Complete Supreme Court Half Yearly Digest 2024 [Final Part]

Labour Law

Respondent, a part-time labourer, reinstated by Labour Court in 2001. State repeatedly litigated against implementation of the Labour Court award, harassing respondent for 22 years. Frivolous Special Leave Petition dismissed; respondent awarded costs of Rs.10,00,000. State of Rajasthan v. Gopal Bijawat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 125

Land Law

Land Revenue Code; Section 36A and Registration Act, 2008; Section 17 – Restriction in conveyance of land by tribal in favour of non-tribal – Under Section 36A, restriction is only in case of transfer by way of sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or otherwise and there is no bar for a tribal to enter into an agreement to sell and seeking advance sale consideration. Previous sanction is to be taken before conveyance could be made and conveyance by way of sale would take place only at the time of registration of a sale deed in accordance with Section 17 of the Registration Act, 2008. Babasaheb Dhondiba Kute v. Radhu Vithoba Barde, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : (2024) 4 SCC 310

The tenant holding possession of the Watan property under the Maharashtra Hereditary Offices Act, 1874, on the 'Tiller's Day', which is not subjected to payment of land revenue to the State Government, would be entitled to exercise their right of statutory purchase for purchasing the tenanted Watan property under the Maharashtra Revenue Patels (Abolition of Offices) Act, 1962. Baban Balaji More v. Babaji Hari Shelar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 234

Legal Maxim

'Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria' – It means that no man can take advantage of his own wrong. He who prevents a thing from being done shall not avail himself of the non-performance he has occasioned. A wrong doer ought not to be permitted to make profit out of his own wrong. (Para 18 & 19) Municipal Committee Katra v. Ashwani Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : AIR 2024 SC 2855

Letter of Intent

The Letter of Intent is merely an expression of intention to enter into a contract. It does not create any right in favour of the party to whom it is issued. There is no binding legal relationship between the party issuing the LOI and the party to whom such LOI is issued. A detailed agreement/contract is required to be drawn up between the parties after the LOI is received by the other party more particularly in case of contract of such a mega scale. (Para 10) Level 9 Biz Pvt. Ltd. v. Himachal Pradesh Housing and Urban Development Authority, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : AIR 2024 SC 1808

Limitation

Plea of limitation – Held, even if the plea of limitation is not set up as a defence, the Court has to dismiss the suit if it is barred by limitation. (Para 16) Shivraj Reddy v. S. Raghuraj Reddy, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 411

Suit of specific performance preferred on the last date of limitation – Every suit for specific performance need not be decreed merely because it is filed within the period of limitation by ignoring time limits stipulated in the agreement. The courts will also frown upon suits which are not filed immediately after the breach/refusal. Held, the suit having been preferred after a long delay, the plaintiff is not entitled for specific performance. (Para 16 & 18) Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 407

The period of limitation for filing a suit for rendition of account is three years from the date of dissolution. Held, the firm dissolved in year 1984 by virtue of death of the partner and the suit came to be filed in the year 1996 which was not within a period of three years hence, time-barred, Further held, the learned Single Judge was justified in rejecting the suit on grounds of being barred by limitation. (Para 20) Shivraj Reddy v. S. Raghuraj Reddy, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 411

Limitation Act, 1963 - Limitation period of one year for filing of suit for preemption — Held, the issue regarding limitation for filing of the suit is misconceived and it was not raised by the appellants before the lower Appellate Court or the High Court. (Para 18) Jagmohan v. Badri Nath, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : AIR 2024 SC 900 : (2024) 3 SCC 588

The bar of limitation cannot be obviated or circumvented by taking recourse of proceedings under Article 136 of the Constitution when a statutory appeal is available. Gopal Krishnan MS v. Ravindra Beleyur, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 5

Limitation Act, 1963; Section 3 – Bar of limitation – Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. The use of the word 'shall' in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions in Section 4 to 24. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. Hence, it is an obligation upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. Section 3, being a substantive law of mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a strict sense. (Para 10 & 12) Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 288

Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 – Exception to general rule of limitation in section 3 – Section 5 empowers the courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant gives 'sufficient cause' for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. The courts are conferred with discretionary powers to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time. Such power may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally. (Para 12) Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 288

Limitation Act, 1963; Section 3 & 5 – Application for condoning delay in filing appeal – The High Court, has not found it fit to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of condoning the delay. Held, merely because some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal. Sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay hence, there is no occasion for us to interfere with the decision of High Court. (Para 26 & 32) Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 288

Limitation Act, 1963 – Object – The law of limitation is founded on public policy – It is enshrined in the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” i.e. it is for the general welfare that a period of limitation be put to litigation. The object is to put an end to every legal remedy and to have a fixed period of life for every litigation as it is futile to keep any litigation or dispute pending indefinitely. (Para 7) Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 288

Limitation Act, 1963; Section 14 – Exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation – Execution application dismissed on grounds of being barred by limitation – Article 14 (2) carves out an exception excluding the period of limitation when the proceedings are being pursued with due diligence and good faith in a Court “which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it”. Held, it is apparent that the Plaintiff has pursued the matter bonafidely and diligently and in good faith before what it believed to be the appropriate forum and, therefore, such time period is bound to be excluded when computing limitation before the Court having competent jurisdiction. All conditions stipulated for invocation of Section 14 are fulfilled. (Para 27 & 38) Purni Devi v. Babu Ram, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 273

J&K Limitation Act; Article 182 and Civil Procedure Code; Section 48 – Article 182 deals with period of Limitation of 3 years for filing an execution application for the first-time seeking enforcement of a decree. Meanwhile, Section 48 of the CPC deals with subsequent applications and fixes an outer limit of 12 years when execution remains unsatisfied. Held, the period from 'when the execution application was filed' to 'when the prior proceeding was dismissed', has to be excluded while computing period of limitation, which results in the execution application filed by the Plaintiff, being within the limitation period prescribed under Article 182 of the Limitation Act, which is 3 years. (Para 7 & 39) Purni Devi v. Babu Ram, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 273

Condonation of delay – To condone delay of 12 years and 158 days in filing application for restoration of the Writ Petition – The High Court vide the impugned order declined to condone the delay. Held, the length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. Further, while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and the vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied. The High Court committed no error of law in passing the impugned order. (Para 26 & 34) Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 276 : AIR 2024 SC 1884

Limitation – The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity and the 'Sword of Damocles' cannot be kept hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. Held, it appears that the appellants want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. (Para 26 & 27) Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 276 : AIR 2024 SC 1884

Liquor Shop

The restrictions which were introduced by this Court in K Balu, (2017) 2 SCC 281 were in the context of national and State highways. As clarified subsequently, where the area in question falls within municipal or local limits, the distance requirements which are spelt out in the applicable Rules or Regulations would have to be complied with. (Para 16) Alankar Wines Pvt. Ltd. v. Human Rights and Consumer Protection Societies, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 89

Medical

Medical Admissions - Supreme Court permits three doctors to resign from their NEET super specialty seats to enroll in Institutes of National Importance (INI). The vacant seats resulting from the resignation will be included in the mop-up round. Vandeep Singh Basra v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 72

Medical Admissions - Restrictions imposed on resignation from NEET seats - the Supreme Court approved a proposal brought forth by Union of India to allow only those candidates to resign who had joined Institutes of National Importance (INIs) post counselling. The proposal given was reasonable and balanced the interests of meritorious students with concern of medical institutions where seats would fall vacant if upgradation is permitted. (Para 4) Vandeep Singh Basra v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 81

Medical Negligence

Medical Negligence - The Supreme Court directs the doctor to pay Rs. 2.5 lakh to the patient who lost vision in one eye. P.C. Jain v. Dr. R.P. Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 70

Mere reliance on medical literature would not be sufficient to exonerate the Hospital from its duty of ensuring that the Head of the Department, Anaesthesia ought to have inserted the Double Lumen Tube. Instead, he was not available and the task was delegated to a trainee anaesthetist. Awarded Rs. 10 lakhs compensation. J. Douglas Luiz v. Manipal Hospital, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 132

Evidentiary value of expert opinion – In cases of deficiency of medical services, duty of care does not end with surgery – Findings of the DCDRC that there were lapses in duty of care by Respondent vis a vis both pre-operative and post-operative standards for conducting a traumatic cataract surgery is affirmed. Further, the expert opinion establishes a nexus between the lapses in post-operative care and the development of loss of vision after the operation. Despite the presence of evidence pointing towards negligence of the Respondents, both the forums (SCDRC and the NCDRC) failed to consider it and have mechanically and exclusively relied on the Medical Council report which did not delve into the nuances of pre-operative and post-operative care. While the report of the Medical Council can be relevant for determining deficiency of service before a consumer forum, it cannot be determinative, especially when it contradicts the evidentiary findings made by a consumer forum. In such circumstances, the appellate forum is tasked with the duty of undertaking a more thorough examination of the evidence on record. (Para 12, 13, 14 & 15) Najrul Seikh v. Dr. Sumit Banerjee, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 219

Medical Termination Act, 1971

Section 3(2)(b)(i) r/w (3) and 5 - Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003; Rule 3B - Petitioner is having pregnancy of over 32 weeks by now, it is not advisable to accept her prayer as prayed for. (Para 5) R. v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 92

Section 3(1) – Opinion of the Registered Medical Practitioner (RMP) and medical board under the MTP Act – Section 3(1) protects the registered medical practitioner from penal provisions against abortion, under the Indian Penal Code, if it is carried out as per the MTP Act. The MTP Act requires and empowers the RMP to form an opinion, in good faith, on whether a pregnancy may be terminated. The medical board, in forming its opinion on the termination of pregnancies must not restrict itself to the criteria under Section 3(2-B) of the MTP Act and must also evaluate the physical and emotional wellbeing of the pregnant person furnishing full details to the court. Further, while issuing a clarificatory opinion the medical board must provide sound and cogent reasons for any change in opinion and circumstances – Held, the medical board in its clarificatory report restricted itself to the criteria under Section 3(2-B) of the MTP Act and failed to form an opinion on the impact of the pregnancy on the physical and mental health of the pregnant person. Further held, the delays caused by a change in the opinion of the medical board or the procedures of the court must not frustrate the fundamental rights of pregnant people. (Para 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 29 & 31) A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : AIR 2024 SC 2499

Section 3(4)(a) – Consent of guardian in case of abortion of a minor – The guardians of 'X', namely her parents, have consented for taking the pregnancy to term. This is permissible as 'X' is a minor and the consent of the guardian is prescribed under Section 3(4)(a) of the MTP Act. The order of this court allowing 'X' to terminate her pregnancy is recalled. (Para 32, & 33) A (Mother of X) v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 349 : AIR 2024 SC 2499

Mines and Minerals

The immutable geology of the area has limestone formation of the Vindhyan age, and as per geological study and assessment, the limestone is located in Nimbahera city. The mineral reserve of this stone occurs between Nimbahera shales and Suket shales. The limestone is a valuable mineral resource from the perspective of the State exchequer and is a material or a raw material used in more than one sense. The State Government granted prospective mining leases of small, medium and large areas in and around the hillock and the surrounding areas of the Chittorgarh Fort to individuals/industrial houses. The exploitation of minerals available in the surrounding area by the lessees to the State Government, particularly in an unscientific manner or disproportionate exploitation of minerals in hard and rude mining activities, was seen as a threat to the existential utility of the Chittorgarh Fort and the structures. (Para 3 & 4) Birla Corporation Ltd. v. Bhanwar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 38 : AIR 2024 SC 833

The Supreme Court directed a survey of Karnataka mines for which rehabilitation and reclamation plans are not in place. Samaj Parivartana Samudaya v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 268

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988

Motor accident compensation – Assessment of compensation on the basis of income of deceased – The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for assessment of just and fair compensation. Assessment of compensation cannot be done with mathematical precision. The assessment of income of the deceased by the High Court was done on a very conservative basis. Considering the material placed on record, income of the deceased deserves to be re-assessed as it is established that he was multi-tasking and was not engaged in a 9.00 to 5.00 P.M. job. Considering the age of deceased at the time of accident as 52 years, the applicable multiplier for computation of compensation would be 11 times the sum of total dependency, as per the judgment of this Court in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121, approved by the Supreme Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and others, (2017) 16 SCC 680. (Para 14 & 15) Vethambal v. Oriental Insurance Company, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : AIR 2024 SC 1377

Is deemed transfer of motor insurance policy on sale of vehicle applicable only to third party risks ? The Supreme Court refers to a larger bench. Jaswinder Singh v. New India Assurance Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 190

Section 161 - Compensation of Victims of Hit and Run Motor Accidents Scheme, 2022 - If the Police conclude that it is a case of hit and run accident, the Police must inform the victim or the legal representatives of the victim, as the case may be, about the availability of the Scheme. (Para 6) S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 35 : AIR 2024 SC 583

Section 166 - Compassionate Assistance to Dependents of Deceased Government Employees, Rules, 2006 (Haryana) - The family of a deceased in a motor accident cannot seek "double benefits". If the family has received benefits from the State Government on account of the death of the deceased, then such benefits are liable to be deducted from the compensation payable under the Motor Vehicles Act. There cannot be a duplication in payments or a windfall owing to a misfortune. On the death of the person in harness, owing to a road traffic accident the dependents of a deceased cannot be doubly benefited as opposed to those who are dependents of a deceased who dies owing to illness or any other reason under the Rules formulated by the Haryana Government. (Para 6) Krishna v. Tek Chand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 116

Section 166 - Homemaker's deemed income cannot be less than minimum wages notified for daily wager. The role of a homemaker is as important as that of a family member whose income is tangible as a source of livelihood for the family. The activities performed by a home-maker, if counted one by one, there will hardly be any doubt that the contribution of a home-maker is of a high order and invaluable. In fact, it is difficult to assess such a contribution in monetary terms. (Para 8) Arvind Kumar Pandey v. Girish Pandey, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 152

Section 173 – Appeal – A person dissatisfied with the amount of compensation received can file an appeal. (Para 12) Alifiya Husenbhai Keshariya v. Siddiq Ismail Sindhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 414

Municipal Corporation

Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 – Section 352 – Procedure of acquisition is mandatory to be followed – Section 352 is bereft of any procedure whatsoever before compulsorily acquiring private property. Held, compulsory acquisition will be unconstitutional if proper procedure is not established or followed before depriving a person of their right to property. The constitutional right to property comprises of seven sub-rights or procedures such as the right to notice, hearing, reasons for the decision, to acquire only for public purpose, fair compensation, efficient conduct of the procedure within timelines and finally the conclusion. Held, as Section 352 does not provide for these sub-rights or procedures, it can never be a valid power of acquisition. Hence, acquisition of land under Section 352 is rejected. (Para 2 & 24) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382

Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 – Section 352 & 537 – Power of acquisition – Section 352 empowers the Municipal Commissioner to identify the land required for the purpose of opening of public street, square, park, etc. and under Section 537, the Municipal Commissioner has to apply to the Government to compulsorily acquire the land. Upon such an application, the Government may, in its own discretion, order proceedings to be taken for acquiring the land. Held, section 352 is, not the power of acquisition. Hence, the submission that Section 352 enables the Municipal Commissioner to acquire land is rejected. The appellant-Corporation acquiring land under Section 352 acted in blatant violation of statutory provisions. (Para 22) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382

Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 – Section 363 – Section 363 relates to payment of compensation upon an agreement and not for compulsory acquisition. (Para 23) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382

Murder Trial

Merely on the basis of suspicion, conviction would not be tenable. (Para 20) Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 60 : AIR 2024 SC 695 : (2024) 3 SCC 481

Only on the sole circumstance of recovery of a blood-stained weapon, it cannot be said that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 19) Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 60 : AIR 2024 SC 695 : (2024) 3 SCC 481

Muslim Law

Can muslim women claim equality in succession ? Can Will be executed for the entire property as per Mohammedan law? Supreme Court to decide. Tarsem v. Dharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 396

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

Can accused get default bail if FSL report isn't submitted with chargesheet within prescribed time? The Supreme Court refers to the Larger Bench. Hanif Ansari v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 302

Section 37 – Constitution of India; Article 21 - Bail on grounds of undue delay in Trial despite bar in NDPS Act – Failure to conclude the trial within a reasonable time resulting in prolonged incarceration militates against the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and as such, conditional liberty overriding the statutory embargo created under Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act may, in such circumstances, be considered. Held, section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, does not fetter the grant of bail to an accused on the ground of undue delay in the completion of the trial. Direction given to enlarge the petitioner on bail. Ankur Chaudhary v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 416

Sections 41 & 42 – Mandatory compliance of procedure before search – Power of Magistrate and an Officer of Gazetted rank to issue warrant – Empowers a Magistrate to issue search warrant for the arrest of any person or for search, whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence under the provisions of the NDPS Act 1985. As per Section 41(2), such reason to believe must arise from either personal knowledge or information given by any person to him and is required to be reduced into writing. The search conducted at the house of Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04 was not based on the personal knowledge, rather it was an action bereft of mandatory statutory compliance of Section 41(2). The raid at the house of the Accused No. 01 and Accused No. 04 is in violation of the statutory mandate of Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act 1985. (Para 32, 42, 46 & 47) Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : AIR 2024 SC 2778

Section 42(1) – Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorisation – The provision obligates an officer empowered by virtue of Section 41(2) to record the information received from any person regarding an alleged offence under Chapter IV of the NDPS Act 1985 or record the grounds of his belief as per the Proviso to Section 42(1), in case an empowered officer proceeds on his personal knowledge. The grounds of belief is to be conveyed to the immediate official superior, prior to the search and in case of any inability to do so, the Section 42(2) provides that a copy of the same shall be sent to the concerned immediate official superior along with grounds of his belief as per the proviso. Absolute non­compliance of the statutory requirements under the Section 42(1) and (2) of the NDPS Act 1985 is verboten. However, any delay in the said compliance may be allowed considering the same is supported by well-reasoned explanations for such delay. (Para 31) Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : AIR 2024 SC 2778

Section 63 – Order of confiscation and auction of article is challenged – The court cannot order confiscation of an article until the expiry of one month from the date of seizure or without hearing any person who may claim any right thereto. Held, the appellant is the registered owner of the article and has a right to be heard by the court before the final order of confiscation is passed and the seized vehicle is put to auction. Hence, the order passed by the trial court to the extent it orders confiscation and auction of the dumper is set aside. (Para 13, 14 & 15) Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 395

