Supreme Court Weekly Digest With Subject /Statute Wise Index [April 1 to 13]

SUPREME COURT WEEKLY DIGEST APRIL 2024 PART 1

(APRIL 1 - 13, 2024)

Citations 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 269 to 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 290

Abuse of Process of Law

Abuse of process of law – Collusion between parties in tender process – Held, respondent no. 1 in collusion with respondent no. 2, had misused the process of law for covering up the irregularities and illegalities committed in the tender process. The division bench of High Court failed to notice the ill-intention of the respondent nos. 1 and 2 and via the impugned order, permitted respondent no. 2 to execute the project even though the tender was already withdrawn by the respondent no.1 (HIMUDA) in view of the report made by the independent Committee (constituted by the High Court) confirming gross irregularities and illegalities committed by the officers of respondent no. 1. Held, the impugned order having been passed without proper application of mind and without assigning any cogent reason for brushing aside the findings of Independent Committee and observations of Single Bench, deserves to be quashed and set aside. Respondent no.1 shall be at liberty to initiate a fresh tender process in accordance with law and after following the due process of law. (Para 12 & 13) Level 9 Biz Pvt. Ltd. v. Himachal Pradesh Housing and Urban Development Authority, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 275

Administrative Law

Supreme Court delivers split verdict on appointment of Shiksha Karmi's in Madhya Pradesh. Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 279

Advocate

After the change of power from one political party to another, the States/Union Territories are changing their panel of Advocates appearing in this Court. Therefore, this Court is required to grant adjournments from time to time on the ground of change. It is true that the States/Union Territories have power to change their empanelled Advocates, but while doing so, they must ensure that the Court's functioning is not adversely affected. Therefore, it will be appropriate if the States/Union Territories while changing the panel of Advocates continue the old panel for at least 06 weeks so that the Courts are not forced to grant adjournments. Sachin Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 270

Bail

Criminal Law – Bail application – No specific prayer for bail in appeal petition – Held, the plea for bail in the context of the present appeal is implicit. Since the appeal, in substance, is against the judgment by which prayer for bail was refused, merely based on the manner of framing of reliefs or prayers in the subject-petition, the actual relief sought by the appellant would not stand eclipsed. (Para 16) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280

Caste Certificate

In cases where the scrutiny committee has decided the validation of the caste claim, the Courts should refrain from interfering unless the committee's decision suffers from any perversity. Navneet Kaur Harbhajansing Kundles v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

Section 294 – No formal proof of certain documents – The essential ingredient of Section 294(1) of the Cr.PC is that when any document is produced by the prosecution or the accused, the parties shall be called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of each such document. In this case, it is nobody's case that the appellant-accused was called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of the WhatsApp chats. (Para 21) Pankaj Singh v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Criminal procedure Code 1973; Section 439 and National Investigation Agency Act, 2008; Section 21(2) – Jurisdiction of High Court to entertain Bail application – The jurisdiction of the High Court to consider the question of bail is coordinate with that of the Sessions Court and it has evolved as a matter of practice that an accused seeking bail ought to approach the Sessions Court before approaching the High Court. Further, the High Court adopted proper course while exercising jurisdiction under Section 439 of the 1973 Code to refer the matter to a Division Bench to decide the bail plea in accordance with Section 21(2) of the 2008 Act. (Para 12) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280

Section 451 – Custody and disposal of the property pending an inquiry or trial – When any property is produced before any criminal court during the course of inquiry or trial, it is the criminal court which would have the jurisdiction and the power to pass appropriate orders for the proper custody of such property or for selling or disposing of such property. The appellant without approaching the concerned court under Section 451 of CrPC, directly approached the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Held, when there is a specific statutory provision contained in the CrPC. empowering the criminal court to pass appropriate order for the proper custody and disposal of the property pending the inquiry or trial, the appellant could not have invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking release of his vehicle. (Para 5 & 6) Khengarbhai Lakhabhai Dambhala v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 289

