UGC regulations enhancing the age of superannuation to 65 years are applicable to the appellant. Held, the appellant's retirement at the age of 60 was valid as the State of Telangana, through G.O.Ms.No.40 (2012), had not adopted the 2010 amendments to AICTE and UGC regulations. CSIIT, being a self-financed minority institution affiliated with JNTU, is bound by the regulations of the affiliating university, which prescribe 60 years as the age of retirement. AICTE and UGC regulations are not binding on institutions unless adopted by the respective state governments or affiliating universities. The appellant, primarily involved in administrative work as Director, did not qualify as a "teacher" under the regulations. The appellant's acceptance of retirement benefits indicated acquiescence to his superannuation. The Court distinguished the precedents relied upon by the appellant, noting factual differences and limited applicability to the case at hand. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the appellant's retirement at the age of 60 and upholding the High Court's judgment. P.J. Dharmaraj v. Church of South India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 958

Applicability and interpretation of the Modified Assured Career Progression Scheme (MACPS) under the Central Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules (CCS RP Rules), particularly concerning financial upgradation and recovery of benefits - Objective of MACPS - Financial Upgradation vs. Promotion - Past Benefits Considered - Concurrent Schemes - Illustrations and Examples - Refund of Recoveries - No Comments on Clause 8.1 - Held, the MACPS is intended to prevent stagnation by granting financial upgradation to employees who do not receive regular promotions within intervals of 10, 20, or 30 years. The upgradation is based on Grade Pay hierarchy, not the promotional hierarchy of the cadre. Financial upgradation under MACPS does not equate to functional promotion or confer seniority benefits. It is purely personal to the employee and does not affect cadre hierarchy. Financial upgradations or promotions previously granted under the Assured Career Progression Scheme (ACPS) or due to pay-scale revisions under the Sixth Central Pay Commission (CPC) are to be accounted for when assessing eligibility under MACPS. Time-bound or in-situ promotion schemes cannot operate concurrently with MACPS. Employees cannot avail of dual benefits under both schemes. Recovery of Benefits: a. Recoveries from retirees and those retiring within one year of this judgment's pronouncement are barred. b. For other employees, recoveries may be made after issuing notices, with options for staggered recovery within two years, depending on the amount. No interest shall be charged on recoveries. c. Pension and pay scales shall be recalibrated prospectively from January 1, 2025. The examples in Clause 28 of MACPS reinforce the principles outlined, emphasizing the scheme's intent to account for financial upgradations received under different schemes. For retirees, any amounts recovered must be refunded. For serving employees, recoveries already made need not be refunded. The Court refrains from addressing the validity of Clause 8.1 of MACPS, leaving it open for determination in separate petitions or appeals. Appeals allowed. MACPS benefits to be granted only after accounting for previous financial upgradations under the CCS RP Rules. Recoveries from retirees and prospective recalibration of pay and pension ordered. Union of India v. N.M. Raut, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1040

Pension - Validity of letters dated 14 March 2016 issued by Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited (HPCL) affecting pensionary benefits for: 40 pensioners employed after 15 July 1974, and 229 retirees post-28 June 1994, including voluntary retirees. Alleged violation of principles of natural justice due to withdrawal of pensionary benefits without prior notice or opportunity of being heard. Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petitions (SLPs), refusing to interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Court emphasized that the letters in question were issued without adherence to principles of natural justice. However, the significant passage of time and the limited impact on 269 retired employees influenced the decision not to intervene. The dismissal is confined to the facts of these specific cases and does not constitute adjudication on other legal questions raised by the petitioners. Special Leave Petitions dismissed. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Pensioners Social and Welfare Association, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1046

