Article 12 & 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition – 'State' or 'Other Authority' – The respondent employer, Air India Limited (AIL) after its disinvestment ceased to be a State or its instrumentality within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India – The writ petitions were maintainable on the date of institution but whether they continued to be maintainable as on...
Article 12 & 226 – Maintainability of Writ Petition – 'State' or 'Other Authority' – The respondent employer, Air India Limited (AIL) after its disinvestment ceased to be a State or its instrumentality within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India – The writ petitions were maintainable on the date of institution but whether they continued to be maintainable as on the date the same were finally heard? – Held, the issue about exercise of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would arise only on the date when the writ petitions were taken up for consideration and decision. The subsequent event of disinvestment of the Government Company and its devolution into a private company would make the company immune from being subjected to writ jurisdiction under Article 226, even if the litigant had entered the portals of the Court while the employer was the Government. (Para 5, 32 & 38) R.S. Madireddy v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 384
Article 12 & 226 – Writ Jurisdiction of High Court – The High Court has the power to issue the directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Certiorari, Quo Warranto and Prohibition to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government within its territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of rights conferred by Part-III of the Constitution of India and for any other purpose. Held, since, respondent employer (AIL) had been disinvested and had assumed the character of a private entity not performing any public function, the High Court could not have exercised the extraordinary writ jurisdiction to issue a writ to such private entity. (Para 34 & 38) R.S. Madireddy v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 384
Article 13 – Scope of Judicial Review in matters of economic policy – Courts must adopt a less stringent form of judicial review while adjudicating challenges to legislation and executive action which relate to economic policy as compared to laws relating to civil rights such as the freedom of speech or the freedom of religion. The amendment to Section 31 of the RBI Act can be classified as a financial provision to the extent that it seeks to introduce a new form of a bearer banking instrument. However, any resemblance to an economic policy ends there. The amendments in question can be clubbed into two heads: first, provisions mandating non-disclosure of information on electoral financing; and second, provisions permitting unlimited corporate funding to political parties. Both these amendments relate to the electoral process. The Bonds were introduced only to curb black money in the electoral process, and protect informational privacy of financial contributors to political parties. The Union of India has itself classified the amendments as an “electoral reform”. Thus, the submission of the Union of India that the amendments deal with economic policy cannot be accepted. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441
Article 14 – Exemption of certain projects or activities from mandatory obtaining environment clearance – Unguided and blanket exemption, is, per se, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India – Item 6 grants exemption from the requirement of obtaining EC for “extraction or sourcing or borrowing of ordinary earth for linear projects, such as roads, pipelines, etc. Held, when an exception is sought to the requirement of obtaining EC, the exception must be specific. There is no specification about the quantum of ordinary earth, which can be extracted or the area which can be used to extract ordinary earth. “Linear projects” have not been defined making the term “linear projects” very vague. Even the amended item 6 continues to suffer from the same vice of arbitrariness, which Article 14 of the Constitution of India prohibits. The exemption granted without incorporating any safeguards is completely unguided and arbitrary and such blanket exemption completely defeats the very object of the EP Act. Hence, on account of the violation of Article 14, item 6 in the impugned notification, as well as the amended impugned notification, is struck down. (Para 25, 26 & 27) Noble M. Paikada v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : AIR 2024 SC 1871
Article 14 – Right to equality of the underprivileged – Held, forests play a pivotal role in controlling pollution, which significantly affects the underprivileged, violating their right to equality. It is the vulnerable sections of the society who would be most affected by the depletion of forests, considering the fact that the more affluent sections of society have better access to resources as compared to the underprivileged. The concept of sustainable development is to be understood from an eco-centric approach. First and foremost, it is the environment that needs to be sustained, while the anthropogenic development must follow later. (Para 30 & 32) State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : AIR 2024 SC 2466
Article 14 & 16 and Gujarat Rules, 2005; Rule 8 – Constitutionality of the Rules stipulating minimum qualifying marks in the viva voce test, as a part of the selection criteria, is challenged – Held, the Prescription of minimum qualifying marks for interview is permissible and this is not in violation of All India Judges Association and Others vs. Union of India and Others which accepted certain recommendations of the Shetty Commission. Further held, the minimum cut-off of 20% for the Bihar recruitment and 40% for the Gujarat recruitment cannot be considered to provide a high threshold if one keeps in mind that the recruitment is for selection of judicial officers. The object of viva voce set out in Rule 8(5) of Gujarat Rules, 2005 has a reasonable and direct nexus with the object sought to be achieved i.e. the appointment of well-rounded judicial officers. For recruitment of judicial officers, ideally the effort should be to not only test the candidate's intellect but also their personality. The prescription of minimum cut off is also not perceived to be of such a nature that it reeks of irrationality, or was capricious and/or without any adequate determining principle. It does not appear to be disproportionate so as to adversely affect “meritorious” candidates and certainly not manifestly arbitrary, or irrational or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The concerned recruitment Rules cannot be said to be unconstitutional. The impugned selection process in the State of Bihar and Gujarat are found to be legally valid and are upheld. (Para 66, 67 & 102) Abhimeet Sinha v. High Court of Judicature at Patna, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : AIR 2024 SC 2596
Article 14 and Income Tax Rules, 1962; Rule 3(7) (i) – Fixing single benchmark for interest rates charged by different banks – Rule 3(7) (i) is challenged to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 insofar as it treats the PLR of SBI as the benchmark to determine the value of benefit to the assessee in comparison to the rate of interest charged by other individual banks – Held, it is neither arbitrary nor unequal exercise of power. By fixing a single clear benchmark for computation of the perquisite or fringe benefit, the rule prevents ascertainment of the interest rates being charged by different banks from the customers and, thus, checks unnecessary litigation. Rule 3(7) (i) ensures consistency in application, provides clarity for both the assessee and the revenue department, and provides certainty as to the amount to be taxed. Rule 3(7) (i) is based on a uniform approach and fair determining principle which aligns with constitutional values. Hence, Rule 3(7) is held to be intra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (Para 32 & 33) All India Bank Officers' Confederation v. Central Bank of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 352
Article 14, 19, 21, 48A & 51A(g) – Fundamental rights and Directive principle of state policy are complimentary to each other – Article 48A and 51A(g) ought to be understood in light of Articles 14, 19 and 21, as they represent the collective conscience of the Constitution. If the continued existence and protection of forests is in the interest of humanity and nature, then there can be no other interpretation than to read the constitutional ethos into these provisions. Part III and Part IV of the Constitution are like two wheels of a chariot, complementing each other in their commitment to a social change and development. There is a constitutional duty enjoined upon every court to protect and preserve the environment. Courts will have to apply the principle of parens patriae in light of the constitutional mandate enshrined in Articles 48A, 51A, 21, 14 and 19 of the constitution. Therefore, the burden of proof lies on a developer or industrialist and also on the State in a given case to prove that there is no degradation. (Para 25, 26 & 38) State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : AIR 2024 SC 2466
