Maharashtra Rent Control Act | Tenant Can't Be Mechanically Evicted Based On Municipality's Demolition Order; Immediacy Must Be Examined : Supreme Court
In a case under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (“Act”), the Supreme Court observed that the eviction of a tenant cannot be ordered merely based on a demolition notice issued by the Municipal body. The Court has to examine the "immediate urgency" of the need for demolition.The Court made this observation in the context of Section 16(1)(k) of the Act which says "that the premises...
In a case under the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (“Act”), the Supreme Court observed that the eviction of a tenant cannot be ordered merely based on a demolition notice issued by the Municipal body. The Court has to examine the "immediate urgency" of the need for demolition.
The Court made this observation in the context of Section 16(1)(k) of the Act which says "that the premises are required for the immediate purpose of demolition ordered by any municipal authority or other competent authority".
In this case, one of the grounds urged by the landlord to seek the tenant's eviction was that the Municipal Authority has issued a demolition order. Though the trial court and the appellate court allowed the eviction petition, the High Court dismissed it, following which the landlord approached the Supreme Court.
The landlord contended that once the Municipal authority has issued a demolition order, then the Court can substitute its views. The bench comprising Justices Aniruddha Bose and Bela Trivedi however observed that the Court can examine the need for "immediate demolition."
"Court has to examine if there is immediacy of the need for demolition," the bench observed after referring to the Bombay High Court's judgments in Manohar Prabhumal Rajpal -vs- Satara City Municipal Corporation, Satara and Another and M.L. Sonavane -vs- C.G. Sonar.
Concurring with the findings of the High Court, the Bench observed that the court while deciding whether the demolition is necessary or not should not blindly rely on the municipal authority report rather a court should also decide the degree of immediate urgency.
“the Court trying an eviction proceeding under the aforesaid provision has very limited role in determining as to whether demolition is really necessary or not, but it does not automatically follow therefrom that the Court would mechanically adopt the view of the municipal authority of there being urgent need of demolition.”
Further, the court further explained the distinction between clauses (i) and (k) of Section 16(1) of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, where it noted that when the eviction is sought under clause (k) then the jurisdiction is vested with the court to decide the degree of immediate urgency.
“The conditions under which a landlord can bring an eviction action under clauses (i) and (k) of Section 16(1) are different in their operations. In respect of an eviction proceeding founded on the former provision, it contemplates a lesser degree of immediacy or urgency, as held in the Constitution Bench judgment which we have referred to above. But the latter provision requires a greater degree of urgency and it is within the jurisdiction of the Court to test this factor.”
The landlord had also raised the ground that he required the property for own use and raised the ground under Section 16(1)(g). However, in this regard, the Supreme Court affirmed the view taken by the High Court that the trial court and the appellate court have failed to satisfy whether other reasonable accommodation was available to the landlord.
“Neither the Trial Court nor the Appellate Court chose to analyse this requirement before directing eviction... Sub-section (2) of Section 16 relates to reasonable and bona fide need in terms of Section 16(1)(g) and if the requirement is in the aforesaid terms, then the Court has to be satisfied having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available to the landlord or the tenant. This provision essentially incorporates the principle of “comparative hardship”, as such a test has come to be known in tenancy jurisprudence.”
"We affirm the view taken by the High Court that there was no satisfaction in the manner contemplated in Section 16 (2) of the 1999 Act as far as bona fide need in terms of Section 16(1)(g) was concerned," the Court observed.
Case Details: BAITULLA ISMAIL SHAIKH AND ANR. VERSUS KHATIJA ISMAIL PANHALKAR AND ORS.
Citation : 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 79