Pensionary benefits; classification as a permanent employee - Whether the appellant was entitled to pensionary benefits despite alleged irregularities in his appointment. Whether the Division Bench of the High Court erred in reversing the judgment of the Single Judge that upheld the Labour Court's decision granting permanent employee status to the appellant. The appellant was appointed as a mason in 1974 and worked until his retirement on March 31, 2012. The Labour Court declared him a permanent employee and entitled him to arrears from June 4, 1996. Subsequent appeals by the respondents were dismissed at multiple levels, including the Supreme Court. The Single Judge of the High Court granted pensionary benefits, but this was reversed by the Division Bench, denying such relief. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, restoring the judgment of the Single Judge and granting pensionary benefits to the appellant's heirs/legal representatives. The Labour Court's order granting permanent employee status attained finality, and respondents failed to overturn it at any appellate stage. The Division Bench erred in questioning the validity of the appellant's service induction and classification when these issues were conclusively settled earlier. The State's failure to regularize the appellant's employment despite the Labour Court's directive constituted a violation, and the appellant could not be deprived of his pensionary entitlements due to the respondents' inaction. The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside, and the Single Judge's judgment was restored. Pensionary benefits and family pension, with 6% interest from the date of retirement, were ordered to be disbursed to the legal heirs within three months. Madanlal Sharma v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1053

Promotion Criteria – Deputation Service – Direct Recruitment - The Supreme Court examined the applicability of Clause 6 of Circular dated 22.05.2017, which allowed the deputation period to be treated as regular service for promotion to the post of Deputy General Manager (Technical) in the appellant organization. Held, deputation service prior to repatriation cannot be treated as continuous service under Clause 6 if the employee was repatriated to their parent department and later joined the organization through direct recruitment. Respondent No. 1, having been repatriated in 2014 and rejoining in 2015 as a direct recruit, was a fresh entrant. His service for promotion purposes could only be reckoned from 26.08.2015, the date of his direct recruitment. The Circular was a one-time measure aimed at addressing disparities between deputationists and regular employees but did not confer a right to individuals with gaps in service unconnected to the organization. The respondent's claim for promotion under Clause 6 was rejected, as he had not completed the required four years of service as Manager (Technical) on the relevant date. The respondent was ineligible for promotion under the Circular, and the decisions of the CAT and High Court were set aside. The respondent shall be considered for future promotions based on his service starting from 26.08.2015. The appeal was allowed with no order as to costs. National Highways Authority of India v. G. Athipathi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 965

Regularization of Temporary Employees – Principles of Equality – Discriminatory Treatment Prohibited – Scope of Uma Devi Judgment distinguished - Held, the denial of regularization and subsequent termination of temporary employees, despite their long-term, unblemished service in sanctioned posts performing essential duties, constitutes discriminatory treatment and violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Court clarified that the judgment in State of Karnataka v. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 does not preclude regularization of employees serving in irregular but not illegal appointments over extended periods under sanctioned posts. The Court emphasized that procedural formalities cannot be used to perpetually deny substantive rights accrued through prolonged service. It observed that misclassification of employees as “temporary” or “contractual,” arbitrary terminations, and denial of basic benefits reflect systemic exploitation, undermining principles of fairness and equity. Government institutions, entrusted with upholding justice, must lead by example in ensuring fair and stable employment, aligning with international labour standards. The termination orders were quashed. The appellants were directed to be reinstated with regularization but without back wages, ensuring continuity of service for post-retirement benefits. The reliance on the outsourcing policy and procedural formalities to deny regularization was declared unjust and contrary to equity. The appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Court and Tribunal orders. Jaggo v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1032

Retirement - Grant-in-Aid Pension Scheme - Liability for payment of retiral benefits to an employee dismissed from a Grant-in-Aid private college and subsequently reinstated. The appellant, a private college under the Grant-in-Aid scheme of the Government of Gujarat, dismissed respondent no.2, a lecturer, in 1994 for misconduct. After prolonged litigation, the High Court reinstated the respondent in 2010 but directed that only 75% back wages be paid. Upon further appeals, the High Court ruled in 2022 that the respondent's services should be treated as continuous for retiral benefits. In a 2023 review, the High Court modified its earlier direction, placing full liability for retiral benefits on the appellant college. Held, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order holding the appellant college liable for retiral benefits, ruling that the liability rests with the State Government under the applicable Grant-in-Aid Pension Scheme. The Grant-in-Aid Pension Scheme explicitly assigns responsibility for pension and retiral benefits to the State Government. The appellant's conduct in contesting the dismissal was not deemed frivolous or malicious, and no jurisdictional overreach was found in its actions. The appellate authority's findings that the charges against respondent no.2 were trivial do not negate the State's obligation under the Scheme. Appeal allowed. The High Court's 2023 order was modified to affirm that the State Government (respondent no.1) is liable for the retiral dues of respondent no.2. Nutan Bharti Gram Vidyapith v. Government of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 954

