Supreme Court Annual Digest 2024- Code Of Civil Procedure (CPC)

SUPREME COURT ANNUAL DIGEST 2024 - CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908

Section 9 and Order 7 Rule 1 - Jurisdictional Fact and Maintainability of Suit - The issue of maintainability of a suit pertains to the jurisdiction of the trial court and strikes at the root of the proceedings under Order VII Rule 1, CPC. A suit barred by law renders the trial court incompetent to entertain it. Even if a case is not explicitly barred under Section 9, CPC, the trial court must ascertain whether jurisdictional facts exist to proceed with the trial and grant relief. This duty to ensure the existence of jurisdictional facts is fundamental and applies regardless of whether the parties raise the issue. The trial court must invite parties' attention to non-existent jurisdictional facts during issue settlement. Failure to do so, or an erroneous assumption of jurisdiction, leads to decisions deemed ultra vires and invalid. Higher courts, including the Supreme Court, possess the authority to review and rectify such jurisdictional lapses even when the trial court has not framed specific issues on maintainability or jurisdictional facts. R. Kandasamy v. T.R.K. Sarawathy, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 911 : AIR 2025 SC 44

Section 11 – Bar of res judicata – Object of the principle of res judicata is to avoid parties to litigate on the same issue which has already been adjudicated upon and settled. The matter which is directly and substantially in issue in the previous litigation ought not to be permitted to be raised and adjudicated upon in the subsequent suit. Title and possession over the disputed land is claimed – Held, the judgment and order of the previous suit which is final and conclusive, in no specific terms adjudicates upon the right, title and interest of the suit land. The suit, was dismissed simpliciter without adjudication of any rights of the plaintiff-appellant over the suit land vis-à-vis the Cantonment Board. Hence, the principle of res judicata would not be attracted as the issue in the present suit was neither directly or indirectly in issue in the previous suit. The suit is not barred by res judicata. (Para 21, 23, 25) Har Narayan Tewari v. Cantonment Board, Ramgarh Cantonment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 446 : (2024) 8 SCC 114

Section 11 – Applicability of res judicata between co-defendants – It is a settled law that the principle of res judicata is applicable not only between the plaintiff and the defendants but also between the co-defendants. In applying the principle of res judicata between the co-defendants, primarily three conditions are necessary to be fulfilled, namely, (i) there must be a conflict of interest between the co-defendants; (ii) there is necessity to decide the said conflict in order to give relief to plaintiff; and (iii) there is final decision adjudicating the said conflict. Once all these conditions are satisfied, the principle of res judicata can be applied inter se the co-defendants. Held, there was no conflict of interest between the co-defendants in the earlier Suit. None of the above stated conditions between co-defendants stood fulfilled for applying res judicata. Hence, the principle of res judicata would not be attracted as the there was no conflict of interest between the co-defendants in the said previous suit which if any never came to be adjudicated upon. The suit is not barred under Section 11 CPC. (Para 23 & 25) Har Narayan Tewari v. Cantonment Board, Ramgarh Cantonment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 446 : (2024) 8 SCC 114

Section 11 – Res judicata, as a technical legal principle, operates to prevent the same parties from relitigating the same issues that have already been conclusively determined by a court. Held, the previous decision of this Court in the first round would not operate as res judicata to bar a decision on the lead matter and the other appeals, because this rule may not apply hard and fast in situations where larger public interest is at stake. In such cases, a more flexible approach ought to be adopted by courts, recognizing that certain matters transcend individual disputes and have far-reaching public interest implications. Hence, the applicability of res judicata is negated. (Para 23 & 25) Government of NCT of Delhi v. BSK Realtors LLP, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 420 : (2024) 7 SCC 370

Section 13 – Bar of Res Judicata – Maintainability of suit challenged – Held, the suit is filed with a different set of facts and another set of litigants have raised additional contentions. Therefore, the writ petition should not be dismissed on the ground of res-judicata. (Para 23) Abhimeet Sinha v. High Court of Judicature at Patna, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : AIR 2024 SC 2596

Section 16 - Subject Matter Jurisdiction - Personal Obedience Principle - Specific Performance and Territorial Jurisdiction - Practical Impediments to Jurisdiction - Contractual Implications - The court reaffirms that under Section 16 CPC, suits concerning immovable property must generally be instituted in the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the property is situated. Relief sought in respect of immovable property can be entertained by a court outside the property's jurisdiction only if the relief can be entirely enforced through the personal obedience of the defendant. This principle is rooted in the maxim "equity acts in personam." A suit for specific performance and delivery of possession is covered under Section 16(d) of the CPC. Courts cannot assume jurisdiction over immovable property situated outside their territorial limits, even by agreement between the parties. When enforcing a decree for specific performance requires actions, such as registering a sale deed, in a jurisdiction where the property is located, such relief cannot be said to be entirely achievable through the personal obedience of the defendant. Even in the absence of an explicit prayer for the transfer of possession, if the nature of the contract implies such transfer, the suit remains one governed by Section 16(d) of the CPC. The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the High Court was correct in determining that the relief sought could not be entirely enforced through the personal obedience of the defendants, thus negating the applicability of the proviso to Section 16. Rohit Kochhar v. Vipul Infrastructure Developers Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 951

