S. 300 IPC | Lacking Intention To Commit Murder Irrelevant If Bodily Injury Is Caused With Lethal Weapon, Likely To Cause Death : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of an individual for committing murder who, out of a scuffle, inflicted serious injury on vital parts of the deceased body with lethal weapons. The bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Prasanna B Varale rejected the accused-appellant's argument that his act to commit murder was not intentional and premeditated, hence he cannot be punished...
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of an individual for committing murder who, out of a scuffle, inflicted serious injury on vital parts of the deceased body with lethal weapons.
The bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Prasanna B Varale rejected the accused-appellant's argument that his act to commit murder was not intentional and premeditated, hence he cannot be punished for committing culpable homicide amounting to murder.
Referring to clause (3) of Section 300 IPC, the Court said lacking intention to commit murder is irrelevant, and the accused would still be held guilty for committing murder if he causes a bodily injury to the deceased as is likely to result in death in the ordinary course of nature.
“Even if it is presumed that the appellant-accused no. 1 did not have the intention to cause such bodily injury, the act of causing injuries with knife to vital parts is reflective of the knowledge that causing such injuries is likely to cause death in the ordinary course.” the court said.
Justice Nath in the judgment referred to Virsa Singh vs. State of Pepsu (1958) judgment, where the Court held that to bring the case under clause 3 of Section 300 IPC, the prosecution must establish objectively:
“1. That a bodily injury is present;
2. That the nature of injury must be proved;
3. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury;
4. That the injury inflicted is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of the nature.”
The Court said once all the four ingredients are fulfilled then the offence would be deemed as murder.
In Virsa Singh's case, it was held that the intention to cause death or the knowledge that the injury inflicted is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature would not be relevant if it is proven that the accused intended to cause the specific bodily injury and injury was inflicted on the deceased.
“It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.”, the Court said in Virsa Singh's case.
Thus, the Court held that the accused's argument that the incident was not premeditated was not supported with the fact that the accused had inflicted the injuries on the vital parts of the deceased body (lungs and heart) with a lethal weapon, sufficient to cause death in an ordinary course of nature.
“The defence's argument that the incident was a spontaneous scuffle does not absolve the appellant of liability. While the scuffle may have triggered the attack, the appellant's use of a lethal weapon and the manner in which the injuries were inflicted elevate the act from culpable homicide to murder. Courts have consistently held that intent can be inferred from the nature and severity of injuries, as well as the choice of weapon and the manner of its use. The use of a lethal weapon and the deliberate targeting of vital parts of the body are strong indicators of such intent.”
Further, the Court noted that the nature and location of the injuries inflicted, the choice of weapon, and the circumstances of the attack are crucial factors in determining the liability of the accused.
“In light of the evidence and the legal principles involved, the appellant's plea for leniency on the grounds of spontaneity and lack of premeditation cannot be sustained. The nature and location of the injuries inflicted, the choice of weapon, and the circumstances of the attack unequivocally establish the liability of the appellant for causing the death of Subrahmannian. The argument that the act was committed in the spur of the moment does not diminish the gravity of the offence or the appellant's culpability.”, the Court held.
Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.
Appearance:
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Nikhil Goel, Sr. Adv. Mr. Haris Beeran, Adv. Mr. Azhar Assees, Adv. Mr. Anand B. Menon, Adv. Ms. Maneesha Sunilkumar, Adv. Mr. Radha Shyam Jena, AOR
For Respondent(s) Mr. P.V. Dinesh, Sr. Adv. Mr. Nishe Rajen Shonker, AOR Mrs. Anu K Joy, Adv. Mr. Alim Anvar, Adv. Ms. Anna Oommen, Adv. Ms. Urvashi Chauhan, Adv.
Case Title: KUNHIMUHAMMED@ KUNHEETHU VERSUS THE STATE OF KERALA
Citation : 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 964