Supreme Court Monthly Digest- August 2024 With Statute And Subject Wise Index

Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958

Monument of national importance - Protection of a structure known as the Gumti - The petitioner challenged the dismissal of his writ petition by the Delhi High Court, which followed the Archaeological Survey of India's (ASI) report that changes made by the Defence Colony Welfare Association (DCWA) to the Gumti resulted in its loss of originality, thereby negating its protected status. The Court expressed concerns regarding the decision-making process of the ASI and the Central Government in initially recommending the Gumti's protection and later opposing it based on modifications made by the DCWA. In light of these findings, the Court ordered the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to conduct a preliminary inquiry into various aspects related to the Gumti's status, including the circumstances surrounding its occupation by the DCWA, the authority behind the alterations made, and the lack of preventive measures against unauthorized changes. The CBI was directed to report back within two months, while the Court prohibited any changes to the Gumti until further orders, underscoring the need for protecting heritage sites. Rajeev Suri v. Archaeological Survey of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 627

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

Arbitral Tribunal is not empowered to grant interest upon interest while passing an arbitral award as the Arbitration Act, 1940 does not specifically provide for the grant of interest on interest. D. Khosla and Company v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 558

Courts and arbitral tribunals have the duty to examine the contract clauses in proceedings concerning arbitration. Pam Developments v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 613

How to determine conversion of arbitral award in foreign currency to indian currency - Explained. DLF Ltd. v. Koncar Generators and Motors Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 565

Section 34 and 37 - Loss due to idle labor, machinery, etc. - Arbitrator awarded Rs. 5,80,500 to the appellant, relying on the Hudson's formula for on-site establishment expenses. The District Court, under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, upheld the award, stating that the Arbitrator's findings were not irrational or in conflict with public policy. However, the High Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Section 37, examined the contractual provisions and found that the claim was impermissible under the "Special Terms and Conditions" of the contract, which explicitly prohibited claims for idle labor or machinery. The High Court overruled the Arbitrator's decision, stating that the contract terms should have been properly considered, and its conclusions were upheld by the higher court. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court's decision, affirming that the contract terms must guide the award and that no amount can be granted for idle labor or machinery in violation of the contract. (Para 7) Pam Developments v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 613

Section 37 - Interest on delayed payments of running account (RA) bills - Arbitrator awarded Rs. 54,84,024 with an interest rate of 12% p.a. to the appellant, holding that the delay in payments led to "blocked capital," entitling the claimant to compensation. The District Court upheld the Award. However, the High Court, under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, set aside the Award, questioning the Arbitrator's analysis of the payment timelines and contract terms. The High Court held that the Arbitrator failed to address key issues such as the timing of bill preparation and entitlement to interest. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court restored the Arbitrator's Award, finding no fault in the Arbitrator's reasoning and ruling that the High Court's interference was unwarranted. The Court reiterated that the scope of interference under Section 37 is limited and found that the Award was neither perverse nor in conflict with public policy. (Para 8) Pam Developments v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 613

Section 31(7) and 34 - Award of interest - Arbitrator awarded pre-reference interest at 12% per annum from the date of breach to the date of the Award), and post-award interest at 9.25% per annum. The District Judge upheld this decision under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. However, the High Court modified the Award, disallowing pre-reference interest based on its interpretation that the contract prohibited it, and allowed interest only for the pendente lite and post-award periods. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court reinstated the Arbitrator's award of pre-reference interest, holding that the Arbitrator had the discretion to award interest under Section 31(7) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and that the contract between the parties did not explicitly prohibit such an award. Interference with an arbitrator's decision on interest is unwarranted unless there is a clear violation of the contract or statutory provisions. (Para 9) Pam Developments v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 613

Auction

Blacklisting of an entity amounts to 'civil death', must be justifiable and proportionate. Blue Dreamz Advertising Pvt. Ltd. v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 559

Transferring public property at nominal price arbitrary; states' right can be sold only by auction/transparent process. City Montessori School v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 545

Bail

Accused need not furnish multiple sureties against multiple bail orders - Courts can do away with the condition of local surety if its insistence delays the release of the accused from jail and renders the bail order ineffective. Girish Gandhi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 593

Matrimonial Disputes - Condition that the husband must fulfill all the physical and financial requirements of the wife. Held, Such an impracticable requirement infringes on personal liberty and the right to dignity. Bail conditions should be reasonable and proportionate, particularly in matrimonial disputes, to allow the accused to comply and foster reconciliation between the parties. (Para 8) Sudeep Chatterjee v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 540

The maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel a person to do the impossible) emphasized in relation to onerous bail conditions. A court should not impose conditions that are impracticable or impossible for the accused to comply with, particularly in cases of anticipatory bail. (Para 1) Sudeep Chatterjee v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 540

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

Section 72(1) - Unauthorized dissemination of the identity and graphic content related to a murder and alleged rape case - The Court reiterated its directives established in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703 emphasizing the necessity to protect the identity of victims of sexual violence and the prohibition against media exposure of such identities. In light of these violations, the Court issued an injunction ordering the immediate removal of all references, photographs, and video clips of the deceased from social media and electronic platforms. Kinnori Ghosh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 590

Section 479 - Maximum period for detaining undertrial prisoners - Implementation of - Inhuman conditions in prisons - The Court directed that this provision, which allows for the release of first-time offenders who have served one-third of the maximum imprisonment period, shall apply to all undertrials regardless of when their cases were registered. The Court mandated the Superintendents of Jails across India to expedite the processing of applications for bail based on this new legislation within two months. Additionally, it ordered State Governments and Union Territories to submit comprehensive affidavits detailing the number of undertrials eligible for release, applications made, and actual releases. Re-Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons v. Director General of Prisons, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 632

Building

Recover compensation from officers who demolished buildings ignoring status quo order. Ajay Kumar Yadav @ Ajay Rai v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 572

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Delay of 17 Years in filing Written Statement – The respondent delayed filing the Written Statement, which led to procedural complications, including the suit being mistakenly marked as disposed of on the High Court's website - Held, Procedural rules should not obstruct substantive justice, particularly when confusion caused by the court's own administrative errors contributed to the delay. (Para 15) PIC Departmentals Pvt. Ltd. v. Sreeleathers Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 580

Order XLI - Rule 25 and 27 - Courts at the Appellate stage of civil suits cannot create a new case for the parties while framing such additional issues that were never raised in the pleadings of the parties. Rama Kt. Barman v. Md. Mahim Ali, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 637

Order XLI - Rule 25 and 27 - Recovery of Possession - Whether the High Court erred in framing new substantial questions of law at the appellate stage without providing the parties an opportunity to lead evidence on the new issues. Held, the High Court, in allowing the respondents' appeal, had framed additional substantial questions of law, which were neither raised in the lower courts nor supported by evidence. The High Court cannot create a new case for the parties at the appellate stage. As per Order XLI Rule 25 and Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, new issues or evidence may be introduced only after following due procedure. Consequently, the matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The parties were directed to maintain status quo regarding possession of the suit land until the appeal is re-decided by the High Court. Appeal allowed. Rama Kt. Barman v. Md. Mahim Ali, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 637

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Supreme Court orders CBI inquiry into alleged illegalities in Chandigarh police's arrest of dentist. Union Territory of Chandigarh v. Mohit Dhawan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 601

Section 41 and 41A - Supreme Court asks Police Chiefs to take action against erring officials for arrests in violation of Section 41/41A Cr.P.C. and Supreme Court guidelines. Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 600

Section 162 - FIR Manipulation – Investigation Tainted by Delay in FIR Recording – Reiterated that when the police deliberately delay recording the First Information Report (FIR) after receiving information about a cognizable offense, and the FIR is prepared after on-site deliberation, consultation, and discussion, such an FIR cannot be considered the actual FIR but a statement made during the investigation, thereby falling under Section 162 Cr.P.C. Failure to promptly record the FIR raises doubts about the authenticity of the investigation, as it leaves room for fabrication of evidence and false clues. Deliberate delay in FIR registration taints the investigation. FIR prepared after consultation and deliberation is inadmissible as it is hit by Section 162 CrPC. Non-production of the Daily Diary (Roznamcha) can suggest fabrication and concealment of material facts. FIR delayed and investigation tainted. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562

Section 162 - Obligation to Record FIRs - The Court emphasized that police officers must record information about cognizable offenses, regardless of territorial jurisdiction. Refusing to do so constitutes a dereliction of duty. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562