Article 14 & 21 – The right to a healthy environment and the right to be free from the adverse effects of climate change – The right to a healthy environment encapsulates the principle that every individual has the entitlement to live in an environment that is clean, safe, and conducive to their well-being. Even if there is no umbrella legislation in India which relates to climate change and the attendant concerns this does not mean that the people of India do not have a right against the adverse effects of climate change. As the havoc caused by climate change increases year by year, it becomes necessary to articulate this as a distinct right. It is recognised by Articles 14 and 21. Without a clean environment which is stable and unimpacted by the vagaries of climate change, the right to life is not fully realised. States are compelled to prioritize environmental protection and sustainable development, thereby addressing the root causes of climate change and safeguarding the wellbeing of present and future generations. It is a fundamental right of all individuals to live in a healthy and sustainable environment. (Para 19, 24, 25 & 35) M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 286
Articles 14 and 51A - Appointment of Deputy Chief Ministers in the States - Submission that no such office is stipulated in the Constitution – Held, Appointment of Deputy Chief Ministers not unconstitutional. A Deputy Chief Minister is, first and foremost, a Minister in the Government of the State. The appellation of a Deputy Chief Minister does not breach the constitutional position. (Para 1) Public Political Party v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 130
Article 19(1) (a) – Commercial speech includes advertisements and is protected under Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution, subject to the reasonable restrictions in Article 19(2). Commercial speech that is deceptive, unfair, misleading, and untruthful is excluded from such constitutional protection and can be regulated and prohibited by the State. Subject to constitutional restrictions, the producer/ advertiser has the freedom to creatively and artistically promote his goods and services. (Para 5) Yash Raj Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Afreen Fatima Zaidi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : AIR 2024 SC 2333
Article 19(1) (a) & 21– Right to dissent – The right to dissent in a legitimate and lawful manner is an integral part of the rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) and every individual must respect the right of others to dissent. An opportunity to peacefully protest against the decisions of the Government is an essential part of democracy. The right to dissent in a lawful manner must be treated as a part of the right to lead a dignified and meaningful life guaranteed by Article 21, but the protest or dissent must be subject to reasonable restrictions imposed in accordance with Article 19(2). Further, the police machinery must be enlightened on the concept of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution and the extent of reasonable restraint on this freedom. The police machinery must be sensitised about the democratic values enshrined in our Constitution. (Para 10 & 13) Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : (2024) 4 SCC 156
Article 19(1)(a) – Infringement of the Right to information of the voter – The non-disclosure of information about electoral contributions under amendments introduced by the Finance Act 2017 and the Electoral Bond Scheme is violative of the right to information of the voter traceable to Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The voters have a right to the disclosure of information which is “essential” for choosing the candidate for whom a vote should be cast. The information about funding to a political party is such an 'essential' information for a voter to exercise their freedom to vote in an effective manner. The right to information of the voter includes the right to information of financial contributions to a political party because of the influence of money in electoral politics (through electoral outcomes) and governmental decisions. Information about political funding would enable a voter to assess if there is a correlation between policy making and financial contributions. Anonymizing contributions through electoral bonds are violative of Article 19(1)(a). Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441
Article 19(1)(a) and Indian Evidence act, 1872; Section 124 – Scope of right to information in the context of deciding the disclosure of evidence relating to affairs of the State – Conflict between public interest and private interest – Article 19(1)(a) has been held to guarantee the right to information to citizens. It is the role of citizens to hold the State accountable for its actions and inactions and they must possess information about State action for them to accomplish this role effectively. Provisions of the Indian Evidence Act stipulate that evidence which is relevant and material to proceedings need not be disclosed to the party if the disclosure would violate public interest. When such disclosure is denied on the ground that it would violate public interest, there is a conflict between private interest and public interest. There is a public interest in the impartial administration of justice which can only be secured by the disclosure of relevant and material documents. There is a close relationship between the right to information and open governance. Citizens have a duty to hold the government of the day accountable for their actions and inactions, and they can effectively fulfil this duty only if the government is open and not clothed in secrecy. The right to information has an instrumental exegesis, which recognizes the value of the right in facilitating the realization of democratic goals. But beyond that, the right to information has an intrinsic constitutional value; one that recognizes that it is not just a means to an end but an end in itself. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441
Article 19(1)(a) and 19(2) and Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018 - Infringement of the right to information of the voters for the purposes of curbing black money – Proportionality standard applied – Least restrictive means stage –The Electoral Bond Scheme is not the only means for curbing black money in Electoral Finance. There are other alternatives which substantially fulfill the purpose and impact the right to information minimally when compared to the impact of electoral bonds on the right to information. The legal regime itself provides other alternatives to curb black money such as contributions through cheques, bank draft, electronic clearing system or electoral trusts. Hence, the Electoral Bond Scheme does not fulfill the least restrictive means test. Further, the right to information under Article 19(1)(a) can only be restricted based on the grounds stipulated in Article 19(2). The purpose of curbing black money is not traceable to any of the grounds in Article 19(2). Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441
Article 20(1) – Article 20(1) does not prohibit this Court, to award a lesser punishment in a befitting case, when this Court is of the opinion that a lesser punishment may be awarded since the new law on the penal provision provides a lesser punishment i.e. lesser than what was actually applicable at the relevant time. The prohibition contained in Article 20 of the Constitution of India is on subjecting a person to a higher punishment than which was applicable for that crime at the time of the commission of the crime. There is no prohibition for this Court to impose a lesser punishment which is now applicable for the same crime. (Para 8) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212
Article 20(3) and Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Section 42(1) – Power of search and seizure under Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act 1985, is inherently limited by the recognition of fundamental rights by the Constitution as well as statutory limitations. Article 20(3) of the Constitution would not be affected by the provisions of search and seizure. The statutory provisions conferring authorities with the power to search and seize are a mere temporary interference with the right of the accused as they stand well regulated by reasonable restrictions emanating from the statutory provisions itself. (Para 41) Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : AIR 2024 SC 2778
Article 21 of the Constitution of India is the soul of the Constitution as the liberty of a citizen is of paramount importance. Not deciding the matter pertaining to liberty of a citizen expeditiously and shunting away the matter on one or the other ground would deprive the party of their precious right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. (Para 3) Amol Vitthal Vahile v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 159
Article 21 and 47 – Right to food – Although the Constitution of India does not explicitly provide for Right to food, the fundamental Right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution does include Right to live with human dignity and right to food and other basic necessities. Article 47 of the Constitution also provides that the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties. (Para 5) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248
Article 21 – Right to just and fair trial – Actions of the authorities concerned within the meaning of the NDPS Act 1985 must be towards ensuring of upholding the rights of the accused in order to allow the accused to have a fair trial. (Para 24) Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : AIR 2024 SC 2778