Section 67 – Evidentiary value of confessional statements recorded under Section 67 – Information received under section 67 is not in the nature of a confessional statement. Such statements cannot be used against the accused. (Para 51 & 53) Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : AIR 2024 SC 2778

Section 52A – Safe custody of sample packets – Proceedings required to be followed as per Section 52A of the NDPS Act, by the investigating officer of preparing an inventory and obtaining samples in presence of the jurisdictional magistrate is not followed. Due to lack of proper procedure followed, the FSL report is held to be nothing but a waste paper and cannot be read in evidence. Glaring loopholes in the prosecution case give rise to an inescapable inference that the prosecution has failed to prove the required link evidence to satisfy the Court regarding the safe custody of the sample packets from the time of the seizure till the same reached the Forensic Science laboratory (FSL). (Para 21 & 22) Mohammed Khalid v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 183 : (2024) 5 SCC 393

Section 67 - Confession statements are not admissible evidence. The authorities / officers of the Narcotics Control Bureau must comply and abide by the judgment in Toofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1. Sharik Khan v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 216

Section 37 – Bail to the accused charged in connection with offence involving commercial quantity of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance – In case of recovery of huge quantities of narcotic substance, the Courts should be slow in granting even regular bail to the accused, more so when the accused is alleged to be having criminal antecedents. The Court would have to mandatorily record the satisfaction in terms of the rider contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act that there are grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence alleged and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The High Court not only omitted to record any such satisfaction, but has rather completely ignored the factum of recovery of narcotic substance, multiple times the commercial quantity. The impugned order is cryptic and perverse on the face of the record and cannot be sustained. Thus, the same is quashed and set aside. State v. B. Ramu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 128

National Food Security Act, 2013

There being a systematic legal framework provided under the NFSA for the implementation of the schemes and programmes for providing food and nutritional security, no direction is required to implement the concept of Community Kitchens as prayed for by the petitioners in the instant petition. It is open for the States/UTs to explore such alternative welfare schemes as may be permissible under the NFSA. (Para 7 & 9) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248

Object - To provide for food and nutritional security in human life cycle approach, by ensuring access to adequate quantity of quality food at affordable prices to people to live a life with dignity and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. With the enactment of the NFSA there was a paradigm shift in the approach to food security from “welfare to rights based approach.” (Para 6) Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : AIR 2024 SC 1248

National Investigation Agency Act, 2008

National Investigation Agency Act, 2008; Section 22(1) & 22(3) – Power of Chief Judge cum City Sessions Court for trial of offences set out in the Schedule to the NIA Act – The State Government has been given exclusive power under Section 22(1) to constitute one or more Special Courts for trial of offences under any or all the enactments specified in the Schedule to NIA Act. The jurisdiction conferred by this Act on a Special Court shall, until a Special Court is designated by the State Government, be exercised by the Court of Session of the division in which such offence has been committed. Held, the State has not constituted a special court under Section 22, hence, the Chief Judge cum City Sessions Court had the power and jurisdiction to deal with the case by virtue of Section 22 (3). Hence, the order of Chief Judge cum City Sessions Court permitting the addition of the offences under UAPA to the case does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. (Para 23, 24, 28, 29 & 30) State of West Bengal v. Jayeeta Das, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 312 : AIR 2024 SC 2161

Natural Justice

Principles of Natural justice – Opportunity of being heard – The insured claims that the copies of the surveyor's report and the investigators' report were not provided timely and thus, the insured-appellant did not get proper opportunity to rebut the same. Held, the ends of justice require that the insured-appellant should have been provided proper opportunity to file its rebuttal/objections to the affidavit/reports submitted by the insurer-respondent before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and consequently, the complaint should be reconsidered on merits after providing such opportunity to the appellant. The appellant shall be permitted to file its rebuttal/rejoinder affidavit before the National Commission and shall be reheard and decided on merits afresh. (Para 17, 18 & 19) Kozyflex Mattresses Pvt. Ltd. v. SBI General Insurance Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 255

NEET

NEET UG 2024 - Grace marks given to 1563 candidates will be cancelled, they'll be given retest option: Centre tells Supreme Court. Alakh Pandey v. National Testing Agency, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 421

The issue of fixing cut-off dates pertains to the policy domain. Hence, it would be appropriate if the petitioners are permitted to submit a representation to the Union of India. Aditya Dubey v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 154

Students of open schools recognized by Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) and State Education Boards eligible for NEET exam. Medical Council of India v. Anshul Aggarwal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 189

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Director of the company not responsible for its day-to-day affairs cannot be held liable for dishonor of cheque. (Para 10) Susela Padmavathy Amma v. Bharti Airtel Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 237

Section 138 – Maintainability of suit – Criminal law can be set in motion by anyone, even by a stranger or legal heir. A complaint under Section 138, preferred by the Power of Attorney Holder is held maintainable and also that such Power of Attorney Holder can depose as complainant. (Para 11) Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 407

Section 138 – Civil and Criminal course adopted on same issue – Whether, a criminal proceeding can be initiated and the accused therein held guilty, in connection with a transaction, in respect of which a decree by a competent Court of civil jurisdiction, already stands passed? Held, civil court judgments are not binding on criminal courts, but the ratio of the civil proceedings would be binding on criminal proceedings for certain limited purposes such as sentence or damages imposed by the criminal court. The Court in criminal jurisdiction would be bound by the civil Court having declared the cheque to be only for the purposes of security. The civil Court having declared the cheque (subject matter of dispute) to be only for the purposes of security, the criminal proceedings for cheque dishonour under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would be unsustainable in law and, therefore liable to be quashed and set aside. The damages as imposed by the Courts must be returned to the appellant. (Para 8, 11 & 12) Prem Raj v. Poonamma Menon, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 272 : (2024) 6 SCC 143

Section 138 – Dishonouring of cheque – Held, existence of any “enforceable debt or other liability” not found. Petitioner's case not made out. (Para 11) Rajco Steel Enterprises v. Kavita Saraff, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 306 : AIR 2024 SC 2105

Section 138 - Amendment of Complaint - Cheque Date - Typographical Error - The appellant challenged the High Court's decision permitting the respondent to amend the complaint to correct the date on a cheque from 22.07.2010 to 22.07.2012. The application for amendment was filed after evidence had been tendered, and the learned Magistrate rejected the amendment on the grounds that the date had been consistently recorded as 22.07.2010 in both the complaint and the evidence. The legal notice issued before the complaint also mentioned the date 22.07.2010. The High Court allowed the amendment, but the Supreme Court found that the amendment was not justified since the original date was crucial for compliance with the statutory time frame and the financial status of the account. The High Court's order permitting the amendment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. Munish Kumar Gupta v. Mittal Trading Company, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 339

Section 138 – Requirement of 'consent' in compounding of offence under section 138 – Even though compensation is duly paid by the accused, yet if the complainant does not agree for the compounding of the offence, the courts cannot compel the complainant to give 'consent' for compounding of the matter. Held, as the complainant has compensated the complainant and has already been in jail for more than 1 year, even though the complainant is unwilling to compound the case, the proceedings must come to an end. (Para 12 & 14) Raj Reddy Kallem v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 336

Section 147 & 138 – Compoundable offence – All offences punishable under the Negotiable Instruments Act are compoundable – In cases of section 138 the accused must try for compounding at the initial stages instead of the later stage, however, there is no bar to seek the compounding of the offence at later stages of criminal proceedings including after conviction. (Para 12) Raj Reddy Kallem v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 336

Section 143A - Mere filing of the cheque dishonor complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act would not grant a right to a complainant to seek interim compensation under Section 143A (1) of the N.I. Act, as the power of the court to grant interim compensation, isn't mandatory but discretionary and needs to be decided after prima facie evaluating the merits of the case. (Para 14) Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : (2024) 4 SCC 419

Section 118 r/w. 139 - Even if a blank cheque leaf is voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused towards some payment would attract the presumption under Section 139 of the Act and in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of the debt, the presumption would hold good. (Para 5) K. Ramesh v. K. Kothandaraman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Section 118 r/w. 139 - Accused has signed the cheque. The only dispute is with regard to the age of the ink used in making the signature on the cheque and the age of the signature and contents of the cheque. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence. (Para 5 & 6) K. Ramesh v. K. Kothandaraman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 145

Sections 138 and 141 - The Director of the company wouldn't be held liable for the dishonor of a cheque issued by the company pursuant to the retirement of the Director unless some credible evidence is brought on record proving the guilt of the director. The director could be held liable for the dishonor of the cheque after his retirement only when it is proved that any act of a company is proved to have been done with the connivance or consent or may be attributable to a director. (Para 10) Rajesh Viren Shah v. Redington (India) Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : AIR 2024 SC 1047

Section 118(e) and 138 - If the accused is disputing the signature on the cheque, then the certified copies of the signatures from the bank could be summoned from the bank to compare the same with the signature appearing on the cheque. The indorsements on a cheque carry a presumption of genuineness as per Section 118(e) of the Act. Hence, it is incumbent upon the accused to lead evidence to rebut the presumption of genuineness of signatures. (Para 16) Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : AIR 2024 SC 787

Section 118(e) and 138 - The accused had not taken any efforts to disprove his signature at the trial stage. No question was put to the witness from the bank regarding the genuineness of the signature. Also, the cheque was returned not on the grounds of any discrepancy in the signatures. If at all, the accused was desirous of proving that the signatures as appearing on the cheque issued from his account were not genuine, then he could have procured a certified copy of his specimen signatures from the Bank and a request could have been made to summon the concerned Bank official in defence for giving evidence regarding the genuineness or otherwise of the signature on the cheque. (Para 16) Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : AIR 2024 SC 787

Section 138 - Accused persons filed an undertaking based on a settlement. Since the amount agreed was not paid, the interim protection, granted via suspension of sentence and bail, was withdrawn. Appeal dismissed with cost of Rs 5 lakhs and directed to surrender within a period of four weeks. Satish P. Bhatt v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 16

Section 138 - Once the settlement has been arrived at and the complainant has signed the deed accepting a particular amount in full and final settlement of the default amount and the fine amount awarded by the Trial Court, the proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act need to be quashed. (Para 4) Ghanshyam Gautam v. Usha Rani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 23

Section 138 - Question regarding the time-barred nature of an underlying debt or liability in proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act is a mixed question of law and fact which ought not to be decided by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. (Para 7) Atamjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 76

Panchayat

Maharashtra Temporary Extension of Period for Submitting Validity Certificate (for certain elections to Village Panchayats, Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis) Act, 2023; Section 3(1) and 3(2) (b) - Section 3 provides an extended time to submit Validity Certificate within a period of twelve months from the date of commencement of this Act. The idea was that such elected candidates ought not to be deprived merely because of non-issuance of Validity Certificates when the applications are long pending before the scrutiny committee. Rejection of application by the scrutiny committee under Section 3(2)(b) would dis-entitle Appellant 1 from the benefit of Section 3. Rejection will also include cases in which applications are rejected on account of defaults committed by the applicants themselves. The application of appellant 1 was rejected by the scrutiny committee. Since there was no valid application filed by appellant before the nomination to the Scrutiny Committee, the protective umbrella of Section 3 does not apply to the appellant. (Para 40) Sudhir Vilas Kalel v. Bapu Rajaram Kalel, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 99 : AIR 2024 SC 1010 : (2024) 3 SCC 679

Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1959; Section 10-1A provides, every person desirous of contesting election to a membership in the reserved category, shall submit alongwith the Nomination paper & Caste Certificate, a 'Validity Certificate' issued by the Scrutiny Committee. If such person fails to produce the Validity Certificate within a period of twelve months from the date on which he is declared elected, his election shall be deemed to have been terminated retrospectively and he shall be disqualified for being a member. In violation of producing the validity certificate, the Appellant No.1 stood automatically disqualified as a Member with retrospective effect from the date of his election. (Para 36) Sudhir Vilas Kalel v. Bapu Rajaram Kalel, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 99 : AIR 2024 SC 1010 : (2024) 3 SCC 679

Maharashtra Village Panchayats Act, 1958; Section 35 - Validity of No-Confidence motion. A Motion of No Confidence is to be carried by not less than three-fourth of the total number of members who are entitled, to 'sit' and 'vote 'at any meeting. Held, the 3/4th member requirement for coming up with a no-confidence motion was fulfilled as appellant 1 has ceased to be a member because of automatic disqualification. (Para 42 & 43) Sudhir Vilas Kalel v. Bapu Rajaram Kalel, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 99 : AIR 2024 SC 1010 : (2024) 3 SCC 679

Partnership Act, 1932

Liability of legal heirs on death of partner of firm – Held, legal heirs of a deceased partner do not become liable for any liability of the firm upon the death of the partner. (Para 8) Annapurna B. Uppin v. Malsiddappa, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : AIR 2024 SC 2015

Section 42(c) – Dissolution of partnership on death of partner – Partnership would stand dissolved automatically on the death of the partner unless and until there was a contract between the remaining partners of the firm to the contrary. Held, there is no such averment by the respondents. Hence, the business activities even if carried on by the remaining partners of the firm, would be deemed to be carried in their individual capacity. (Para 17, 19) S. Shivraj Reddy v. S. Raghuraj Reddy, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 411

Passport

Passports Act, 1967; Section 12(b) - As discernible from the language of the provision, what must be established is that the accused knowingly furnished false information or suppressed material information with the intent of obtaining a passport or travel document. In the present case, it is crucial to consider that the alleged forgery of signatures on the passport application was inconclusive. Moreover, the cognizance of such like offence can be taken only at the instance of the Prescribed Authority. No complaint to that effect has been disclosed against the Appellants. This Court, therefore, will exercise caution before invoking such severe offences and penalties solely on the basis of conjectures and surmises. Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Penal Code, 1860

Section 34 – Common intention – The existence of common intention in a given case must necessarily be established by the Prosecution with relevant evidence. The Court also has the responsibility to analyze and assess the evidence before convicting a person with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC. Importantly, a mere common intention per se may not attract Section 34 IPC without action in furtherance of such common intention. (Para 19, 22 & 25) Madhusudan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 418

Section 34 & 120B – Since the foundational facts essential for constituting the substantive offences under Sections 153A and 504 IPC are not available from the admitted allegations of prosecution, the allegations qua the subsidiary offences under Sections 34 and 120B IPC would also be non est. (Para 30) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Section 34 & 149 – Difference between common intention and common object – There is a significant distinction between Section 34 and Section 149 of IPC. Section 34 requires active participation and prior meeting of minds whereas Section 149 assigns liability merely by membership of an unlawful assembly and has a wider scope than Section 34 IPC. (Para 15) Madhusudan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 418

Section 34 & 494 – Charged with common intention to commit offence of Bigamy – Held, in order to bring home the said charge, the complainant would be required to prima facie prove not only the presence of the accused persons, but the overt act or omission of the accused persons in the second marriage ceremony and also establish that such accused were aware about the subsisting first marriage. Held, mere presence in the marriage is not enough to establish common intention to commit offence of Bigamy. Further, there is no allegation that the accused, acted as witnesses to the second marriage having knowledge of the first marriage. Hence, the charge is not established. (Para 17 & 18) S. Nitheen v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 385

Section 96 to 106 - Right of Private Defence – The law provides that the person claiming such a right bears the onus to prove the legitimacy of the actions done in furtherance thereof and it is not for the Court to presume the presence of such circumstances or the truth in such a plea being taken. (Para 19) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667

Section 120B and Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002; Section 2(1) (y) – Schedule offence – Offence punishable under Section 120B of the IPC could become a scheduled offence only if the conspiracy alleged is of committing an offence which is included in the Schedule to the PMLA. Held, the offences alleged in the complaint except Section 120-B of IPC are not scheduled offences within the meaning of Section 2(1) (y) of the PMLA. (Para 2, 3) Yash Tuteja v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 310

Section 149 - If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence-A plain reading of the provision abundantly makes clear that an overt act of some of the accused persons of an unlawful assembly with the common object to kill the deceased Shivanna and to cause grievous hurt to the other family members is enough to rope in all of them for an offence under Section 302 IPC in aid with Section 149 IPC. (Para 20) Haalesh @ Haleshi @ Kurubara Haleshi v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : AIR 2024 SC 1056 : (2024) 3 SCC 475

Section 153A – For applying Section 153A IPC, the presence of two or more groups or communities is essential. Held, in the present case, no such groups or communities were referred to in the news article. Hence, the FIR lacks the necessary ingredients of the said offence. (Para 29) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Section 153-A (1) (a) & Section 153-A (1) (b) and Constitution of India; Article 19(1) (a) – Freedom to criticise decisions of the government – Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, under which, every citizen has the right to offer criticism of the action of abrogation of Article 370 or every other decision of the State. If every criticism or protest of the actions of the State is to be held as an offence under Section 153-A, democracy, which is an essential feature of the Constitution of India, will not survive. The appellant intended to criticise the action of the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India and did not refer to any religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community. Describing the day the abrogation happened as a “Black Day” is an expression of protest and anguish. The effect of the words used by the appellant will have to be judged from the standards of reasonable women and men. Merely because a few individuals may develop hatred or ill will, it will not be sufficient to attract Section 153-A (1) (a) of the IPC. Further, every citizen has the right to extend good wishes to the citizens of the other countries on their respective independence days. It cannot be said that such acts will tend to create disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious groups. Motives cannot be attributed only because the person belongs to a particular religion. WhatsApp status of the appellant cannot be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony among various groups. Thus, continuation of the prosecution under Section 153-A of the IPC will be a gross abuse of the process of law. (Para 9, 10, 11, 12 & 14) Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : (2024) 4 SCC 156

Section 292 and Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 67 – Obscenity – Profanity is not per se obscene – Vulgarity and profanities do not per se amount to obscenity. While a person may find vulgar and expletive-filled language to be distasteful, unpalatable, uncivil, and improper, that by itself is not sufficient to be 'obscene'. The specific material which the High Court found to be obscene, was “foul, indecent and profane” language and nothing more. The High Court has equated profanities and vulgarity with obscenity, without undertaking a proper or detailed analysis into how such language, by itself, could be sexual, lascivious, prurient, or depraving and corrupting. (Para 35) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775 : 2024 Cri LJ 1781