Section 202 - Scope of Inquiry - At the stage of the issuing process under Section 202 Cr.P.C., the court is not required to determine whether the accused will ultimately be convicted or acquitted. The inquiry is limited to ascertaining whether there are sufficient grounds for proceeding with the case. The Magistrate must focus on the existence of a prima facie case, based on the allegations in the complaint and the evidence presented, without engaging in detailed evaluation of the merits. The accused has no right to be heard at this stage, and the Magistrate's discretion must be judicially exercised. Grounds for quashing the issuance of process include: lack of essential ingredients of the offence, patently absurd allegations, capricious exercise of discretion, or fundamental legal defects in the complaint. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603

Section 202 and 482 - Issuance of Process and Application of Mind by Magistrate - The issuance of summons in a criminal case is a serious matter and cannot be done mechanically. The Magistrate must apply their mind to the facts alleged in the complaint, consider the evidence, and ensure that sufficient grounds exist for proceeding further. This requires a careful evaluation of whether the complaint discloses an offense and whether the accused is prima facie answerable. Vicarious liability of corporate office bearers cannot be assumed unless explicitly provided for in the statute, and direct allegations against them must be demonstrated. The process of summoning can be challenged under Section 482 of CrPC if it is shown that the Magistrate failed to exercise due discretion and formed an opinion without sufficient material. The Magistrate's order must reflect a subjective satisfaction based on proper scrutiny. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603

Section 216 does not give any right to the accused to file a fresh application seeking his discharge after the charge is framed by the court, more particularly when his application seeking discharge under Section 227 has already been dismissed. Unfortunately, such applications are being filed in the trial courts sometimes in ignorance of law and sometimes deliberately to delay the proceedings. Once such applications, though untenable, are filed, the trial courts have no alternative but to decide them, and then again such orders would be challenged before the higher courts, and the whole criminal trial would get derailed. Suffice it to say that such practice is highly deplorable, and if followed, should be dealt with sternly by the courts. (Para 11) K. Ravi v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 624

Section 227 - Application of judicial mind at the stage of considering discharge - A judge is required to sift through the evidence presented by the prosecution to ascertain whether there is sufficient ground to proceed against the accused. The judge must not act merely as a post office for the prosecution but must exercise judicial discretion to determine whether a prima facie case exists. (Para 20) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606

Section 227 - Principles - The judge has the power to sift and weigh evidence to determine if a prima facie case is made out. If the materials disclose a grave suspicion, a charge can be framed; however, mere suspicion or weak evidence would justify a discharge. The judge must avoid conducting a mini-trial and should focus on whether the evidence, taken at face value, presumes an offense has been committed. (Para 20) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606

Section 439 - Bail decisions must consider relevant factors such as the nature of accusations, the accused's role, potential tampering of evidence, and risk of flight. It was held that the learned Single Judge erred by not adequately addressing these factors. Moreover, despite the respondent's six-month incarceration, the economic offense's gravity, involving the siphoning of Society funds affecting numerous individuals, justified canceling bail. The Court underscored that bail orders based on irrelevant or insufficient material are open to interference. Although bail was revoked, the Court granted liberty to the respondent to reapply for bail if circumstances change, ensuring the trial court remains uninfluenced by the present judgment. Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 619

Section 482 - FIRs can be quashed even after a charge-sheet is filed if continuing the proceedings would be an abuse of the process of law. Shaileshbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 635

Section 482 - Inherent Jurisdiction of High Court – Scope of Powers - This provision enables the court to quash criminal proceedings at various stages—whether at the stage of issuing process, committal, or framing of charges—prior to the commencement of trial. Quashing should only be exercised with caution. The High Court must ensure that the material produced by the accused is of "sterling and impeccable quality," ruling out the prosecution's case without needing to conduct a trial. This power may be exercised even when a discharge application is pending before a trial court. Further, the court reiterated that the inherent powers under Section 482 can be used by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law or secure the ends of justice. Specifically, criminal proceedings may be quashed if the allegations are absurd, inherently improbable, or based on mala fides. (Para 18) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974

Section 3 - The High Court had previously dismissed the appellant's writ petition, which claimed that relevant documents were not supplied, impairing the detenue's right to make an effective representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Held, the grounds for detention were nearly identical to those in a prior case where the High Court quashed the detention orders due to the non-supply of similar documents, particularly WhatsApp chats. The Court emphasized the necessity for judicial discipline and adherence to precedent within the same High Court, ruling that the second Division Bench should have followed the earlier decision. Quashed the detention order and its confirmation, reinstating the rights of the detenue. Shabna Abdulla v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 588

Constitution of India

Article 14, 16, and 21 - Reservation for persons with benchmark disabilities, - Fixation of cut-off marks - Horizontal vs. Vertical Reservations - The appellants challenged the recruitment process of 120 posts of Civil Judge and Judicial Magistrate initiated by the Rajasthan High Court, contending that the respondents failed to publish cut-off marks for the category of persons with benchmark disabilities in the preliminary examination results. The appellants claimed this omission was discriminatory and violated their fundamental rights and the applicable state rules regarding reservation for persons with disabilities. Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the reservation for persons with benchmark disabilities is treated as an "overall horizontal reservation" and not compartmentalized into specific vertical categories such as SC, ST, or OBC. Candidates with disabilities were required to meet the cut-off marks for the vertical category they applied under. The Court found no statutory mandate requiring separate cut-off marks for the persons with benchmark disabilities in the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010, or the Rajasthan Rights of Persons with Disabilities Rules, 2018. The Court reaffirmed that those who participate in a selection process cannot challenge its methodology post-facto upon failing to succeed. Hence, the action of the respondents was not discriminatory or violative of the appellants' fundamental rights. Appeals dismissed. Rekha Sharma v. High Court of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 592

Article 14 and 341 - Issue of sub-classification within Scheduled Castes - Sub-classification of Scheduled Castes Permissible - Article 14 allows sub-classification within a class that is not homogenous, provided it meets the intelligible differentia standard. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Article 15(4) and 16(4) - Indra Sawhney Case - Applicability - The principle of sub-classification applies beyond Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and extends to beneficiary classes under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) - In Indra Sawhney, the Court did not restrict sub-classification to Other Backward Classes, but extended it to other beneficiary classes under Articles 15(4) and 16(4). State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Article 163 and 239AA(4) - Delhi Lt. Governor position not akin to that of a State's Governor - There is a clear distinction between the discretionary power of the Governor under Article 163 and that of the Lt. Governor under Article 239AA(4). While Article 163 requires Governor of a State to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, 'except in so far as he is by or under this Constitution required to exercise his functions or any of them in his discretion', the exception in so far as the Lt. Governor, under Article 239AA(4) is concerned, he will act in his discretion, 'in so far as he is required by or under any law'. Article 239AA of the Constitution takes into account the unique position of NCTD and therefore adopts the mandate of 'law' as a distinct feature for exercise of discretion". Govt of NCT of Delhi v. Office of Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 551

Article 225 and 329(a) - Judicial review in delimitation matters is not completely barred by Article 329(a) of the Constitution. Constitutional courts can intervene under Article 226 if the delimitation process is found to be arbitrary or unconstitutional. Kishorchandra Chhanganlal Rathod v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 556

Article 226 - High Court should not re-appreciate evidence led in departmental enquiry. State of Rajasthan v. Bhupendra Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 569

Article 341 intends to only give 'constitutional identity' to scheduled castes; not to hold them as 'homogenous class'. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Article 341 (1) - Interpretation of - Article 341(1) does not create an integrated homogenous class, as the castes notified by the President are "deemed" to be Scheduled Castes but can be further classified. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Article 341 (2) - Sub-classification within Scheduled Castes does not violate Article 341(2), unless it results in a preference or exclusive benefit to certain castes over all the seats reserved for the class. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Social Heterogeneity of Scheduled Castes - Historical and empirical evidence shows that Scheduled Castes are socially heterogeneous. Therefore, the State can classify them further if there is a rational principle with a clear nexus to the purpose of sub-classification. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Sub-classification within Scheduled Castes is permissible to ensure substantive equality of opportunity, provided it is based on backwardness and inadequate representation. The decision in Chinnaiah that barred sub-classification within Scheduled Castes is overruled. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Sub-classification within Scheduled Castes - Data Collection and Representation - The State can sub-classify based on inadequate representation, provided backwardness is established through data. The State must collect data on inadequate representation in public services, which can serve as an indicator of backwardness. State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Article 16(1), 16(4) and 335 - Efficiency of Administration - Article 335 does not limit sub-classification; rather, it reinforces the importance of inclusion and equality in public services in line with Article 16(1). State of Punjab v. Davinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 538