Article 21 – Pre-conviction detention – Liberty of a pre-trial detenue – Detention before conclusion of trial at the investigation and post-chargesheet stage has the sanction of law but any form of deprival of liberty results in breach of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and must be justified on the ground of being reasonable, following a just and fair procedure. Pre-conviction detention must be proportionate in the facts of a given case depending on gravity and seriousness of the offence alleged to have been committed. (Para 38) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : AIR 2024 SC 2169 : 2024 Cri LJ 2001
Article 21 – Primacy of consent of pregnant person in abortion – The right to choose and reproductive freedom is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The consent of a pregnant person in decisions of reproductive autonomy and termination of pregnancy is paramount and the MTP Act does not allow any interference with the personal choice of a pregnant person in terms of proceeding with the termination. The Act or indeed the jurisprudence around abortion developed by the courts leave no scope for interference by the family or the partner of a pregnant person in matters of reproductive choice. In case there is a divergence in the opinion of a pregnant person and her guardian, the opinion of the minor or mentally ill pregnant person must be taken into consideration as an important aspect in enabling the court to arrive at a just conclusion. (Para 32, 35 & 37) A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : AIR 2024 SC 2499
Article 21 – Right to abortion – The right to abortion is a concomitant right of dignity, autonomy and reproductive choice guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. The fundamental right of a pregnant person is not compromised for reasons other than to protect the physical and mental health of the pregnant person. (Para 21) A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : AIR 2024 SC 2499
Article 21 – The expression 'life' unequivocally includes the right to live a life worthy of human honour and dignity. Self-regard, social image and an honest space for oneself in one's surrounding society, are just as significant to a dignified life as are adequate food, clothing and shelter. Held, pre-conceived notions of prevailing stereotypes associated with a particular community, often render them 'invisible victims' and impede their right to live a life with self-respect. (Para 14 & 15) Amanatullah Khan v. Commissioner of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 351 : AIR 2024 SC 2340
Article 21 – Right to health – The fundamental right to health encompasses the right of a consumer to be made aware of the quality of products being offered for sale by manufacturers, service providers, advertisers and advertising agencies. (Para 23) Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 381
Article 21 & 22(1) & 22 (5) – Mandatory to inform' grounds of arrest' – The requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation. Noncompliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be. (Para 30) Prabir Purkayastha v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 376
Article 21 and 32 - Writ petition aggrieved by non-consideration and non-disposal of criminal appeal is not maintainable. If priority has not been given to the criminal appeal by the High Court for early hearing, for whatever reason, the same is also part of the judicial process and cannot be made amenable to a challenge in a writ petition under Article 32 citing breach of Article 21. A judicial decision rendered by a Judge of competent jurisdiction in or in relation to a matter brought before him does not infringe a Fundamental Right. If the petitioner wishes to be released on bail pending the criminal appeal, cannot invoke the writ remedy but has to take recourse to an application under Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (Para 3) Ganpat @ Ganapat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 147
Article 22(1) and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA); Section 43B (1) – The proceedings of arrest and the police custody remand of appellant is questioned – On grounds that mandator requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested is not provided – The arrest memo nowhere conveys the grounds on which the accused was being arrested. Keeping the accused in police custody without informing him the grounds on which he has been arrested; deprives the accused of the opportunity to avail services of the legal practitioner of his choice to oppose the prayer for police custody remand and seek bail. Held, the copy of the remand application in the purported exercise of communication of the grounds of arrest in writing was not provided to the accused appellant or his counsel before passing of the order of remand which vitiates the arrest and subsequent remand of the appellant. Further held, the mere fact that a charge sheet has been filed in the matter, would not validate the illegality and the unconstitutionality committed at the time of arresting the accused and the grant of initial police custody remand to the accused. The arrest of the appellant followed by remand order are hereby declared to be invalid in the eyes of law and are quashed and set aside. Hence, the appellant is entitled to a direction for release from custody. (Para 48, 50 & 51) Prabir Purkayastha v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 376
Article 22(4) and Act, 1986; Section 9, 10, 11 & 12 - Advisory Board - Article 22(4) mandates that, any law pertaining to preventive detention must provide for constitution of an Advisory Board consisting of persons who have been or qualified to be appointed as judges of the High Court. It further vests the Advisory Board with the pivotal role of reviewing an order of detention within three-months by forming an opinion as to whether there is a sufficient cause for such detention or not, after consideration of all the material on record including representation if any, of the detenu. Under preventive detention legislations, Advisory Boards(s) are constitutional safeguards available to the detenu against an order of detention. Under the Act, 1986, Section 9 gives expression to this constitutional requirement, and provides for the constitution and composition of an Advisory Board for the purposes of the Act. Under section 10, any order of detention that has been made under the Act shall be placed before an Advisory Board thereunder within three-weeks from the date of its passing. As per Section 11, the Advisory Board must form an opinion and specify as to whether there is sufficient cause warranting the detention of the detenu. (Para 50, 52 & 53) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733
Article 32 – Quashing the order of detention – The Court does not sit in judgment over the correctness of the subjective satisfaction but may ascertain whether the subjective satisfaction is based on objective facts or influenced by any caprice, malice or irrelevant considerations or non-application of mind. (Para 43) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733
Article 32 – Writ of Habeas Corpus – 'Habeas Corpus' literally means 'have his body'. This is a prerogative process for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an effective relief of immediate release from unlawful or unjustifiable detention, whether in prison or in private custody. It is the duty of the Court to issue this writ to safeguard the freedom of the citizen against arbitrary and illegal detention. By the writ of habeas corpus, the Court can cause any person who is imprisoned to be brought before the Court and obtain knowledge of the reason why he is imprisoned and then either set him free then and there if there is no legal justification for the imprisonment, or see that he is brought speedily to trial. The writ may be addressed to any person whatsoever an official or a private individual who has another in his custody. (Para 29 & 30) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733
Article 32 - Writ or direction for expeditious disposal of Criminal Appeal - Held, the Supreme Court has no power of superintendence over the High Courts. There is no provision in Chapter-IV (titled The Union Judiciary) under Part-V (The Union) of the Constitution of India which, in terms similar to Article 227 of the Constitution (Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court) under Chapter-V thereof, confers power of superintendence on the Supreme Court over the High Courts. In our constitutional scheme there is a clear division of jurisdiction between the two institutions and both the institutions need to have mutual respect for each other. Accepting the prayer of the petitioner and issuing any direction, as prayed, would amount to inappropriate exercise of discretionary jurisdiction showing disrespect to another constitutional court; hence, no such direction, as prayed by the petitioner, can be issued. That apart, assuming that an extraordinary case requires a nudge from Supreme Court for early hearing of a long pending criminal appeal, it is only a request that ought to be made to the High Court to such effect in appropriate proceedings, care being taken to ensure that the proceeding before Supreme Court is otherwise maintainable. (Para 1 - 3) Ganpat @ Ganapat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 147
Article 136 – Interference not warranted – The Technical Assistants are not claiming against the 75% posts available for direct recruits. Their claim is only towards 25% posts which are required to be filled in from Junior Draughting Officers, Overseers and Technical Assistants who have put five year service and have acquired B.E./A.M.I.E. qualification. Held, the Technical Assistants are not encroaching upon the quota apportioned for directly recruited Assistant Engineers. The continuation of the appellants as Assistant Engineers would not amount to encroaching upon the 75% posts apportioned for the members of the appellants' association. Hence, any interference at this stage is likely to undo the settled position which has been prevalent almost for a period of last 18 years. (Para 21, 25 & 26) Association of Engineers v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 304 : AIR 2024 SC 2061