Companies Act, 2013

Companies Act, 2013; Section 31(2) - Section 31(2) was thus introduced with the intention to confer validity on any alterations to the articles as if they were originally contained therein. Therefore, any increase in the share capital of the company also shall be valid as if it were originally there when the Articles of Association were first stamped. Legislature has specifically mentioned Articles of Association in Article 10 of Schedule-I of the Stamp Act, where stamp duty is to be charged inter alia on increase in the share capital of a company. Thus, in spite of Section 31(2) of the Companies Act, stamp duty will be payable on increased share capital. (Para 12 & 13) State of Maharashtra v. National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 285

Companies Act, 2013; Section 94 & 97 – A company is empowered to increase its share capital, by such amount as it thinks expedient, by passing a resolution in a general meeting. Once a resolution for authorising increase in share capital has been passed in terms of Section 94 of the Companies Act, a notice is required to be sent by the company in Form No.5 to the Registrar, pursuant to Section 97 of the Companies Act. (Para 7) State of Maharashtra v. National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 285

Conflict of Law

Conflict between laws – It is a settled position of law that in case of conflict between two laws, the general law must give way to the special law. A conjoined reading of the Stamp Act and the Companies Act would show that while the former governs the payment of stamp duty for all manner of instruments, the latter deals with all aspects relating to companies and other similar associations. In the case at hand, we are concerned with an instrument which is chargeable to Stamp Duty and finds its origin in the Companies Act. The various provisions of the Companies Act provide the purpose and scope of the instrument. Thus, it has to be said that the Companies Act is the special law and the Stamp Act is the general law with regards to Articles of Association, and the special will override the general. (Para 11) State of Maharashtra v. National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 285

Constitution of India

Article 14 & 21 – The right to a healthy environment and the right to be free from the adverse effects of climate change – The right to a healthy environment encapsulates the principle that every individual has the entitlement to live in an environment that is clean, safe, and conducive to their well-being. Even if there is no umbrella legislation in India which relates to climate change and the attendant concerns this does not mean that the people of India do not have a right against the adverse effects of climate change. As the havoc caused by climate change increases year by year, it becomes necessary to articulate this as a distinct right. It is recognised by Articles 14 and 21. Without a clean environment which is stable and unimpacted by the vagaries of climate change, the right to life is not fully realised. States are compelled to prioritize environmental protection and sustainable development, thereby addressing the root causes of climate change and safeguarding the wellbeing of present and future generations. It is a fundamental right of all individuals to live in a healthy and sustainable environment. (Para 19, 24, 25 & 35) M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 286

Constitution of India; Article 21 – Pre-conviction detention – Liberty of a pre-trial detenue – Detention before conclusion of trial at the investigation and post-chargesheet stage has the sanction of law but any form of deprival of liberty results in breach of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and must be justified on the ground of being reasonable, following a just and fair procedure. Pre-conviction detention must be proportionate in the facts of a given case depending on gravity and seriousness of the offence alleged to have been committed. (Para 38) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280

Constitution of India; Article 293 – Borrowing by states – Plaintiff -State seeks interim injunction against Union of India to restore the position that existed before the Defendant union imposed ceiling on all the borrowings of the Plaintiff state – The Triple-Test, are followed by the Courts as the pre-requisites before a party can be mandatorily injuncted to do or to refrain from doing a particular thing. These three cardinal factors, are: (a) A 'Prima facie case', which necessitates that as per the material placed on record, the plaintiff is likely to succeed in the final determination of the case; (b) 'Balance of convenience', such that the prejudice likely to be caused to the plaintiff due to rejection of the interim relief will be higher than the inconvenience that the defendant may face if the relief is so granted; and (c)'Irreparable injury', which means that if the relief is not granted, the plaintiff will face an irreversible injury that cannot be compensated in monetary terms. Held, the Plaintiff – State has failed to establish a prima facie case that even after adjusting the over-borrowings of the previous year, there is fiscal space to borrow. The balance of convenience, thus, clearly lies in favour of the Defendant – Union of India as the mischief that is likely to ensue in the event of granting the interim relief, will be far greater than rejecting the same. Further Plaintiff – State has sought to equate 'financial hardship' with 'irreparable injury'. Held, it appears prima facie that 'monetary damage' is not an irreparable loss. If the State has essentially created financial hardship because of its own financial mismanagement, such hardship cannot be held to be an irreparable injury that would necessitate an interim relief against Union. Since the Plaintiff – State has failed to establish the three prongs of proving prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, State of Kerala is not entitled to the interim injunction, as prayed for. (Para 3, 12, 25, 33, 35 & 37) State of Kerala v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 269