Section 34 - Interest Act, 1978; Section 3 - Whether interest is payable on interest? Held; Ordinarily courts are not supposed to grant interest on interest except where it has been specifically provided under the statute or where there is specific stipulation to that effect under the terms and conditions of the contract. There is no dispute as to the power of the courts to award interest on interest or compound interest in a given case subject to the power conferred under the statutes or under the terms and conditions of the contract but where no such power is conferred ordinarily, the courts do not award interest on interest. Even Section 34 CPC is silent in this regard whereas Sub-Section (3) of Section 3 of the Interest Act specifically prohibits the same. (Para 23 & 24) D. Khosla and Company v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 558 : AIR 2024 SC 3937 : (2024) 9 SCC 476

Section 37 - Specific Relief Act, 1963; Section 28 - Jurisdiction of the Execution Court - The expression "may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made" in Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, must be interpreted expansively. It includes the court of first instance even if the decree was passed by an appellate court, as the decree arises from the same suit. As per Section 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), the term "the court which passed a decree" encompasses: (a) The court of first instance, even if the decree was passed in appellate jurisdiction. (b) The court with jurisdiction at the time of application if the original court has ceased to exist or lacks jurisdiction. Applications under Section 28 of the 1963 Act, such as for rescission of the contract or extension of time, can be entertained and decided by the Execution Court if it qualifies as the court that passed the decree under Section 37 of the CPC. The objection to the jurisdiction of the Execution Court to decide the application under Section 28(1) of the 1963 Act is dismissed. Ishwar v. Bhim Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 651 : AIR 2024 SC 4232

Section 47 and Order 21 Rule 58 and 97 - Procedural irregularity cannot defeat substantive right - Supreme Court sets aside High Court order dismissing objections to decree due to misapplication of provisions. Joginder Singh v. Dr. Virinderjit Singh Gill, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 838

Section 100 – Second appeal – Whether substantial question of law is involved? – Held, the substantial question of law arising in the second appeal was - Whether the suit as setup by the plaintiff-appellant was barred by principle of res judicata in view of the decision in the earlier Suit. (Para 17) Har Narayan Tewari v. Cantonment Board, Ramgarh Cantonment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 446 : (2024) 8 SCC 114

Section 144 – Objection of restitution on grounds of being a bona fide purchaser – Held, one who has purchased property from decree holder with full knowledge of pending restitution proceedings is not entitled to object restitution on the ground that he is a bona fide purchaser. (Para 18) Bhikchand v. Shamabai Dhanraj Gugale, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : AIR 2024 SC 2903

Section 144 – Restitution – A decree for realisation of a sum in favour of the plaintiff should not amount to exploitation of the judgment debtor by selling his entire property. The right of a decree holder should never be construed to have bestowed upon him a bonanza only because he had obtained a decree for realisation of a certain amount. Restitution application is allowed. Sale of the attached properties belonging to the judgment debtor is set aside and the parties are restored back to the position where the execution was positioned before the attachment of the immovable properties. (Para 27 & 28) Bhikchand v. Shamabai Dhanraj Gugale, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : AIR 2024 SC 2903

Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 – Review Jurisdiction – To declare reserved forest land as private land – Review of earlier order where it had given a clear finding that the title over the reserved forest land wasn't proved by the private person. Held, the High Court showed utmost interest and benevolence in allowing the review by setting aside the well merited judgment in the appeal by replacing its views in all material aspects. The High Court which is expected to act within the statutory limitation went beyond and graciously gifted the forest land to a private person who could not prove his title. The High Court could not interfere by placing reliance upon evidence produced after the decree which states that the land is forest land which has become part of reserved forest. (Para 54 & 56) State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : AIR 2024 SC 2466

Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 – Scope of review - Mistake or error apparent on the face of record would debar the court from acting as an appellate court in disguise, by indulging in a re-hearing. Such a mistake or error should be self-evident and an omission so glaring that it requires interference in the form of a review. There is absolutely no room for a fresh hearing or of adjudication for a second time. (Para 20) State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : AIR 2024 SC 2466

Section 114 r/w. Order XLVII - Review Jurisdiction - Scope and Principles - Nature of Review Jurisdiction - Grounds for Review - Limitation of Review Jurisdiction - Review jurisdiction is not an inherent power of the court but must be explicitly conferred by law - A review may be sought only on specific grounds: (i) Discovery of new and important evidence that was not available despite due diligence at the time of the original proceedings. (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. (iii) Any other sufficient reason analogous to the aforementioned grounds. Review proceedings are distinct from appellate jurisdiction and cannot serve as an avenue for rehearing or correcting errors on merits. Errors must be self-evident and not require elaborate reasoning. To succeed on the ground of “discovery of new evidence”, the applicant must demonstrate: (i) The evidence was genuinely new and could not have been discovered earlier despite due diligence. (ii) The evidence is material and could have altered the outcome if presented originally. An error apparent must be obvious and indisputable upon a plain reading of the record. Disputes requiring detailed reasoning do not qualify. In the present case, the Division Bench (review) exceeded its jurisdiction by reviewing a judgment on grounds that did not meet the rigorous criteria of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The additional documents presented were irrelevant to the central issue of contempt and time-barred proceedings. The impugned review order was quashed, affirming that no valid grounds for review were made out, and the original judgment was upheld. S. Tirupathi Rao v. M. Lingamaiah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 503 : AIR 2024 SC 3738