Article 136 – Interference under Article 136 is not warranted – The Supreme Court may exercise its power under Article 136 sparingly and only when exceptional circumstances exist which justify the exercise of its discretion. The court is not inclined under Article 136 of the Constitution to re-appreciate the findings of facts which have been arrived at by the High Court. The order of the High Court does not suffer from any error that would warrant the invocation of jurisdiction under Article 136. (Para 18 & 23) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211
Article 136 – Jurisdiction of Supreme Court – Discretion to interfere – In cases where there is no substantial question of law this court would not exercise its discretion. (Para 18) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers' Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 230
Article 136 – Power to interfere in acquittal passed by High Court – Once the appellate court acquits the accused, the presumption of innocence as it existed before conviction by the Trial Court, stands restored. Court, while scrutinizing the evidence, will proceed with great circumspect and will not routinely interfere with an order of acquittal, save when the impeccable prosecution evidence nails the accused beyond any doubt. An intervention is warranted when the High Court's approach or reasoning is deemed perverse or when based on suspicion and surmises court rejects evidence or when the acquittal is primarily rooted in an exaggerated adherence to the rule of giving the benefit of doubt in favour of the accused. Further circumstance for intervention arises when the acquittal would lead to a significant miscarriage of justice. An erroneous or perverse approach to the proven facts of a case and/or ignorance of some of the vital circumstances would amount to a grave and substantial miscarriage of justice. Supreme Court will be justified in exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction to undo the injustice mete out to the victims of a crime. (Para 15, 17 & 18) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : (2024) 4 SCC 469
Article 136 – Scope of interference in arbitral award – While adjudicating the merits of a Special Leave Petition and exercising its power under Article 136, the Supreme Court must interfere sparingly and only when exceptional circumstances exist, justifying the exercise of the Court's discretion. The Supreme Court must be slow in interfering with a judgement delivered in exercise of powers under Section 37 unless there is an error in exercising of the jurisdiction. Held, the judgment of the Division Bench provided more than adequate reasons to come to the conclusion that the arbitral award suffered from perversity and patent illegality. There was no valid basis for interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. (Para 43 & 71) Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : AIR 2024 SC 2070
Article 136 – Special leave petition – Interference not required – Findings of the First Appellate Court and the High Court are based on evidence and is not perverse. (Para 11) Rajco Steel Enterprises v. Kavita Saraff, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 306 : AIR 2024 SC 2105
Article 136 – Wrongful denial of employment and regularization – Distinction between the two sets of workers – Artificial distinction asserted by appellant between two set of workers is unjustified. The appellant has failed to establish any distinction between the 19 workers who were regularized and the 13 workers who were left out. The tribunal came to the conclusion that the nature of the duties performed by the 13 workmen are perennial in nature and they hold the same status as the 19 regularized employees but were wrongly not made part of the settlement. There is no merit in the appeals filed by the appellant. (Para 20, 21 & 22) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers' Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 230
Article 141 – Held, directions of the court shall be treated as the law under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. (Para 24) Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 381
Article 142 doesn't empower Courts to ignore substantive rights of litigants - Issued guidelines on exercise of inherent powers. High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177
Article 142 – Direction of Supreme Court for automatic vacation of interim stay due to lapse of time – The jurisdiction of Supreme Court under article 142 cannot be exercised to make judicial legislation. By a blanket direction in the exercise of power under Article 142, the Supreme Court cannot interfere with the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court of granting interim relief by limiting its jurisdiction to pass interim orders valid only for six months at a time. Putting such constraints on the power of the High Court will amount to making a dent on the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution, which is an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. Elementary principles of natural justice, mandate that an order vacating or modifying interim relief is to be passed only after hearing all the affected parties and order passed without hearing the beneficiary is against the basic tenets of justice. If an interim order is automatically vacated only because the High Court cannot hear the main case within the time limit, the maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” will apply, i.e. no litigant should be allowed to suffer due to the fault of the Court. Further, automatic vacation on lapse of time gives an unfair advantage to the respondent in the case and adversely affects a litigant's right to the remedies under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Such orders virtually defeat the right of a litigant to seek and avail of statutory remedies such as revisions, appeals, and applications under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as well as the remedies under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Constitutional Courts may issue directions for the time-bound disposal of cases only in exceptional circumstances. (Para 16, 17, 24, 28 & 32) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177
Article 142 – Direction of Supreme court to dispose stay cases on a day-to-day basis – Such directions of the Supreme Court virtually amounts to judicial legislation. The High Courts cannot be expected to decide, on a priority basis or a day-to-day basis, only those cases in which a stay of proceedings has been granted while ignoring several other categories of cases that may require more priority to be given. Therefore, the issue of giving out-ofturn priority to certain cases should be best left to the concerned Courts. (Para 28, 30 & 32) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177
Article 142 – Scope of powers of Supreme Court under Article 142 – The jurisdiction under Article 142 cannot be invoked to pass blanket orders setting at naught a very large number of interim orders lawfully passed by all the High Courts, and that too, without hearing the contesting parties. The jurisdiction under Article 142 can be invoked only to deal with extraordinary situations for doing complete justice between the parties before the Court. Although the Supreme Court under Article 142 can always issue procedural directions to other Courts, the right to be heard before an adverse order is passed is not a matter of procedure but a substantive right. Hence, Article 142 does not empower this Court to ignore the substantive rights of the litigants. Power under Article 142 cannot be exercised to defeat the principles of natural justice, which are an integral part of our jurisprudence. (Para 19 & 22) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177
Article 142 – Power to ensure electoral democracy – The Court is duty-bound, to do complete justice to ensure that the process of electoral democracy is not allowed to be thwarted by subterfuges. The Court must step in exceptional situations to ensure that the basic mandate of electoral democracy at the local participatory level is preserved. The extraordinary situation of electoral misconduct by the presiding officer himself, justifies the invocation of the power of this Court under Article 142. (Para 37) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526
Article 142 – Setting aside the Election Process – It would be inappropriate to set aside the election process in its entirety when the only infirmity which has been found is at the stage when the counting of votes was recorded by the Presiding Officer. Allowing the entire election process to be set aside would further compound the destruction of fundamental democratic principles which has taken place as a consequence of the conduct of the Presiding Officer. (Para 35) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526
Article 142 and Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 354D & 506 – Power of court exercised to quash conviction of accused – Held, the offences under Section 354D IPC and Section 506 IPC are personal to the complainant and the accused, and the fact that the appellant and the complainant have married each other during the pendency of the appeal gives rise to a reasonable belief that both were involved in some kind of relationship even when the offences alleged were said to have been committed. Hence, on grounds that the accused and the complainant married each other and the affirmation of the conviction of accused would have the disastrous consequence on the matrimonial relationship of the accused with the complainant, the appellant is acquitted of the charges. (Para 7, 9 & 11) Dasari Srikanth v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 391