Consumer Protection Act, 1986

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Maintainability of commercial disputes – Appropriate remedy in commercial disputes – Investment made by the complainant was for deriving benefit, therefore, it would be an investment for profit/gain and such commercial transactions would be outside the purview of the 1986 Act. Commercial disputes cannot be decided in summary proceeding under the 1986 Act but the appropriate remedy for recovery of the said amount, would be before the Civil Court. The complaint was thus not maintainable. The District Forum, the State and the National Commissions fell in error in allowing the complaint. (Para 7) Annapurna B. Uppin v. Malsiddappa, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 284

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Maintainability of complaint when complainant deemed partner of firm – There was a registered partnership deed of the firm and there is no further document placed on record by the complainant regarding dissolution of the said registered deed. The said registered deed continued till the time when the investment was made by the complainant, hence, the complainant would be deemed to be partner of the firm. Once the complainant himself was a partner as per the registered partnership deed, he could not have maintained the complaint for settling the dispute with respect to the partnership firm. (Para 4.5 & 6) Annapurna B. Uppin v. Malsiddappa, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 284

Corruption

Public Interest Litigation - Allegations of faulty contracts awarded by the State of Arunachal Pradesh to near relatives of the then Chief Minister. Direction for examination by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG). Voluntary Arunachal Sena v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 283

Criminal Law

Criminal Law – Power of appellate court in reversal of acquittal – Unless the finding of acquittal is found to be perverse or impossible, interference with the same would not be warranted. Held, no perversity or impossibility could be found in the approach adopted by the learned trial Judge. The elaborate exercise of the trial Judge, has been washed away by the High Court in a totally cursory manner. The judgment of High Court is based on conjectures and surmises. Impugned judgment of High Court is quashed and accused persons are acquitted. (Para 9, 14, 19 & 23) Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 271

Election Law

Representation of the People's Act, 1951 (RP Act); Section 100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i), 123(2) & 83(1)(b) – Election petition – Invalidation of election – On grounds that the appellant has committed corrupt practice and the result of the election was materially affected by the improper acceptance of nomination. Held, none of the allegations with regard to the false statements, and suppression and misrepresentation of facts with regard to his educational qualification or with regard to his liability in respect of the loan availed by him for his partnership firm or with regard to his default in depositing the employer's contribution to provident fund, would fall within the definition of “Corrupt practice” of “undue influence” as envisaged in Section 123(2) of the RP Act. (Para 16 & 19) Karim Uddin Barbhuiya v. Aminul Haque Laskar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 287

Representation of the People's Act, 1951; Section 83(1) (a) & 87 and Civil Procedure Code, 1908 Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of election petition on grounds of incomplete contents of the petition – Lack of cause of action – The pleadings with regard to the allegation of corrupt practice have to be precise, specific and unambiguous. The Election petition lacks concise statement of “material facts” as contemplated in Section 83(a), and lacks “full particulars” of the alleged Corrupt practice as contemplated in Section 83(b) of the RP Act. Held, mere bald and vague allegations without any basis would not be sufficient compliance of the requirement of making a concise statement of the “material facts” in the Election Petition. If the allegations contained in Election Petition do not set out grounds as contemplated in Section 100 and do not conform to the requirement of Section 81 and 83 of the Act, the Election Petition is liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of CPC. An omission of a single material fact leading to an incomplete cause of action or omission to contain a concise statement of material facts on which the Election petitioner relies for establishing a cause of action, would entail rejection of Election Petition. (Para 19. 20, 21 & 24) Karim Uddin Barbhuiya v. Aminul Haque Laskar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 287