Article 136 - Extraordinary Powers of the Supreme Court - Article 136 of the Constitution confers plenary and extraordinary powers upon the Supreme Court, enabling it to interfere in any judgment, decree, or order passed by any court or tribunal in India. Unlike statutory appellate powers, Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal but provides discretionary authority to address exceptional cases where substantial injustice or a significant question of law arises. These powers are not bound by procedural limitations. This jurisdiction, though wide, is sparingly exercised, especially in matters where grave miscarriage of justice is evident. Article 136 acts as a corrective and protective jurisdiction, with the Court exercising its discretion to uphold justice, maintain legal consistency, and safeguard fundamental rights. (Para 19) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606

Article 136 - The Supreme Court's powers under Article 136 are plenary and extraordinary, unfettered by statutory provisions and distinct from ordinary appellate powers. The jurisdiction under Article 136 is invoked in cases of grave injustice or substantial legal questions of public importance, even extending to the correction of factual errors where lower courts have acted perversely or improperly. This discretionary power, exercisable by special leave, is not restricted by procedural limitations and can be invoked by private parties as well as the State. (Para 19) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606

Article 136 - The Court has emphasized the need for this power to be exercised sparingly, only in exceptional circumstances, to ensure justice is upheld and miscarriage of justice is prevented. It is a corrective and supervisory jurisdiction aimed at maintaining consistency in legal precedents and safeguarding the rights and liberties of individuals. The inherent limitations are self-imposed and exercised with judicial discretion to avoid arbitrary decisions. (Para 19) Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606

Articles 341 and 342 - Validity of Scheduled Caste Certificates - While the appellants had obtained their certificates through lawful processes, subsequent circulars issued by the Government of Karnataka, effectively revoked those certificates and classified the appellants as General Merit category candidates. The court emphasized that only Parliament has the authority to amend the list of Scheduled Castes as stipulated under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution of India. The court acknowledged the pragmatic decision by the State to protect the employment of individuals who obtained their certificates under earlier erroneous inclusions but clarified that they would not be entitled to future benefits from the reserved category. Ultimately, the court quashed the notices issued by respondent banks to terminate the appellants' services, upheld their entitlement to protection based on prior government circulars, and allowed the appeals. K. Nirmala v. Canara Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 618

Electoral Bond Scheme - Constitutionality and Investigations - The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the grievances regarding quid pro quo or criminality must be addressed through available legal remedies under the law, such as invoking criminal procedure or approaching the High Courts under Article 226. The Court further declined to order the constitution of an SIT, emphasizing that existing statutory mechanisms, such as the Income Tax Act, must be followed. The Court ruled that premature invocation of its jurisdiction under Article 32 was not warranted when statutory remedies had not yet been exhausted, reiterating that judicial review was reserved for constitutional challenges, not ordinary criminal investigations. Common Cause v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 567

Reserved category candidate can claim general category seat of horizontal reservation based on merit. Ramnaresh @ Rinku Kushwah v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 589

Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Section 13 – Applications to condone delay in filing written statements filed before New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage (P) Ltd., (2020) 5 SCC 757 decision cannot be summarily rejected. Dr. Vijay Dixit v. Pagadal Krishna Mohan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 625

Consumer Protection Act, 2019

Section 2 (7) of the Act defines “consumer” to mean any person who buys any goods for a consideration but does not include a person who obtains such goods for resale or for any commercial purpose. Therefore, purchase and sale of goods for resale or for commercial purpose is excluded from the purview of the definition of “consumer”. (Para 14) Omkar Realtors and Developers v. Kushalraj Land Developers, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 609

Section 2 (7) - A company purchasing a flat for residential use of its director and family can be a "consumer". Omkar Realtors and Developers v. Kushalraj Land Developers, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 609

Section 2(7), Section 67 — Definition of "Consumer" — Real estate purchase for residential use — Double allotment — Deficiency in service — Refund with compensation - The respondent, a real estate company, booked a flat in the appellant's project for residential use by one of its directors. Due to double allotment of the same flat and failure to arrange necessary funds, the respondent declined possession, leading to the appellant's cancellation of the allotment and forfeiture of the deposited amount. The respondent sought a refund, alleging deficiency in service and unfair trade practices. The NCDRC held that the respondent was a "consumer" under Section 2(7) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, as the purchase was for personal residential use and not for commercial purposes. Held, the NCDRC's decision, finding that the appellant's actions, including the double allotment and cancellation of the booking before resolving the dispute, amounted to a deficiency in service. The Court also confirmed the order directing the appellant to refund the deposited amount with compensation, and dismissed the appeal. Omkar Realtors and Developers v. Kushalraj Land Developers, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 609

Double allotment of a flat constitutes a deficiency in service, and the cancellation of the allotment without resolving such issues is unjustified. The appellant was directed to refund the amount along with compensation, with a timeline for repayment. Omkar Realtors and Developers v. Kushalraj Land Developers, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 609

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

A Police Inspector and a Chief Judicial Magistrate from Gujarat guilty of Contempt of Court for arresting and remanding an accused ignoring an interim anticipatory bail order passed by the Supreme Court. Tusharbhai Rajnikantbhai Shah v. Kamal Dayani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 557

Appeal under Section 19 maintainable against directions regarding merits of dispute even if there is no punishment order. Ajay Kumar Bhalla v. Prakash Kumar dixit, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 550

The power of contempt should be applied cautiously and sparingly, ensuring that it is invoked only when actions obstruct justice, undermine the law's majesty, or diminish public confidence in the judicial system. The judgment reiterates that contempt proceedings are sui generis, not governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure or strict rules of evidence, yet must adhere to principles of fairness, allowing the alleged contemnor an opportunity to present their case. The court cites various precedents stressing that contempt jurisdiction exists to protect the integrity of the judiciary rather than individual judges and must be exercised judiciously, demanding a high standard of proof akin to criminal proceedings. (Para 22 - 29) In Re: Patanjali Ayurved Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 573

The expression "wilful disobedience," as defined in Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, pertains to civil contempt, which involves (1) a judgment, decree, order, writ, or other court process, and (2) intentional disobedience of such court mandates. This definition delineates two categories of contempt: (a) wilful disobedience to court orders, which encompasses any order without distinction between adjudicated and consent orders, and (b) wilful breach of an undertaking given to the court, which is treated distinctly from compromises between parties. Courts have emphasized that "wilfulness" denotes intentional, voluntary actions done with bad purpose, excluding involuntary or negligent actions. Therefore, to establish civil contempt, it must be shown that the disobedience or breach was intentional, reflecting a conscious disregard of the law, thus upholding the sanctity of judicial proceedings and the rule of law. The court must also consider the specific circumstances surrounding the alleged contempt to determine the presence of wilfulness. (Para 30 - 39) In Re: Patanjali Ayurved Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 573

The term "undertaking," while not explicitly defined in the relevant Act, carries significant weight in contempt proceedings. It is understood as a promise or engagement, often made by a party or their counsel in the context of legal proceedings, that can be enforced similarly to an injunction. Definitions from legal dictionaries highlight that an undertaking does not require consideration and represents a commitment made to secure concessions from the court or the opposing party. Importantly, courts have asserted that if a party's actions convey the impression of providing an undertaking, they will be bound by it, irrespective of any subjective belief that they were not giving one or that their intentions were misunderstood. This underscores the seriousness and enforceability of undertakings within legal contexts. (Para 40 - 42) In Re: Patanjali Ayurved Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 573

The distinction between qualified and unconditional apologies in contempt proceedings is critical. A proper apology must be unconditional, demonstrating genuine contrition rather than serving as a tactical maneuver to evade consequences. The court emphasizes that apologies cannot coexist with justifications; they must reflect true remorse. The court assesses the sincerity of an apology based on the contemnor's behavior before and after the apology, the timing of its presentation, and whether it serves to uphold or undermine judicial authority. Apologies lacking genuine contrition or offered at a late stage—often as a strategy to avoid punishment—are typically rejected. Ultimately, the court retains discretion to refuse any apology that does not meet these stringent criteria, emphasizing that an apology is not a blanket excuse for contemptuous actions. (Para 43 - 50) In Re: Patanjali Ayurved Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 573

Citizenship Act, 1955

Bail for non-citizens - Supreme Court finds fault with view that accused can be denied bail merely on account of being a foreigner. Onyeka Samuel v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 630