Termination Proceedings - Principles of Natural Justice - Police verification report - The appellant's termination was challenged on the grounds that it violated principles of natural justice. The government deemed the appellant "unsuitable" for employment without specifying reasons in the show cause notice or termination order. Additionally, the appellant was not furnished with the police verification report or any other relevant documents, depriving him of the opportunity to present a meaningful defense. This lack of transparency contravenes the principle that administrative or quasi-judicial orders must state reasons to ensure fairness, accountability, and the opportunity for judicial review. Furthermore, the appellant was denied a personal hearing, a critical procedural safeguard. The Supreme Court held that the termination order violated principles of natural justice, as it lacked cogent reasons, adequate disclosure of materials, and an opportunity for personal hearing. The Court restored the Tribunal's order, setting aside the termination, and rejected the High Court's contrary finding that the procedural actions adhered to natural justice. Basudev Dutta v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 957

Termination Proceedings - Principles of Natural Justice - Police verification report - The appellant, who joined as an Ophthalmic Assistant on 06.03.1985, was terminated from service based on a police verification report filed after 25 years, just two months before his retirement. The delay in submission of the verification report, for which the respondent authorities admitted fault without valid justification, deprived the appellant of pensionary benefits despite 26 years of unblemished service. The Court held the termination arbitrary, illegal, and violative of natural justice principles, rendering it unsustainable. It further directed all State police authorities to complete verification reports regarding candidates' antecedents, nationality, and document authenticity within a stipulated time, not exceeding six months from the date of appointment. Consequently, the appellant's service benefits were ordered to be paid within three months from the receipt of the judgment copy. Basudev Dutta v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 957

Validity of termination orders issued under clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) of the Constitution - Whether the appellants were justified in keeping the respondents' applications for Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) pending for an unreasonable period. Entitlement of the respondents to reinstatement and consequential benefits. The respondents, who were doctors in the service of the State of Uttar Pradesh, applied for VRS in 2006–2008. The applications remained undecided, and the respondents resorted to prolonged absenteeism. The State terminated their services on May 3, 2010, citing impracticability of holding disciplinary proceedings due to widespread absenteeism among doctors. The High Court quashed the termination orders, reinstated the respondents, and directed consequential benefits. The Supreme Court partially set aside the High Court's orders and substituted the termination orders with voluntary retirement orders effective May 3, 2010. The respondents were denied arrears of salary and monetary benefits, including pension, for the period prior to the judgment. The prolonged pendency of VRS applications by the State was unjustified. The respondents' absenteeism was not condonable, and reinstatement was inappropriate. The interests of justice required that the respondents be granted VRS retrospectively from May 3, 2010, but without monetary benefits for the interim period. Termination orders dated May 3, 2010, are set aside. Respondents deemed voluntarily retired from May 3, 2010. No arrears of salary or pension payable before the date of this judgment. Pension, if payable, to be fixed from May 3, 2010, and disbursed prospectively. The judgment balances the competing interests of the State in maintaining discipline and the respondents' right to fair treatment, while emphasizing timely decision-making in public administration. State of U.P. v. Sandeep Agarwal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1024

Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013

Effective Implementation of - Directions Issued - Notification of District Officers - Constitution of Local Committees - Designation of Nodal Officers - Implementation of SHe-Box Portal - Monitoring and Compliance - The Court highlights the need for effective mechanisms to facilitate complaints of sexual harassment by aggrieved women, emphasizing the role of Legal Services Institutions and the mandatory constitution of Internal Complaints Committees (ICCs) and Local Committees. States and Union Territories must notify District Magistrates or equivalent officers as District Officers to exercise powers under the Act. District Officers are directed to establish Local Committees in districts where ICCs are absent or where complaints involve the employer. Each district must have designated Nodal Officers at local administrative levels to receive and forward complaints to the Local Committee. States and Union Territories are encouraged to use the SHe-Box portal for registering and addressing complaints. Chief Secretaries must ensure the constitution or reconstitution of ICCs in government and private workplaces. They are required to submit compliance reports to the Court. The order underscores the importance of creating awareness about women's rights and providing accessible avenues for redressal of grievances. Aureliano Fernandes v. State of Goa, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 959