Election Petition – Right to contest election or to question the election by means of an Election Petition is neither common law nor fundamental right. It is a statutory right governed by the statutory provisions of the RP Act. (Para 12) Karim Uddin Barbhuiya v. Aminul Haque Laskar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 287

Representation of the People Act, 1951; Section 100(1)(d)(iv) – Invalidation of election on grounds of non-compliance of Section 100(1)(d)(iv) – Candidates failure in disclosing the fact that he had occupied government accommodation and in filing the 'No Dues Certificate' in that regard, with his nomination form, cannot be said to be a defect of any real import as there were no actual outstanding dues payable by him in relation to the government accommodation occupied by him earlier. Every defect in the nomination cannot straightaway be termed to be of such character as to render its acceptance improper and each case would have to turn on its own individual facts, insofar as that aspect is concerned. There must be a distinction between non-disclosure of substantial issues as opposed to insubstantial issues, which may not impact one's candidature or the result of an election. Held, plaintiff did not sufficiently plead or prove a specific breach or how it materially affected the result of the election. (Para 40, 42, 48) Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 290

Representation of the People Act, 1951; Section 123(2), Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 2(30) and Sale of Goods Act, 1930; Section 19 – Invalidation of election on grounds of corrupt practices by candidate – Non-disclosure of 3 vehicles – As per Section 2(30) of Act of 1988, an “Owner” is a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered. As per Section 19 of Act of 1930, where there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred. Held, mere failure to get registered the name of the new owner of an already registered vehicle does not mean that the sale/gift transaction would stand invalidated and such a vehicle, despite being physically handed over to the new owner, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be treated as still being in the possession and control of the former owner. Held, once it is accepted that the three vehicles in question were either gifted or sold before the filing of the nomination by candidate, the said vehicles cannot be considered to be still owned by candidate's wife and son for purposes other than those covered by the Act of 1988. Non-disclosure of the three vehicles registered in the names of the wife and son of candidate, could not be treated as an attempt of candidate to unduly influence the voters. Such non-disclosure cannot lead to invalidation of election on grounds of corrupt practices under Section 123(2). (Para 22, 27 & 28) Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 290

Constitution of India – Voters right to know – Candidates non-disclosure of fact of substantial character – Held, 'right to privacy' of the candidate would still survive as regards matters which are of no concern to the voter or are irrelevant to his candidature for public office. In that respect, non-disclosure of each and every asset owned by a candidate would not amount to a defect of a substantial character. Every case would have to turn on its own peculiarities and there can be no hard and fast or straitjacketed rule as to when the non-disclosure of a particular movable asset by a candidate would amount to a defect of a substantial character. (Para 44) Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 290

Evidence Law

Standard of proof – Beyond reasonable doubt – The prosecution has failed to prove the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the impugned orders cannot be sustained, and they are hereby quashed and set aside. (Para 23) Pankaj Singh v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Tutored Witness – Benefit of doubt – Held, evidence of the PW2 – PW5 will have to be discarded as there is a distinct possibility that the said witnesses were tutored by the police on a day before it was recorded by trial court. This kind of interference by the Police with the judicial process, amounts to gross misuse of power by the Police machinery. Hence, there is a serious doubt created about the genuineness of the prosecution case and the benefit of this substantial doubt must be given to the appellants. Therefore, both the Sessions Court and the High Court have committed an error in convicting the appellants. (Para 8 & 9) Manikandan v. State by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 281