Section 7A - Whether the physical or virtual presence of the estranged husband is mandatory for processing an application for an Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) card. The respondent, an Iranian citizen, applied for an OCI card based on her marriage to an Indian citizen. Due to the estranged relationship between the couple, the husband refused to appear for the required personal interview during the OCI application process. The Delhi High Court, both at the Single Judge and Division Bench levels, dispensed with the need for the husband's presence for the processing of the OCI application. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the Union of India, setting aside the High Court's orders. Held, the physical or virtual presence of the Indian spouse is mandatory for the personal interview as per Clause 21.2.5(vi) of the Visa Manual and the checklist for processing OCI card applications. This requirement was necessary to ascertain the genuineness of the marriage and compliance with statutory provisions under Section 7A of the Citizenship Act. The application must be processed in accordance with the notified procedures, and the High Court's order to dispense with the requirement was legally unsustainable. However, the Court left it open for the Central Government to consider whether the respondent's case fell under "special circumstances" under Section 7A(3) of the Citizenship Act, which could allow the government discretion to waive the requirement. The appeals were allowed, and the High Court's judgments were set aside. Union of India v. Bahareh Bakshi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 638

Section 7A(1)(d) - Physical or virtual presence of the Indian spouse is mandatory to process the application of a foreign national for an Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) card. Union of India v. Bahareh Bakshi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 638

Delay

Delay in filing an application should be condoned if it has been sufficiently explained, regardless of the length of the delay. Mool Chandra v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 552

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957

Lieutenant Governor (LG) of Delhi has the power to nominate aldermen to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi without the aid and advice of the Delhi Government. The power was a statutory power flowing from the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and hence the Governor need not act as per the aid and advice of the Delhi Government. Since it was a statutory power given to the LG and not an executive power of the Government, the LG was expected to act as per the statutory mandate and not as per the aid and advice of the Delhi Government. The power to be exercised is a statutory duty of the LG and not the executive power of the State. Govt of NCT of Delhi v. Office of Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 551

Doctrine

When can the doctrine of prospective overruling be applied - Explained. Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 577

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961

Section 6 - Stridhan is the exclusive property of the woman, and her father cannot claim recovery of Stridhan from in-laws without explicit authorisation from her. Mulakala Malleshwara Rao v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 621

Section 6 - The Supreme Court reiterated that it cannot be assumed that dowry and traditional presents given at the time of marriage are entrusted to the parents-in-law of the bride and would attract the ingredients of Section 6 of the Act. Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act provides that any dowry received by a person other than the woman in connection with her marriage must be transferred to her within the specified period. It further states that such dowry, until transferred, is to be held in trust for the benefit of the woman. Failure to transfer is punishable with imprisonment and/or fine. (Para 15, Referred : Bobbili Ramakrishna Raja Yadad v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2016) 3 SCC 309). Mulakala Malleshwara Rao v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 621

Section 6 - Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 406 - Allegations that the appellants, former in-laws of the complainant's daughter, had not returned the "stridhan" (gifts, including gold ornaments) given at the time of marriage. Key facts include the unsuccessful marriage of the complainant's daughter, her divorce in the U.S. in 2016, and subsequent remarriage in 2018. The complaint, filed in 2021, alleged the failure of the appellants to return the "stridhan." The Supreme Court found no evidence supporting the claim of "stridhan" possession by the appellants, emphasizing that the complainant had no locus standi to initiate proceedings on behalf of his daughter without her express authorization. The Court reiterated established jurisprudence on the absolute ownership of "stridhan" by a married woman and highlighted that delay in filing the FIR raised questions about the complainant's motives. The appeal was allowed, and the proceedings were quashed on the grounds of insufficient evidence, unexplained delay, and abuse of the legal process. Mulakala Malleshwara Rao v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 621

Education

Court can't declare equivalence of qualification' - Supreme Court affirms view that B.Sc (Polymer Chemistry) isn't equal to B.Sc (Chemistry). Shifana P.S. v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 553

New Delhi Municipal Corporation (NDMC) would not be liable for absorption and payment of benefits to the excess staff of the school run by the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee (DSGMC) on account of the closure of the school done by the DSGMC without the prior approval of the NDMC. As per Rule 46 of the Delhi Education Rules (Rules), it was incumbent upon the DSGMC to get approval from the NDMC before closing the school when the NDMC contributes 95% of the fund amount used for the management of the school. DSGMC's failure to take necessary approval under Rule 46 doesn't shift the responsibility upon the NDMC under Rule 47 to absorb and provide the salary and other benefits of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school run by the DSGMC. New Delhi Municipal Council v. Manju Tomar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 620

Environment

Every State organ, especially the ones associated with environment protection such as Chhattisgarh Environment Conservation Board (CECB) must diligently ensure timely compliance with the directions of the National Green Tribunal. P. Arun Prasad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 597

Public authorities should take best efforts to reduce trees required to be cut for public projects. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 561

The Supreme Court directs NGT to monitor silicosis-prone industries and orders NHRC to oversee compensation processes for affected workers. Peoples Rights and Social Research Centre (PRASAR) v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 560

Evidence

Murder Trial - Eyewitness Testimony – Role of Independent Witness in corroborating the prosecution's version of the events - Discussed. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562

Criminal Law – Eyewitness Testimony – Credibility of Prosecution Witness – FIR Registration Discrepancies – Independent Witness and Police Conduct - The absence of a timestamp on the FIR and its delayed entry into the court record further fueled suspicions that the FIR was a post-investigation document, undermining its credibility. Possible manipulation or concealment of the original complaint by the prosecution. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562

Section 26 - Confessions made by the accused to the medical officer were inadmissible, as they were made while in police custody. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562

Recovery of a bloodstained weapon without connecting evidence is insufficient for conviction. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562

Section 27 - Disclosure Statements and Link Evidence – Acquittal – Prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act were not proved as per law, and no credible discovery resulted from them, as the link evidence ensuring safe custody of the recovered articles from seizure until reaching the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) was absent. The investigating officer's testimony on disclosure statements was vague and unacceptable, and the FSL reports were rendered insignificant. The Court set aside the concurrent findings of the lower courts due to improper appreciation of evidence and perverse findings. The appellants were acquitted, and their convictions by the Trial Court and High Court were quashed. Appeals allowed. Convictions set aside. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562

Section 106 of the Evidence Act also put burden on the husband who went to sleep with her in the same room, but escaped unscathed to explain as to how the death had occurred as it was within the special knowledge within the meaning of said Section. (Para 8) Damodar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 607

Usually in matters involving criminality, discrepancies are bound to be there in the account given by a witness, especially when there is a conspicuous disparity between the date of the incident and the time of deposition. However, if the discrepancies are such that they create serious doubt on the veracity of a witness, then the Court may deduce and decline to rely on such evidence. This is especially true when there are variations in the evidence tendered by prosecution witnesses regarding the sequence of events as they have occurred. Courts must exercise all the more care and conscientiousness when such oral evidence may lean towards falsely implicating innocent persons. (Para 13, Referred : Andhra Pradesh v. Pullagummi Kasi Reddy Krishna Reddy, (2018) 7 SCC 623. Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 622

Family Law

Natural guardian's right to custody of a child is not lost just because temporary custody was given to a relative. Gautam Kumar Das v. NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 586

Foreign Judgment

Foreign Judgment that goes against Indian law is not conclusive between parties involved and not binding on the Indian Courts. Rohan Rajesh Kothari v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 579

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Sections 24 and 25 - Whether alimony can be granted under Sections 24 and 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, in cases where the marriage has been declared void. The Court noted that different High Court and Supreme Court rulings provided divergent interpretations on the issue, citing several precedents both in favor of and against granting alimony in such circumstances. The matter was referred to a three-judge bench to resolve the conflict and provide clarity on the applicability of Sections 24 and 25 in cases involving void marriages. Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 605

Hospital

Ensure basic safety conditions for doctors pending receipt of National Task Force (NTF) report : Supreme Court to States. In Re : Alleged Rape and Murder of Trainee Doctor, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 594

The Supreme Court holds hospital liable for handing over dead body to the wrong family, allows Rs. 25 lakh compensation. Ernakulam Medical Centre v. Dr. P.R. Jayasree, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 583