Section 292 and Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 67 – Standard to determine obscenity – 'Community standard test' – The Supreme Court in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal markedly moved away from the Hicklin test to the “community standard test”. The standard of determination is that of an ordinary common person and not a hypersensitive person such as an adolescent's or child's mind, who is susceptible to influences. The High Court has incorrectly used the standard of “impressionable minds” to gauge the effect of the material and has therefore erred in applying the test for obscenity correctly. (Para 7. 1 & 39) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775 : 2024 Cri LJ 1781

Section 292 and Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 67 – Objective consideration while assessing whether the material is obscene – The court must consider the work as a whole and then the specific portions that have been alleged to be obscene in the context of the whole work to arrive at its conclusion. The High Court has taken the meaning of the language in its literal sense, outside the context in which such expletives have been spoken. While the literal meaning of the terms used may be sexual in nature and they may refer to sexual acts, their usage does not arouse sexual feelings or lust in any viewer of ordinary prudence and common sense. Rather, the common usage of these words is reflective of emotions of anger, rage, frustration, grief, or perhaps excitement. By taking the literal meaning of these words, the High Court failed to consider the specific material (profane language) in the context of the larger web-series and by the standard of an “ordinary man of common sense and prudence”. Neither did the creator of the web-series intend for the language to be taken in its literal sense nor is that the impact on a reasonable viewer who will watch the material. Therefore, there is a clear error in the legal approach adopted by the High Court in analysing and examining the material to determine obscenity. (Para 36 & 37) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775 : 2024 Cri LJ 1781

Section 292 – Obscene material – Section 292 defines 'obscene' as a book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation, figure or any other object that is lascivious, appeals to the prurient interest, or has such effect, if taken as a whole, that tends to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to read, see or hear the matter contained in it. The provision criminalises the sale, distribution, public exhibition, circulation, import, export, etc of obscene material. The provision excludes such material when the publication is justified as being for public good on the ground that it is in the interest of science, art, literature, or learning or other objects of general concern; such material is kept or used for bona fide religious purposes; it is sculptured, engraved, painted or represented on or in ancient monuments and temples. (Para 12) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775 : 2024 Cri LJ 1781

Section 299, 302 & 304 Part II – The act of celebratory firing during marriage ceremonies is an unfortunate practice – In the absence of any evidence on record to suggest that the Appellant aimed at and / or pointed at the large crowd whilst engaging in such celebratory firing; or there existed any prior enmity between the Deceased and the Appellant, the act cannot be punishable under Section 302 IPC. On grounds that (i) there was no previous enmity between the Deceased; (ii) no intention may be attributed to the Appellant as may be culled out from the record to cause death of the Deceased; and (iii) person carrying a gun with live cartridges has knowledge that firing the gun in presence of several people is an act likely to cause death, the Appellant is guilty of commission of 'culpable homicide' under Section 299 IPC i.e., punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The conviction and sentence of the Appellant under Section 302 IPC is liable to set aside. (Para 13, 14 & 15) Shahid Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : AIR 2024 SC 1319 : 2024 Cri LJ 1579

Section 302 – Acquittal order reversed in conviction – Reason assigned by High Court to discard evidence of complainant (PW2) and his daughter (PW3) is untenable. Complainant narrated the entire occurrence on a call made to the Police Control Room within ten minutes of the occurrence, hence, the court fails to find any meeting of the minds in such few minutes so as to create a false narrative only to implicate Gurpreet Singh. The presence of Gursewak Singh at the time of occurrence, his prompt reporting of the crime, and the swift action taken by the police immediately upon receipt of the said report, have cumulatively and unequivocally established the prosecution case beyond any doubt. On the contrary, the prosecution has successfully established that accused had been nursing a grudge against the deceased, hence, the attribution of motive by the prosecution stands proved. The reasons assigned by the High Court while granting acquittal are totally perverse and as a result of misreading of the evidence on record. Hence, it warrants interference by Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136. (Para 28, 30, 31, 33) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : (2024) 4 SCC 469

Section 302 - Setting a person on fire is an act of extreme cruelty and would fall under Section 302 IPC. Naresh v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 37

Section 302 - The fact remains that both the star witnesses of the prosecution are disbelieved in the trial by clearly stating that their statements are contradictory, the facts are twisted and improvements are made. For trial under Section 302 IPC, if a witness is branded as untrustworthy having allegedly twisted the facts and made contrary statements, it is not safe to impose conviction on the basis of a statement made by such witness. When there is an effort to falsely implicate one accused person, statements made by such an eyewitness cannot be relied upon without strong corroboration. Moreover, there is material on record proving previous enmity between the parties. State of Haryana v. Mohd. Yunus, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 36 : AIR 2024 SC 597 : (2024) 3 SCC 180

Section 302 & 34 – Co-accused –There is also not an iota of evidence to suggest that other respondents had any meeting with Accused and/or they had conspired with him for the execution of the crime. As there is no specific motive attributed, benefit of doubt can be extended to them. There is no convincing explanation to implicate them as co­accused. (Para 35) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : (2024) 4 SCC 469

Section 302 r/w 34 – Murder - Benefit of Doubt - An appellate court should give the benefit of doubt to the accused persons if the evidence on record indicates the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that a plausible view, different from the one expressed by the courts below can be taken. (Para 17) Jitendra Kumar Mishra @ Jittu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 20 : (2024) 2 SCC 666

Section 302 r/w. 34 – Murder - Circumstantial Evidence - When the prosecution case is solely based on the circumstantial evidence, then the courts must be vigilant while examining the facts proving the circumstantial evidence i.e., it must be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and should be free from doubts, improbabilities and inconsistencies. (Para 29 & 30) Pradeep Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : AIR 2024 SC 518 : (2024) 3 SCC 324

Section 302 Exception 4 – Sudden provocation/ heat of the moment – Four conditions must be satisfied to bring the matter within Exception 4: (i) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in the heat of passion; and; that (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner – Where the offender takes undue advantage or has acted in a cruel or an unusual manner, the benefit of Exception 4 cannot be given to him. If the weapon used or the manner of attack by the assailant is disproportionate, that circumstance must be taken into consideration to decide whether undue advantage has been taken. Held, cannot overlook the fact that the appellant inflicted as many as twelve blows with a knife on the deceased who was unarmed and helpless. Hence, case is not one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder but the same is a case of murder. The High Court committed no error in affirming the judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial court. (Para 79, 82, 83, 84) Anees v. State Govt of NCT, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : AIR 2024 SC 2297 : 2024 Cri LJ 2377

Section 302, 304 (Part II) and 34 - The prosecution has failed to establish common intention of Accused 3 to commit murder of deceased. Held, merely based on the presence of Accused 3 near the scene of offence and his family relations with the other accused, common intention cannot be established. That the trial court and the High Court have mechanically drawn inference against Accused 3 under Section 34. Further, participation of Accused 3 in assault is confirmed. Appeal of Accused 3 is allowed by altering the conviction under Section 302 to Section 304 Part II of IPC due to lack of evidence of common intention to murder. (Para 31) Velthepu Srinivas v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : AIR 2024 SC 1050

Section 302 - 304 - Commutation of Sentence - The lack of cogent evidence to prove that Accused 3 shared a common intention to commit murder is an important factor to commute a sentence from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II IPC. (Para 29) Velthepu Srinivas v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : AIR 2024 SC 1050

Sections 302 and 316 - From every available evidence, which was placed by the prosecution, it is a case where a sudden fight took place between the husband and wife. The deceased at that time was carrying a pregnancy of nine months and it was the act of pouring kerosene on the deceased that resulted in the fire and the subsequent burn injuries and the ultimate death of the deceased. This act at the hands of the appellant will be covered under the fourth exception given under Section 300 of the IPC, i.e., “Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner”. The act of the appellant is not premeditated, but is a result of sudden fight and quarrel in the heat of passion. Therefore, we convert the findings of Section 302 to that of 304 Part-II, as we are of the opinion that though the appellant had knowledge that such an act can result in the death of the deceased, but there was no intention to kill the deceased. Therefore, this is an offence which would come under Part-II not under Part-I of Section 304 of the IPC. (Para 20 & 21) Dattatraya v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 215

Section 304 Part II is in two parts. The section provides for two kinds of punishment to two different situations: Firstly, if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Here the important ingredient is the “intention”. Secondly, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Here the important ingredient is “knowledge”. (Para 28) Velthepu Srinivas v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : AIR 2024 SC 1050

Sections 304A and 338 - Fire Accident - Trekking Expedition - Persons who were part of the trekking expedition died owing to a forest fire which is an instance of vis major. No negligence could have been attributed to the trek organiser who only facilitated the organization of the trekking expedition. The organizers and even the members of the trekking expedition were totally unaware of the forest fire as such. Accidentally they were engulfed in the forest fire and they died by sheer accident and not owing to any negligence or any criminal intent attributable to the trek organiser. The trek organiser had no role whatsoever in causing the death of the trekkers who died due to a forest fire which is a natural cause. Peter Van Geit v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 83

Section 306 – Abetment to suicide – Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. Apprehensions expressed in the suicide note, by no stretch of imagination, can be considered sufficient to attribute to the appellant, an act or omission constituting the elements of abetment to commit suicide. The necessary ingredients of the offence of abetment to commit suicide are not made out from the chargesheet and hence allowing prosecution of the appellant is grossly illegal. (Para 21 & 23) Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : AIR 2024 SC 1405 : (2024) 3 SCC 665 : 2024 Cri LJ 1461

Section 306 – Abetment of Suicide – The basic ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 306 of the IPC are suicidal death and abetment thereof. Oral evidence of witnesses does not disclose any form of incessant cruelty or harassment on the part of the husband which would in ordinary circumstances drag the wife to commit suicide as if she was left with no other alternative. Mere demand of money from the wife or her parents for running a business would not constitute cruelty or harassment. In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime cannot be assumed to be ostensibly present but has to be visible and conspicuous. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide. Mere harassment is not sufficient to hold an accused guilty of abetting the commission of suicide. The court should look for cogent and convincing proof of the act of incitement to the commission of suicide and such an offending action should be proximate to the time of occurrence. In the absence of any cogent evidence of harassment or cruelty, an accused cannot be held guilty for the offence under Section 306 of IPC by raising presumption under Section 113A. Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : (2024) 3 SCC 573 : 2024 Cri LJ 1561

Section 306 - Before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative to put an end to her life. It must be borne in mind that in a case of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the deceased to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC would not be sustainable. (Para 36) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393

Section 306 - In order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It would also require an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and that this act of the accused must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. (Para 39) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393

Section 306 - Human mind is an enigma. There can be myriad reasons for a man or a woman to commit or attempt to commit suicide: it may be a case of failure to achieve academic excellence, oppressive environment in college or hostel, particularly for students belonging to the marginalized sections, joblessness, financial difficulties, disappointment in love or marriage, acute or chronic ailments, depression, so on and so forth. Therefore, it may not always be the case that someone has to abet commission of suicide. Circumstances surrounding the deceased in which he finds himself are relevant. (Para 47) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393

Section 306 - The court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that the victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. (Para 40) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393

Section 306 - Where the accused by his act or omission or by his continued course of conduct creates a situation that the deceased is left with no other option except to commit suicide, then instigation may be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. (Para 34) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393

Sections 306 and 417 - Prohibition of Harassment of Woman Act, 2002 (Tamil Nadu); Section 4 - Broken relationships and heartbreaks are part of everyday life. Merely advising a partner to marry as per the advice of parents would not attract the penal provisions of abetment to suicide. There must be direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. The accused must be shown to have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain acts to facilitate the commission of suicide. Where the words uttered are casual in nature and which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarreling people, and nothing serious is expected to follow from the same, the same would not amount to abetment of suicide. In order to constitute 'instigation', it must be shown that the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide. The words uttered by the accused must be suggestive of the consequence. (Para 10 - 12 & 16) Prabhu v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 112

Sections 341, 323 and 302 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 200, 203 and 227 – Discharge - The version of PW-1 is that the accused repeatedly kicked on chest with a stick. In the post-mortem, no injury was found on the chest or any other part of the body of the deceased. The expert testimony of the doctor who performed the autopsy of the deceased cannot be completely ignored while deciding the guilt of an accused. Therefore, taking the evidence of the witnesses as it is, there was no material to proceed against the accused in the private complaint. (Para 11 & 12) Ramalingam v. N. Viswanathan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : AIR 2024 SC 757 : (2024) 4 SCC 808

Section 361 & 363 – Kidnapping from lawful guardianship – 'Kidnapping' within the meaning of Section 361 of IPC was established by the prosecution. Held, there was no reason for the father of the victim to falsely implicate the appellants and tutor the child to depose against them. Hence, the accused is convicted for the lesser offence of kidnapping defined by Section 361 of IPC, which is punishable under Section 363 of IPC. William Stephen v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : (2024) 5 SCC 258

Section 364A – Kidnapping for ransom - Ingredients – There should be a kidnapping or abduction of any person or a person should be kept in detention after such kidnapping or abduction. If the said act is coupled with a threat to cause death or hurt to such person, an offence under Section 364A is attracted. William Stephen v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : (2024) 5 SCC 258

Section 364A – Kidnapping for ransom not established – Mere Demand For Ransom without a threat to death or hurt would not Amount to offence under Section 364A. The ingredients of Section 364A of IPC were not proved by the prosecution in as much as the prosecution failed to lead cogent evidence to establish the second part of Section 364A about the threats given by the accused to cause death or hurt to such person. Only if the threats given to the parents or the close relatives of the kidnapped person by the accused was established, then a case could be made out that there was a reasonable apprehension that the person kidnapped may be put to death or hurt may be caused to him. Conviction of the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 364A of IPC is set aside. William Stephen v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : (2024) 5 SCC 258

Section 364A - Kidnapping for Ransom - The necessary ingredients which the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, before the Court are not only an act of kidnapping or abduction but thereafter the demand of ransom, coupled with the threat to life of a person who has been kidnapped or abducted, must be there. (Para 14) Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : AIR 2024 SC 271 : (2024) 3 SCC 125

Section 375 – “Consent” of a woman – To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. Held, the allegations in the FIR so also in the restatement made before the Dy. S.P., do not, on their face, indicate that the promise by accused was false or that the complainant engaged in the sexual relationship on the basis of such false promise. No error has been committed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court by holding that permitting further proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of law and result in miscarriage of justice. (Para 11, 15 & 18) Ms. X v. Mr. A, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2024 CriLJ 1894

Section 375 - If it is established that from the inception, the consent by the victim is a result of a false promise to marry, there will be no consent, and in such a case, the offence of rape will be made out. (Para 7) Sheikh Arif v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 68 : AIR 2024 SC 710 : (2024) 4 SCC 463

Section 376(2) (f) – Fiduciary relationship – Held, appellant was not in a position of trust towards the prosecutrix. Hence, there was no fiduciary relationship between the appellant-accused and the Prosecutrix. (Para 7 & 11) Pankaj Singh v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Sections 376, 417 and 420 - Accused is a police officer. The allegation of undue influence and/or unintended favour towards him by the Investigating Officer cannot be brushed aside lightly. The appellant in her application has stated that: (i) respondent no.2 was already married to M and was, thus, disqualified to perform the second marriage; (ii) he being a Government officer, his second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage would have been a misconduct under the Conduct Rules; and (iii) that the first chargesheet itself suggested that the appellant and respondent no.2 had been living together and were in physical relationship. If that is so, the Investigating Agency ought to have further probed as to whether they have been cohabitating pursuant to the so-called marriage performed on 13.09.2012 and/or it was merely a consensual live-in relationship. Similarly, the Investigating Officer does not appear to have taken any pains to visit the hospital/medical clinics to verify whether the appellant underwent abortion twice. We are not sure whether the statements of the persons living in the neighbourhood were recorded or not to find out whether the appellant and respondent no.2 had been living together as husband and wife. All these facts will have a material bearing on the determination by the Trial Court as to whether a prima facie case under Sections 376, 417 and 420 of IPC is made out or not. XXX v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 110

Sections 376 / 506 - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Rape - Lodging a case after 34 years and that too on the basis of a bald statement that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of commission of offence, could itself be a ground to quash the proceedings. No explanation whatsoever is given in the FIR as to why the prosecutrix was keeping silent for a long period of 34 years. The material on record shows that the relationship was consensual, in as much as the son who is born out of the said relationship has been treated by the accused as his son and all the facilities, including cash money, have been provided to him. Rajaram Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 40

Sections 376 and 506 – Rape - False promise of marriage - The relationship between the accused and the victim was a consensual relationship which culminated in the marriage. In the legal notice issued on behalf of the victim, the factum of marriage was admitted and the victim has been described as the wife of the accused. Therefore, on the face of it, the allegation that the physical relationship was maintained due to false promise of marriage is without basis, as their relationship led to the solemnization of marriage. Therefore, this is a case where the allegations made in the FIR were such that on the basis of the statements, no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Hence, a case was made out for quashing the FIR. (Para 9) Ajeet Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 18 : AIR 2024 SC 257 : (2024) 2 SCC 422

Section 376 AB - Punishment for rape on woman under twelve years of age - In the instant case, the petitioner-convict was aged 40 years on the date of occurrence and the victim was then only a girl, aged 7 years. Thus, the position is that he used a lass aged 7 years to satisfy his lust. For that the petitioner-convict took the victim to a temple, unmindful of the holiness of the place, disrobed her and himself and then committed the crime. We have no hesitation to hold that the fact he had not done it brutally will not make its commission non-barbaric. (Para 10) Bhaggi @ Bhagirath @ Naran v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 87 : AIR 2024 SC 938

Section 405 - Criminal Breach of Trust - Commercial disputes over variation of rate cannot per se give rise to an offence under Section 405 of the 1860 Code without presence of any aggravating factor leading to the substantiation of its ingredients. (Para 14) Sachin Garg v. State of U.P, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Section 406 – Criminal breach of trust – Section 406 requires entrustment, which carries the implication that a person handing over any property or on whose behalf the property is handed over, continues to be the owner of the said property. Further, the person handing over the property must have confidence in the person taking the property to create a fiduciary relationship between them. A normal transaction of sale or exchange of money/consideration does not amount to entrustment. (Para 36) Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2024 SC 2420 : 2024 CriLJ 2322