Evidence Act, 1872

Evidence Act, 1872 – Conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence – Prosecution to prove case beyond reasonable doubt – It is necessary for the prosecution that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It is a primary principle that the accused 'must be' and not merely 'may be' proved guilty before a court can convict the accused. The facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act must have been done by the accused. The suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt and an accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Held, the prosecution has failed to prove any of the incriminating circumstances beyond reasonable doubt and in no case, the chain of circumstances, which was so interlinked to each other that leads to no other conclusion, than the guilt of the accused persons. Held, the findings of the learned trial Judge are based on correct appreciation of the material placed on record. (Para 6, 7 & 13) Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 271

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 114A – Applicability of presumption as to absence of consent for offences under Section 376(2) – The condition precedent for applicability of Section 114A is that the prosecution must be for the offence of rape under various clauses set out under Section 376(2) of the IPC. No charge was framed against the appellant accused for the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(f) of the IPC. In the absence of the charge framed under Section 376(2)(f) of the IPC, neither the prosecution nor the victim can contend that Section 376(2)(f) of the IPC was applicable. Therefore, the presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act will not apply, and the burden will be on the prosecution to prove that the sexual intercourse was without the consent of the Prosecutrix. (Para 11) Pankaj Singh v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Interim Relief

Interim Relief – Injunction – Difference between prohibitory injunction and mandatory injunction – Prohibitory injunctions vary from mandatory injunctions in terms of the nature of relief that is sought. While the former seeks to restrain the defendant from doing something, the latter compels the defendant to take a positive step. The Courts are, therefore, relatively more cautious in granting mandatory injunction as compared to prohibitory injunction and thus, require the plaintiff to establish a stronger case. (Para 13, 14) State of Kerala v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 269

International Law

International agreements and treaties – It is the duty of the Court to give effect to international agreements and treaties to which India is a party. India's international obligations and commitments have not been enacted in domestic law. Regardless, the Court must be alive to these obligations while adjudicating writ petitions which seek reliefs that may hinder these obligations from being fulfilled or otherwise interfere with India's international commitments as well as the right to be free from the adverse effects of climate change. (Para 56 & 58) M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 286

Judicial Service

There cannot be any discrimination between the retired High Court judges, depending on their source of elevation (whether from the bar or the District Judiciary), while computing their pensionary benefits. Union of India v. Justice (Retd) Raj Rahul Garg, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 277

Pensionary payments to Judges constitute a vital element in the independence of the judiciary. As a consequence of long years of judicial office, Judges on demitting office do not necessarily have the options which are open to members from other services. The reason why the State assumes the obligation to pay pension to Judges is to ensure that the protection of the benefits which are available after retirement would ensure their ability to discharge their duties without “fear or favour” during the years of judgeship. The purpose of creating dignified conditions of existence for Judges both during their tenure as Judges and thereafter has, therefore, a vital element of public interest. Courts and the Judges are vital components of the rule of law. Independence of the judiciary is hence a vital doctrine which is recognized in the constitutional scheme. The payment of salaries and dignified pensions serves precisely that purpose. Hence, any interpretation which is placed on the provisions of the Act must comport with the object and purpose underlying the enactment of the provision. (Para 25) Union of India v. Justice (Retd) Raj Rahul Garg, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 277

Letter of Intent

The Letter of Intent is merely an expression of intention to enter into a contract. It does not create any right in favour of the party to whom it is issued. There is no binding legal relationship between the party issuing the LOI and the party to whom such LOI is issued. A detailed agreement/contract is required to be drawn up between the parties after the LOI is received by the other party more particularly in case of contract of such a mega scale. (Para 10) Level 9 Biz Pvt. Ltd. v. Himachal Pradesh Housing and Urban Development Authority, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 275

Limitation

Limitation Act, 1963; Section 3 – Bar of limitation – Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. The use of the word 'shall' in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions in Section 4 to 24. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. Hence, it is an obligation upon the court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. Section 3, being a substantive law of mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a strict sense. (Para 10 & 12) Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 288