Section 13 - Compliance with procedural requirements - Allegation of sexual harassment by a Border Security Force (BSF) Constable against a superior officer - Held, the BSF initially conducted an inquiry under the Sexual Harassment Act, which did not substantiate the allegations. A subsequent inquiry under the Border Security Force Act, 1968, resulted in the accused officer being punished with 89 days of rigorous imprisonment, forfeiture of five years of service for promotion, and forfeiture of five years of past service for pension purposes. The Court observed that the inquiry report under the Sexual Harassment Act was not provided to the petitioner, violating Section 13(1) of the Act. The Court imposed a penalty of ₹25,000 on the BSF for this procedural lapse, to be paid to the petitioner. The punishment already imposed on the accused officer was deemed sufficient to meet the ends of justice. The writ petition was disposed of with directions to pay the penalty for procedural non-compliance. Ms. X v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 972

Specific Relief Act, 1963

Section 16(c) (pre-amendment) - Specific Performance – Readiness and Willingness – Burden of Proof - The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court which reversed the trial court's decree for specific performance granted in favor of the plaintiff-petitioner. The High Court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate readiness and willingness to perform the contract as mandated under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Readiness pertains to the plaintiff's financial and practical capacity to fulfill the contract, whereas willingness refers to the plaintiff's conduct and intention. Both are essential for granting specific performance. The plaintiff must specifically plead and substantiate readiness and willingness through oral and documentary evidence, including proof of financial capability. The High Court, on reappreciating the evidence, held that the plaintiff failed to establish readiness and willingness. This finding, being factual, was not considered perverse by the Supreme Court. Special Leave Petition dismissed. Findings of the High Court upheld. R. Shama Naik v. G. Srinivasiah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 947

Section 20 - Specific Performance – Discretionary Relief – Hardship – Held, the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and must be guided by judicial principles. Mere inadequacy of consideration, rise in price, or the onerous nature of the contract does not constitute hardship under Section 20(2) of the Act unless unforeseen at the time of entering into the contract. The Court reversed the High Court's judgment that denied specific performance on the ground of hardship to the defendants, noting that the hardship claimed was neither unforeseeable nor substantiated by evidence. It reaffirmed the Trial Court's decree for specific performance with a modification. Appeal allowed. Parswanath Saha v. Bandhana Modak, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1028

Section 22 - Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 55 - Whether the executing court can grant the relief of possession when a decree for specific performance does not explicitly include possession - Interpretation of the scope of Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act concerning relief for possession during execution proceedings. Held, the Supreme Court reiterated that in a suit for specific performance, the relief of possession can be implied under certain circumstances, even if not explicitly decreed, particularly when possession is with the contracting party. The Court upheld the decision of the High Court, which directed the executing court to issue a warrant of possession to the decree-holder, recognizing the implied right to possession under a decree for specific performance. The Court relied on its precedent in Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal, (1982) 1 SCC 525 and the principle that Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act allows the amendment of pleadings to include possession at any stage, including execution proceedings. This is to ensure complete and effective relief to the decree-holder and avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The petition was dismissed as the High Court's order directing the executing court to grant possession to the decree-holder was found to be in accordance with established legal principles. Birma Devi v. Subhash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 976

Supreme Court Rules, 2013

Order XV Rule 2 - Whether the Supreme Court Registry can decline to list cases directed to be listed by the Court due to non-compliance with procedural aspects. The Court clarified that Rule 2 of Order XV of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, does not authorize the Registry to refuse listing cases even if procedural requirements, like proof of service of notice to caveators, are not met. The Registry is directed to list such cases with an office report highlighting non-compliance. The Court emphasized that procedural rules should not obstruct urgent matters directed to be listed. Saddam Hussain M.K. v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1049