Sections 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 — Review of judgment — Non-consideration of the reasoning given by the Full Bench of the High Court in which findings were given by relying on the judgment of the Constitution Bench of Supreme Court, and not showing how the findings therein were erroneous in law, would amount to an error, apparent on the face of record. In the judgment under review the Supreme Court had, without giving any reasoning, cursorily observed that findings recorded by different Benches of the High Court relying on judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, were clearly erroneous. Judgment passed by the Supreme Court without considering the reasoning given by Full Bench of High Court that on account of more than 100 decisions rendered by various Benches of High Court, doctrine of stare decisis was applicable, would be an error apparent on face of record. Application for review was allowed. (Paras 66 - 67) Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : AIR 2024 SC 2694

Order 2 Rule 2 – Bar to subsequent suit on same cause of action – Observing that the suit for recovery of possession is different from the suit for arrears of rent and damages, the Supreme Court held that there's no bar to file a separate suit for arrears of rent and damages after a suit for possession. Held, a plea of a bar under 0. 2. R. 2, Civil Procedure Code can be established only if the defendant files in evidence the pleadings in the previous suit and thereby proves to the Court the identity of the cause of action in the two suits. Hence, both the causes of action being separate, the second suit was clearly maintainable. (Para 17) Uniworld Logistics Pvt. Ltd. V. Indev Logistics Pvt. Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 469

Order 5 Rule 25 - Original Side Rules; Order IV - Institution of ordinary suits and service of summons - Service where defendant resides out of India and has no agent - In the present case, the appellant had appeared before the High Court at the stage when leave to sue was sought by the respondent. Leave to sue was granted on 24 January 2020. It was over two years thereafter on 9 March 2022 that an advocate's notice was issued to the appellant. From the advocate's notice, it is evident that the requirement of the High Court OS Rules, which have been noted earlier, were not complied with. The Advocate's notice contained no annexures or documents. It is not evident from the suit number referred to in the notice whether it was the same plaint in respect of which leave to sue had been granted two years earlier. (Para 19) Trois Corporation HK Ltd v. National Ventures Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 217

Order 6 - Delay of 17 Years in filing Written Statement – The respondent delayed filing the Written Statement, which led to procedural complications, including the suit being mistakenly marked as disposed of on the High Court's website - Held, Procedural rules should not obstruct substantive justice, particularly when confusion caused by the court's own administrative errors contributed to the delay. (Para 15) PIC Departmentals Pvt. Ltd. v. Sreeleathers Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 580

Order 6 Rule 1 and 2 - Written Statement - A party whose right to file a written statement in a case has been forfeited cannot introduce his case indirectly through evidence or written submission. Such a party can still participate in the proceedings and cross-examine the complainant, but cannot indirectly introduce his case. (Para 18) Kaushik Narsinhbhai Patel v. S.J.R. Prime Corporation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 497 : AIR 2024 SC 3854 : (2024) 9 SCC 462

Order 6 Rule 1 & 2 and Order 7 Rule 1 - Pleadings should be liberally construed and need not contain the exact language used in the statutory provision. But it does not mean that the pleadings even if fails to plead the essential legal requirement for establishing a right, the same be so construed so as to impliedly include what actually has not been pleaded. Particularly when it happens to be an essential ingredient for establishing a right. It is settled in law that a fact which is not specifically pleaded cannot be proved by evidence as evidence cannot travel beyond the pleadings. (Para 23) Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : AIR 2024 SC 1947 : (2024) 6 SCC 130

Order 6 Rule 17 - Amendment in pleadings – No evidence could be led beyond pleadings – Specific amendment in the pleadings was sought by the plaintiffs with reference to oral partition but the same was rejected by the trial court. In such a situation, where no further challenge was made to the rejection, the plaint attained finality and evidence with reference to oral partition cannot be considered. The Trial Court had rightly ignored the plea taken in the replication by the plaintiffs regarding oral partition, as amendment sought to that effect had already been declined. What was not permitted to be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. The High Court committed a grave error in placing reliance upon the partition which was not even the pleaded case. (Para 14, 15 & 16) Srinivas Raghavendrarao Desai v. Kumar Vamanrao @ Alok, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : AIR 2024 SC 1310

Order 6 Rule 17 - By way of an amendment to the Plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC, the plaintiff can introduce certain aspects that are necessary to determine the issues between the parties. Delay occurred in preferring the application to amend the plaint post-commencement of the trial would not have an effect if due diligence was taken. If the aspect introduced by the plaintiff remained undecided, which ought to be decided to determine the issues between the parties, then the delay that occurred in filing an amendment application would not have much relevance. Dinesh Goyal @ Pappu Versus Suman Agarwal (Bindal), 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 739 : AIR 2024 SC 4779

Order 6 Rule 17 - Amendment in pleadings – No evidence could be led beyond pleadings – Specific amendment in the pleadings was sought by the plaintiffs with reference to oral partition but the same was rejected by the trial court. In such a situation, where no further challenge was made to the rejection, the plaint attained finality and evidence with reference to oral partition cannot be considered. The Trial Court had rightly ignored the plea taken in the replication by the plaintiffs regarding oral partition, as amendment sought to that effect had already been declined. What was not permitted to be done directly cannot be permitted to be done indirectly. The High Court committed a grave error in placing reliance upon the partition which was not even the pleaded case. (Para 14, 15 & 16) Srinivas Raghavendrarao Desai v. Kumar Vamanrao @ Alok, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : AIR 2024 SC 1310