Vandalism at the Hospital - Unsafe working conditions of medical professionals, particularly women, in healthcare institutions - Lack of safety protocols in medical institutions, leading to vulnerability of healthcare professionals to violence, including gender-based violence. Unregulated access to sensitive areas of hospitals and insufficient security measures. Insufficient infrastructure, resting spaces, and basic amenities for medical professionals during long shifts. Absence of effective legislation addressing systemic and institutional issues in healthcare safety. The Court constituted a National Task Force (NTF) comprising healthcare professionals and government officials to address the safety and working conditions of medical professionals. The NTF was tasked with formulating recommendations for improving institutional safety, preventing violence, and creating enforceable protocols for the dignified treatment of medical workers. The Court emphasized the need for a national consensus and set guidelines for hospital safety measures, including the installation of security systems, provision of adequate restrooms, and monitoring access to sensitive hospital areas. The Court stressed the urgency of protecting healthcare workers and ensuring safe working conditions in medical institutions. It flagged the systemic failures in safety standards, particularly the vulnerability of women professionals to violence and harassment, and called for immediate remedial actions. In Re : Alleged Rape and Murder of Trainee Doctor, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 585

Judicial Service

Necessary for judges to exercise restraint on remarks in the age of live-streaming and wide reporting. In Re : Order of Punjab and Haryana High Court, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 566

National Pension Scheme - Compliance with payment of judicial officers' arrears and allowances - Proceedings against various states - General directions were issued for resolving any subsisting grievances of judicial officers and ensuring the establishment of Standard Operating Procedures. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 634

Registrar must ensure assistants work diligently - Supreme Court warns registry of serious consequences for errors. Vairamuthu v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 596

Statutory rules and executive instructions in the recruitment process - The issue concerns the application of unamended Schedule 'B' of the Manipur Judicial Service Rules, 2005 (MJS Rules) in the recruitment process, particularly regarding the evaluation criteria for written and viva voce examinations. The unamended rules provided that the final selection would be based on the cumulative grade value obtained in both the written and viva voce examinations, without prescribing any minimum cut-off for the viva voce segment. Held, amendments made to the rules after the recruitment process commenced, introducing a minimum of 40% qualifying marks for the viva voce, could not be retrospectively applied. The petitioner, having secured a cumulative 50.6% as per the unamended rules, would have qualified under the original scheme. Executive resolutions, such as the Full Court's resolution prescribing a viva voce cut-off, cannot override statutory rules unless those rules are properly amended. Reliance on decisions such as Kavita Kamboj v. High Court of P & H, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 174 and Abhimeet Sinha v. High Court of Patna, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 350 was found inapplicable in this case, as those judgments addressed the legality of prescribing minimum interview marks where the rules were silent or ambiguous. However, in the present case, the unamended MJS Rules explicitly provided the method of final selection. Therefore, the petitioner's evaluation should have been conducted under the unamended rules, and the executive resolution imposing a viva voce cut-off was invalid as it substituted rather than supplemented the statutory rules. Salam Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur at Imphal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 636

Substantive legitimate expectation and fairness in recruitment process - Whether the High Court's decision violated the substantive legitimate expectation of the petitioner. Held, for a public authority to frustrate a claim of legitimate expectation, it must objectively demonstrate an overriding public interest. The petitioner claimed a legitimate expectation under the unamended MJS Rules, 2005, that the merit list would be based on the aggregate marks of the written examination and viva voce. However, a minimum 40% cut-off for the viva voce was introduced after the recruitment process had begun, without prior notice to the candidates. Such a post-hoc imposition violated the petitioner's substantive legitimate expectation, rendering the process arbitrary and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. The petitioner's participation in the recruitment process did not preclude him from challenging the process's illegality, reaffirming the principle that the doctrine of estoppel cannot override the law. In conclusion, the Court ordered that the petitioner, having secured over 50% in aggregate marks, be declared successful in the recruitment test. The petitioner was granted appointment with notional seniority from 2015 for superannuation purposes but without retrospective monetary benefits. The directions were to be implemented within four weeks. Salam Samarjeet Singh v. High Court of Manipur at Imphal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 636

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015

Juvenile cannot be denied bail without recording finding that proviso to Section 12(1) Juvenile Justice act is applicable. Juvenile in Conflict with Law V v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 582

Section 12(1) - The Supreme Court granted bail to a juvenile who had been in custody for over a year, criticizing the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB), trial court, and the Rajasthan High Court for failing to record a specific finding justifying the denial of bail under the proviso to Section 12(1) of the Juvenile Justice Act. The Court emphasized that, absent such a finding, bail could not be denied. Citing a Psychological Assessment Report indicating the juvenile was not high-risk, the Court set aside previous orders and directed the juvenile's immediate release on bail without surety, with supervision instructions to be issued to the Probation Officer. Juvenile in Conflict with Law V v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 582

Sections 36, 39, and 46 - Inquiry, Rehabilitation, and Aftercare - Section 36 mandates the Child Welfare Committee (CWC) to conduct a social investigation and pass orders for the child's placement in a children's home, fit facility, or foster care. Section 39 emphasizes the process of rehabilitation and social reintegration based on individual care plans, aiming for family-based care or institutional placement. Section 46, supported by Rule 25, provides financial support to children leaving institutional care upon reaching 18 years to ensure their reintegration into society. The Court underscored the importance of these provisions in ensuring that children receive necessary support and opportunities for education, vocational training, and self-sufficiency. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587

Section 46 r/w. Rule 25 - The failure to implement these provisions, particularly Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act, denies victims the fundamental right to dignity and protection guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It directed strict implementation of these provisions to prevent victims from facing situations where their right to make informed choices about their future is compromised. The State is duty-bound to provide shelter, support, and financial assistance to victims, ensuring their reintegration into society and protecting their right to lead a dignified life. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587

Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006

Banks are not empowered to classify the loan accounts of the MSMEs, as Non-Performing Assets (NPA), without following the mandatory procedure laid down in the Instructions for Framework for Revival and Rehabilitation of MSMEs issued by the Ministry of MSME. Pro Knits v. Board of Directors of Canara Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 548

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

Emoluments and benefits such as house rent allowance, flexible benefit plan, contribution to provident fund, etc. accrued to the deceased ought to be included while computing the loss of dependency to determine the compensation. Meenakshi v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 549

The High Court had limited the compensation awarded to the claimants to Rs. 4,00,000/- in addition to the amount awarded by the Tribunal based on the court fees paid. Held, courts are duty-bound to award “just compensation” based on the evidence, irrespective of the amount claimed in the appeal. The appellants were held entitled to Rs. 28,00,375/-, the compensation determined by the court, despite initially claiming only an additional Rs. 4,00,000/-. The Court permitted the appellants to amend the memo of appeal and pay the deficient court fee within four weeks. Kavita Balothiya v. Santosh Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 546

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

Section 20(b)(ii)(B) and Section 50 – The respondent was convicted by the Trial Court for possession of 2.05 kgs of Ganja. The High Court acquitted the respondent, holding the search and seizure illegal due to non-compliance with Section 50. The State appealed to the Supreme Court. Held: The Supreme Court restored the conviction, holding that Section 50 formalities do not apply to recoveries from a bag. The respondent, who had already served four years, four months, and 21 days in prison, was sentenced to the period already undergone. Judgment of acquittal set aside. Conviction restored with modification of sentence to the period already undergone. The fine of Rs. 50,000 was upheld with a default imprisonment clause. Appeal allowed. State of Kerala v. Prabhu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 640

Section 50 – Whether recovery from a bag requires compliance with Section 50 - The Court reiterated that compliance with Section 50 is not mandatory when the recovery of contraband is made from a bag carried by the accused, not from the person of the accused. (Referred : Ranjan Kumar Chadha v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 856). State of Kerala v. Prabhu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 640

National Highways

Encroachments on National Highways and road safety measures - Proper mechanisms for inspection and removal of encroachments - The Supreme Court directed the Ministry of Road Transport & Highways to: Constitute inspection teams for regular and frequent inspections of National Highways to prevent and remove encroachments. Ensure each team is responsible for specific stretches of highways and immediately reports encroachments to the competent authority. Develop a public portal where citizens can report encroachments, upload photographs, and location details, and introduce a toll-free number for reporting. Ensure action taken reports are uploaded on the portal and give wide publicity to the portal and toll-free number. Additionally, the court indicated that similar mechanisms should be extended to State Highways and forwarded the matter to the Road Safety Committee chaired by Justice Abhay Sapre. The Amicus Curiae was asked to submit a note on other relevant issues. Gyan Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 633

National Housing Bank Act, 1987

Section 29A and 50 - Whether the complaint could proceed against all the accused, including the directors of the company, without specific averments regarding their roles in the commission of the offence. Held, In cases involving vicarious liability, it is necessary to make specific averments that the accused directors were in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the company's business at the time of the offence. Absent such averments, the complaint cannot proceed against the directors, except the Managing Director, who is presumed to be in charge of the company's operations by virtue of their position. National Housing Bank v. Bherudan Dugar Housing Finance Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 541