Article 142 – Maintainability of the Curative Petition – Test of 'manifest injustice' – The exercise of the curative jurisdiction of this Court should not be adopted as a matter of ordinary course and create a fourth or fifth stage of court intervention in an arbitral award. The Court may entertain a curative petition to (i) prevent abuse of its process; and (ii) to cure a gross miscarriage of justice. The concern of the Court for rendering justice in a cause cannot be considered less important than the principle of finality. There are certain situations, which would require reconsideration of a final judgement even after the review has been dismissed to set right a miscarriage of justice. The interference by Supreme Court by setting aside the judgement of the Division Bench, has resulted in restoring a patently illegal award and has caused a grave miscarriage of justice. Hence, curative petition is allowed applying the standard of a 'grave miscarriage of justice'. (Para 32, 33 & 70) Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : AIR 2024 SC 2070
Article 142 – Joint application to declare the marriage void – Held, marriage between the parties is not a 'Hindu marriage' having regard to the provisions of Section 7 of the Act. Hence, the registration certificate is null and void. Dolly Rani v. Manish Kumar Chanchal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 334
Article 142 – Quashing of criminal proceedings – There is nothing on record to show that the appellant had any ill intention of cheating or defrauding the complainant. The transaction between the parties was purely civil in nature which does not attract criminal law in any way. Held, all pending criminal appeals is liable to be quashed. (Para 13) Raj Reddy Kallem v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 336
Article 142 – Applicability/non-applicability of the doctrine of merger – The extraordinary constitutional powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which is to be exercised with a view to do complete justice between the parties, remains unaffected and being an unfettered power, shall always be deemed to be preserved as an exception to the doctrine of merger and the rule of stare decisis." Held, the doctrine of merger is not of universal application and powers under Article 142 of the Constitution shall be deemed as an exception to the doctrine of merger and the rule of stare decisis. (Para 33) Government of NCT of Delhi v. BSK Realtors LLP, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 420
Article 226(3) – Clause (3) will not apply when an interim order in a writ petition under Article 226 is passed after the service of a copy of the writ petition on all concerned parties and after giving them an opportunity of being heard. It applies only to ex-parte ad interim orders. It provides for an automatic vacation of interim relief only if the aggrieved party makes an application for vacating the interim relief and when the application for vacating stay is not heard within the time specified. (Para 26) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177
Article 226 and Criminal procedure Code, 1973; Section 482 – Categories of cases wherein quashing power could be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice are: (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are absurd and inherently improbable to reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is provision providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is mala fide. (Para 32) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251
Article 226 – Error of jurisdiction of High Court – The petitioner had expressly consented to the High Court to evaluate the entirety of the matter in its full perspective. As the petitioner has agreed to the evaluative action by the High Court, it cannot be concluded that the High Court has committed an error of jurisdiction. (Para 16 & 17) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211
Article 226 – Jurisdiction to interfere in administrative decisions – The judiciary must exercise restraint and avoid unnecessary intervention qua administrative decision(s) of the executive involving specialised expertise in the absence of any mala-fide and / or prejudice. The process of evaluation of an IAS officer, ought to have been left to the executive on account of it possessing the requisite expertise and mandate for the said task. The High Court entered into a specialised domain i.e., evaluating the competency of an IAS officer without the requisite domain expertise and administrative experience to conduct such an evaluation. The High Court ought not to have ventured into the said domain particularly when the Accepting Authority is yet to pronounce its decision qua the Underlying Representation. (Para 25, 27 & 28) State of Haryana v. Ashok Khemka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 220 : AIR 2024 SC 1397
Article 226 – Delay defeats equity – Writ petition dismissed on grounds of Delay or Laches – An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. The High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. The High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is not gainsaid that in all cases of delay the petition is to be dismissed and in certain circumstances depending on the facts of each case, if the court thinks fit can on its discretion condone the delay. For filing a writ petition, there is no fixed period of limitation prescribed but the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches of the applicant in approaching a writ court. (Para 9, 10 & 11) Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 318 : AIR 2024 SC 2717
Article 226 – Entertaining petition under Article 226 in case of availability of alternative remedy – The High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an alternate effective remedy is available. This rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. (Para 15) PHR Invent Educational Society v. Uco Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : AIR 2024 SC 1893
Article 226 – Exceptions when a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution could be entertained in spite of availability of an alternative remedy – (i) where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question; (ii) it has acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; (iii) it has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed; and (iv) when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice. (Para 29) PHR Invent Educational Society v. Uco Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : AIR 2024 SC 1893
Article 226 – Power of High court to interfere – Reopening the issue is not allowed under Article 226 – Held, the High Court could have interfered in the confirmed auction sale only in cases of fraud or collusion. As the case is not of fraud or collusion, the effect of the order of the High Court would be again reopening the issues which have achieved finality. (Para 26) PHR Invent Educational Society v. Uco Bank, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 294 : AIR 2024 SC 1893
Article 226 – Writ jurisdiction – Jurisdiction of High Court to overturn finding of scrutiny committee – The High Court ought not to have interfered, especially when Scrutiny Committee had followed the due procedure under Rule 12, 17 and 18 of the 2012 Rules and that there was nothing perverse about a finding of fact. The order of validation of caste claim by Scrutiny Committee is based on subjective satisfaction. The Scrutiny Committee is an expert forum armed with fact finding authority. Held, order passed by Scrutiny Committee reflects due appreciation of evidence and application of mind and in absence of any allegation of bias/malice or lack of jurisdiction, disturbing the findings of Scrutiny Committee cannot be sustained. The High Court has clearly overstepped by reappreciating the evidence in absence of any allegation of malafide or perversity. (Para 15, 17 & 19, 22) Navneet Kaur Harbhajansing Kundles v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 278
Article 226 – Writ of certiorari – Object – The writ jurisdiction is supervisory and the Court exercising it, ought to refrain to act as an appellate court unless the facts so warrant. The writ of certiorari is expended as a remedy and is intended to cure jurisdictional error, and should not be used by superior Court to substitute its own views by getting into fact-finding exercise unless warranted. High Courts as well as Supreme Court should refrain themselves from deeper probe into factual issues like an appellate body unless the inferences made by the concerned authority suffers from perversity on the face of it or are impermissible in the eyes of law. (Para 17 & 19) Navneet Kaur Harbhajansing Kundles v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 278
Article 226 – Civil Suit filed to declare clause 8 of Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) arbitrary – Clause 8 of the NIT mandated deposit of five post-dated cheques and bank guarantee to secure the payment of balance auction amount – Held, once the respondent-writ petitioner had participated in the tender process being fully conscious of the terms and conditions of the auction notice, he was estopped from taking a U-turn so as to question the legality or validity of the terms and conditions of the auction notice. By dragging the matter to litigation, the respondent himself was responsible for the delay occasioned in issuance of the work order which deprived him of the opportunity to work for the entire period of 365 days. The impugned order granting payment of pro-rata auction amount for the 33 days, that he has worked less than the contract period, is ex-facie illegal and without jurisdiction. Hence, the same is quashed and set aside. (Para 21 & 24) Municipal Committee Katra v. Ashwani Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : AIR 2024 SC 2855