Limitation Act, 1963; Section 5 – Exception to general rule of limitation in section 3 – Section 5 empowers the courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant gives 'sufficient cause' for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. The courts are conferred with discretionary powers to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time. Such power may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally. (Para 12) Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 288

Limitation Act, 1963; Section 3 & 5 – Application for condoning delay in filing appeal – The High Court, has not found it fit to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of condoning the delay. Held, merely because some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal. Sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay hence, there is no occasion for us to interfere with the decision of High Court. (Para 26 & 32) Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 288

Limitation Act, 1963 – Object – The law of limitation is founded on public policy – It is enshrined in the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” i.e. it is for the general welfare that a period of limitation be put to litigation. The object is to put an end to every legal remedy and to have a fixed period of life for every litigation as it is futile to keep any litigation or dispute pending indefinitely. (Para 7) Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 288

Limitation Act, 1963; Section 14 – Exclusion of time in computing the period of limitation – Execution application dismissed on grounds of being barred by limitation – Article 14 (2) carves out an exception excluding the period of limitation when the proceedings are being pursued with due diligence and good faith in a Court “which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it”. Held, it is apparent that the Plaintiff has pursued the matter bonafidely and diligently and in good faith before what it believed to be the appropriate forum and, therefore, such time period is bound to be excluded when computing limitation before the Court having competent jurisdiction. All conditions stipulated for invocation of Section 14 are fulfilled. (Para 27 & 38) Purni Devi v. Babu Ram, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 273

J&K Limitation Act; Article 182 and Civil Procedure Code; Section 48 – Article 182 deals with period of Limitation of 3 years for filing an execution application for the first-time seeking enforcement of a decree. Meanwhile, Section 48 of the CPC deals with subsequent applications and fixes an outer limit of 12 years when execution remains unsatisfied. Held, the period from 'when the execution application was filed' to 'when the prior proceeding was dismissed', has to be excluded while computing period of limitation, which results in the execution application filed by the Plaintiff, being within the limitation period prescribed under Article 182 of the Limitation Act, which is 3 years. (Para 7 & 39) Purni Devi v. Babu Ram, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 273

Condonation of delay – To condone delay of 12 years and 158 days in filing application for restoration of the Writ Petition – The High Court vide the impugned order declined to condone the delay. Held, the length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. Further, while considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and the vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied. The High Court committed no error of law in passing the impugned order. (Para 26 & 34) Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 276

Limitation – The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity and the 'Sword of Damocles' cannot be kept hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. Held, it appears that the appellants want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. (Para 26 & 27) Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 276

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 – Civil and Criminal course adopted on same issue – Whether, a criminal proceeding can be initiated and the accused therein held guilty, in connection with a transaction, in respect of which a decree by a competent Court of civil jurisdiction, already stands passed? Held, civil court judgments are not binding on criminal courts, but the ratio of the civil proceedings would be binding on criminal proceedings for certain limited purposes such as sentence or damages imposed by the criminal court. The Court in criminal jurisdiction would be bound by the civil Court having declared the cheque to be only for the purposes of security. The civil Court having declared the cheque (subject matter of dispute) to be only for the purposes of security, the criminal proceedings for cheque dishonour under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would be unsustainable in law and, therefore liable to be quashed and set aside. The damages as imposed by the Courts must be returned to the appellant. (Para 8, 11 & 12) Prem Raj v. Poonamma Menon, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 272

Partnership

Liability of legal heirs on death of partner of firm – Held, legal heirs of a deceased partner do not become liable for any liability of the firm upon the death of the partner. (Para 8) Annapurna B. Uppin v. Malsiddappa, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 284