Order 6 Rule 17 - Interim order of trial court not violated – Interim order restraining defendants No.1 to 4 from alienating the property was passed by the Trial Court on 31.05.1999 and on that date, defendant No. 7 was not party to the suit as he was impleaded only on 02.01.2001. There is no order passed by the Trial Court thereafter directing that the interim order was further extended qua the newly impleaded defendant also, hence it cannot be said to be a case of wilful violation of the order passed by the Trial Court. (Para 22) Srinivas Raghavendrarao Desai v. Kumar Vamanrao @ Alok, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : AIR 2024 SC 1310

Order 7 Rule 1 - For every fact which is pleaded, there has to be evidence, either oral or documentary, to substantiate the same. A bald averment or mere statement by a defendant bereft of evidentiary material to back up such averment / statement takes such a defendant's case nowhere. (Para 24) A.B. Govardhan v. P. Ragothaman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 626 : AIR 2024 SC 4269

Order 7 Rule 11 – Representation of the People's Act, 1951; Section 83(1) (a) & 87 - Rejection of election petition on grounds of incomplete contents of the petition – Lack of cause of action – The pleadings with regard to the allegation of corrupt practice have to be precise, specific and unambiguous. The Election petition lacks concise statement of “material facts” as contemplated in Section 83(a), and lacks “full particulars” of the alleged Corrupt practice as contemplated in Section 83(b) of the RP Act. Held, mere bald and vague allegations without any basis would not be sufficient compliance of the requirement of making a concise statement of the “material facts” in the Election Petition. If the allegations contained in Election Petition do not set out grounds as contemplated in Section 100 and do not conform to the requirement of Section 81 and 83 of the Act, the Election Petition is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC. An omission of a single material fact leading to an incomplete cause of action or omission to contain a concise statement of material facts on which the Election petitioner relies for establishing a cause of action, would entail rejection of Election Petition. (Para 19. 20, 21 & 24) Karim Uddin Barbhuiya v. Aminul Haque Laskar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : AIR 2024 SC 2193

Order 7 Rule 11(d) - Applicability of Limitation and Rejection of Plaint - Legal Principles Discussed - Claims for possession and title to immovable property under Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, must be initiated within twelve years. Where possession has been with adverse parties for over a century, the plaintiff's claim for possession and title is barred by limitation. Vague and unsubstantiated allegations of fraud do not suffice to overcome the bar of limitation. Fraud allegations must be specific and clearly articulated; otherwise, they cannot revive a time-barred claim. Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1041

Order 7 Rule 11(d) - Courts must reject a plaint at the threshold if it is evident from the plaint's averments that the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. Reluctance to reject such plaints at an early stage results in unnecessary litigation and hardship for defendants. Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1041

Order 7 Rule 11(d) - The plaintiff sought possession and declaration of ownership of suit properties, relying on outdated government resolutions and alleging fraud in earlier compromise decrees. The possession of the properties had been with adverse parties for over a century, and the plaintiff failed to assert any rights within the limitation period. The plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d), CPC, as the claims were barred by limitation and constituted an abuse of the legal process. The appellate court's decision to allow the plaint to proceed was set aside, and the suit was dismissed at the threshold. The appeal was allowed, and the plaintiff's suit was dismissed as barred by limitation. Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1041

Order 7 Rule 11(d) and Order 20 Rule 12 - Inquiry for Mesne Profits – No Limitation for Completion of Inquiry under Order XX Rule 12 CPC - The Supreme Court dismissed a Special Leave Petition challenging the High Court's decision upholding the rejection of an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The application sought dismissal of proceedings for determination of mesne profits on grounds of limitation. The respondents, pursuant to a decree dated 12.07.1973 directing an inquiry into mesne profits, moved an application in 2014 to complete the inquiry. The petitioners contended that this application was barred by limitation as it was filed decades after the decree attained finality. The Court held that proceedings for determination of mesne profits under Order XX Rule 12 CPC are not barred by limitation, as such proceedings are a continuation of the original suit and akin to preparing a final decree. The Court reiterated that no specific time limit applies for initiating such inquiries. The Court also noted that when no statutory limitation is prescribed, the facts and circumstances of each case must be assessed holistically to determine reasonableness. Finding no error in the lower courts' rulings, the Court dismissed the petition, allowing the petitioners to participate in the mesne profits inquiry before the Trial Court. Choudappa v. Choudappa, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 671 : (2024) 9 SCC 236

Order 8 - Defendant can cross-examine plaintiff even if suit is proceeding ex-parte against him and written statement isn't filed. Ranjit Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 737

Order 8 Rules 3 & 5 – Specific admission and denial of the pleadings in the plaint – A general or evasive denial is not treated as sufficient. Rule 5 provides that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied in the written statement, shall be taken to be admitted by the defendant. In the written statement filed by the appellants, no specific para-wise reply was given. The failure of the defendant to give a para wise reply against the claim made by the plaintiff would make the allegations made in the plaint as admitted against the defendant. As there is no specific admission or denial with reference to the allegation in different paras, it becomes a roving inquiry for the Court to find out as to which line in some paragraph in the plaint is either admitted or denied in the written statement filed. (Para 15) Thangam v. Navamani Ammal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : AIR 2024 SC 1324 : (2024) 4 SCC 247

Order 8 Rule 10 - Mere failure or neglect of a defendant to file a written statement controverting the pleaded facts in the plaint, in all cases, may not entitle him to a judgment in his favour unless by adducing evidence he proves his case/claim. (Para 18) Asma Lateef v. Shabbir Ahmad, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : AIR 2024 SC 602 : (2024) 4 SCC 696