Article 226 – Claim of damages in Writ Petition – Held, such relief is not subject matter of extra ordinary writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Law is well settled that disputes arising out of purely contractual obligations cannot be entertained by the High Court in exercise of the extra ordinary writ jurisdiction. Hence, the High Court ought to have relegated the writ petitioner (respondent herein) to the competent Court for claiming damages. (Para 22 & 23) Municipal Committee Katra v. Ashwani Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : AIR 2024 SC 2855
Article 226 – Writ petition – Petition rejected by High Court on grounds of delay – Held, delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the court. The condition of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of the case. It would depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice. Hence, impugned order of High Court is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration. (Para 25) Dharnidhar Mishra v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 380
Article 226 - the High Court by way of the interim order could not have passed an order which had the effect of encroaching upon the areas reserved for the Legislature and the Executive. Our Constitution recognizes the independence of the three wings of the State, i.e. the Executive, Legislature and the Judiciary. No doubt that if the High Court found that the legislature concerned was not valid on account of any of the grounds available within the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it could set aside such a legislation. But by way of an interim order it could not have in effect stayed the operation of the said Statute. (Para 8 - 10) State of Uttar Pradesh v. In Re Constitution of Education Tribunals, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 71
Article 227 – Jurisdiction of High Court to interfere with order of trial court – Held, the High court could not have interfered with the order of the trial Court, unless found the view taken by the learned trial Judge was perverse or impossible. (Para 19) P. Seshareddy v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 379
Article 229 - Officers and servants and the expenses of High Courts - Article 229 (2) pertains only to the service conditions of 'officers and servants' of the High Courts and does not include Judges of the High Court (both sitting and retired judges). The Chief Justice does not have the power, under Article 229, to make rules pertaining to the post-retiral benefits payable to former Chief Justices and judges of the High Court. Therefore, the Rules proposed by the Chief Justice, in the present case, do not fall within the competence of the Chief Justice under Article 229. (Para 25) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1
Article 229 (2) - The High Court did not have the power to direct the State Government to notify Rules proposed by the Chief Justice pertaining to post-retiral benefits for former Judges of the High Court. The Chief Justice did not have the competence to frame the rules under Article 229 of the Constitution. Further, the High Court, acting on the judicial side, does not have the power to direct the Government to frame rules proposed by it on the administrative side. (Para 24 – 30) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1
Article 234 and Gujarat Rules, 2005; Rule 8 – Consultation with public service commission required under Article 234 of the Constitution for amending the rules –The prescription of minimum qualifying marks in the viva-voce under Rule 8(3) of Gujarat Rules, 2005 as amended in 2011 was only in consultation with the High Court of Gujarat but not with the Gujarat Public Service Commission. Held, the Governor is under no compulsion to consult the Public Service Commission in case the Commission does not wish to be consulted. The concerned Gujarat Rules cannot, therefore, be declared to be void particularly when the Rules were framed with due consultation with the High Court. (Para 93, 97 & 102) Abhimeet Sinha v. High Court of Judicature at Patna, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : AIR 2024 SC 2596
Article 285 - 'Enemy property' vested in the possession of the Union Government-appointed 'custodian', as per the Enemy Property Act, 1968, cannot be considered a property of the Union Government to claim the exemption from the municipal taxes under Article 285 (1) of the Constitution of India. (Para 22) Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab. Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 156
Article 293 – Borrowing by states – Plaintiff -State seeks interim injunction against Union of India to restore the position that existed before the Defendant union imposed ceiling on all the borrowings of the Plaintiff state – The Triple-Test, are followed by the Courts as the pre-requisites before a party can be mandatorily injuncted to do or to refrain from doing a particular thing. These three cardinal factors, are: (a) A 'Prima facie case', which necessitates that as per the material placed on record, the plaintiff is likely to succeed in the final determination of the case; (b) 'Balance of convenience', such that the prejudice likely to be caused to the plaintiff due to rejection of the interim relief will be higher than the inconvenience that the defendant may face if the relief is so granted; and (c)'Irreparable injury', which means that if the relief is not granted, the plaintiff will face an irreversible injury that cannot be compensated in monetary terms. Held, the Plaintiff – State has failed to establish a prima facie case that even after adjusting the over-borrowings of the previous year, there is fiscal space to borrow. The balance of convenience, thus, clearly lies in favour of the Defendant – Union of India as the mischief that is likely to ensue in the event of granting the interim relief, will be far greater than rejecting the same. Further Plaintiff – State has sought to equate 'financial hardship' with 'irreparable injury'. Held, it appears prima facie that 'monetary damage' is not an irreparable loss. If the State has essentially created financial hardship because of its own financial mismanagement, such hardship cannot be held to be an irreparable injury that would necessitate an interim relief against Union. Since the Plaintiff – State has failed to establish the three prongs of proving prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, State of Kerala is not entitled to the interim injunction, as prayed for. (Para 3, 12, 25, 33, 35 & 37) State of Kerala v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 269
Article 300A - The expression person in Article 300-A covers not only a legal or juristic person but also a person who is not a citizen of India. The expression property is also of a wide scope and includes not only tangible or intangible property but also all rights, title and interest in a property. (Para 18) Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab. Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 156
Article 300A – Right to property – The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 300-A provides that the State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred in that Article. (Para 18) Dharnidhar Mishra v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 380
Article 300A – Sub-rights to Right to property – The seven sub-rights or strands constituting the right to property. These are: i) duty of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire his property – the right to notice, ii) the duty of the State to hear objections to the acquisition – the right to be heard, iii) the duty of the State to inform the person of its decision to acquire – the right to a reasoned decision, iv) the duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition is for public purpose – the duty to acquire only for public purpose, v) the duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate – the right of restitution or fair compensation, vi) the duty of the State to conduct the process of acquisition efficiently and within prescribed timelines of the proceedings – the right to an efficient and expeditious process, and vii) final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting – the right of conclusion. Held, the larger right to property is seen as comprising intersecting sub-rights, each with a distinct character but interconnected to constitute the whole. The sub-rights weave themselves into each other, and as a consequence, State action or the legislation that results in the deprivation of private property must be measured against this constitutional net as a whole, and not just one or many of its strands. Further held, noncompliance of these will amount to violation of the right, being without the authority of law. These sub-rights of procedure have been synchronously incorporated in laws concerning compulsory acquisition and are also recognised by our constitutional courts while reviewing administrative actions for compulsory acquisition of private property. (Para 26, 28 & 29) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A – The Right to notice – A prior notice informing the bearer of the right that the State intends to deprive them of the right to