Section 406 – Dishonest misappropriation of 'Stridhan' – Entrustment of stridhan property with dominion over such property to the husband or to any member of his family as well as dishonest misappropriation of or conversion to his own use the said property by the husband or such other member of his family is an offence under Section 406 – Held, admittedly there is no criminal offence claimed and, therefore, proof on balance of probabilities would be sufficient. (Para 21) Maya Gopinathan v. Anoop S.B., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 327 : AIR 2024 SC 2454

Section 406, 409, 420, 457, 380 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; S. 13(1)(d) r/w. 13(2) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 319 - Demand of money for extending benefits during custody - Application filed under Section 319 Cr.P.C. against the police officials - All the witnesses have equivocally narrated the incidents that took place at different places regarding threats, demand of huge sum of money, torture etc. - According to them, the amount was being demanded for the following benefits to be extended: (i) firstly, not to physically torture; (ii) not to ask for further police remand; (iii) to help get bail; and (iv) to give good treatment during custody. Held, there appears to be prima facie evidence on record to make it a triable case as against the police officials. (Para 8 - 14) Gurdev Singh Bhalla v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 28 : (2024) 3 SCC 142

Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B - On a reading of the FIR as well as the charge-sheet, we do not find that the offences aforestated is made out at all. We do not find any criminal breach of trust nor any cheating by impersonation. There is also no cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, nor has any documents referred to any forgery or security or any forgery for the purpose of cheating. There is no reference to any document which has been forged so as to be used as a genuine document and much less is as there any criminal conspiracy which can be imputed to the appellants herein in the absence of any offence being made out vis-a-vis the aforesaid Sections. (Para 17) Vishal Noble Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 96

Sections 406 and 506 - The ingredients to allege the offence are neither stated nor can be inferred from the averments. A prayer is made to the police for recovery of money from the appellants. The police is to investigate the allegations which discloses a criminal act. Police does not have the power and authority to recover money or act as a civil court for recovery of money. Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 150

Section 415 – Cheating – The offence of cheating requires dishonest inducement, delivering of a property as a result of the inducement, and damage or harm to the person so induced. The offence of cheating is established when the dishonest intention exists at the time when the contract or agreement is entered, for the essential ingredient of the offence of cheating consists of fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him to deliver any property, to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he had not been deceived. (Para 37) Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2024 SC 2420 : 2024 CriLJ 2322

Sections 415 and 420 - Cheating - Ingredients to constitute the offence - Discussed. (Para 11 - 13) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Sections 415 and 420 - Cheating - For attracting the provisions of Section 420 of IPC, it must be shown that the FIR / complaint discloses: (i) the deception of any person; (ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person; and (iii) dishonest intention of the accused at the time of making the inducement. (Para 13) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Sections 415 and 420 - Cheating - The dishonest inducement is the sine qua non to attract the provisions of Sections 415 and 420 of IPC. (Para 20) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196

Section 417 - Mere non-performance of marriage by accused at booked marriage hall does not constitute commission of offense of cheating. (Para 8) Raju Krishna Shedbalkar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 158

Section 420 - It must also be understood that a statement of fact is deemed 'deceitful' when it is false and is knowingly or recklessly made with the intent that it shall be acted upon by another person, resulting in damage or loss. 'Cheating' therefore, generally involves a preceding deceitful act that dishonestly induces a person to deliver any property or any part of a valuable security, prompting the induced person to undertake the said act, which they would not have done but for the inducement. (Para 12) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Section 420 - The act of the wife to forge the sign of husband to seek the passport for minor child to travel abroad doesn't amount to cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC, due to the absence of a deceitful act that resulted in a loss or damage of property to a husband. Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Section 420 - The term 'property' employed in Section 420 IPC has a well defined connotation. Every species of valuable right or interest that is subject to ownership and has an exchangeable value – is ordinarily understood as 'property'. It also describes one's exclusive right to possess, use and dispose of a thing. The IPC itself defines the term 'moveable property' as, “intended to include corporeal property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth.” Whereas immoveable property is generally understood to mean land, benefits arising out of land and things attached or permanently fastened to the earth. (Para 13) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Section 420 - While prosecuting a person for the offence of cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC, it is to be seen whether the deceitful act of cheating was coupled with an inducement leading to the parting of any property by the complainant. To constitute an offence of cheating, merely committing a deceitful act is not sufficient unless the deceitful act dishonestly induced a person to deliver any property or any part of a valuable security, thereby resulting in loss or damage to the person. (Para 10 - 20) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 323, 504 and 506 - Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh); Section 2(b)(i) and 3(1) - “Gang” - Meaning of - the person alleged to be the member of the gang should be found indulging in anti-social activities which would be covered under the offences punishable under Chapters XVI, or XVII or XXII IPC. For framing a charge for the offence under the Gangsters Act and for continuing the prosecution of the accused under the above provisions, the prosecution would be required to clearly state that the accused are being prosecuted for any one or more offences covered by anti-social activities as defined under Section 2(b). (Para 12 & 13) Farhana v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 131 : AIR 2024 SC 1158

Sections 468 and 471 - Forgery - There are two primary components that need to be fulfilled in order to establish the offence of 'forgery', namely: (i) that the accused has fabricated an instrument; and (ii) it was done with the intention that the forged document would be used for the purpose of cheating. Simply put, the offence of forgery requires the preparation of a false document with the dishonest intention of causing damage or injury. (Para 22) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033

Section 494 and Criminal procedure Code, 1973; Section 216 – Bigamy – Charges framed against accused for offence of Bigamy – Held, order framing charge is erroneous on the face of the record because no person other than the spouse to the second marriage could have been charged for the offence punishable under Section 494 IPC simplicitor. Defect in framing of charge is curable and can be altered at any stage as per the provisions of Section 216 CrPC. Further held, allowing the proceedings of the criminal case to be continued against the appellants with defect in charges framed, would tantamount to gross illegality and abuse of the process of Court. Hence, all subsequent proceedings sought to be taken against the appellants are quashed and set aside. (Para 16, 21) S. Nitheen v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 385

Section 498A – Cruelty – In all cases, where wife complains of harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A of the IPC cannot be applied mechanically. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the other or mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may not amount to cruelty. The Court must appreciate that all quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A very technical and hyper sensitive approach would prove to be disastrous for the very institution of the marriage. (Para 32) Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 343 : 2024 CriLJ 2307 : AIR 2024 SC 2548

Sections 499 and 500 - Petitioner described all Gujarati people as “thugs”. It is true that every prosecution for defamation cannot be quashed on the ground that the offending allegations have been withdrawn. After the petitioner has explained the context in which he made the statements and after withdrawal of those statements, in the facts of the case, it is unjust to continue the prosecution. No purpose will be served by continuing the prosecution. Therefore, in the peculiar facts of the case, this is a fit case to quash the complaint. (Para 8 - 10) Tejashwi Prasad Yadav v. Hareshbhai Pranshankar Mehta, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 113 : AIR 2024 SC 1026 : (2024) 4 SCC 731

Section 500 - A criminal defamation case was filed against the owner of a newspaper for an article published against an advocate. The Magistrate rejected the complaint, stating that the news article in question was published in good faith and in the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Magistrate's view cannot be termed as "illegal or unjustified," and therefore, there is no justification for interference by the Sessions Court or the High Court. (Para 8 & 9) Sanjay Upadhya v. Anand Dubey, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 67 AIR 2024 SC 811 : (2024) 3 SCC 718

Section 504 – This offence can be invoked when the insult of a person provokes him to break public peace or to commit any other offence. Held, there is no such allegation in the FIR that owing to the alleged offensive post attributable to the appellant, the complainant was provoked to such an extent that he could indulge in disturbing the public peace or commit any other offence. Hence, the FIR lacks the necessary ingredients of the said offence. (Para 30) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251

Section 506 – Criminal intimidation – An offence of criminal intimidation arises when the accused intendeds to cause alarm to the victim, though it does not matter whether the victim is alarmed or not. The word 'intimidate' means to make timid or fearful, especially: to compel or deter by or as if by threats. The threat communicated or uttered by the person named in the chargesheet as an accused, should be uttered and communicated by the said person to threaten the victim for the purpose of influencing her mind. The word 'threat' refers to the intent to inflict punishment, loss or pain on the other. Mere expression of any words without any intent to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring home an offence under Section 506 of the IPC. (Para 38) Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2024 SC 2420 : 2024 CriLJ 2322

Section 506 - Criminal Intimidation - The allegation of criminal intimidation against the accused is made in the complaint statements, no particulars thereof have been given. Both in the complaint petition and the initial deposition of one of the witnesses, there is only reproduction of part of the statutory provision giving rise to the offence of criminal intimidation. This would constitute a mere bald allegation, short of any particulars as regards to the manner in which threat was conveyed. (Para 17) Sachin Garg v. State of U.P, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 75

Quashing of FIR – A court must exercise its jurisdiction to quash an FIR or criminal complaint when the allegations made therein, taken prima facie, do not disclose the commission of any offence. (Para 48) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775 : 2024 Cri LJ 1781

Subjective test of Intention - A person intends a consequence when he (1) foresees that it will happen if the given series of acts or omissions continue, and (2) desires it to happen. The most serious level of culpability, justifying the most serious levels of punishment, is achieved when both these components are actually present in the accused's mind. Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : (2024) 3 SCC 573 : 2024 Cri LJ 1561

Police Act, 1861

The information disclosing the commission of the cognizable offence needs to be recorded as a First Information Report (FIR) in the form of a book and not in the General Diary maintained by the Police. (Para 28) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162

Police Manual

Pertinently, there is no discernible conflict or contradiction between the definitions of 'Reporting Authority' and 'Reviewing Authority' in the 1970 Rules, post 1987, and in the 2007 Rules. The clear import of these definitions is that such authorities must be from within the same service or department. Invocation of the doctrine of harmonious construction vis-à-vis these definitions, therefore, does not arise. Given the clear intent of the 1970 Rules/2007 Rules that the reporting, reviewing and accepting authorities should be from within the same service or department, the question is whether breach of such requirement can be permitted in the State of Assam under Rule 63(iii) of the Manual. State of Assam v. Binod Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 46 : AIR 2024 SC 760 : (2024) 3 SCC 611

Possession

Panchayat (General) Rules, 1961 (Rajasthan); Rule 266 – Only in certain specified situation, the land could be transferred by way of sale on private negotiation, namely, where any person has a plausible claim of title to the land and auction may not fetch reasonable price or it may not be the convenient mode for disposal of land or where such a course is regarded by the Panchayat necessary for advancement of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or other Backward Classes. Another situation envisaged is where the person is in possession of land for more than 20 years but less than 42 years. Nothing was produced on record to show that the due process required for leasing out/sale of the land in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs by private negotiation was followed. Gram Panchayat from whom the land was taken was not impleaded as party to admit or deny the allegations made by the respondents/plaintiffs in the plaint. The alleged lease deed/sale deed has been issued in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs is clearly violative of Rule 266. (Para 29) Tehsildar, Urban Improvement Trust v. Ganga Bai Menariya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 153

Power of Attorney

Attorney holder can maintain a plaint on behalf of the person he represents provided he has personal knowledge of the transaction in question. Attorney holder can depose and verify on oath before the court but he must have witnessed the transaction as an agent and must have due knowledge about it. The Power of Attorney holder who has no knowledge regarding the transaction cannot be examined as a witness. Evidence given by person who has no authority to act as power of authority, is meaningless to establish. (Para 28 & 29) Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : AIR 2024 SC 1947

Practice and Procedure

A technicality like the caption of the application/petition could not be an impediment to consider the substance thereof. XXX v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 110

If the High Court found it necessary to direct the presence of the government officer then it should have been first through video conferencing. State of West Bengal v. Ganesh Roy, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 324

It will be appropriate if the Registry of this Court stops referring to the Trial Courts as 'Lower Courts'. Even the record of the Trial Court should not be referred to as Lower Court Record (LCR). Instead, it should be referred to as the Trial Court Record (TCR). The Registrar (Judicial) to take a note of this order. Sakhawat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 103

Roster notified by the Chief Justice is not an empty formality. All Judges are bound by the same. No Bench can hear a case, unless as per the prevailing roster, the particular case is assigned to the Bench or that the case is specially assigned to the Bench by the Chief Justice. (Para 8) Directorate of Enforcement v. Bablu Sonkar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 123 : (2024) 3 SCC 714

The Registry should call for the soft copies of the records of the High Court and the Trial Court immediately after leave to appeal is granted in a petition challenging orders of conviction/acquittal. Mijai Molla @ Mijanur Molla v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 105

Precedent

'Ignoring precedent a material error' : Supreme Court recalls its 2022 verdict for not considering constitution bench Judgment. Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : AIR 2024 SC 2694

Pre-emption

Pre-emption Act, 1913 (Punjab); Section 16, 8(2) and 3(3) - 'Land' and 'Immovable property' are two different terms. As per Section 3(3), immovable property is more than the land on which certain construction has been made. Notification dated 08.10.1985 limits its application for taking away the right of pre-emption only with reference to sale of 'land' falling in the areas of any municipality. In the present case, it is sale of immovable property, which is more than the land as a rolling mill had already been set up on the land. Held, notification is not applicable to property in dispute. (Para 17) Jagmohan v. Badri Nath, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : AIR 2024 SC 900 : (2024) 3 SCC 588

Pre-emption Act, 1913 (Punjab); Section 8(2) - Notification issued in exercise of powers under Section 8(2) enables the State Government to exclude any transaction of sale of any land or property for exercise of right of pre-emption. Notification exempts right of pre-emption in respect of sale of land falling in the area of municipalities in Haryana. (Para 8) Jagmohan v. Badri Nath, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : AIR 2024 SC 900 : (2024) 3 SCC 588

Preconception and Pre­-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation & Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994

Section 20(1) & (2) – The appropriate authority on being satisfied that there was a breach of provisions of PC&PNDT Act or the Rules may, after issuing notice and giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard, without prejudice to any criminal action against the licensed entity, suspend its registration for such period as it may think fit or cancel the same as the case maybe. The order of suspension was passed on 25.10.2010 without any notice or affording any opportunity of hearing as per Section 20(2). The order dated 25.10.2010 also does not qualify the requirements of Section 20(3). (Para 18) District Appropriate Authority v. Jashmina Dilip Devda, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 202

Section 20(3) – Suspension of registration of license – Power of suspension under Section 20(3) of PC&PNDT Act can only be exercised when the appropriate authority forms an opinion with reasons in writing, that it is necessary or expedient in public interest to suspend the registration of licensed entity. It is incumbent on the authority to form an opinion for reasons to be recorded in writing to indicate the said public interest. Such power can be exercised without issuing notice under Section 20(1). The power of sub­section (3) is intermittent and in addition to the power of sub­section (2) but it may be exercised sparingly, in exceptional circumstances in public interest. Suspension order dated 29.12.2010 does not contain reasons as required to form an opinion that it is necessitated or expedient in public interest to exercise such power. The order of suspension does not qualify the requirements of Section 20(3), is not justified and has rightly been set aside. (Para 16, 17& 18) District Appropriate Authority v. Jashmina Dilip Devda, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 202

Section 20(3) – Duration of suspension order – The power of suspension, if any exercised, by the appropriate authority deeming it necessary or expedient in public interest for the reasons so specified, it should be for interim period and not for an inordinate duration. (Para 17) District Appropriate Authority v. Jashmina Dilip Devda, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 202

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 19 - Sanction - The Sessions Court could not have acquitted the accused only on the ground of alleged invalid sanction, without recording its findings on all the issues involved. (Para 8) P.I. Babu v. C.B.I., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 56

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 17A - Interpretation of - Split Verdict - Referred to Larger Bench. Nara Chandrababu Naidu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 41

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960

Animal Birth Control Rules, 2001 - Under all circumstances, there cannot be any indiscriminate killings of canines and the authorities have to take action in terms of the mandate and spirit of the prevalent legislation(s) in place. There is no gainsaying in the fact that exhibiting compassion to all living beings, is the enshrined Constitutional value and mandate, and cast obligation on the authorities to maintain. (Para 11) Animal Welfare Board of India v. People For Elimination of Stray Troubles, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 434

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954

Section 2(ix) (k) and Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955; Rule 32(c) & (f) – Misbranded food – The packets taken from shop/godown of the appellants by the food inspector were misbranded as defined under Section 2(ix) (k) of the Act, as they were not labelled in accordance with the requirements of the Act or the Rules made thereunder. (Para 7) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212

Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955; Rule 32(c) & (f) and Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006; Section 52 – Reduction of sentence as per current law applicable – Sentence of imprisonment and fine converted to only fine – The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, repealed by the introduction of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, wherein Section 52 provides a maximum penalty of Rs.3,00,000/- for misbranded food and no provision for imprisonment. When an amendment is beneficial to the accused it can be applied even to cases pending in Courts where such a provision did not exist at the time of the commission of offence. (Para 9) A.K. Sarkar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 212

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002

Once a complaint under Section 44 (1)(b) of the PMLA is filed, it will be governed by Sections 200 to 205 of the CrPC as none of the said provisions are inconsistent with any of the provisions of the PMLA. (Para 23 (a)) Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

If the accused was not arrested by the ED till filing of the complaint, while taking cognizance on a complaint under Section 44(1)(b), as a normal rule, the Court should issue a summons to the accused and not a warrant. Even in a case where the accused is on bail, a summons must be issued. (Para 23 (b)) Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

In the facts of this case, the appellant will complete 3½ years of incarceration on 26th May, 2024. Thus, he will complete half of the prescribed sentence. In this case, obviously the trial has not started, as the charge has not been framed. This Court has held that Section 436A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "CRPC") will apply even to a case under the PMLA. But the Court can still deny the relief owing to the ground such as where the trial was delayed at the instance of the accused. As stated earlier, here there is no occasion for the appellant to cause the delay in trial, as even charge has not been framed. Moreover, there is no other circumstance brought on record which will compel us to deny the benefit of Section 436A of the CRPC to the appellant. Ajay Ajit Peter Kerkar v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 400

After a summons is issued under Section 204 of the CrPC on taking cognizance of the offence punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA on a complaint, if the accused appears before the Special Court pursuant to the summons, he shall not be treated as if he is in custody. Therefore, it is not necessary for him to apply for bail. However, the Special Court can direct the accused to furnish bond in terms of Section 88 of the CrPC. (Para 23 (c)) Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

In a case where the accused appears pursuant to a summons before the Special Court, on a sufficient cause being shown, the Special Court can grant exemption from personal appearance to the accused by exercising power under Section 205 of the CrPC. (Para 23 (d)) Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