Penal Code, 1860

Penal Code, 1860; Section 376(2) (f) – Fiduciary relationship – Held, appellant was not in a position of trust towards the prosecutrix. Hence, there was no fiduciary relationship between the appellant-accused and the Prosecutrix. (Para 7 & 11) Pankaj Singh v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Failure to mask victim's identity in POCSO case - Sensitization of Judicial and Police Officers ordered - In this order, the court considers an application for anticipatory bail in a case under the POCSO Act. While denying bail, the court notes a violation of Section 33(7) of the POCSO Act and Section 228A of the IPC regarding the disclosure of the victim's identity. Citing the importance of safeguarding the victim's identity, the court directs the need for sensitization of judicial and police officers in West Bengal to ensure compliance with these provisions. The order emphasizes that disclosing the victim's identity is permissible only in specific circumstances for the child's best interest. The court orders a copy of the order to be forwarded to the Registrar General of the High Court of Calcutta for further action. Utpal Mandal @ Utpal Mondal v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 282

Stamp Act

Bombay Stamp Act, 1958; Section 2(l) & Article 10 of Schedule-I – Form No. 5 is not an instrument. It is only the articles which are an instrument within the meaning of Section 2(l) of the Stamp Act and accordingly have been mentioned in Article 10 of Schedule-I of the Stamp Act. Stamp Duty is affixed on Form No. 5 only as a matter of practical convenience because a company itself cannot carry out the alterations and record the increase in share capital in its Articles of Association. (Para 9) State of Maharashtra v. National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 285

Bombay Stamp Act, 1958; Article 10 of Schedule-I – After amendment of Article 10, “increased share capital” is a part of Article 10 – The effect of adding “increased share capital” is that stamp duty will be charged on subsequent increases in the authorised share capital, subject to the maximum cap. The ceiling of Rs. 25 lakhs is applicable on Articles of Association and the increased share capital therein, not on every increase individually. Even if the amendment does not have retrospective effect and the increase was initiated by the respondent after the cap was introduced, since the instrument 'Articles of Association' remains the same, the duty already paid on the same instrument will have to be considered. In case stamp duty equivalent to or more than the cap has already been paid, no further stamp duty can be levied. (Para 15 & 18) State of Maharashtra v. National Organic Chemical Industries Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 285

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Section 43D (5) – Bail – Long period of incarceration was held to be a valid ground to enlarge an accused on bail in spite of the bail restricting provision of Section 43D (5) of the 1967 Act. Taking cognizance of the composite effect of delay in framing charge, period of detention undergone by the accused, the nature of allegations against her vis-à-vis the materials available before this Court at this stage in addition to her age and medical condition, she ought not to be denied the privilege of being enlarged on bail pending further process. (Para 36 & 41) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Section 15 & 16 of the 1967 Act –Terrorist act – Section 15(1) refers to certain acts which would constitute a terrorist act. To qualify for being a terrorist act, an act must be done with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security or sovereignty of India or such act must be accompanied with an intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country. In sub-clauses (a), (b), and (c) of section 15(1), the law stipulates the manner of commission of the acts to come within the ambit of the expression “terrorist act” under the 1967 legislation. Held, prima facie commission or attempt to commit any terrorist act by the appellant not found. (Para 30) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Section 17 – Funding terrorist act – Held, no corroboration of the allegation that the appellant has funded any terrorist act or has received any money for that purpose. No prima facie case made out. (Para 31) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Section 18 – Conspiracy or attempt to commit, advocate, abet, advice, incite or facilitate commission or any terrorist act. Held, mere participation in some meetings and attempt to encourage women to join the struggle for new democratic revolution, prima facie, do not reveal the commission of an offence under Section 18 of the 1967 Act. (Para 32) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Section 20 & 38 – Membership of terrorist organisation – Mere meeting of accused individuals or being connected with them through any medium cannot implicate one in Chapter VI offences under of the 1967 Act, in the absence of any further evidence of being associated with a terrorist organisation. The offence under Section 20 not made out. (Para 34 & 35) Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 280