property is a right in itself; a linear extension of the right to know embedded in Article 19(1)(a). The Constitution does not contemplate acquisition by ambush. The notice to acquire must be clear, cogent and meaningful. (Para 30.1) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A – The Right to be heard – It is the right of the property-bearer to communicate his objections and concerns to the authority acquiring the property. This right to be heard against the proposed acquisition must be meaningful and not a sham. (Para 30.2) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A – The Right to a reasoned decision – It is incumbent upon the authority to take an informed decision and communicate the same to the objector. The declaration is mandatory, failing which, the acquisition proceedings will cease to have effect. (Para 30.3) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A – The Duty to acquire only for public purpose – The acquisition must be for a public purpose is inherent and an important fetter on the discretion of the authorities to acquire. Further, the decision of compulsory acquisition of land is subject to judicial review and the Court will examine and determine whether the acquisition is related to public purpose. If the court arrives at a conclusion that that there is no public purpose involved in the acquisition, the entire process can be set-aside. (Para 30.4) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A – The Right of restitution or fair compensation – A person's right to hold and enjoy property is an integral part to the constitutional right under Article 300A. Deprivation or extinguishment of that right is permissible only upon restitution, be it in the form of monetary compensation, rehabilitation or other similar means. Compensation has always been considered to be an integral part of the process of acquisition. Fair and reasonable compensation is the sine qua non for any acquisition process. (Para 30.5) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A – The Right to an efficient and expeditious process – It is necessary for the administration to be efficient in concluding the process and within a reasonable time. This obligation must necessarily form part of Article 300A. (Para 30.6) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A – The Right of conclusion – The culmination of an acquisition process is not in the payment of compensation, but also in taking over the actual physical possession of the land. If possession is not taken, acquisition is not complete. With the taking over of actual possession after the normal procedures of acquisition, the private holding is divested and the right, title and interest in the property, along-with possession is vested in the State. The obligation to conclude and complete the process of acquisition is also part of Article 300A. (Para 30.7) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Articles 341 and 342 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes - Public notification of 'tribes or tribal communities' by the President of India, upon consultation with the Governor, is a sine qua non for deeming such tribes or tribal communities to be 'Scheduled Tribes' in relation to that State or Union Territory for the purposes of the Constitution. (Para 15) Chandigarh Housing Board v. Tarsem Lal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 139
Articles 341 and 342 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes - Insofar as a person claiming benefit having regard to his status as a Scheduled Tribe in a State, when he migrates to a Union Territory where a Presidential Order has not been issued at all insofar Scheduled Tribe is concerned, or even if such a Notification is issued, such an identical Scheduled Tribe does not find a place in such a Notification, the person cannot claim his status on the basis of his being noted as a Scheduled Tribe in the State of his origin. (Para 29) Chandigarh Housing Board v. Tarsem Lal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 139
Ad-interim order of stay – When a High Court grants a stay of the proceedings while issuing notice without giving an opportunity of being heard to the contesting parties, it is not an interim order, but it is an ad-interim order of stay. It can be converted into an interim order of stay only after an opportunity of being heard is granted on the prayer for interim relief to all the parties to the proceedings. Ad-interim orders, by their very nature, should be of a limited duration. (Para 14) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177
Bar association's resolution to not represent a party - Such a Resolution could not have been passed. Right to defend oneself is a Fundamental Right under Part III of the Constitution of India and further right to appear for a client is also a Fundamental Right being a part of carrying on one's profession as a lawyer. (Para 3) Rupashree H.R. v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 126
Grounds on which interim order comes to an end – Can come to an end by disposal of the main case either on merits or for default or other reasons, by the High Court, in which the interim order has been passed or by a judicial order vacating interim relief, passed after hearing the contesting parties on the above stated grounds. (Para 16) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177
Guidelines issued to secure the fundamental rights and dignity of intimate partners, and members of the LGBTQ+ communities in illegal detention – Mandatory in nature – Habeas corpus petitions and petitions for protection must be given a priority in hearing and courts must avoid adjournments or delays in the disposal of the case; In evaluating the locus standi of a partner or friend, the court must not make a roving enquiry into the precise nature of the relationship between the appellant and the person; Effort must be to create an environment conducive for a free and un-coerced dialogue to ascertain the wishes of the corpus; The court must ensure that the corpus is produced before the court and given the opportunity to interact with the judges in-person in chambers to ensure the privacy and safety of the detained or missing person; The court must ensure that the wishes of the detained person is not unduly influenced by the Court, or the police, or the natal family during the course of the proceedings; Upon securing the environment and inviting the detained or missing person in chambers, the court must make active efforts to put the detained or missing person at ease; If a detained or missing person expresses their wish to not go back to the alleged detainer or the natal family, then the person must be released immediately without any further delay; Courts must grant an ad-interim protection while dealing with a petition for police protection by intimate partners on the grounds that they are a same sex, transgender, inter-faith or inter-caste couple to maintain their privacy and dignity; The Court must not adopt counselling or parental care as a means of changing the mind of the appellant, or the detained/missing person; The Judge during the interaction with the corpus to ascertain their views must not attempt to change or influence the admission of the sexual orientation or gender identity of the appellant or the corpus and Sexual orientation and gender identity fall in a core zone of privacy of an individual and no stigma or moral judgment must be imposed when dealing with cases involving parties from the LGBTQ+ community. (Para 16 & 17) Devu G. Nair v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 249
Hierarchy in judiciary – Any orders passed by the Supreme Court, ought to be respected and fully complied with, in view of the fact that the hierarchy in the judiciary needs to be respected by one in all. In that hierarchy, the orders passed by the Supreme Court would bind not just the parties, but the judicial officers as well. (Para 8) Ireo Grace Realtech Pvt. Ltd. v. Sanjay Gopinath, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 428
High Court's power to vacate or modify interim relief – The High Courts are always empowered to vacate or modify an order of interim relief passed after hearing the parties if (a) A litigant, after getting an order of stay, deliberately prolongs the proceedings either by seeking adjournments on unwarranted grounds or by remaining absent when the main case in which interim relief is granted is called out for hearing before the High Court with the object of taking undue advantage of the order of stay; (b) The High Court finds that the order of interim relief is granted as a result of either suppression or misrepresentation of material facts by the party in whose favour the interim order of stay has been made; and (c) The High Court finds that there is a material change in circumstances requiring interference with the interim order passed earlier. A long passage of time may bring about a material change in circumstances. These grounds are not exhaustive and there can be other valid grounds for vacating an order of stay. (Para 15) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177
Object of passing interim orders – An order of interim relief is usually granted in the aid of the final relief sought in the case. An occasion for passing an order of stay of proceeding arises as it is not possible for the High Court to take up the case for final hearing immediately. Further, to avoid the possibility of passing an order of remand, the grant of stay of proceedings is called for in many cases. (Para 13) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177
Parliamentary processes not taking place on the floor of the house are also covered by parliamentary privilege. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701 : (2024) 5 SCC 629