If the accused does not appear after a summons is served or does not appear on a subsequent date, the Special Court will be well within its powers to issue a warrant in terms of Section 70 of the CrPC. Initially, the Special Court should issue a bailable warrant. If it is not possible to effect service of the bailable warrant, then the recourse can be taken to issue a nonbailable warrant. (Para 23 (e)) Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

A bond furnished according to Section 88 is only an undertaking by an accused who is not in custody to appear before the Court on the date fixed. Thus, an order accepting bonds under Section 88 from the accused does not amount to a grant of bail;. (Para 23 (f), Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

In a case where the accused has furnished bonds under Section 88 of the CrPC, if he fails to appear on subsequent dates, the Special Court has the powers under Section 89 read with Sections 70 of the CrPC to issue a warrant directing that the accused shall be arrested and produced before the Special Court; If such a warrant is issued, it will always be open for the accused to apply for cancellation of the warrant by giving an undertaking to the Special Court to appear before the said Court on all the dates fixed by it. While cancelling the warrant, the Court can always take an undertaking from the accused to appear before the Court on every date unless appearance is specifically exempted. When the ED has not taken the custody of the accused during the investigation, usually, the Special Court will exercise the power of cancellation of the warrant without insisting on taking the accused in custody provided an undertaking is furnished by the accused to appear regularly before the Court. When the Special Court deals with an application for cancellation of a warrant, the Special Court is not dealing with an application for bail. Hence, Section 45(1) will have no application to such an application. (Para 23 (g). Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

When an accused appears pursuant to a summons, the Special Court is empowered to take bonds under Section 88 of the CrPC in a given case. However, it is not mandatory in every case to direct furnishing of bonds. However, if a warrant of arrest has been issued on account of nonappearance or proceedings under Section 82 and/or Section 83 of the CrPC have been issued against an accused, he cannot be let off by taking a bond under Section 88 of the CrPC, and the accused will have to apply for cancellation of the warrant. (Para 23 (h), Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

After cognizance is taken of the offence punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA based on a complaint under Section 44 (1)(b), the ED and its officers are powerless to exercise power under Section 19 to arrest a person shown as an accused in the complaint. (Para 23 (i), Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

If the ED wants custody of the accused who appears after service of summons for conducting further investigation in the same offence, the ED will have to seek custody of the accused by applying to the Special Court. After hearing the accused, the Special Court must pass an order on the application by recording brief reasons. While hearing such an application, the Court may permit custody only if it is satisfied that custodial interrogation at that stage is required, even though the accused was never arrested under Section 19. However, when the ED wants to conduct a further investigation concerning the same offence, it may arrest a person not shown as an accused in the complaint already filed under Section 44(1)(b), provided the requirements of Section 19 are fulfilled. (Para 23 (j), Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : AIR 2024 SC 2512

A very strange and unusual Writ Petitions have been filed by the State against the Directorate of Enforcement under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, before the High Court seeking relief, which would indirectly stall or delay the inquiry/investigation. The Writ Petitions filed, at the instance of the State Government, challenging summons issued to the District Collectors prima facie appears to be thoroughly misconceived, and the impugned order passed by the High Court also being under utter misconception of law. Directorate of Enforcement v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 172

Once cognizance of a complaint filed under Section 44 is taken by the Special Court under the PMLA Act, the power to arrest vesting under Section 19 of the PMLA Act cannot be exercised. Tarsem Lal v. Directorate of Enforcement Jalandhar Zonal Office, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 191: AIR 2024 SC 2512

Section 2(1) (y), 2(1) (u) & 3 and Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 203 & 204 – Schedule offence – In absence of scheduled offence, there cannot be any proceeds of crime within the meaning Section 2(1) (u) of the PMLA. Proceeds of crime means any property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, by any person as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence or the value of any such property. Existence of the proceeds of crime is a condition precedent for the applicability of Section 3 of the PMLA. If there are no proceeds of crime, the offence under Section 3 of the PMLA is not made out. Hence, there is no need of the Special Court to apply its mind in accordance with Section 203 r.w 204 of the Cr.PC to find out whether a prima facie case is made out or not. (Para 4, 6 & 7) Yash Tuteja v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 310

Section 45 - The appellants have miserably failed to satisfy that there are reasonable grounds for believing that they are not guilty of the alleged offences. On the contrary, there is sufficient material collected by the respondent-ED to show that they are prima facie guilty of the alleged offences. (Para 30) Satyendar Kumar Jain v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 240 : AIR 2024 SC 1576

Preventive Detention

In a case where a detenue receives the ground of detention in the language known to him which contains a clear statement over his right to make a representation, there is no need for informing verbally once again. Sarfaraz Alam v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 15 : AIR 2024 SC 407 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 755 : (2024) 3 SCC 347

Difference between preventive and punitive detention – The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. An order of preventive detention, may be made before or during prosecution, with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. (Para 25) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733

Mere involvement in sexual offence not sufficient : Supreme Court quashes Preventive Detention Order. Vaddi Lakshmi v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 254

Prisoner

Guidelines and standard operating procedure for implementation of the scheme for support to poor prisoners. Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 151

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

Failure to mask victim's identity in POCSO case - Sensitization of Judicial and Police Officers ordered - In this order, the court considers an application for anticipatory bail in a case under the POCSO Act. While denying bail, the court notes a violation of Section 33(7) of the POCSO Act and Section 228A of the IPC regarding the disclosure of the victim's identity. Citing the importance of safeguarding the victim's identity, the court directs the need for sensitization of judicial and police officers in West Bengal to ensure compliance with these provisions. The order emphasizes that disclosing the victim's identity is permissible only in specific circumstances for the child's best interest. The court orders a copy of the order to be forwarded to the Registrar General of the High Court of Calcutta for further action. Utpal Mandal @ Utpal Mondal v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 282

'One day trial' in POCSO case - Supreme Court affirms High Court Order for fresh trial after setting aside conviction. Bablu Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 203

Property Law

U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953; Section 49 – The power to declare the ownership in an immovable property can be exercised only by a Civil Court save and except when such jurisdiction is barred expressly or by implication under a law. Section 49 cannot be construed as a bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine the ownership rights. It contemplates bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil or Revenue Court for the grant of declaration or adjudication of rights of tenure holders in respect of land lying in an area for which consolidation proceedings have commenced. Hence, the power under Section 49 cannot be exercised to take away the vested title of a tenure holder. Kalyan Singh had acquired ancestral rights as a tenure holder and was co-owner in the suit land much before the consolidation proceedings commenced. Held, the Consolidation Officer could not take away the ownership rights of Kalyan Singh which he had already inherited much before the commencement of the consolidation proceedings. Order passed by the Consolidation Officer has rightly been held to be null and void and without any jurisdiction. (Para 9, 12 & 13) Prashant Singh v. Meena, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 355

Mesne profits become payable on continuation of possession after 'expiry' of lease – A tenant who once entered the property in question lawfully, continues in possession after his right to do so stands extinguished, is liable to compensate the landlord for such time period after the right of occupancy expires. The effect of the words 'determination', 'expiry', 'forfeiture' and 'termination' would, subject to the facts applicable, be similar, i.e., when any of these three words are applied to a lease, the rights of the lessee/tenant stand extinguished and mesne profit would be payable. Held, the very purpose for which a property is rented out, is to ensure that the landlord by way of the property is able to secure some income. If the income remains static over a long period of time, then such a landlord would be within his rights, subject of course, to the agreement with their tenant, to be aggrieved by the same. Hence, deposit of the amount claimed by the petitioner-applicant is must to ensure complete justice inter se the parties. (Para 19, 20 & 21) Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar Huf v. Ashwin Bhanulal Desai, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 413

Tenant at sufferance – Such a tenant is a person who enters upon a land by lawful title, but continues in possession after the title has ended without statutory authority and without obtaining consent of the person then entitled. (Para 16.2) Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar Huf v. Ashwin Bhanulal Desai, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 413

Plea of adverse possession – Ingredients to prove the plea of adverse possession: - (a) The plaintiff must plead and prove that he was claiming possession adverse to the true owner; (b) The plaintiff must plead and establish that the factum of his long and continuous possession was known to the true owner; (c) The plaintiff must also plead and establish when he came into possession; and (d) The plaintiff must establish that his possession was open and undisturbed. It is a settled law that by pleading adverse possession, a party seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner, and therefore, there is no equity in his favour. The plea is based on continuous wrongful possession for a period of more than 12 years. Therefore, the facts constituting the ingredients of adverse possession must be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff. (Para 12) M. Radheshyamlal v. V. Sandhya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 245 : AIR 2024 SC 1595

Plea of adverse possession – When a party claims adverse possession, Firstly, he must know who the actual owner of the property is. Secondly, he must plead that he was in open and uninterrupted possession for more than 12 years to the original owner's knowledge. It is not pleaded that even before the year 1947, the plaintiff or his father were in hostile possession to the knowledge of the original owner. Therefore, there is no proper foundation for the plea of adverse possession in the plaint. Further, the plaintiff could not establish that his adverse possession commenced from a particular date. In a complaint filed to police one year before the institution of the suit the plaintiff asserted that he was in possession of the suit property for 35 years before filing the complaint. In the plaint, the plaintiff claimed to have been in possession since 1950. The plaintiff's own complaint defeats the case made out in the plaint. The plaintiff failed to prove his adverse possession. (Para 13, 15 & 16) M. Radheshyamlal v. V. Sandhya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 245 : AIR 2024 SC 1595

Public Service

Selection Process - Whether the error committed in the application form, which was uploaded is a material error or a trivial error and was the State justified in declaring the candidate as having failed on account of the same? Held, the candidate has participated in the selection process and cleared all the stages successfully. The error in the application is trivial which did not play any part in the selection process. The State was not justified in making a mountain out of this molehill. (Para 19) Vashist Narayan Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1 : AIR 2024 SC 248

Public Trust Doctrine

The aesthetic use and the pristine glory of the natural resources, the environment and the ecosystems of our country cannot be permitted to be eroded for private, commercial or any other use unless the courts find it necessary, in good faith, for the public good and in public interest to encroach upon the said resources. (Para 138) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : AIR 2024 SC 1955

The state holds natural resources in trust for the benefit of the public, ensuring that the common resources necessary for the well-being of the populace are protected against exploitation or degradation. It is important to balance economic interests with environmental and public welfare concerns. While the industry has played a role in economic growth, the health and welfare of the residents of the area is a matter of utmost concern and the State Government is responsible for preserving and protecting these concerns. (Para 25) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211

Railways Act, 1989

Section 106(3) – Applicability of Section 106(3) – Whether the present case is one of 'Overcharge' or 'Illegal Charge'? – Primary challenge is to the chargeable distance of 444 km in itself. The case of the respondent company is not that it has paid anything in excess of what was at the time of booking of the consignment required by law, rather, the respondent's case is that the charge which was required to be paid by the law as prevailing at the time of booking of the consignment was wrong. Held, as the same was admittedly charged as per the prevailing law and not due to any misapplication or mistake i.e., as per the old local distance table, this clearly is not a case of overcharge and would not fall within the four corners of Section 106(3) of the Act, 1989. Further held, the chargeable distance of 444 km was illegal. No infirmity with the impugned judgement and order passed by the High Court. The freight had been paid as per the notified chargeable distance which was later found to be incorrect, it was a case of “illegal charge” and not that of “overcharge”. (Para 105 & 107) Union of India v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : AIR 2024 SC 1820

Section 106 and Railways Act, 1890; Section 78B – Scope of Section 106(3) – Section 106 deals with notice for claim of compensation and refund of overcharge. Under Section 106(3) a statutory time-period of 6-months has been provided for making a notice of claim for a refund of an 'overcharge' and if the notice of claim is not made within the stipulated period, then the claim becomes time-barred. The rigours of Section 106(3) of the Act, 1989 will only be applicable where the claim is for a refund of an 'overcharge'. (Para 59) Union of India v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : AIR 2024 SC 1820

Section 106(3) – Condition for Notice for Claim for Refund of Overcharge is: Claim must be for refund of an 'Overcharge', Overcharge must have been paid to the Railway Administration in respect of the goods carried by the railway, notice must be issued within 6-months from the date of payment or delivery of goods for which overcharge was paid, and Notice must be served to the concerned railway administration to whom the overcharge was paid. (Para 43) Union of India v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : AIR 2024 SC 1820

Difference between 'overcharge' and 'illegal charge' – An 'overcharge' is any sum charged in excess or more than what was payable as per law. Whereas, for an illegal charge, the sum must not have been payable by law. An Overcharge is effectively concerned with the error in the quantum of what was or should be payable, whereas an illegal charge is solely concerned with whether a particular thing was payable by the law / in conformity with the law or not. (Para 60, 70 & 74) Union of India v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : AIR 2024 SC 1820

Recruitment

Power of court to interfere in recruitment process – Courts should be cautious and slow in dealing with recruitment process adopted by the recruitment agency. Merely because a recruitment agency is not in a position to satisfy the Court, a relief cannot be extended to a deprived candidate, as it will have a cascading effect on the entire recruitment process. The courts are duty bound to take into consideration the relevant orders, rules and enactments before finally deciding the case. Whether a candidate is fit for a particular post or not has to be decided by the duly constituted Selection Committee which has the expertise on the subject. The decision of the Selection Committee can be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality or patent material irregularity in the constitution of the Committee or its procedure vitiating the selection, or proved mala fides affecting the selection etc. Recruitment made in favour of respondent 2 is restored. (Para 14) Telangana Residential Educational Institutions Recruitment Board v. Saluvadi Sumalatha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : AIR 2024 SC 1434

Process of recruitment – Ratio of seats – 30% of the posts meant for both locals and non-locals have to be mandatorily filled up first before going for the remaining 70%. Government notification stated that all Departments are directed to maintain 70% of reservation in direct Recruitment to Locals maintaining the 30:70 ratio. The High Court fell into an error in not only adopting a wrong ratio but also fixing 70% first. (Para 13) Telangana Residential Educational Institutions Recruitment Board v. Saluvadi Sumalatha, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : AIR 2024 SC 1434

Order of cancellation of selection – On grounds of non-disclosure of any criminal antecedent in recruitment – Non-disclosure, could not be deemed fatal. The order of cancellation is neither fair nor reasonable. Broad-brushing every non-disclosure as a disqualification, will be unjust and the same will tantamount to being completely oblivious to the ground realities obtaining in this great, vast and diverse country. Each case will depend on the facts and circumstances that prevail thereon, and the court will have to take a holistic view, based on objective criteria, with the available precedents serving as a guide. It can never be a one size fits all scenario. (Para 30) Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : (2024) 5 SCC 264

Character verification procedure challenged – The order of cancellation does not follow the mandate prescribed in Clause 4 of the Form of verification of character. Instead of considering whether the appellant was suitable for appointment, the Appointing Authority has mechanically held his selection was irregular and illegal because the appellant had furnished an affidavit with incorrect facts. (Para 29) Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : (2024) 5 SCC 264

Determination of nature of relief – Essentials to be looked into by the court while adjudging suitability of the candidate for the office – The nature of the office, the timing and nature of the criminal case; the overall consideration of the judgement of acquittal; the nature of the query in the application / verification form; the contents of the character verification reports; the socio economic strata of the individual applying; the other antecedents of the candidate; the nature of consideration and the contents of the cancellation / termination order are some of the crucial aspects which should enter the judicial verdict in adjudging suitability and in determining the nature of relief to be ordered. (Para 28) Ravindra Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 155 : (2024) 5 SCC 264

Registration Act, 1908

Section 47 - A registered sale deed operates from the date of execution when the entire consideration is paid. Changes made in a sale deed by one party unilaterally, after the registration of the deed and without the knowledge of the other party, have to be ignored. (Para 11) Kanwar Raj Singh v Gejo, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 4 : AIR 2024 SC 238 : (2024) 2 SCC 416

Remission

A woman deserves respect howsoever high or low she may be otherwise considered in society or to whatever faith she may follow or any creed she may belong to. Can heinous crimes, inter alia, against women permit remission of the convicts by a reduction in their sentence and by granting them liberty? These are the issues which arise in these writ petitions. (Para 1) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

If a criminal is curable, he ought to be improved by education and other suitable arts, and then set free again as a better citizen and less of a burden to the state. This postulate lies at the heart of the policy of remission. In addition, there are also competing interests involved– the rights of the victim and the victim's family to justice vis-a-vis a convict's claim to a second chance by way of remission or reduction of his sentence for reformation. (Para 1) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Reasons for grant or refusal of remission should be clearly delineated in the order by passing a speaking order. (Para 55 (h) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Remission: Scope & Ambit - Discussed. (Para 22 - 39) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

The factors that govern the grant of remission namely: i. Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large? ii. Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime? iii. Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime? iv. Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this convict any more? v. Socio-economic condition of the convict's family. (Para 48) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

The question regarding maintainability of a PIL challenging orders of remission is kept open to be considered in any other appropriate case. (Para 27) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

The policy of remission applicable would therefore be the Policy of the State which is the appropriate Government and which has the jurisdiction to consider that application. The policy of remission applicable at the time of the conviction could apply and only if for any reason, the said policy cannot be made applicable a more benevolent policy, if in vogue, could apply. (Para 55 (d) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

When an application for remission is granted under the provisions of the Constitution, the following among other tests may apply to consider its legality by way of judicial review of the same. (i) that the order has been passed without application of mind; (ii) that the order is mala fide; (iii) that the order has been passed on extraneous or wholly irrelevant considerations; (iv) that relevant materials have been kept out of consideration; (v) that the order suffers from arbitrariness. (Para 55 (i) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

While considering an application for remission, there cannot be any abuse of discretion. In this regard, it is necessary to bear in mind the following aspects as mentioned in Laxman Naskar v. State of West Bengal, (2000) 2 SCC 595, namely, - (i) Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large? (ii) Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing crime? (iii) Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing crime? (iv) Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this convict any more? (v) Socio-economic condition of the convict's family. (Para 55 (e) Bilkis Yakub Rasool v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 22 : AIR 2024 SC 289

Rent Control

Rent Control Act, 1999 (Maharashtra); Section 16(1)(k) - Eviction of a tenant cannot be ordered merely based on a demolition notice issued by the Municipal body. The Court has to examine the "immediate urgency" of the need for demolition. (Para 13) Baitulla Ismail Shaikh v. Khatija Ismail Panhalkar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 79 : AIR 2024 SC 846