Order 9 Rule 9 - Representation of Peoples Act, 1951; Section 86(5) – Replication of pleading – Discretionary jurisdiction of High court to grant leave to file replication – Leave granted to the election petitioner to file a replication in answer to the new facts asserted in the written statement is challenged – Replication, though not a pleading as per Rule 1 of Order VI, is permissible with the leave of the Court under Order VIII Rule 9 of the CPC, which gives a right to file a reply in defence to set-off or counter-claim set up in the written statement. Section 86(5) of the 1951 Act provides that the High Court may allow the particulars of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition to be amended or amplified in such manner as may, in its opinion, be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition, but it shall not allow any amendment of the petition which will have the effect of introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. Further, while considering grant of leave, the Court must bear in mind that, — (a) a replication is not needed to merely traverse facts pleaded in the written statement; (b) a replication is not a substitute for an amendment; and (c) a new cause of action or plea inconsistent with the plea taken in original petition/plaint is not to be permitted in the replication. Held, the non-disclosure of bank accounts, alleged in the election petition, was sought to be explained by the returned candidate in his written statement. The replication only sought explain the averments made in the written statement and does not seek to incorporate any new material facts or a new cause of action to question the election. Hence, leave to file replication was justified and well within the discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court. (Para 16, 17, 18 & 20) Sheikh Noorul Hassan v. Nahakpam Indrajit Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : AIR 2024 SC 2360 : (2024) 9 SCC 353

Order 9 Rule 9 - Representation of peoples Act, 1951; Section 87 – Jurisdiction of High Court in an election petition – An election petition is to be tried, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the CPC to the trial of suits subject to the provisions of the 1951 Act and of any rules made thereunder. The High Court, acting as an Election Tribunal, subject to the provisions of the 1951 Act and the rules made thereunder, is vested with all such powers as are vested in a civil court under the CPC. Hence, in exercise of its powers under Order VIII Rule 9 of the CPC, the High Court is empowered to grant leave to an election petitioner to file a replication. (Para 15 & 20) Sheikh Noorul Hassan v. Nahakpam Indrajit Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : AIR 2024 SC 2360 : (2024) 9 SCC 353

Order 9 Rule 13 - The order of the High Court directing a deposit of 75% of the suit claim as a condition precedent for condoning the delay and for setting aside the ex parte decree was unwarranted. The ends of justice would have been met if an order of costs was imposed on the appellant as a condition precedent for condoning the delay and for setting aside the ex parte decree. Imposing a requirement of a deposit of 75% of the suit claim is disproportionate and would have to be set aside. (Para 20) Trois Corporation HK Ltd v. National Ventures Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 217

Order 12 Rule 6 - Unless there is a clear, unambiguous, unequivocal and unconditional admission, courts should not exercise their discretion under the Rule because judgment on admissions is without a trial which may even preclude a party to challenge the matter on merits in the court of appeal. Rajesh Mitra @ Rajesh Kumar Mitra v. Karnani Properties Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 790

Order 14 Rule 2 - The question of jurisdiction would assume importance even at the stage a court considers the question of grant of interim relief. Where interim relief is claimed in a suit before a civil court and the party to be affected by grant of such relief, or any other party to  the suit, raises a point of maintainability thereof or that it is barred by law and also contends on that basis that interim relief should not to be granted, grant of relief in whatever form, if at all, ought to be preceded by formation and recording of at least a prima facie satisfaction that the suit is maintainable or that it is not barred by law. Such a satisfaction resting on appreciation of the averments in the plaint, the application for interim relief and the written objection thereto, as well as the relevant law that is cited in support of the objection, would be a part of the court's reasoning of a prima facie case having been set up for interim relief, that the balance of convenience is in favour of the grant and non-grant would cause irreparable harm and prejudice. It would be inappropriate for a court to abstain from recording its prima facie satisfaction on the question of maintainability, yet, proceed to grant protection pro tem on the assumption that the question of maintainability has to be decided as a preliminary issue under Rule 2 of Order XIV, CPC. That could amount to an improper exercise of power. If the court is of the opinion at the stage of hearing the application for interim relief that the suit is barred by law or is otherwise not maintainable, it cannot dismiss it without framing a preliminary issue after the written statement is filed but can most certainly assign such opinion for refusing interim relief. However, if an extraordinary situation arises where it could take time to decide the point of maintainability of the suit and non grant of protection pro tem pending such decision could lead to irreversible consequences, the court may proceed to make an appropriate order in the manner indicated above justifying the course of action it adopts. In other words, such an order may be passed, if at all required, to avoid irreparable harm or injury or undue hardship to the party claiming the relief and/or to ensure that the proceedings are not rendered infructuous by reason of non-interference by the court. (Para 39) Asma Lateef v. Shabbir Ahmad, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : AIR 2024 SC 602 : (2024) 4 SCC 696

Order 17 - Courts cannot prepone the date of hearing without giving notice to the other party. Ranjit Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 737

Order 18 Rule 1 - Circumstances under which a defendant gets the right to begin in a suit hearing - As per the CPC, the plaintiff has the right to begin. However, if the defendant admits the facts alleged by the plaintiff and argues that plaintiff is not entitled to relief due to certain additional facts or any point of law, then the defendant gets the right to begin. (Para 16) Jami Venkata Suryaprabha v. Tarini Prasad Nayak, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1015