NEET

NEET-UG 2024 - Exam cancellation only when malpractice is systemic & separation of untainted candidates is impossible. Vanshika Yadav v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 539

NTA should avoid flip-flops which happened in NEET-UG case. Vanshika Yadav v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 539

Supreme Court asks expert committee to suggest reforms for better administration of NEET-UG Exam. Vanshika Yadav v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 539

Supreme Court highlights NTA's lapses, and says the manner in which NEET-UG 24 was conducted raises serious concerns. Vanshika Yadav v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 539

The petitioners, a group of doctors with postgraduate medical degrees, challenged the National Medical Commission's (NMC) decision to postpone the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test – Super Specialty (NEET-SS) 2024 examination, originally set for 2024. The NMC's decision, based on data showing a majority of candidates for NEET-SS are from prior batches, aims to prevent a competitive imbalance in future examinations. The Court, while acknowledging the petitioners' concerns, upheld the NMC's decision as reasonable and equitable, emphasizing the need to balance hardship against academic policy considerations. The Court directed the NMC to announce a schedule for the NEET-SS 2024 examination within thirty days, ensuring timely communication to students completing their postgraduate courses by January 2025. Rahul Balwan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 631

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

Sections 20 and 29 - The appellant had been convicted by the Trial Court for possession of 1.25 kg of "charas" and sentenced to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment. The appellant contested the conviction based on discrepancies in the police logbook, which showed that the police were at a different location at the time of the alleged seizure. Held, the High Court had erred in brushing aside crucial documentary evidence (the logbook) and statements of the police witnesses, which contradicted the prosecution's case. Given the absence of independent witnesses and the unreliability of the prosecution's evidence, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the appellant of all charges. Prakash Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 616

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Section 138—Discrepancies in the interest rate were insufficient to discredit the principal amount due, especially when the respondent admitted to issuing the cheque. (Para 17 & 18) Sri Sujies Benefit Funds Ltd. v. M. Jaganathuan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 581

Sections 138, 139, 118(a); Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 391; Prohibition of Charging Exorbitant Interest Act, 2003 (Tamil Nadu) — Discrepancies in interest rates and the partial repayments did not sufficiently rebut the statutory presumption of liability—Respondent failed to demonstrate that the cheque was not for a legally enforceable debt—Even if the interest charged exceeded the rate allowed under the Tamil Nadu Act, this was not a ground to invalidate the entire debt. (Para 17 & 18) Sri Sujies Benefit Funds Ltd. v. M. Jaganathuan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 581

Section 138 and 147 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 320 and 482 – Compounding of Offence – Consent of Complainant – Mandatory Requirement. A.S. Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. Nayati Medical Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 608

Notice

Notices sent to the residences of the accused while they were under custody cannot be proper service of notice. Saher Ali Mia v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 578

Penal Code, 1860

Section 120B, 409, 420, 468, 471 - Bail - Criminal Conspiracy - Misuse of Educational Funds - The appellants were involved in managing various educational institutions in Madhya Pradesh. FIRs were lodged against them for allegedly engaging in fraudulent activities related to the management of school funds, particularly in connection with the sale of textbooks and fee hikes. Whether the appellants' involvement in the sale of textbooks and fee hikes constitutes offenses under the IPC. Whether the rejection of bail by the Trial Court and High Court was justified. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and granted bail to the appellants. The allegations made against the appellants were almost identical and pertained to their educational activities, which included managing the sale of textbooks and raising fees. These activities, per se, could not constitute criminal offenses under the IPC. Further, the investigation was still incomplete, and the prolonged incarceration of the appellants was unwarranted. The Court directed the release of the appellants on bail, subject to conditions. Fr. Abraham Thazhathedathu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 591

Section 193 - Mere denial of the complainant's allegations does not constitute perjury. Prosecution for perjury requires clear evidence of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and should only be initiated when expedient in the interest of justice. James Kunjwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 574

Section 304 II - Conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC modified to the period already undergone, considering the emotional tension and spur-of-the-moment nature of the incident. Hussainbhai Asgarali Lokhandwala v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 584

Section 304B and 498A - Dowry death - The High Court reversed the acquittal passed by the trial court, holding that the death occurred within seven years of marriage due to 100% burn injuries at the matrimonial home. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's conviction, emphasizing the presumption of dowry death under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, and held that the appellants failed to discharge their burden of proof. The appeal was dismissed. Damodar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 607

Section 307 – Acquittal restored due to lack of convincing evidence - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction under Section 307 of the IPC, restoring the acquittal of the appellant by the Trial Court. The Court held that the High Court's decision to convict was based on weak and inconsistent evidence, including contradictory witness testimonies and absence of key eyewitnesses from the investigation. The prosecution's case was undermined by discrepancies in the roles attributed to the accused, the nature of injuries inflicted, and the medical evidence presented. The Court reiterated that an appellate court should not overturn a well-reasoned acquittal unless there is a manifest error in the trial court's findings. Accordingly, the conviction was deemed unsafe, and the appellant was acquitted. Appeal allowed, acquittal restored. Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 622

Section 307 – The appellants were charged under Section 307 IPC for an alleged knife attack on the victims. The trial court acquitted the appellants in 1995, but the High Court reversed the acquittal in 2009, sentencing them to seven years of rigorous imprisonment. Whether the conviction of the appellants under Section 307 IPC is justified in light of the inconsistencies in the prosecution's case. Held, the Supreme Court, upon reviewing the evidence, found significant contradictions between the FIR, witness testimonies, and medical reports. The absence of key eyewitnesses and discrepancies in the prosecution's narrative weakened the case. The court reiterated the principle that a conviction under Section 307 IPC requires clear intent and overt acts by the accused, which was not established beyond reasonable doubt in this case. The Court emphasized that an appellate court should not overturn an acquittal without compelling reasons. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the trial court's acquittal was restored. The appeal was allowed, and the appellants were acquitted. Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 622

Section 353 - Mere jostling and pushing while resisting arrest did not amount to criminal use of force. Mahendra Kumar Sonker v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 570

Section 406 and 420 - Difference Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - In a criminal breach of trust, there is an entrustment of property, where the accused dishonestly misappropriates or uses the property in violation of the trust placed in him. In contrast, cheating involves a fraudulent or dishonest inducement from the beginning of the transaction, where the accused deceives the victim into delivering property or taking action they would not have otherwise taken. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603

Section 406 and 420 - Difference Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - Criminal breach of trust requires that the property entrusted must belong to someone other than the accused, who holds it in trust. Cheating, on the other hand, is based on false representations made at the inception of the transaction. Both offences, while involving dishonest intent, are mutually exclusive. The accused cannot be charged with both for the same transaction unless distinct elements of each offence are present. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603

Section 406 and 420 - Difference Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - Mere breach of contract does not give rise to a criminal offence unless fraudulent or dishonest intent at the inception is demonstrated. A civil remedy is appropriate where the dispute arises from non-payment after a sale of goods, as the sale transfers ownership to the buyer, eliminating the possibility of criminal breach of trust. Prosecution under criminal breach of trust cannot be sustained without the essential element of entrustment. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603

Section 406 and 420 - Judicial Oversight in Distinguishing Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - the Supreme Court expressed concern over the casual approach of the lower courts in distinguishing between the offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating. The Court emphasized the magistrates' duty to thoroughly examine complaints and ascertain whether the ingredients of the specific offences are met. It also criticized the police's routine practice of registering both offences without proper application of mind. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603

Section 406 and 420 - The Court called for proper legal training for police officers across the country to prevent wrongful prosecution under these distinct offences. It further directed that the judgment be sent to the Union Ministries of Law & Justice and Home Affairs for appropriate action, highlighting the need for systemic reforms. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603

Section 406 and 420 - Mere non-performance of a contractual obligation, such as failure to register the sale, does not constitute cheating or criminal breach of trust. Radheyshyam v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 595

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

The allegations against the appellants primarily pertained to a civil dispute arising from contractual obligations rather than criminal misconduct. The investigation initiated by the CBI, based on an incomplete CAG report, was flawed, and there was no basis to conclude that the appellants had engaged in any criminal conspiracy or wrongful conduct. The CBI's investigation relied on an audit report that had not been finalized, and the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate criminal intent. The Karnataka High Court had previously ruled favorably for the appellants in related proceedings, which the CBI ignored. There was no evidence to support the claims that the appellants had caused financial loss to the state or wrongfully profited from the disposal of coal rejects. As a result, the Supreme Court quashed the order framing charges and set aside the proceedings, concluding that the matter was of a civil nature, devoid of criminal elements. Appeals allowed, and charges against the appellants quashed. Karnataka EMTA Coal Mines Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 606