Representation of Peoples Act, 1951

Code of Civil procedure, 1908; Order VIII Rule 9 and Representation of Peoples Act, 1951; Section 86(5) – Replication of pleading – Discretionary jurisdiction of High court to grant leave to file replication – Leave granted to the election petitioner to file a replication in answer to the new facts asserted in the written statement is challenged – Replication, though not a pleading as per Rule 1 of Order VI, is permissible with the leave of the Court under Order VIII Rule 9 of the CPC, which gives a right to file a reply in defence to set-off or counter-claim set up in the written statement. Section 86(5) of the 1951 Act provides that the High Court may allow the particulars of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified in such manner as may, in its opinion, be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition, but it shall not allow any amendment of the petition which will have the effect of introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. Further, while considering grant of leave, the Court must bear in mind that, — (a) a replication is not needed to merely traverse facts pleaded in the written statement; (b) a replication is not a substitute for an amendment; and (c) a new cause of action or plea inconsistent with the plea taken in original petition/plaint is not to be permitted in the replication. Held, the non-disclosure of bank accounts, alleged in the election petition, was sought to be explained by the returned candidate in his written statement. The replication only sought explain the averments made in the written statement and does not seek to incorporate any new material facts or a new cause of action to question the election. Hence, leave to file replication was justified and well within the discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court. (Para 16, 17, 18 & 20) Sheikh Noorul Hassan v. Nahakpam Indrajit Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : AIR 2024 SC 2360

Code of Civil procedure, 1908 and Representation of peoples Act, 1951; Section 87 – Jurisdiction of High Court in an election petition – An election petition is to be tried, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the CPC to the trial of suits subject to the provisions of the 1951 Act and of any rules made thereunder. The High Court, acting as an Election Tribunal, subject to the provisions of the 1951 Act and the rules made thereunder, is vested with all such powers as are vested in a civil court under the CPC. Hence, in exercise of its powers under Order VIII Rule 9 of the CPC, the High Court is empowered to grant leave to an election petitioner to file a replication. (Para 15 & 20) Sheikh Noorul Hassan v. Nahakpam Indrajit Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : AIR 2024 SC 2360

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016

The RPWD Act came into force on 19 April 2017. Though over seven years have elapsed since the enactment of the law, the implementation across the country is still in a dismal state. Many States had not framed the rules under the RPWD Act, which under Section 101(1), they were required to frame within six months from the date of commencement. Seema Girija v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 322

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013

Though, the Right to Property is no more a Fundamental Right, still it is recognized as a Constitutional Right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Depriving a citizen of his Constitutional Right to use the land for 20 years and then showing graciousness by paying the compensation and beating drums that the State has been gracious is unacceptable. The state is not doing charity by paying compensation to the citizens for acquisition of land. (Para 25 & 26) Sudha Bhalla @ Sudha Punchi v. Rakesh Kumar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 167

Sale

Ownership over property can't be claimed when a sale deed is executed by a person having no title. Savitri Bai v. Savitri Bai, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 178 : AIR 2024 SC 1193

Sale agreement with minor void, not enforceable in law. Krishnaveni v. M.A. Shagul Hameed, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 165

SARFAESI Act

Principle underlying Sections 73 and 74 of the Indian Contract Act 1872 - that the compensation payable due to a breach of contract is limited to the losses suffered by the other party due to the breach - did not apply to an auction purchase under the SARFAESI Act. (Para 68) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

The SARFAESI Act is a special legislation with an overriding effect on the general law more particularly the Indian Contract Act, 1872. (Para 68) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

The underlying principle envisaged under Section(s) 73 & 74 of the 1872 Act which is a general law will have no application, when it comes to the SARFAESI Act more particularly the forfeiture of earnest-money deposit which has been statutorily provided under Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules as a consequence of the auction purchaser's failure to deposit the balance amount. (Para 68) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002; Rule 9 (5) - Consequence of forfeiture of 25% of the deposit under Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules is a legal consequence that has been statutorily provided in the event of default in payment of the balance amount. The consequence envisaged under Rule 9(5) follows irrespective of whether a subsequent sale takes place at a higher price or not, and this forfeiture is not subject to any recovery already made or to the extent of the debt owed. In such cases, no extent of equity can either substitute or dilute the statutory consequence of forfeiture of 25% of deposit under Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules. (Para 111) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002; Rule 9 (5) - Entire earnest money deposited by an auction purchaser would be forfeited as per Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules on the failure to deposit the remaining amount within the stipulated period. (Para 68) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002; Rule 9(5) of the SARFAESI Rules puts a mandatory requirement on the successful auction purchaser to deposit a 25% amount after the sale is confirmed by the secured creditor in favor of the auction purchaser. Moreover, the Rule makes it clear that in default of payment of the remaining 75% amount by the auction purchaser within the period mentioned in Rule 9(4) i.e., 15 days, the deposit shall be forfeited by the secured creditor and the auction purchaser would not be entitled to receive the 25% deposited earnest money. Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002; Rule 9 (5) - Secured creditor's right to forfeit the earnest deposit amount by the auction purchaser doesn't arise due to loss or damage suffered due to a breach of contract but under a statutory requirement mentioned under SARFAESI Rules. (Para 111) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002

Section 17 and Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 20024; Rule 8(6) & 8(7) – Auction sale set aside on grounds of non-compliance of the statutory provisions in conducting the sale – Mandatory notice of 30 days was not given to the Borrower before holding the auction/sale proceedings. Hence, auction sale is set aside. Bank is directed to refund the auction sale money to the appellants. (Para 4 & 12) Govind Kumar Sharma v. Bank of Baroda, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 325

Right of bank to claim possession of property – Held, once the auction sale is set aside, the status of the appellants as owners would automatically revert to that of tenants (as it was before the auction sale) and the Bank would have no right to claim actual physical possession from the appellants nor would the appellants be under any obligation to handover physical possession to the Bank. (Para 12) Govind Kumar Sharma v. Bank of Baroda, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 325

SEBI

SEBI's wide powers, coupled with its expertise and robust information gathering mechanism, lend a high level of credibility to its decisions as a regulatory, adjudicatory and prosecuting agency. (Para 17 (d)) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414

The Court must be mindful of the public interest that guides the functioning of SEBI and refrain from substituting its own wisdom in place of the actions of SEBI. (Para 17 (e)) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414

The power of the Court to enter the regulatory domain of SEBI in framing delegated legislation is limited. The court must refrain from substituting its own wisdom over the regulatory policies of SEBI. The scope of judicial review when examining a policy framed by a specialized regulator is to scrutinise whether it violates fundamental rights, any provision of the Constitution, any statutory provision or is manifestly arbitrary. (Para 67 (a)) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act 1989

To punish a person for casteist insults under SC / ST Act, comments have to be made within public view. Priti Agarwalla v. State of GNCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 394

Section 3(1)(xi) - Conviction for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(xi) of the Act 1989 cannot be sustained if the act of outraging the modesty of a woman was not committed on the ground of caste. (Para 8 & 11) Dashrath Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 66

Section 3(2)(v) – It is nowhere the case of the prosecution that the offence committed upon the deceased was on the basis of his caste. From the admitted allegations of the prosecution, the necessary ingredients of the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act are not made out. Prosecution for the offence is ex facie illegal and unwarranted. (Para 16 & 18) Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : AIR 2024 SC 1405 : (2024) 3 SCC 665 : 2024 Cri LJ 1461

Section 4 – Taking cognizance of an offence punishable for the negligence of duty by a public servant – To constitute a prima facie case of negligence of duty, the proviso to section 4(2) contemplates an administrative enquiry and recommendations. The absence of recommendation would bar taking cognizance by the Court. The proviso is an inbuilt safeguard to the public servant from initiation of prosecution by every dissatisfied complainant. Held, for taking cognizance for an offence of commission and omission under section 4(2) of the Act of 1989, the recommendation of the administrative enquiry is a sine qua non. The recommendation of administrative enquiry on alleged failure of duty or function by a public servant would make the neglect of an offence clear and the cognizance of such an offence is legal. Further held, the Magistrate did not call for an administrative enquiry report on the dereliction of duties complained against the named public servants. Taking up the merits of the negligence of duty by the public servant without the recommendation of the administrative enquiry is impermissible. Hence, no case warranting penal proceedings under section 4 has been made out and the impugned judgment, directing penal prosecution is not in conformity with the mandate of law. (Para 13. 2, 13. 3, 13.4, 14.4 & 17) State of GNCT of Delhi v. Praveen Kumar @ Prashant, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 422

Section 4(1) – Ingredients for taking cognizance of an offence punishable for the negligence of duty by a public servant – The provision has the following facets: i. Firstly, section 4(1) is meant to operate against a public servant, and the threshold requirement is that the public servant shall not be a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe; ii. Secondly, such a public servant willfully neglects his duties, as mandated under the Act of 1989 and the Rules of 1995. (Para 13) State of GNCT of Delhi v. Praveen Kumar @ Prashant, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 422

Section 4(2) – Duties for performance by a public servant – Section 4(2) uses the word 'include' which is a phrase of extension and not of restrictive connotations. The word 'include' is not equivalent to 'mean'. The words and phrases in sub-section (2) must be construed as comprehending not only such acts as they signify according to their natural import but also those which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. (Para 13.1 & 13.2) State of GNCT of Delhi v. Praveen Kumar @ Prashant, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 422

Section 4(2) – Object of a proviso – The main function of a proviso is to put a qualification and to attach a condition to the main provision. It indicates the exceptions to the provision but may aid in explaining what is meant to be conveyed by its part. A proviso is enacted to modify the immediately preceding language. (Para 13.4) State of GNCT of Delhi v. Praveen Kumar @ Prashant, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 422

Service Law

Entitlement of post-retiral benefits and terminal dues – The appellant(s) have continued to work initially as seasonal/daily wage employees but thereafter regularized and have continued to work till their superannuation. Held, considering the fact that the appellant(s) have worked for a long period (over 30 years), it would be unreasonable and unfair to deny them post retiral benefits or terminal dues as may be admissible to the regular government employees. Hence, the appellant(s) would be entitled to all consequential benefits. (Para 3, 5 & 9) Anand Prakash Mani Tripathi v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 417

Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Samvida Shala Shikshak (Employment and Conditions of Contract) Rules, 2005; Rule 7A – Recruitment rule challenged – Denial of Appointment in question – The State Government exercising powers conferred upon it by Section 95(1) r.w. Section 70(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 promulgated recruitment rules – In spite of having passed the selection exam, the State Government took the shield of an amended rule i.e. Rule 7-A, issued on 29th July, 2009 for denying relief to the appellant herein, even when the said rule had no retrospective application. Further, in spite of the High Court having struck down the said rule and passing repeated orders in favour of the appellant, another notification dated 21st March, 2018 was issued making the amended rule effective from 1st January, 2008 i.e. prior to the date of recruitment. Hence, this was clearly a mala fide action in an attempt to circumvent the orders passed by the High Court by hook or by crook so as to prevent the appellant and her peers of their lawful claim to appointment which stood crystalized long back. Held, the appointment order will be effective from the date on which the first appointment order pursuant to the selection process dated 31st August, 2008 came to be issued. (Para 8 & 11) Smita Shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : AIR 2024 SC 2292

Civil Services (House Rent Allowance and City Compensation Allowance) Rules, 1992 (Jammu and Kashmir) – Rule 6(h)(i) and 6(h)(ii) – Entitlement to claim House Rent Allowance (HRA) – Held, the appellant being a Government employee, could not have claimed HRA while sharing rent free accommodation allotted to his father, a retired Government servant. Hence, appeal is dismissed. (Para 9, 10) R.K. Munshi v. Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 364 : AIR 2024 SC 2145

Civil Services (House Rent Allowance and City Compensation Allowance) Rules, 1992 (Jammu and Kashmir) – Rule 6(h)(iv) – Claim of HRA after demitting office – Appellant's Retired Father Could Not Claim HRA Upon Suppernuation from service. Held, Rule 6(h)(iv) has no application in present case. (Para 9) R.K. Munshi v. Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 364 : AIR 2024 SC 2145

Madhya Pradesh State Service Examination Rules, 2015; Rule 4(3)(d)(III) – Amended Rule 4(3)(d)(III) is challenged to be ultravires– The amended Rule 4(3)(d)(III) read as, that meritorious reservation category candidates, who did not avail any benefit of relaxation, are not to be clubbed with meritorious unreserved category candidates at the time of declaring the result of the preliminary examination itself. Such adjustment will only be at the time of final selection, not at the time of preliminary/main examination – Held, amended Rule 4(3)(d)(III) patently harmed the interests of the reservation category candidates, as even meritorious candidates from such categories, who had not availed any reservation benefit/relaxation, continued to occupy the reservation category slots which would have otherwise gone to deserving reservation category candidates lower down in the merit list of that category, had they been included with meritorious unreserved category candidates on the strength of their marks. Further held, the State of Madhya Pradesh itself realized the harm that it was doing to the reservation category candidates and chose to restore Rule 4, as it stood earlier, which enabled drawing up the result of the preliminary examination by segregating deserving meritorious reservation category candidates with meritorious unreserved category candidates at the preliminary examination stage itself. (Para 8, 30 & 32) Deependra Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 342 : AIR 2024 SC 2147

Madhya Pradesh State Service Examination Rules, 2015 – Normalization of marks – Normalization was undertaken in the context of the marks obtained by candidates in the two main examinations by applying a formula, so as to bring them all on an even keel so as to finalize the list of candidates eligible to be interviewed. This was done by applying a formula uniformly to the marks secured by all the candidates who appeared in the two main examinations, so that their marks would become comparable and enable preparation of a unified marks list. Held, the process of normalization and the consequential merger of the marks secured by the candidates who appeared in the two main examinations cannot be found fault with. (Para 26 & 29) Deependra Yadav v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 342 : AIR 2024 SC 2147

Consumer Protection (Qualification for Appointment, Method of Recruitment, Procedure for Appointment, Term of Office, Resignation and Removal of the President and Members of the State Commission and District Commission) Rules 2020 - No written test would be either feasible or practicable for the appointment of the President of the SCDRC for which a former Judge of the High Court is eligible for appointment. Hence, insofar as appointments to the post of President of the SCDRC are concerned, we direct that the requirement of holding a written examination and viva voce in the terms as envisaged shall stand relaxed for the present. At the same time, it is clarified that the appointments to the office of President of the SCDRC shall be made in consultation with and subject to the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court. (Para 4) Ganeshkumar Rajeshwarrao Selukar v. Mahendra Bhaskar Limaye, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 236

It is not open for an employer to change the qualifications prescribed in the advertisement midstream, during the course of the ongoing selection process. Any such action would be hit by the vice of arbitrariness as it would tantamount to denial of an opportunity to those candidates who are eligible in terms of the advertisement but would stand disqualified on the basis of a change in the eligibility criteria after the same is announced by the employer. (Para 8) Anil Kishore Pandit v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 233

PAR Rules; Rule 5(1) – Mandatory nature of timelines – Outcome of contravention of timelines prescribed under the schedule in view of Rule 5(1) of the PAR Rules – The previous performance appraisal report(s) of Respondent were admittedly beyond the timelines prescribed under the Schedule, however within the period prescribed under Rule 5(1) of the PAR Rules. The High Court observed that the timelines prescribed under the Schedule were not water-tight and in fact, were flexible. Admittedly, the Accepting Authority has met the timelines prescribed under Rule 5(1) of the PAR Rules and accordingly, there is no reason to expunge the remarks and overall grades awarded to Respondent by the Accepting Authority on the PAR on account of a contravention of the timelines prescribed under the Schedule. (Para 19, 20 & 21) State of Haryana v. Ashok Khemka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 220 : AIR 2024 SC 1397

Reduction of grade by accepting authority challenged on grounds of prejudice – Contention of prejudice caused cannot be accepted on account of the fact that Respondent was awarded an overall grade '9' which undisputedly forms a part of the 'outstanding' grade i.e., the highest category awarded to an IAS officer. There can be no qualm that the said overall grade is more than sufficient for the purposes of empanelment / promotion vis-à-vis Respondent. (Para 24) State of Haryana v. Ashok Khemka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 220 : AIR 2024 SC 1397

Validity of transfer order – Absence of malafide intention – Even if transfer order was made on the recommendation of an MLA, that by itself would not vitiate the transfer order. It is the duty of the representatives of the people in the legislature to express the grievances of the people and if there is any complaint against an official the State Government is certainly within its jurisdiction to transfer such an employee. (Para 9.3) Pubi Lombi v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 231

Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989 (Rajasthan); Rule 24(4) which provides that no candidate shall be eligible for appointment to the service who has more than two children on or after 01.06.2002 is non-discriminatory and does not violate the Constitution. Ramji Lal Jat v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 175

Central Industrial Security Forces (CISF) Rules, 2010; Rule 61 - Free Accommodation - All CISF personnel entitled to House Rent Allowance (HRA) if they are not provided accommodation. Union of India v. Paramisivan M., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 134

Military Nursing Service - Terminating women officer on ground of marriage - Such rule was exfacie manifestly arbitrary, as terminating employment because the woman has got married is a coarse case of gender discrimination and inequality. Acceptance of such patriarchal rule undermines human dignity, right to non-discrimination and fair treatment. Laws and regulations based on gender-based bias are constitutionally impermissible. Rules making marriage of women employees and their domestic involvement a ground for disentitlement would be unconstitutional. Union of India v. Ex. Lt. Selina John, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 135

Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 2022 (Gujarat); Rule 25 - Qualifying service of a government employee - Qualifying service for the purpose of calculating terminal benefits / pensionary benefits under the Pension Rules would include prior services rendered by such person under inter alia the Central Government provided that (i) the employment of such person under the Central Government encompassed an underlying pension scheme; and (ii) such person came to be absorbed by the State Government. The Appellant has most certainly, 'implicitly' been absorbed by the State Government i.e., the Appellants' participation in the selection process was prefaced by an NOC from the Central Government; and subsequently was followed by the tender of a technical resignation to the Central Government upon securing employment with the State Government. The interpretation sought to limit the benefit of Rule 25(ix) only to such person(s) who may have 'explicitly' been absorbed by the State Government is narrow and restrictive. (Para 14 & 18) Vinod Kanjibhai Bhagora v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 108