Order 18 Rule 1 - Whether the High Court was justified in affirming the trial court's rejection of the plaintiff's application under Order XVIII Rule 1 CPC. Whether the defendants' written statement constituted an admission of the plaintiff's claim, thereby necessitating the defendants to lead evidence first. Held, the provision grants the plaintiff the right to begin unless the defendant admits the plaintiff's claims but raises legal or factual defenses. The defendants admitted the existence of the agreement for sale but characterized it as a sham transaction and denied agreeing to sell the property. This denial negated any alleged admissions by the defendants. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's finding that the written statement did not constitute an unequivocal admission of the plaintiff's claims. The application under Order XVIII Rule 1 CPC was rightly rejected, and there was no procedural infirmity in the trial court's or High Court's orders. Jami Venkata Suryaprabha v. Tarini Prasad Nayak, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1015

Order 18 Rule 1 - Court's Discretion - Procedural rules must be applied flexibly to serve justice. The trial court has discretion to decide which party should lead evidence first based on the circumstances of the case. No Party can insist that the other party should be asked to begin first. A court is concerned with the trial of a suit from the time when it is instituted. The hearing of a suit is only a part of the trial of the suit. The determination of the question as to which party has a right to begin is an integral part of the hearing itself. Order XVIII Rule 1 indeed provides for the plaintiff's right to begin the evidence but not the court's obligation to ask the plaintiffs to begin first. There is no impediment for the court to call upon either party to lead evidence first, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the issues framed. Neither party can insist that the other one should be asked to lead it first. It all depends upon what the Court deems proper in the circumstances. Where it finds that the defendant's plea strikes at the root of the case, there would be no hitch in asking him/her to prove such a plea first which can lead to disposal of the case. There can be no watertight compartmentalisation in matters of justice and all rules of procedure are designed and directed to achieve and secure ends of justice. (Para 17 & 18) Jami Venkata Suryaprabha v. Tarini Prasad Nayak, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1015

Order 21 - Execution of Decree - Limitation Period - Whether the limitation period for execution of a decree is governed by the date of the final decree or the date of its engrossment on stamp paper. The Court reaffirmed that the limitation for executing a decree begins from the date of the final decree, not its engrossment on stamp paper. Citing Chiranji Lal v. Hari Das, (2005) 10 SCC 746 the Court emphasized that furnishing stamp paper is a procedural step and cannot suspend the limitation period, which is crucial to prevent undue delays in execution proceedings. Renjith K.G. v. Sheeba, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : AIR 2024 SC 5167

Order 21 Rule 54(1) & 66 – Valuation of sale property – Either whole of the attached property or such portion thereof as may seem necessary to satisfy the decree shall be sold in auction. The valuation of the property mentioned in attachment Panchanama (prepared under Rule 54) can always provide the estimated value of the property, otherwise the provisions enabling the court to auction only a part of the property which would be sufficient to satisfy the decree would be unworkable or redundant. The sale held without examining this aspect and not in conformity with this mandatory requirement would be illegal and without jurisdiction. Held, when only one of the attached properties was sufficient to satisfy the decree there was no requirement for effecting the sale of the entire attached properties. Further held, when the valuation of three attached properties is mentioned in the attachment Panchanama, it was the duty of the Court to have satisfied itself on this aspect and having failed to do so the Court has caused great injustice to the judgment debtor by auctioning his entire attached properties causing huge loss to the judgment debtor and undue benefit to the auction purchaser. (Para 22 & 25) Bhikchand v. Shamabai Dhanraj Gugale, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 375 : AIR 2024 SC 2903

Order 21 Rule 90 - A person aggrieved by an auction sale conducted by the public functionary in gross violations of the mandatory provisions of law cannot be called upon to establish the dual conditions stipulated in Order XXI Rule 90 CPC for setting aside the auction sale. Al-Can Export Pvt. Ltd. v. Prestige H.M. Polycontainers Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 453 : AIR 2024 SC 3907 : (2024) 9 SCC 94

Order 21 Rule 99 & 101 - Pendente Lite Transferee's Rights - Whether a pendente lite transferee can resist the execution of a decree - A pendente lite transferee, though not a party to the suit, can invoke Order XXI Rule 99 to assert independent rights after dispossession. This includes the right to seek adjudication of claims under Order XXI Rule 101 without a separate suit. The court reiterated that such transferees are entitled to protect their interests despite their knowledge of ongoing litigation, referencing Yogesh Goyanka v. Govind, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 457. The appeals were dismissed, affirming that the High Court correctly allowed the pendente lite transferee to challenge the execution based on limitation and remanded the matter for fresh consideration by the trial court. Renjith K.G. v. Sheeba, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 798 : AIR 2024 SC 5167

Order 23 Rule 1 - The provision which pertains to a suit would not ipso facto apply to a miscellaneous application invoking inherent powers of Supreme Court, instituted in a set of statutory appeals which stood disposed of. Even if an applicant applies for withdrawal of an application, in exceptional cases, it would be within the jurisdiction of the Court to examine the application and pass appropriate orders. (Para 19) Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 241

Order 23 Rule 3 - Compromise of Suit - For a valid compromise in a suit there has to be a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties which would then require it to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court. In the present case, neither the compromise deed has been reduced to writing, nor it is recorded by the court. Mere statements of the parties before court about such said compromise, cannot satisfy the requirements of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC. Therefore, the compromise decree is not valid. (Para 20 & 23) Amro Devi v. Julfi Ram, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 482 : AIR 2024 SC 5513