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954

Section 7 r/w Section 16 – Conviction for use of permitted food colour – Tartrazine yellow colour permissible under Rule 28 of Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 – Erroneous conviction set aside. Mahesh Chander @ Mahesh Chand v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 610

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Section 45 – Bail - In cases where there has been a delay in trial and the accused has spent a long period in custody, right to bail shall be read into Section 439 Cr.P.C. and Section 45 PMLA. The same will however depend on the nature of allegations, as well. Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 563

In order to avail the right to fair trial, the accused cannot be denied the right to have inspection of the documents including the “un-relied upon documents. Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 563

Section 45 – Bail - Interpretation and Application - Court must balance the statutory twin conditions required for bail with the fundamental principle that "bail is the rule and jail is the exception." Even in cases under PMLA, the overarching principle of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution prevails, ensuring that statutory conditions for bail should not override constitutional safeguards. Thus, courts should be guided by the higher constitutional mandate of speedy trial and personal liberty, especially where prolonged incarceration occurs without the conclusion of trial. (Para 11) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617

Section 45 - Scope of Inquiry - In assessing bail applications under Section 45 of the PMLA, the Court need not delve deeply into the merits of the case. The inquiry is limited to determining whether there are "reasonable grounds for believing" that the accused is guilty, based on the material collected during the investigation. This does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt, but rather an assessment of the broad probabilities of the case. Thus, Section 45 requires the Court to assess the genuineness of the case against the accused, but not to conclusively determine guilt at this stage. (Para 13) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617

Section 24 - Foundational Facts and Legal Presumption of involvement in money laundering - Held, this presumption only arises once three basic facts are established by the prosecution: (i) the commission of a scheduled offence, (ii) the property in question being derived from the criminal activity, and (iii) the involvement of the accused in any process or activity related to the proceeds of crime. Once these foundational facts are established, a legal presumption arises that the proceeds of crime are involved in money laundering. However, the presumption is rebuttable, and the accused has the opportunity to disprove their involvement by presenting evidence within their personal knowledge. This presumption is not conclusive, and the accused must be given a fair opportunity to rebut it through cross-examination, presenting evidence, or under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The provision, therefore, balances the burden of proof between the prosecution and the accused, ensuring that the presumption under Section 24(a) of the PMLA is neither unreasonable nor unconstitutional. (Para 14) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617

Section 24 - Significance of the Counter to Bail Application under PMLA - The counter must establish a cogent case by demonstrating the three foundational facts required under Section 24 of the Act: (i) the commission of a scheduled offence, (ii) the derivation of proceeds of crime from that offence, and (iii) the accused's involvement in any process or activity related to those proceeds. Only after these foundational facts are prima facie established does the presumption under Section 24 arise, shifting the burden to the accused to rebut the same. The counter affidavit must crystallize the material relied upon, thereby assisting the court in making an informed decision at the bail stage under Section 45 of PMLA. It enables the court to assess whether there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty, aligning with the framework laid down in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 633. (Para 15) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617

Section 50 - When an accused is in custody under PMLA irrespective of the case for which he is under custody, any statement under Section 50 PMLA to the same Investigating Agency is inadmissible against the maker. The reason being that the person in custody pursuant to the proceeding investigated by the same Investigating Agency is not a person who can be considered as one operating with a free mind. It will be extremely unsafe to render such statements admissible against the maker, as such a course of action would be contrary to all canons of fair play and justice. (Para 32) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617

Section 50 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 30 - Enforcement Directorate cannot start with a statement of a co-accused to implicate the accused. An incriminating statement of a co-accused would not amount to substantive evidence. (Para 37) Prem Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 617

Section 45 (1) - Proviso to Section 45(1) of PMLA extends special treatment to women, regardless of their social status or qualifications. Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 614

Section 45 (1) - Refusal to grant bail - The appellant, a political figure, sought bail after being charged with offenses related to money laundering. The appellant contended that since the investigation was complete and the charge sheet had been filed, her continued custody was unnecessary. Additionally, it was argued that the appellant, being a woman, was entitled to special treatment under the proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA, as affirmed in Manish Sisodia v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 563. Held, detailed discussions on the merits of the case should be avoided at the bail stage to prevent prejudice during trial. The Court rejected the High Court's reasoning, which had denied the benefit of the proviso to Section 45(1) based on the appellant's educational qualifications and social standing, finding that the lower court misinterpreted the provision as applicable only to "vulnerable women." The Supreme Court reiterated that the statutory provision mandates special treatment for women, and such benefit should not be denied unless specific reasons are provided. The Court set aside the High Court's order, granted bail to the appellant, and imposed conditions to prevent tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses. Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 614

Continued custody is unnecessary once investigation and charge sheet are complete. Bail granted under the principle that prolonged pre-trial incarceration should not amount to punishment without trial. Kalvakuntla Kavitha v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 614

No assertion in ED complaint that scheduled offences generated proceeds of crime - grants bail. Bhagwan Bhagat v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 576

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

Section 19(6) - The Court expressed concern over the failure of the State machinery to follow the mandatory rehabilitation provisions under Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act. Emphasizing the importance of victim rehabilitation, the Court directed the formation of a committee comprising experts from NIMHANS or TISS to assist the victim in making an informed choice regarding her future. The State was instructed to provide the committee with details of the benefits available to the victim. The Court also directed all States and Union Territories to implement the provisions of Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act and Section 46 of the Juvenile Justice Act and submit compliance reports. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587

Issue of victim support and rehabilitation under the POCSO Act and the Juvenile Justice (JJ) Act - The Court observed the failure of the State machinery under the JJ Act in fulfilling its obligations toward the victim and emphasized the need for remedial actions. It directed the formation of a team of experts, including a clinical psychologist and a social scientist, to meet the victim and help her make an informed choice regarding her future. The team is to carefully ascertain the victim's needs and any support she might be receiving from the accused and his family. The Court emphasized that the process must be handled with sensitivity to avoid causing further insecurity to the victim. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587

Section 33 (5) - Recall of Witness under Section 311 of Cr.P.C – Protection of Child from Repeated Testimony – a child should not be repeatedly called to testify to protect them from further trauma. Mechanical recall of the victim would defeat the protective purpose of the POCSO Act. Madhab Chandra Pradhan v. State of Odisha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 615

The State had a duty to provide care and protection to the victim of an offense under the POCSO Act. Despite the legal framework in place, the State failed in its responsibilities. The court emphasized that under Section 19 of the POCSO Act, police must report such cases to the Child Welfare Committee (CWC) within 24 hours. Similarly, under Section 29 of the Juvenile Justice Act, the CWC is empowered to ensure the care and protection of children in need. The court further underscored the obligations of the CWC to act swiftly in cases of sexually abused children and take suo motu cognizance where necessary. In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587

Railway Accident

Claimants entitled to benefit of higher compensation prescribed after the date of incident. Doli Rani Saha v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 575

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

Section 3(1)(r) - Whether mere knowledge of the complainant's caste identity is sufficient to attract the offence - Held, mere knowledge of the complainant's Scheduled Caste identity is not sufficient to constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act. The offence must be committed "on the ground" or "for the reason" that the person belongs to a Scheduled Caste. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602

Section 3(1)(r) - The Court emphasized that penal statutes must be interpreted strictly, and the intent to humiliate or insult the complainant must be based on their caste identity. The Court noted that where the legislature intended mere knowledge to be sufficient, it had expressed so in clear terms in other sections of the Act. As the allegations in the present case did not establish that the insult was made because of the complainant's caste, the requirements of Section 3(1)(r) were not met. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602

Section 3(1)(u) - Whether any offence under Section 3(1)(u) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, is prima facie made out in the present FIR/complaint. Held, no prima facie case was made out under Section 3(1)(u) of the Act, 1989. To constitute an offence under this provision, the accused must promote or attempt to promote enmity, hatred, or ill-will against members of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes as a group, through words, signs, or visible representation. The Court found that the video in question did not target Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes as a group but was directed solely against the complainant as an individual. Therefore, the essential ingredients of Section 3(1)(u) were not satisfied. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602