Constitution of India – Special leave Petition against order of High Court – To set aside impugned termination order – Class-IV employee, when in financial hardship, may represent directly to the superior but that by itself cannot amount to major misconduct for which punishment of termination from service should be imposed. It is trite law that ordinarily the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer should not be interfered by the appellate authority or by the writ court. However, when the finding of guilt recorded by the Inquiry Officer is based on perverse finding the same can always be interfered. Termination from service order is liable to be set aside. Chatrapal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : AIR 2024 SC 948

Pension – Objective - Pension is earned by a government servant in lieu of tireless service rendered by him / her during the course of their employment; and often is an important consideration for person(s) seeking government employment. The raison d'etre qua the grant of pension by the State Government would inextricably be linked to a concentrated effort by the State Government to enable its former employee(s) to tide over the vagaries and vicissitudes associated with old age vide a pension scheme. (Para 10) Vinod Kanjibhai Bhagora v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 108

Pension – Delegated Beneficial legislation - Pension scheme(s) floated by the State Government form a part of delegated beneficial legislation; and ought to be interpreted widely subject to such interpretation not running contrary to the express provisions of the Pension Rules. (Para 17) Vinod Kanjibhai Bhagora v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 108

The state government is entitled to do the recovery of entitlements received by the officer as the entitlement so received were granted pursuant to the order dated 4th August 2011 issued by the Principal Secretary that was not consistent with the orders issued by the Government orders of the Finance Department. Dr. Balbir Singh Bhandari v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : AIR 2024 SC 701

Stoppage of Salary - While the State sanctioned two vacancies, the school went ahead and recruited three. The State has no proof of commission of any malpractice by the teachers. The State approved their appointments, and the approval order till date has not been cancelled. The appointments have not been terminated. No action has been taken against the school and the school continues to receive the aid. Held, the teachers were not at fault and the State could not have abruptly stopped their salaries. (Para 22 & 34) Radhey Shyam Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 9 : AIR 2024 SC 260

Employees of Private Schools (Condition of Service) Act, 1977 (Maharashtra); Section 7 and Employees of Private Schools (Condition of Service) Rules, 1981 (Maharashtra); Rule 40 – Termination of service challenged – On grounds of non-compliance of MEPS Act and Rules while accepting the resignation – Section 7 of the MEPS Act and Rule 40 of the Rules does not impose any guidelines for acceptance of the resignation upon the management. Held, mere non communication of acceptance of resignation to the employee would not render the termination invalid. (Para 18 & 23) Shriram Manohar Bande v. Uktranti Mandal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 329 : AIR 2024 SC 2325

Employees of Private Schools (Condition of Service) Act, 1977 (Maharashtra); Section 7 and Employees of Private Schools (Condition of Service) Rules, 1981 (Maharashtra); Rule 40 – Termination of service challenged – On grounds of non-compliance of MEPS Act and Rules while accepting the resignation – Power of school committee to accept resignation – Held, the appellant himself had addressed his resignation letter to the school committee, which placed it before the management, upon which the management committee passed a resolution accepting the resignation. Further held, the School Committee consists of four representatives of the management, making it evident that management was involved in the process of considering and accepting the resignation letter. Hence, the appellant failed to prove any error in the findings of the High Court that the acceptance of resignation was in compliance with the requirements of MEPS Act and Rules. (Para 15) Shriram Manohar Bande v. Uktranti Mandal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 329 : AIR 2024 SC 2325

Regularization of employment – Change in nature of employment through continuous service – Held, the essence of employment and the rights thereof cannot be merely determined by the initial terms of appointment when the actual course of employment has evolved significantly over time. Continuous service in capacities of regular employees, performing duties indistinguishable from those in permanent posts, and selection through a process that mirrors that of regular recruitment, constitutes a substantive departure from the temporary nature of the initial engagement. Reliance on procedural formalities cannot be used to perpetually deny substantive rights that have accrued over a considerable period through continuous service. Further, promotion was based on a specific notification for vacancies, followed by a selection process involving written tests and interviews. Hence, the service conditions, as evolved over time, warrant a reclassification from temporary to regular status. The appellants are entitled to be considered for regularization in their respective posts. (Para 5 & 6) Vinod Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 330

Prospective Application of Judgment - B.Ed. Qualification for Primary School Teachers - Review Petition - Equitable Retention of Employment - Bridge Course Requirement - The Judgment delivered on 11th August, 2023, concerning the eligibility criteria for B.Ed. candidates to be appointed as primary school teachers, shall have prospective operation. Candidates appointed prior to this date, based on B.Ed. qualification without any disqualification imposed by a court of law or without a stipulation that their appointment was subject to the final outcome of a case, shall retain their employment. However, such candidates must undergo a bridge course within a year from the date of the judgment to validate their appointments. The National Council for Teacher Education, under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, is directed to devise this course, applicable nationwide. Failure to complete the course within the specified timeframe will invalidate the appointment. The court further extends these directions to cover all similar cases pending in different judicial fora across states and union territories. Devesh Sharma v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 297 : AIR 2023 SC 3895

Regularization of service – UGC directions must be followed by universities – UGC's letter to University directing regularization of the teachers who were selected through a regular selection process and possessed required qualifications was not followed by university. Appellants' appointments were made according to a regular selection process. Held, considering the statutory position of UGC, there was no reason for the University not to follow directions of UGC. The University's action of not continuing them and starting a fresh selection process is unjust, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the employment of the appellants will have to be continued after merger with the regular establishment of the University. Respondents directed to reinstate the appellants. (Para 20, 23 & 28) Meher Fatima Hussain v. Jamia Milia Islamia, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 303 : AIR 2024 SC 2097

Termination from service – Violation of principles of natural justice – Termination of the services of the appellant without holding disciplinary enquiry was unjustified and dehors the requirements of law and in gross violation of principles of natural justice. Termination order declared illegal and appellant reinstated in service. (Para 19 & 20) Sandeep Kumar v. GB Pant Institute of Engineering and Technology, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 308 : AIR 2024 SC 1916

Sexual Offence

Refusal of accused in sexual offence case to undergo medical examination shows unwillingness to cooperate with investigation. X v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 419

Shops and Establishments

Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 (Tamil Nadu); Section 2(3) & 2(6) – Industrial establishment – For an establishment to be covered under the definition of establishment under the 1947 Act, unless it is one of those specifically mentioned, it must satisfy being a commercial establishment. For any establishment to be commercial, it has to be established that the activities undertaken by it are for making some monetary gain. (Para 19 & 21) Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation Ltd. v. Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation Employees Welfare Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 402

Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985

Section 22(1) - If the recovery proceedings against the Sick Company do not pose a threat to its properties or have adversely impacted the scheme of the revival of the Sick Company, then there wouldn't be a bar for filing a suit for the recovery of the dues against the Sick Company. Fertilizer Corporation of India Ltd. v. Coromandal Sacks Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 338

Society

Societies Registration Act, 1860; Section 15 - Such members in default of membership fee would not be entitled to vote and would not be counted as members of the Society. If they were not entitled to vote and they were not to be counted as members, there would be no illegality or for that matter any prejudice being caused by not issuing any notice as the same would be an exercise in futility. (Para 22) Adv. Babasaheb Wasade v. Manohar Gangadhar Muddeshwar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 59 : AIR 2024 SC 768

Special Economic Zones Act, 2005

Section 49(1)(b) and Electricity Act, 2003; Section 14(b) – Deemed to be a distribution licensee – The Ministry of Commerce & Industry (MoCI), vide the 2010 Notification has specified that the 'developer' of the SEZ shall be deemed to be a 'distribution licensee' under the provisions of the Electricity Act. The proviso inserted vide the 2010 Notification, in section 14(b) of the Electricity Act, Provided that the Developer of a SEZ shall be deemed to be a licensee with effect from the date of notification of such SPZ – Held, the proviso to section 14(b) of the Electricity Act is to confer upon an entity like the appellant a status which is otherwise available in accordance with the Electricity Act. With this inclusion it is evident that a SEZ developer is deemed to be a distribution licensee. Once the appellant is a (deemed) distribution licensee, certain benefits and/or privileges do enure in its favour. Accordingly, if CSS is payable by a distribution licensee, the deemed distribution licensee is equally liable to pay the same. (Para 13 & 14, 20) Sundew Properties Ltd. v. Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 393

Specific Relief Act, 1963

Section 12 – Admissibility of deposition of a Power of Attorney Holder – Power of Attorney Holder cannot depose for principal in respect of matters of which only principal can have personal knowledge and in respect of which the principal is liable to be cross-examined – It is necessary for the plaintiff to step into the witness box and depose the said fact and subject himself to cross-examination on that issue. Held, the plaintiff/appellant has failed to enter into the witness box and subject himself to cross-examination, he has not been able to prove the prerequisites of Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. (Para 9, 12 & 13) Rajesh Kumar v. Anand Kumar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 407

Section 20 – Specific Performance – The grant of decree for specific performance is always discretionary and depends on the conduct of the person. Considering the plaintiffs' conduct of making false and/or incorrect statements in the plaint, which were very material, we hold that the plaintiffs are disentitled to relief of specific performance. The relief of specific performance is an equitable relief, hence a person who seeks equity must do equity. (Para 9 & 14) Major Gen. Darshan Singh v. Brij Bhushan Chaudhary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 182 : AIR 2024 SC 1330 : (2024) 3 SCC 489

Land Revenue Code; Section 36A – Specific performance of agreement to sell –The stage of taking previous sanction under Section 36A of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1959 had not arisen in the present case, for the reason that the defendant did not come forward to execute the sale deed. Courts could not have declined to grant the decree for specific performance on the basis of non-compliance of Section 36A inasmuch as the considerations under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 only had to be made for the purpose of adjudicating the suit between the parties. As the plaintiff has performed his part of the agreement as required under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the plaintiff is entitled to the relief specific performance of the agreement to sell. On grant of the decree of specific performance, the appellant-plaintiff shall proceed under Section 36A of Act of 1959 before seeking conveyance of the subject land in his favour in case the defendant is a tribal. Babasaheb Dhondiba Kute v. Radhu Vithoba Barde, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : (2024) 4 SCC 310

Where there is no reason to decline a decree for specific performance, the Courts ought to grant the same rather than give an alternative relief. Babasaheb Dhondiba Kute v. Radhu Vithoba Barde, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : (2024) 4 SCC 310

Section 34 - A suit for declaration of title without seeking recovery of possession is not maintainable when the plaintiff is not in possession. In this regard, a plaint could be amended at any suit stage, even at the second appellate stage. (Para 33) Vasantha v. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 117 : (2024) 5 SCC 282

The person who claims adverse possession must show the following: (a) on what date he came into possession; (b) what was the nature of his possession; (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party; (d) how long his possession has continued; and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. (Para 20) Vasantha v. Rajalakshmi @ Rajam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 117 : (2024) 5 SCC 282

When a contract stipulates a specific time frame within which the consideration needs to be paid by the 'buyer' to execute the 'agreement to sale' by the 'seller', then the buyer must strictly adhere to such condition, otherwise, the 'buyer' can not avail a remedy of specific performance of the sale deed. Alagammal v. Ganesan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 27 : AIR 2024 SC 683 : (2024) 3 SCC 232

Stamp

Stamp Act, 1958 (Bombay); Section 2(l) & Article 10 of Schedule-I – Form No. 5 is not an instrument. It is only the articles which are an instrument within the meaning of Section 2(l) of the Stamp Act and accordingly have been mentioned in Article 10 of Schedule-I of the Stamp Act. Stamp Duty is affixed on Form No. 5 only as a matter of practical convenience because a company itself cannot carry out the alterations and record the increase in share capital in its Articles of Association. (Para 9) State of Maharashtra v. National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : AIR 2024 SC 2037

Stamp Act, 1958 (Bombay); Article 10 of Schedule-I – After amendment of Article 10, “increased share capital” is a part of Article 10 – The effect of adding “increased share capital” is that stamp duty will be charged on subsequent increases in the authorised share capital, subject to the maximum cap. The ceiling of Rs. 25 lakhs is applicable on Articles of Association and the increased share capital therein, not on every increase individually. Even if the amendment does not have retrospective effect and the increase was initiated by the respondent after the cap was introduced, since the instrument 'Articles of Association' remains the same, the duty already paid on the same instrument will have to be considered. In case stamp duty equivalent to or more than the cap has already been paid, no further stamp duty can be levied. (Para 15 & 18) State of Maharashtra v. National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 285 : AIR 2024 SC 2037

Stamp Act, 1958 (Maharashtra); Section 47 & 48 and Bombay Stamp Rules, 1939; Rule 21 & 22A – Limitation – The appellant's case was rejected on the ground that the application filed by her was beyond the limitation period. The application seeking a refund of the stamp duty needs to be preferred within six months from the date of the instrument as stated in Section 48. Held, the application for relief under Section 47 to be made within six months of the date of the instrument prima facie appeared to have been done by the appellant. Hence, the appellant's application was within time and the same could not have been rejected as barred by limitation. (Para 12) Bano Saiyed Parwaz v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 426 : AIR 2024 SC 2881

Stamp Act, 1958 (Maharashtra); Section 47 & 48 – Demand for refund of Stamp Duty paid towards an un-executed conveyance deed – Rights of a bonafide purchaser – It is settled law that the period of expiry of limitation prescribed under any law may bar the remedy but not the right. Held, the appellant is entitled to claim the refund of stamp duty amount on grounds that the appellant has been pursuing her case as per remedies available to her in law and should not be denied refund merely on technicalities. Further held, the appellant being a bonafide purchaser is a victim of fraud played upon her by the vendor which led to the cancellation of the conveyance deed. Hence, the case of the appellant is fit for refund of stamp duty. State is directed to refund the stamp duty. (Para 10 & 16) Bano Saiyed Parwaz v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 426 : AIR 2024 SC 2881

Stay

Applications to vacate interim reliefs can't be kept pending for long' - Issued guidelines to High Court's on granting and vacating interim stay. High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Can there be a blanket stay on money decree ? Shekhawati Art and Exports v. United India Insurance Company Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 408

High Courts and Supreme Courts should refrain from fixing time-bound schedules for case disposal in other courts ordinarily. High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

No automatic vacation of stay orders of High Courts on civil and criminal trials - Overruled Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2018) 16 SCC 299. High Court Bar Association Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 177

Stridhan

Married women's right to 'Stridhan' – Absolute right over 'Stridhan' – The properties gifted to a woman before marriage, at the time of marriage or at the time of bidding of farewell or thereafter are her stridhan properties. It is her absolute property with all rights to dispose at her own pleasure. The husband has no control over it and may only use it during the time of his distress but nonetheless he has a moral obligation to restore the same or its value to his wife. (Para 21) Maya Gopinathan v. Anoop S.B.,, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 327 : AIR 2024 SC 2454

Sub-delegation of Powers

The functions of the General Power of Attorney holder cannot be delegated to any other person without there being a specific clause permitting such delegation in the Power of Attorney. Hence, ordinarily there cannot be any sub-delegation. (Para 28) Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : AIR 2024 SC 1947

Suit for Possession

Identification of Property - Suit for possession has to describe the property in question with accuracy and all details of measurement and boundaries. This was completely lacking. A suit for possession with respect to such a property would be liable to be dismissed on the ground of its identifiability. (Para 23) Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : AIR 2024 SC 714 : (2024) 3 SCC 224

Supreme Court Rules, 2013

Curative Petitions - Registry shouldn't exercise judicial function, can't refuse curative petition saying review was dismissed in open court. Brahmaputra Concrete Pipe Industries v. Assam State Electricity Board, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 163 : AIR 2024 SC 1197

Miscellaneous application – The maintainability of Post-Disposal miscellaneous applications “for clarification, modification or recall – Miscellaneous application seeking clarification of the order passed by the court couldn't be entertained after the disposal of the matter. Post disposal application for modification and clarification of the order of disposal shall lie only in rare cases, where the order passed by this Court is executory in nature and the directions of the Court may become impossible to be implemented because of subsequent events or developments. The factual background of this Application does not fit into that description. The attempt in the present miscellaneous application is clearly to seek a substantive modification of the judgment of this Court. Such an attempt is not permissible in a miscellaneous application which was described in the course of hearing as an application for clarification. By taking out a Miscellaneous Application, the applicant cannot ask for reliefs which were not granted in the main judgment itself. There is a growing tendency of indirectly seeking review of the orders of this Court by filing applications either seeking modifications or clarifications of the orders passed by this Court. Such applications are a total abuse of process of law. Multiple attempts to reopen a judgment of the Court should not be permitted. (Para 11 & 20) Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 241

Order LV Rule 6 – Under Order LV Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013, the Supreme Court has inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent an abuse of the process of the Court. Order LV Rule 6 cannot be inverted to bypass the provisions for review in Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. The maintainability of the present application cannot be explained by invoking the inherent power of this Court either. The applicant has not applied for review of the main judgment. In the contempt action, it failed to establish any willful disobedience of the main judgment and order on account of non-payment of LPS. Now the applicant cannot continue to hitchhike on the same judgment by relying on the inherent power or jurisdiction of this Court. The miscellaneous application is an abuse of the process. (Para 12 & 13) Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 241

Order XII Rule 3 - A post disposal application for modification and clarification of the order of disposal shall lie only in rare cases, where the order passed by this Court is executory in nature and the directions of the Court may become impossible to be implemented because of subsequent events or developments. (Para 20) Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 241

Suppression of Facts

Harsh measures needed to deal with suppression of facts. All India EPF Staff Federation v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 431

Tax

Condonation of Delay - Taxpayer is entitled to hearing on the merits, if appeals were dismissed by the High Court due to a delay in filing the paper-book. Herbicides India Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 44

The hiring of motor vehicles/cranes from a contractor is a service and would not attract Sales Tax or Value Added Tax (VAT) assuming the transaction to be sale of goods. The transfer of right to use the goods not only includes possession but also control over goods by the user. If the control over the goods remains with the contractor during the hire period, then it cannot be termed as sale of goods and only service tax can be levied. K.P. Mozika v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 26 : AIR 2024 SC 667