Order 23 Rule 3 - Consent Decrees - Restoration as a Statutory Remedy - Under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC, a party retains the statutory right to seek restoration of a case if the terms of a compromise are not fulfilled, irrespective of specific liberty being recorded by the court in its order. The court recording a compromise bears the duty to examine its legality, including in cases alleging fraud or non-compliance, through recall applications. Navratan Lal Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 985

Order 23 Rule 3A - Consent Decrees - Bar on Fresh Suits and Appeals - As per Section 96 (3) and Order 23 Rule 3A of the CPC, neither appeals nor fresh suits are maintainable to challenge a consent decree or the legality of a compromise, leaving recall applications as the sole remedy. Navratan Lal Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 985

Order 23 Rule 3A - Compromise decrees cannot be challenged by third parties through a separate suit. The proper remedy is to approach the same court where the compromise decree was passed. Third parties are equally barred from challenging such decrees unless allowed by law. Shri Mukund Bhavan Trust v. Shrimant Chhatrapati Udayan Raje Pratapsinh Maharaj Bhonsle, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1041

Order 23 Rule 3 - Compromise of Suit - The appellant filed a suit for cancellation of power of attorney and sale deeds alleging forgery, which was dismissed by the Trial Court. During the pendency of the first appeal, the parties entered into a compromise, recorded in the High Court's order. The appellant sought restoration of the appeal upon the respondent's non-compliance and dishonor of cheques issued under the compromise. The High Court dismissed the restoration application, citing the absence of liberty for restoration in its earlier order. Held, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the statutory remedy of restoration under Order 23 Rule 3 cannot be curtailed by the absence of explicit liberty in a prior order. The matter was remanded to the High Court for adjudication on merits. The judgment reaffirms the primacy of statutory rights under the CPC and emphasizes the judiciary's role in ensuring access to justice and compliance with lawful agreements. It underscores the limited nature of remedies available against consent decrees and clarifies the procedural safeguards for parties alleging fraud or non-compliance. Navratan Lal Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 985

Order 33 and Order 44 – Suits by indigent persons and appeals by indigent persons – These provisions “exemplify the cherished principle that lack of monetary capability does not preclude a person from knocking on the doors of the Court to seek vindication of his rights.” (Para 11) Alifiya Husenbhai Keshariya v. Siddiq Ismail Sindhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : AIR 2024 SC 3167

Order 39 - Principles governing the grant of temporary injunction - No Mini-Trial at Interim Stage - Courts must refrain from conducting a mini-trial at the stage of deciding an application for temporary injunction. Essential Conditions for Grant - The plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case, which raises substantial questions requiring adjudication. This should be supported by evidence through affidavits or otherwise. However, prima facie case does not equate to establishing prima facie title, which requires evidence at trial. The court must be satisfied that non-interference would result in irreparable injury, meaning a material injury that cannot be adequately compensated by damages. The balance of convenience must favor the grant of the injunction, considering the comparative mischief or injury likely to be caused to either party by granting or refusing the injunction. Judicial Discretion and Status Quo - The court must exercise sound judicial discretion to determine whether maintaining the status quo pending trial is necessary to prevent substantial injury. In Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, (1992) 1 SCC 719, the Court emphasized weighing the potential harm to both parties before deciding on the injunction. The grant of temporary injunction is governed by the principles of prima facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience, requiring careful judicial discretion to protect the rights of the parties pending final adjudication. [Referred: Anand Prasad Agarwal v. Tarkeshwar Prasad, (2001) 5 SCC 568] Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Order 39 Rule 1 - Interim Relief – Test for grant of interim injunction – The three-fold test is establishing (i) a prima facie case, (ii) balance of convenience and (iii) irreparable loss or harm. This three-fold test must not be applied mechanically, to the detriment of the other party and in the case of injunctions against journalistic pieces, often to the detriment of the public. While granting interim relief, the court must provide detailed reasons and analyze how the three-fold test is satisfied. Merely recording that a prima facie case exists, that the balance of convenience is in favour of the grant of injunction and that an irreparable injury would be caused, would not amount to an application of mind to the facts of the case. The three-fold test cannot merely be recorded as a mantra without looking into the facts on the basis of which an injunction has been sought. (Para 5 & 13) Bloomberg Television v. Zee Entertainment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 258

Order 39 Rule 1 - Interim Relief – Interim injunction against publication of journalists – The grant of a pre-trial injunction against the publication of an article may have severe ramifications on the right to freedom of speech of the author and the public's right to know. Courts should not grant ex-parte injunctions except in exceptional cases. In all other cases, injunctions against the publication of material should be granted only after a fullfledged trial is conducted or in exceptional cases, after the respondent is given a chance to make their submissions. An additional consideration of balancing the fundamental right to free speech with the right to reputation and privacy must be borne in mind. (Para 7 & 9) Bloomberg Television v. Zee Entertainment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 258

Order 39 Rule 1 - Power of appellate court to interfere in interim injunction – The grant of an interim injunction is an exercise of discretionary power and the appellate court will usually not interfere with the grant of interim relief. However, appellate courts must interfere if the discretion has been exercised “arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or where the court has ignored settled principles of law regulating the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. The grant of an ex parte interim injunction by way of an unreasoned order, definitely falls within the above formulation, necessitating interference by the High Court. (Para 12) Bloomberg Television v. Zee Entertainment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 258