Section 3(1)(r) - Meaning of the expression "intent to humiliate" - Held, the phrase "intent to humiliate" under Section 3(1)(r) must be interpreted within the context of caste-based discrimination. Insult or intimidation must be linked to the caste identity of the victim, arising from practices such as untouchability or entrenched caste hierarchies. Not every insult or intimidation against a member of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes qualifies as an offence under this provision; it must be motivated by the intention to humiliate based on caste. For the offence to be made out, caste-based remarks or actions reinforcing systemic humiliation must be present. The mere fact that the complainant belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe does not automatically trigger the offence. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602

Section 3(1)(r) - An offence under Section 3(1)(r) of the Act requires a caste-based intent to humiliate, not just ordinary insult or intimidation. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602

Section 3(1)(r) - For an offence to be made out under this provision, certain specific ingredients must be present. These include intentional insult or intimidation directed at a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe with the intent to humiliate, and this act must occur in a place within public view. Mere insult or intimidation of a person belonging to SC/ST community, without any caste-based motivation, does not suffice to attract Section 3(1)(r). Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602

Section 3(1)(r) - Insult or intimidation does not constitute an offence under the Act unless it is specifically aimed at humiliating the victim because of their caste. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602

Section 18 - Anticipatory Bail – When can it be said that a prima facie case is made out in an FIR/complaint? A prima facie case, which translates to "at first sight" or "based on first impression," is made out in an FIR or complaint when the necessary ingredients to constitute an offence under the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 are evident upon a plain reading of the allegations. If such ingredients are absent, no prima facie case is established, and courts are not precluded from granting anticipatory bail despite the bar under Section 18 of the Act. However, when the FIR or complaint does disclose the essential elements of the offence, anticipatory bail becomes unavailable. Its duty is to ensure that the allegations in the complaint are evaluated for their sufficiency in establishing the offence, free from external influence. Additionally, in cases involving digital or social media content, courts may examine the materials referenced in the complaint to assess if the prima facie case is made out. If the ingredients of the offence are not found, the bar under Section 18 does not apply. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602

Section 18 - Anticipatory Bail – Significance of the Expression "Arrest of Any Person" - Section 18 of the SC/ST Act, 1989 does not impose an absolute restriction on anticipatory bail; rather, it applies when a valid arrest under CrPC provisions can be made. For an arrest to be lawful under Section 41 of the CrPC, there must be a reasonable belief, credible information, or reasonable suspicion that the accused has committed an offence, and the arrest must be necessary for purposes like preventing further offences or ensuring proper investigation. Thus, the bar on anticipatory bail under Section 18 only applies if prima facie evidence points to the commission of an offence under the Act. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602

Section 18 – Anticipatory Bail – Absolute Bar on Grant of Anticipatory Bail – Constitutionality - The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Section 18 imposes an absolute bar on the grant of anticipatory bail for offenses under the Act. The provision does not violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, as the offenses under the Act form a separate class arising from the historical practice of untouchability and systemic oppression against SC/ST communities. Section 18 was upheld as it is necessary to prevent potential threats and intimidation by the accused, ensuring victims are not obstructed in pursuing justice. The Court acknowledged concerns of misuse but emphasized that the provision aligns with the object of the Act to protect vulnerable sections of society and uphold their dignity. Shajan Skaria v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 602

Service Law

Decision to reduce pay scale can't be applied retrospectively - Quashes recovery steps against retired govt servant. Jagdish Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 564

A statutory body such as a University cannot act unfairly and arbitrarily in matters of regularization. The decision to regularize should not be based "on the whims of the decision-making authority"; rather, it should have good reasons to justify the exercise of its power. Maitreyee Chakraborty v. Tripura University, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 598

Dying in Harness - When the termination of a contractual appointment is stigmatic, the principles of natural justice have to be followed. Merely because an appointment was made on a contract basis, following an application for compassionate appointment, would not constitute an appointment under Dying in Harness Rules. U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Brijesh Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 628

Eligibility of re-designated Research Assistants for the Career Advancement Scheme (CAS). Held: Research Assistants, although re-designated as Lecturers or Assistant Professors, do not qualify for CAS benefits unless they were directly recruited as Assistant Professors. The CAS requires eight years of service following a "regular appointment," a term that excludes re-designation. The Court emphasized the distinction between cadres of re-designated and directly appointed Assistant Professors and clarified that such differentiation is crucial for determining benefits under the CAS. Additionally, the Court ruled that any benefits already paid to the respondents should not be recovered, though future benefits would be calculated notionally, excluding CAS benefits. Rajasthan Agricultural University v. Dr. Zafar Singh Solanki, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 555

Employees promoted to a particular cadre cannot claim the benefits of promotion when they were not even born in the cadre. Mhabemo Ovung v. M. Moanungba, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 629

Similarly placed employees discriminated - Regularization of worker who served for 30 years. Ushaben Joshi v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 612

Employees governed by different rules and having different duties can't claim parity merely based on the same qualification. Indian Council of Agricultural Research v. Rajinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 611

Grant of advance increments for Ph.D. to technical personnel in ICAR - The Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, created two services, Agricultural Research Service (ARS) and Technical Service (TS), governed by separate service rules. The respondents, technical personnel at ICAR, filed applications for two advance increments on acquiring Ph.D. degrees, similar to those granted to scientists in the ARS under a scheme dated 27.02.1999. The Tribunal and the High Court allowed their claim, equating technical personnel with scientists for this benefit. Whether technical personnel are entitled to the same increments as scientists for obtaining Ph.D. qualifications. Whether the Tribunal and High Court erred in applying Article 14 to grant such benefits. Held, Technical personnel and scientists belong to different services, governed by separate rules and qualifications. Merely because both are engaged in the research framework, technical personnel cannot claim the benefits specifically granted to scientists. Article 14 does not apply to such cases of differential treatment based on service rules, and that the benefit of two advance increments for Ph.D. acquisition was part of the pay package exclusively for scientists. The appeal was allowed, and the orders of the High Court and Tribunal were set aside. Indian Council of Agricultural Research v. Rajinder Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 611

'Temporary' employees working for decades like regular government employees can't be denied equal benefits. Rajkaran Singh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 599

When non-renewal of an employee's contract is for disciplinary reasons, formal enquiry is necessary. Swati Priyadarshini v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 604

Compassionate Appointments - Any appointment obtained through fraudulent means cannot be sustained. Union of India v. Prohlad Guha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 543

Supreme Court grants relief to UPSC aspirant who missed re-medical test in 2014, allows his appointment on clearing test. Rakshit Shivam Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 547

Special Leave Petition

Show proof of applying for certified copy while seeking exemption from filing certified copy of judgment with SLP. Harsh Bhuwalka v. Sanjay Kumar Bajoria, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 554

The Supreme Court prima facie disagrees that a second SLP can be filed if the first SLP was dismissed without any reasons or was withdrawn. N.F. Railway Vending and Catering Contractors Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 542

Specific Performance

Limitation period for a specific performance suit will run from the date fixed for the performance and not from the expiry of the validity of the agreement. Usha Devi v. Ram Kumar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 568

Tax

Finance Act, 1994; Section 65(19)(ii) r/w. 65(105)(zzb) - Sale of lottery tickets by a State Government is not a service but an activity to earn additional revenue. Hence, the wholesale lottery purchasers are not promoting or marketing any service rendered by the State so as to attract service tax liability under the head "business auxiliary service”. (Para 6) K. Arumugam v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 639

Mere insertion of an explanation cannot make an activity a taxable service when it is not covered under the main provision. (Para 6.10) K. Arumugam v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 639

Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (Gujarat) - Section 11(3)(b) - Definition of "purchase price" does not include VAT. State of Gujarat v. Ambuja Cement Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 544

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Section 58 (f) - Production of title deeds of the property as a security towards the debt amounts to the creation of a 'mortgage by deposit of title deeds'. A.B. Govardhan v. P. Ragothaman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 626

Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019

Application process for a PAN card - Requested that certificates issued by District Magistrates under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act be accepted for the application process. The Union of India broadly accepted the demands made in the petition. The Supreme Court observed that the Union of India may consider incorporating these provisions into formal rules for greater clarity. Reshma Prasad @ Ramesh Prasad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 623

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

Bail - Denial of - Chhattisgarh Vishesh Jan Suraksha Act, 2005 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - National Investigation Agency Act, 2008; Section 21(4) - Co-accused had been granted bail and that there was no likelihood of early conclusion of the trial, with only 40 out of 100 prosecution witnesses examined. The petitioner has been in custody since 2020. Bail granted. Mukesh Salam v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 641

'Bail is the rule, jail is the exception' even in special statutes like the UAPA. If the conditions in the special statute for the grant of bail are met, then bail should be granted. Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 571