Temple

Temple Administration - Election Process - Appointment of New Administrator - Honorarium and Expenses - Handover of Administration - Continuation of Existing Arrangements - Trial Court Proceedings - Whether the High Court, having become functus officio after disposing of the Regular First Appeal, erred in entertaining an interlocutory application and appointing an unelected committee contrary to the temple's bye-laws. Whether the removal of the elected Executive Committee and appointment of an unelected committee by the High Court was valid. Held, the High Court acted beyond its jurisdiction in entertaining the interlocutory application and issuing orders after the Regular First Appeal had been disposed of. The administration of the temple must align with the temple's bye-laws, and elections must be conducted under proper supervision. Hon'ble Mr. Justice K. Ramakrishnan (Retd.) was appointed as the Administrative Head/Administrator to oversee and conduct elections for the temple and its allied institutions. The Administrator was directed to finalize and publish the voters' list and complete the election process within four months in accordance with the temple's bye-laws. The Administrator would receive ₹2,00,000/month, with additional honorariums for two appointed assistants. Expenses are to be reimbursed from temple funds. The outgoing Administrative Head appointed by the High Court was directed to transfer charge and accounts to the newly appointed Administrator immediately. Until elections are held, the current arrangements concerning temple administration and allied institutions were to continue. The trial court was instructed to expedite and conclude the final decree proceedings for framing a scheme for temple administration. This judgment underscores the necessity of adhering to statutory provisions and temple bye-laws in managing religious institutions. It ensures accountability and transparency by mandating timely elections and proper supervision of temple administration. Civil Appeals allowed in part; High Court orders modified. Contempt Petitions closed. Oachira Parabrahma Temple v. G. Vijayanathakurup, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 944

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Section 52 - The Courts can set aside a sale transaction, which was carried out in violation of its directions, as void in the exercise of its contempt jurisdiction. The Court held that although a sale transaction carried out during the pendency of court proceedings (pendente lite) would not become void due to the operation of the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Court can reverse such a sale transaction if it was done in contempt of judicial directions. Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 991

Section 53A - Whether the defendants were entitled to protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, based on an unregistered sale agreement - Whether the concurrent findings of the Trial Court, First Appellate Court, and High Court were perverse or erroneous. Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, affirming the judgments of the High Court, First Appellate Court, and Trial Court, which decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiffs for declaration of title and recovery of possession of the suit property. The defendants failed to prove the execution of the alleged sale agreement dated 25-11-1968 and their possession based on it. The courts below found consistent evidence establishing that the defendants had no lawful possession and had illegally occupied the property. The High Court correctly held that the defendants did not satisfy the prerequisites for invoking protection under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 53A, being an exception to the usual requirements of registration and writing, must be strictly construed and could not apply in this case due to lack of proof of the agreement and part-performance. Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act provides protection to a transferee in possession only if the essential conditions, including the existence of a written and signed contract and acts of part-performance, are fulfilled. The burden of proving readiness and willingness to perform under Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, lies on the party seeking specific performance or protection under Section 53A. Special Leave Petition dismissed. Giriyappa v. Kamalamma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1038

Section 54 - ownership of an immovable property does not get transferred until the sale deed is registered. Mere transfer of possession and payment of consideration will not transfer ownership, unless the sale deed is registered. Sanjay Sharma v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1054

Section 58(c) - Whether the mortgage deed dated 17.10.1990 constitutes a "mortgage by conditional sale" - Whether the plaintiff is entitled to redeem the mortgage. Whether permissive possession of the mortgaged property by the mortgagor affects the validity of the transaction as a mortgage by conditional sale. Held, the mortgage deed dated 17.10.1990 satisfies all statutory requirements for a mortgage by conditional sale under Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The conditions for conversion of the mortgage into an absolute sale upon default of payment were explicitly embodied in the same document. Permissive possession of the property by the plaintiff (mortgagor) does not alter the nature of the transaction as a mortgage by conditional sale, as possession was granted to safeguard the property and did not confer any ownership rights beyond the scope of the mortgage deed. The plaintiff failed to repay the mortgage amount within the stipulated period of three years, and no credible evidence was produced to establish an attempt to do so. Furthermore, the plaintiff's failure to testify personally weakened her case. The Trial Court and the High Court erred in interpreting the transaction as a simple mortgage by placing undue emphasis on possession and disregarding the express terms of the registered mortgage deed. The appeals were allowed, and the suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed. The judgments and decrees of the High Court and the Trial Court were set aside. Leela Agrawal v. Sarkar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 967