Order 39 and 43 - Temporary Injunction - Appeal from orders - High Courts must not substitute their views for that of the trial court without finding specific deficiencies like perversity, capriciousness, or arbitrariness in the trial court's order. Observations based on extraneous factors, such as pending litigations or alleged misuse of power, are insufficient to override the trial court's discretionary orders unless they deviate from settled principles governing injunctions under Order 39 CPC. Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Order 41 Rule 31 – Omission to frame points of determination by the first appellate court – Held, even if the first appellate Court does not separately frame the points for determination arising in the first appeal, it would not prove fatal as long as that Court deals with all the issues that actually arise for deliberation in the said appeal. Substantial compliance with the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 CPC in that regard is sufficient. (Para 30) Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 369 : AIR 2024 SC 3026

Order 41 Rule 25 and 27 - Courts at the Appellate stage of civil suits cannot create a new case for the parties while framing such additional issues that were never raised in the pleadings of the parties. Rama Kt. Barman v. Md. Mahim Ali, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 637

Order 41 Rule 25 and 27 - Recovery of Possession - Whether the High Court erred in framing new substantial questions of law at the appellate stage without providing the parties an opportunity to lead evidence on the new issues. Held, the High Court, in allowing the respondents' appeal, had framed additional substantial questions of law, which were neither raised in the lower courts nor supported by evidence. The High Court cannot create a new case for the parties at the appellate stage. As per Order XLI Rule 25 and Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, new issues or evidence may be introduced only after following due procedure. Consequently, the matter was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The parties were directed to maintain status quo regarding possession of the suit land until the appeal is re-decided by the High Court. Appeal allowed. Rama Kt. Barman v. Md. Mahim Ali, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 637

Order 41 Rule 33 - For exercise of the power under Rule 33 of Order 41 CPC the overriding consideration is achieving the ends of justice; and one of the limitations on exercise of the power is that that part of the decree which essentially ought to have been appealed against, or objected to, by a party and which that party has permitted to achieve a finality cannot be reversed to the advantage of such party. (Para 31) Vaibhav Jain v. Hindustan Motors Ltd, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 649 : AIR 2024 SC 4219

Order 43 - Appeal from orders - Failure of the High Court to Justify Its Decision - The High Court's order failed to address pivotal issues raised by the plaintiffs and instead relied on general observations, undermining the appellate scrutiny required for interlocutory orders. The High Court's urgency in vacating the trial court's order, without adequate reasoning, led to complications, including the creation of third-party rights on the suit property. Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Order 43 - Appeal from orders - Scope of Interference - Appealability - Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the CPC permits appeals against orders made under Rules 1, 2, 2A, 4, and 10 of Order 39 CPC - Principles Governing Appellate Interference - Appellate courts should not substitute their discretion for that of the trial court unless the trial court's discretion is exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or contrary to settled principles of law. Ignoring relevant facts also constitutes a ground for interference. (Referred: Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727, Printers (Mysore) v. Pothan Joseph, (1960) SCC Online SC 62). Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Order 43 - Appellate Interference - Test of Perversity - Appellate interference requires demonstration of perversity in the trial court's order, not mere disagreement with its findings. (Referred : Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd. (2016) 2 SCC 672, Mohd. Mehtab Khan v. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan, (2013) 9 SCC 221) Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Order 43 - Role of the Appellate Court - Appellate courts must adhere to the principles laid down in Wander Ltd; 1990 Supp SCC 727 and ensure they do not reassess facts or usurp the jurisdiction of the trial court unless necessary. The appellate court's role is to examine the correctness of the trial court's order within the scope of settled principles, ensuring the hierarchy of courts is respected. The appellate court must not usurp the trial court's role in applying tests such as prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. (Referred : Shyam Sel & Power Ltd. v. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 634; Monsanto Technology LLC v. Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. (2019) 3 SCC 381). Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Order 43 - Appeal from orders - Scope of Jurisdiction - The appellate court must confine its review to determining whether the trial court's order adheres to established legal principles, avoiding unwarranted interference in interlocutory matters. This judgment solidifies the principle that appellate courts exercise limited jurisdiction in appeals from discretionary orders and underscores the importance of avoiding unwarranted interference in the trial court's findings. Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 939

Order 44 Rule 1 – Appeal filed as an indigent person – The grounds on which the claimants application to file appeal as an indigent person was rejected, that the claimant had received compensation by way of the Award of the Tribunal, and therefore, she was not indigent is incorrect. Held, this observation cannot be accepted as the claimant had received no money at that point of time. So even though she had been awarded a sum, her indigency was not extinguished thereby. Hence, the impugned order is set aside. (Para 15) Alifiya Husenbhai Keshariya v. Siddiq Ismail Sindhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : AIR 2024 SC 3167

Order 44 Rule 3(2) – Inquiry as to whether applicant is an indigent person – No further inquiry would be required in respect of a person who was allowed to sue or appeal as an indigent person if they make an affidavit to the effect that they have not ceased to be an indigent unless the Government pleader objects or disputes such claim in which case an inquiry shall be held by the Appellate Court or under the orders thereof. Held, the statutory requirement under the C.P.C., was not met. Hence, the impugned order is set aside. (Para 18) Alifiya Husenbhai Keshariya v. Siddiq Ismail Sindhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 414 : AIR 2024 SC 3167