Position of the High Courts and its power of superintendence – Both the Supreme Court and the High Court are constitutional Courts. A High Court is constitutionally independent of the Supreme Court of India and is not judicially subordinate to the Supreme Court. (Para 23) High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177
Quashing of proceedings – Held, tested on the touchstone of the principles stated in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors., allowing continuance of the proceedings pursuant to the impugned FIR is gross abuse of process of law because the allegations as set out in the FIR do not disclose necessary ingredients of any cognizable offence. Hence, the impugned FIR and all proceedings sought to be taken against the appellant are quashed and set aside. (Para 33) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251
Quashing of proceedings – The object of dispute, manifestly rife with mala fide intentions of only recovering the tainted money by coercion and threat of criminal proceedings. Such proceedings cannot be allowed to proceed further and exploit the time and resources of the law enforcement agency. The valuable time of the police is consumed in investigating disputes that seem more suited for civil resolution. The need for vigilance on the part of the police is paramount, and a discerning eye should be cast upon cases where unscrupulous conduct appears to eclipse the pursuit of justice. There is a need for a circumspect approach in discerning the genuine from the spurious and thus ensuring that the resources of the state are utilised for matters of true societal import. (Para 14 & 15) Deepak Kumar Shrivas v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2024 Cri LJ 1388 : (2024) 3 SCC 601
Rajya Sabha's role is part of basic structure - Rajya Sabha elections protected by legislative privileges under Article 194. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701 : (2024) 5 SCC 629
Right to free and fair elections – It is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Elections at the local participatory level act as a microcosm of the larger democratic structure in the country. Local governments, such as municipal corporations, engage with issues that affect citizens' daily lives and act as a primary point of contact with representative democracy. The process of citizens electing councillors, who in turn, elect the Mayor, serves as a channel for ordinary citizens to ventilate their grievances through their representatives – both directly and indirectly elected. Ensuring a free and fair electoral process throughout this process, therefore, is imperative to maintain the legitimacy of and trust in representative democracy. (Para 36) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526
Right to legal aid – When the examination-in-chief of a prosecution witness is being recorded, the presence of the Advocate for the accused is required, as the advocate has a right to object to a leading or irrelevant question being asked to the witness. The report of trial court records that the evidence of prosecution witnesses was recorded in the presence of the appellants, but their Advocate was not present as they had not engaged any Advocate. Held, after finding that the appellants-accused had not engaged any Advocate, the Trial Court ought to have provided a legal aid Advocate to the appellants accused so that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses could have been recorded in the presence of the Advocate representing the appellants-accused. Recording of evidence in this fashion is not justified even if the High Court had fixed a time-bound schedule for disposal of the case. The trial court could have always sought an extension of time from the High Court. (Para 5 & 6) Ekene Godwin v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 261
Remission – Appellant granted liberty to prefer an appropriate representation addressed to the State Government praying for remission of sentence. Considering the fact that the appellant has undergone almost 11 years of imprisonment so far i.e. almost half of his life lived so far has been spent undergoing the ordeal of the criminal prosecution. Held, when a crime is committed, a variety of factors are responsible for making the offender commit the crime. Those factors may be social and economic, may be the result of value erosion or parental neglect; may be because of the stress of circumstances, or the manifestation of temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted with indigence or other privations. (Para 85 & 86) Anees v. State Govt of NCT, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : AIR 2024 SC 2297 : 2024 Cri LJ 2377
Scope of judicial review in matters of transfer – The scope of judicial review is only available when there is a clear violation of statutory provision or the transfer is persuaded by malafide. In absence of (i) pleadings regarding malafide, (ii) non-joining the person against whom allegation are made, (iii) violation of any statutory provision (iv) the allegation of the transfer being detrimental to the employee who is holding a transferrable post, judicial interference is not warranted. The impugned transfer order is not alleged to be malafide or violative of any prescribed statutory provision, hence, the interference made by the Division Bench setting aside the well-reasoned judgment of the Single Judge is not justified. The Division Bench has committed an error in setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge. (Para 12 & 13) Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 231
Scope of judicial review in policy matters – The Courts do not and cannot examine the correctness, suitability or appropriateness of a policy, nor are the courts advisors to the executive on the matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate. The Courts cannot direct the States to implement a particular policy or scheme on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser alternative is available. Legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, would be the subject of judicial review. The scope of judicial review in examining the policy matters is very limited. (Para 8) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248
Supreme Court asks Yamuna River Board to decide Delhi Govt's plea for additional water; HP Govt withdraws statement on surplus water. Government of NCT of Delhi v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 429
The decision of the Supreme Court enunciating a principle of law is applicable to all cases irrespective of the stage of pendency thereof because it is assumed that what is enunciated by the Supreme Court is, in fact, the law from inception. (Para 16) Bhumikaben N. Modi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : AIR 2024 SC 2444
The proportionality standard - To determine if the violation of the fundamental right is justified – The proportionality standard is by nature curated to give prominence to the fundamental right and minimize the restriction on it. The measure restricting a right must have a legitimate goal (legitimate goal stage); The measure must be a suitable means for furthering the goal (suitability or rational connection stage); The measure must be least restrictive and equally effective (necessity stage); and The measure must not have a disproportionate impact on the right holder (balancing stage). Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441
Writ Jurisdiction – Jurisdiction of the Writ Court in entering into fact-finding exercise while testing legality of an award of tribunal – For revision of wages and other facilities, the standard criteria followed by the industrial adjudicator is the 'industry-cum-region test', which implies that the prevailing pay and other allowances should be compared with equally placed or similarly situated industrial units in the same region. To determine comparability of units applying the industry-cum-region test, the financial capacity of the employer would be a strong factor. Held, where the employer contested comparability of the concerned units, on grounds of its financial position, the proper course would have been to remit the matter to the Industrial Tribunal rather than entering into these factual question independently in exercise of the writ jurisdiction. The High Court ought not to re-appreciate evidence and substitute its own finding for that of the Tribunal, it would not be beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court in its power of judicial review to altogether eschew such a process. (Para 12 & 15) VVF Ltd. Employees Union v. VVF India Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 299
Writ petition – Lack of proper procedure – The writ petition filed claiming title on the disputed plot of land was taken up by the High Court in hot haste and was allowed without issuing formal notice to all the respondents. Further, the State authorities were not given proper opportunity of filing a counter and the standing counsel was instructed to appear without any formal notice being issued and was given a single day's opportunity to present the factual report. Impugned order passed by the High Court suffers from patent illegality, perversity and in sheer violation of principles of natural justice. (Para 16 & 18) Suneeta Devi v. Avinash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 226
Writ petition – Writ petition was manifestly tainted on account of concealment of material facts. Factum of filing of two earlier writ petitions with similar prayers was concealed by respondent while filing the present writ petition. (Para 14 & 16) Suneeta Devi v. Avinash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 226