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

Bail under UAPA, 1967 – Applicability of Section 43-D(5) – Principles and Constitutional Considerations – Long Incarceration and Delay in Trial - Prima Facie Assessment - Fundamental Rights and Speedy Trial - Precedence of Constitutional Rights - The Supreme Court reiterated the principles governing the grant of bail under Section 43-D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA), emphasizing Courts must assess whether the accusations are prima facie true based on the FIR, charge sheet, and case diary, considering the totality of evidence on broad probabilities. If accusations are not prima facie substantiated, bail may be granted. Inordinate delays in trial and long periods of incarceration without conviction violate Article 21 of the Constitution. Courts must harmonize statutory provisions with constitutional guarantees. While legislative intent must initially be adhered to, prolonged detention without trial mandates prioritization of constitutional rights over statutory bars under UAPA. The allegations against the appellant, including participation in meetings and protests organized by the Popular Front of India (PFI), did not establish prima facie involvement in terrorist activities under the UAPA. Protected witnesses' statements and recovered materials lacked incriminating evidence directly implicating the appellant. The appellant had been in custody for over two years without trial commencement, with 40 accused and 354 witnesses prolonging the trial. The Court set aside the High Court's denial of bail, granted bail to the appellant, and emphasized that denying bail in deserving cases contravenes Article 21. The Special Court was directed to release the appellant on appropriate terms within seven days. Athar Parwez v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1006

Validity of default bail granted under Section 167(2) of the CrPC read with Section 43-D of UAPA - Jurisdiction of the Magistrate in granting an extension of time for filing the chargesheet in cases under UAPA - The appeal arises from an order by the High Court granting default bail to the respondents involved in a bomb blast case, under multiple charges including UAPA and the NDPS Act. The High Court held the extension of time granted by a Judicial Magistrate First Class (JMFC) was invalid as only a Designated Special Court could grant such extensions under UAPA. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, emphasizing that the right to default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC must be exercised before the filing of the chargesheet. In this case, the chargesheet was filed on 29.04.2022, and the application for default bail was made on 02.09.2022, well after the filing, thereby extinguishing the right to default bail. The Court reaffirmed that the right to default bail is enforceable only until the chargesheet is filed. The jurisdictional error by the JMFC in granting an extension does not revive the right to default bail once the chargesheet has been filed. The appeal by the State was allowed, and the default bail granted by the High Court to the respondents was set aside. State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 990

University Grants Commission Act, 1956

Validity and interpretation of Regulation 10(f)(iii) of the University Grants Commission (UGC) Regulations, 2018, concerning the counting of past teaching experience for the direct recruitment of Assistant Professors. - Whether Regulation 10(f)(iii) is ultra vires the UGC Act, 1956, or constitutional rights - Whether the High Court erred in reading down Regulation 10(f)(iii) without a challenge to its vires - Validity of shortlisting criteria based on teaching experience under Tables 3A and 3B of the 2018 Regulations. Held, Regulation 10(f)(iii) is not ultra vires the UGC Act or constitutional rights. The regulation is consistent with the enabling legislation and policy objectives of the UGC. The High Court erred in reading down Regulation 10(f)(iii) without finding it ultra vires. Courts cannot rewrite subordinate legislation or discard its provisions without a valid challenge based on legislative competence or conflict with constitutional rights. The Court upheld the shortlisting mechanism based on teaching experience and academic scores as rational and consistent with the 2018 Regulations. It emphasized that teaching experience contributes to the quality of candidates and aligns with UGC's policy to ensure merit-based recruitment. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, affirming the validity of the UGC Regulations, 2018. It restored the criteria for shortlisting candidates based on teaching experience and academic merit, emphasizing the regulatory framework's intent to prioritize experienced and qualified candidates. Appeals allowed. The writ petitions challenging Regulation 10(f)(iii) were dismissed, and the High Court's decision was overturned. Allahabad University v. Geetanjali Tiwari, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1012

Writ

Findings of the court have to be based on the pleadings and the evidence produced before it by the parties. It is well-nigh impermissible for the writ court to conjecture and surmise and make out a third case, not pleaded by the parties, based on arguments advanced in the course of hearing. Allahabad University v. Geetanjali Tiwari, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1012