Income Tax Act, 1961; Section 17(2)(viii) and Income Tax Rules, 1962; Rule 3(7)(i) – Delegation of powers – Residuary clause – The residuary leaves it to the rule-making authority to tax 'any other fringe benefit or amenity' within the ambit of 'perquisites', not already covered by clauses (i) to (viia) of Section 17(2), by promulgating a rule. Held, the enactment of subordinate legislation for levying tax on interest free/concessional loans as a fringe benefit is within the rulemaking power under Section 17(2) (viii) of the Act. Section 17(2) (viii) itself, and the enactment of Rule 3(7) (i) is not a case of excessive delegation of the 'essential legislative function' and falls within the parameters of permissible delegation. Hence, Rule 3(7) (i) is intra vires Section 17(2) (viii) of the Act. (Para 10 & 31) All India Bank Officers' Confederation v. Central Bank of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 352

Income Tax Act, 1961; Section 17(2) (viii) and Income Tax Rules, 1962; Rule 3(7) (i) – The value of interest-free or concessional loans made available to an employee or a member of his household by the employer or any person on his behalf, is to be treated as 'other fringe benefit or amenity' for the purpose of Section 17(2) (viii) and, therefore, taxable as a 'perquisite'. (Para 19) All India Bank Officers' Confederation v. Central Bank of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 352

Value Added Tax Act, 2004 (Delhi); Section 38(3) & 42 – Timeline for refund – As per Section 38(3)(a)(ii), the refund should have been processed within two months from when the returns were filed. Held, the language of Section 38(3) is mandatory and the department must adhere to the timeline stipulated therein. The appellant-department is not justified in retaining the refund amount beyond the stipulated period and then adjusting the refund amount against the amounts due under default notices that were issued subsequent to the refund period. The impugned judgment directing the refund of amounts along with interest as provided under Section 42 of the Act is affirmed. (Para 8, 9, 10 & 11) Commissioner of Trade and Taxes v. Femc Pratibha Joint Venture, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 348 : AIR 2024 SC 2537

Theory of Restitutive Relief

Theory of restitutive relief – In case the Court is of the opinion that no relief of admission can be granted to such a candidate in the very academic year and wherever it finds that the action of the authorities has been arbitrary and in breach of the rules and regulations or the prospectus affecting the rights of the students and that a candidate is found to be meritorious and such candidate/student has approached the court at the earliest and without any delay, the court can mould the relief and direct the admission to be granted to such a candidate in the next academic year in the case if it is found that the management was at fault and wrongly denied the admission to the meritorious candidate. Held, it would neither be desirable nor justifiable to grant admission to the appellant in the on-going session of the MBBS(UG) course. However, considering the fact that the writ petition came to be filed before the High without any delay, the appellant is entitled to restoration of his seat in the first year of MBBS(UG) course in the same college in the next session. (Para 27) Vansh Prakash Dolas v. Ministry of Education & The Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 250 : AIR 2024 SC 1924

Town Planning and Urban Development

Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 (Gujarat); Section 52 – Allotment of land in question – The plaintiffs, being well aware of the fact that Final Plot allotted to them under the second varied Town Planning Scheme was of lesser area, accepted the same without any protest and without agitating a right to a larger area in the light of the initial allotment – Held, having accepted the plot allotted to them upon variation of the scheme without demur or protest, the plaintiffs cannot now seek to reopen the negligence and delay, if any, on the part of the Corporation prior to such variation. (Para 34 & 39) Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 369

Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 (Gujarat); Section 52 – Compensation paid for land is challenged to be inadequate – Held, the conduct of the plaintiffs in depositing the compensation amount thereafter, imply receipt of the compensation amount for the shortfall area in allotted land. This further, foreclosed their right, to either challenge the allotment of a plot of lesser area or to seek more compensation. Further held, the voluntary act of depositing the compensation amount to the trial court precludes them from contending, that the said compensation was never paid to them. (Para 36 & 39) Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 369

Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Section 41 – Doctrine of transfer by Ostensible owner – Bonafide purchaser for valuable Consideration – Held, once it has been held that the transactions executed by the respondents are illegal due to the doctrine of lis pendens the defence of the respondents that they are bonafide purchasers for valuable consideration and thus, entitled to protection under Section 41 is liable to be rejected. The Release Deed is held to be without any legal sanctity. (Para 21, 24) Chander Bhan v. Mukhtiar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : AIR 2024 SC 2267

Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 52 – Doctrine of lis pendens – Object – The object underlying the doctrine of lis pendens is for maintaining status quo that cannot be affected by an act of any party in a pending litigation. The objective is also to prevent multiple proceedings by parties in different forums. The principle is based on equity and good conscience. (Para 16) Chander Bhan v. Mukhtiar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : AIR 2024 SC 2267

Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 52 – Doctrine of lis pendens – Pendency of a suit shall be deemed to have commenced from the date on which the plaintiff presents the suit and extends till a final decree is passed and is realised. The appellant filed a suit for permanent injunction on 21.07.2003 from which the doctrine of lis pendens would take its effect. The release deed executed is of 28.07.2003, which is subsequent to the filing of the suit. Since the release deed is executed after the suit for temporary injunction was filed by the appellant, the alienation made by release deed would be covered by the doctrine of lis pendens. (Para 18, 19, 20) Chander Bhan v. Mukhtiar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : AIR 2024 SC 2267

Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 52 – Doctrine of lis pendens – Applicability States of Punjab, Delhi or Bombay – Held, even if Section 52 of T.P Act is not applicable in its strict sense in the present case, the principles of lis-pendens, which are based on justice, equity and good conscience, would certainly be applicable. (Para 17) Chander Bhan v. Mukhtiar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 347 : AIR 2024 SC 2267

Tribunal

Jurisdiction of Tribunal – Tribunal was justified in giving its award on the reference made by the central government. Central Government invoked the power of reference to refer the matter to the Tribunal to adjudicate the interest of all the 32 workers. The Tribunal was naturally bound by the reference to consider the claim of all the 32 workers. Hence, despite the fact that there was a settlement with respect to some of the workmen, the Tribunal was tasked to examine the entire reference and give independent findings on the issue. (Para 16 & 17) Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal Mines Workers' Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 230

Two-Finger Test

Eradication of the "Two-Finger Test" in rape investigations - The practice of conducting the "two-finger test" in determining the sexual habituation of rape victims despite its prohibition by the Supreme Court - The Court questioned the State on the measures taken to eliminate this regressive and invasive practice. Sunshine Kharpan v. State of Meghalaya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 377

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

Section 2(1) (d) & 43D (2) and Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 167(2) – Power to extend remand beyond 90 days – Under section 43D power is given to 'the court' to extend and authorise detention of the accused beyond a period of 90 days. As per section 2(1) (d), 'The court' would mean jurisdiction of a normal criminal Court and also includes a Special Court constituted under Section 11 or Section 22 of the NIA Act. Hence, the Chief Judge cum City Sessions Court had the jurisdiction to pass the order of extension of detention beyond 90 days. Held, the jurisdictional Magistrate would be clothed with the jurisdiction to deal with the remand of the accused albeit for a period of 90 days only under Section 167(2) of CrPC, because for authorising remand beyond 90 days, an express order of the Sessions Court or the Special Court, as the case may be, would be required by virtue of Section 43D (2) of UAPA. Hence, order of extension of remand by Chief Metropolitan Magistrate beyond the period of 90 days, was illegal. (Para 33, 35, 36, 37) State of West Bengal v. Jayeeta Das, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 312 : AIR 2024 SC 2161

Section 15 & 16 of the 1967 Act –Terrorist act – Section 15(1) refers to certain acts which would constitute a terrorist act. To qualify for being a terrorist act, an act must be done with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security or sovereignty of India or such act must be accompanied with an intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country. In sub-clauses (a), (b), and (c) of section 15(1), the law stipulates the manner of commission of the acts to come within the ambit of the expression “terrorist act” under the 1967 legislation. Held, prima facie commission or attempt to commit any terrorist act by the appellant not found. (Para 30) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : AIR 2024 SC 2169 : 2024 CriLJ 2001

Section 17 – Funding terrorist act – Held, no corroboration of the allegation that the appellant has funded any terrorist act or has received any money for that purpose. No prima facie case made out. (Para 31) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : AIR 2024 SC 2169 : 2024 CriLJ 2001

Section 18 – Conspiracy or attempt to commit, advocate, abet, advice, incite or facilitate commission or any terrorist act. Held, mere participation in some meetings and attempt to encourage women to join the struggle for new democratic revolution, prima facie, do not reveal the commission of an offence under Section 18 of the 1967 Act. (Para 32) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : AIR 2024 SC 2169 : 2024 CriLJ 2001

Section 20 & 38 – Membership of terrorist organisation – Mere meeting of accused individuals or being connected with them through any medium cannot implicate one in Chapter VI offences under of the 1967 Act, in the absence of any further evidence of being associated with a terrorist organisation. The offence under Section 20 not made out. (Para 34 & 35) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : AIR 2024 SC 2169 : 2024 CriLJ 2001

Section 43D (5) – Bail – Long period of incarceration was held to be a valid ground to enlarge an accused on bail in spite of the bail restricting provision of Section 43D (5) of the 1967 Act. Taking cognizance of the composite effect of delay in framing charge, period of detention undergone by the accused, the nature of allegations against her vis-à-vis the materials available before this Court at this stage in addition to her age and medical condition, she ought not to be denied the privilege of being enlarged on bail pending further process. (Para 36 & 41) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : AIR 2024 SC 2169 : 2024 CriLJ 2001

Section 43D(2)(b) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 167(2) - Default Bail - Terrorism cases should not to be taken lightly. (Para 13) State of NCT of Delhi v. Raj Kumar @ Lovepreet @ Lovely, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 10 : AIR 2024 SC 244 : (2024) 2 SCC 632

Section 43D(5) and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 439 – Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act modifies the application of the general bail provisions in respect of offences punishable under Chapter IV and Chapter VI of the UAP Act. Bail must be rejected as a 'rule', if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the 'final report' or 'Case Diary', the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied, that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with the 'tripod test' (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence). The restrictions, on granting of bail in section 43D(5) are in addition to the restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grant of bail. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence 'bail is the rule, jail is the exception' does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act. The 'exercise' of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form of the words used in proviso to Section 43D(5) - 'shall not be released', in contrast with the form of the words as found in Section 437(1) CrPC - 'may be released', suggests the intention of the Legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule. (Para 17, 18 & 20) Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : AIR 2024 SC 952

Section 43B(1) and Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), 2002; Section 19(1) – Interpretation of the phrase 'inform him of the grounds for such arrest' – Held, the provision regarding the communication of the grounds of arrest to a person arrested contained in Section 43B(1) of the UAPA is verbatim the same as that in Section 19(1) of the PMLA – It is a statutory mandate requiring the arresting officer to inform the grounds of arrest to the person arrested under Section 43B(1) of the UAPA at the earliest. Both the provisions find their source in the constitutional safeguard provided under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is the same in both the statutes. Hence, applying the golden rules of interpretation, the provisions which lay down a very important constitutional safeguard to a person arrested on charges of committing an offence either under the PMLA or under the UAPA, have to be uniformly construed and applied. (Para 17, 18, 22 & 34) Prabir Purkayastha v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : AIR 2024 SC 2967

Section 43D(5) – Bail order challenged – Rejection of bail on grounds that accusations against the respondents are prima facie true – The Court at the stage of considering the bail applications of the respondents-accused is merely required to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the respondents in the commission of the alleged offences. Held, there is sufficient material to believe that the accusations against the respondents-accused are prima facie true and that the mandate contained in the proviso to Section 43(D)(5) would be applicable for not releasing the respondents on bail. The Supreme Court should be slow in interfering with the order when the bail has been granted by the High Court, however if such order of granting bail is found to be illegal and perverse, it must be set aside. The High Court has committed gross error in not considering the material/evidence in its right and proper perspective that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the respondents are prima facie true. Hence, the impugned order passed by the High Court cannot be sustained. The impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside. (Para 16, 17, 18, 22 & 24) Union of India v. Barakathullah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 404

University

Revaluation - The appellant filed a suit against the University seeking compensation of Rs. 10 Lakhs for reevaluating copies of subjects not applied for, resulting in a reduction of total marks. The trial court granted damages of Rs. 4 Lakhs, but the High Court set aside the judgment. The Supreme Court, upon examination, found the High Court's observations untenable and restored the damages awarded by the trial court. Vyjyanti Mehra v. Himachal Pradesh University, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 51

Valuation

Valuation of land by the state – Held, it is not clear on what basis the valuation has been arrived at; at what point of time this amount came to be assessed; and the basis for the assessment of such amount. The High Court proceeded on the footing that the valuation has been assessed and it is now for the appellant to file an application to get the amount disbursed. Further held, the High Court should also have asked the State the basis of the determination of the amount towards compensation and the approach of the High Court while disposing of the appeal is disappointing. The impugned order of High Court is set aside. (Para 13 & 15) Dharnidhar Mishra v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 380

Virtual Hearing

Litigants should be allowed to appear virtually if the court thinks their presence is required. Basudha Chakraborty v. Neeta Chakraborty, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 401

Waqf Act, 1995

The original jurisdiction to decide the issue pertaining to Mutawalliship vests with the Waqf board and not the Waqf Tribunal. S V Cheriyakoya Thangal v. S.V P Pookoya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 309

Wildlife Protection Act, 1972

Section 33(a) & 38V(4) – Tiger Safari permissible in buffer zone – Although it will not be permissible to establish a 'Tiger Safari' in a core or critical tiger habitat area without obtaining the prior approval of the National Board, such an activity would be permissible in the buffer or peripheral area. (Para 101) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : AIR 2024 SC 1955

NTCA guidelines 2012, 2016 & 2019 and Wildlife Protection Act, 1972; Chapter IVB – Validity and purpose of the guidelines – NTCA issued Guidelines in 2012, 2016 & 2019 for establishment of 'Tiger Safaris' in the buffer and fringe areas of tiger reserves. There is no infirmity in the 2012 & 2016 Guidelines for establishing the 'Tiger Safaris' in the buffer and fringe areas and emphasizing on the rehabilitation of injured tigers (after suitable treatment), conflict tigers, and orphaned tiger cubs which are unfit for rewilding and release into the wild. However, the 2019 Guidelines, departing from the aforesaid purpose, provide for sourcing of animals from zoos in the Tiger Safaris which is contrary to the purpose of Tiger Conservation. Similarly, as per the 2019 guidelines, vesting of final authority for selection in the CZA and not in the NTCA, is not in tune with the emphasis on tiger conservation as provided under Chapter IVB of the WLP Act. Since undertaking of establishment of such a 'Tiger Safari' would be basically for the 'in-situ' conservation and protection of the tiger, it is the NTCA that shall have the final authority. A 'safari' can be established only for the purposes specified in clause 9 of the 2016 Guidelines and not as per the 2019 Guidelines. (Para 100 & 103) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : AIR 2024 SC 1955

NTCA Guidelines, 2016; Clause 10 – Location of Tiger Safari – Clause 10 requires recommendations of the Committee comprising of the members from NTCA, CZA, Forest Department of concerned State, an experienced tiger biologist/scientist/conservationist, and a representative, nominated by the Chief Wildlife Warden of the concerned State. Technically there is non-compliance with the requirement of clause 10 as such committee was not constituted for the purpose of determining the location of the 'Tiger Safari' at Pakhrau. However, since most of the authorities mentioned therein have participated in the decision and the concerned authorities, who have expertise in the matter, have approved establishment of 'Tiger Safari' at Pakhrau, the decision requires no interference. Held, the provisions of the 2016 Guidelines are scrupulously followed. (Para 111 & 112) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : AIR 2024 SC 1955

Will

Genuineness of Will – On grounds of alleged ill-health of the testator – From the evidence recorded, the testator was found to be in good senses and capable of understanding his welfare to take correct decisions. The testator was conscious of the fact that he had a wife and a minor child whose interest had been taken care of by leaving part of the property for them. The Will was not surrounded by suspicious circumstances. Further, it cannot be concluded that the testator was not in a position to make a 'Will'. (Para 13) Thangam v. Navamani Ammal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : AIR 2024 SC 1324

Words and Phrases

When the words 'barbaric' and 'brutal' are used simultaneously they are not to take the character of synonyms, but to take distinctive meanings. (Para 10) Bhaggi @ Bhagirath @ Naran v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 87 : AIR 2024 SC 938

Writ Petition

Maintainability of Writ Petition – Judicial review is restrained in matters of public tenders – Constitutional courts should exercise caution while interfering in contractual and tender matters, disguised as public interest litigations. The respondent no. 1, being an interested party could not have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court. The prayer made in writ petition, makes it clear that the real grievance of respondent no 1 is about the grant of contract in favour of another bidder. The High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petition on behalf of an interested person who sought to convert a judicial review proceeding for enhancing personal gain. (Para 19 & 21) Travancore Devaswom Board v. Ayyappa Spices, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 207

Writ Petition – Validity of clause 4.8.1 of the NEET UG-2023 Information Brochure – Classification has no nexus to the object sought – Clause 4.8 of the Information Brochure provides an exception/relaxation for claiming seat in the Maharashtra State quota to Children of employees of Government of India or its Undertaking who have passed SSC and/or HSC or equivalent examination from the recognized institutions situated outside the State of Maharashtra. However, this clause imposes a rider that such employee of Government of India or its Undertaking being the parent of the candidate seeking admission in the course under the State quota “must have been transferred from outside the State of Maharashtra at a place of work, located in the State of Maharashtra and also must have reported for duty and must be working as on the last date of document verification at a place located in the State of Maharashtra”. Proviso to Clause 4.8 was relied upon by the respondents while cancelling the admission granted to the appellant in CAP1. Held, the place of posting is not within the control of the employee or the candidate. Thus, the distinction drawn by the clause between two categories of employees in the Government of India services (i) those posted in Maharashtra and (ii) those posted outside Maharashtra has no nexus with the intent and purpose of the guidelines/rules and hence the same deserves to be read down to such extent. The condition creates a stipulation which would be impossible for the candidate or his parent to fulfill. Held, the candidate(s) who are born in Maharashtra and whose parents are also domicile of the State of Maharashtra and are employees of the Government of India or its Undertaking, such candidate(s) would be entitled to a seat under the Maharashtra State quota irrespective of the place of posting of the parent(s) because the place of deployment would not be under the control of the candidate or his parents. (Para 15 & 21) Vansh Prakash Dolas v. Ministry of Education & The Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 250 : AIR 2024 SC 1924

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