Limitation Act | Time Spent Contesting Bonafide Litigation At Wrong Forum Would Be Excluded While Computing Limitation : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court held that the time consumed in contesting bonafide litigation by the litigant at a wrong forum (believing it to be appropriate) would be excluded while computing the period of limitation under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act. Reversing the findings of the High Court, the Bench Comprising Justices Sanjay Karol and Aravind Kumar observed that Section 14(2) of the...
The Supreme Court held that the time consumed in contesting bonafide litigation by the litigant at a wrong forum (believing it to be appropriate) would be excluded while computing the period of limitation under Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act.
Reversing the findings of the High Court, the Bench Comprising Justices Sanjay Karol and Aravind Kumar observed that Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act carves out an exception excluding the period of limitation when the proceedings are being pursued with due diligence and good faith in a Court “which from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.”
“Section 14 of the Limitation Act is to be read as a whole. A conjoint and careful reading of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 14 makes it clear that an applicant who has prosecuted another civil proceeding with due diligence, before a forum which is unable to entertain the same on account of defect of jurisdiction or any other cause of like nature, is entitled to exclusion of the time during which the applicant had been prosecuting such proceeding, in computing the period of limitation.”, the Judgment authored by Justice Sanjay Karol endorsed the view taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Sesh Nath Singh v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Coop. Bank Ltd.
Background
The case relates to the rejection of the execution application of the appellant seeking execution of the decree passed in its favor by the trial court under Section 182 of the J&K Limitation Act. The appellant's execution application was rejected by the trial court on the note that the application was barred by the limitation act, as the amount of time spent i.e., from 18.12.2000 to 29.01.2005 by the appellant in contesting the litigation for execution at Tehsildar Court (having no jurisdiction to entertain the application) wouldn't be excluded while computing the period of limitation.
The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the High Court, following which the civil appeal was preferred before the Supreme Court.
Before the Supreme Court, it was contended by the appellant that the provision of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act being in pari materia with Section 182 of the J&K Limitation Act, therefore, he is entitled to exclusion of time consumed in pursuing their remedy before the learned Tehsildar, in view of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act as the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are to advance the cause of justice and must be interpreted to do so rather than abort proceedings.
Supreme Court's Observation
Accepting the contention made by the appellant, the Supreme Court observed that the appellant would be entitled to take the benefit of Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, as also applicable to the State J&K, therefore the time consumed by the appellant in pursuing the litigation in good faith at the tehsildar court would be excluded while computing the period of limitation for filing up of the execution application of a decree.
The court referred to its three-judge bench Judgment of Consolidated Engg. Enterprises v. Principle Secy, Irrigation Department, where the court had laid down the following conditions that must be satisfied before Section 14 can be pressed into service:
“(1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party;
(2) The prior proceeding had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith;
(3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature;
(4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue; and,
(5) Both the proceedings are in a court.”
Testing out the appellant's case based on the aforementioned conditions, the court observed as follows:
"(i) Both the proceedings are civil in nature and have been prosecuted by the Plaintiff or the predecessor in interest.
(ii) The failure of the execution proceedings was due to a defect of jurisdiction.
(iii) Both the proceedings pertain to execution of the decree dated 10.12.1986, which attains finality on 09.11.2000.
(iv) Both the proceedings are in a court."
Ultimately, the court held that the time spent by the appellant while contesting the application in good faith at the wrong forum believing it to be appropriate is bound to be excluded while computing limitation before the Court having competent jurisdiction.
“We do not find the reasoning given by the learned High Court in paragraph 9 while rejecting the plea for exclusion of time to be sustainable. On a perusal of the record, it is apparent that the Plaintiff has pursued the matter bonafidely and diligently and in good faith before what it believed to be the appropriate forum and, therefore, such time period is bound to be excluded when computing limitation before the Court having competent jurisdiction. All conditions stipulated for invocation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are fulfilled.”, the court observed.
Conclusion
“Therefore, in view of the above discussion, the period from 18.12.2000, when the execution application was filed to 29.01.2005, when the prior proceeding was dismissed, has to be excluded while computing period of limitation, which results in the execution application filed by the Plaintiff, being within the limitation period prescribed under Article 182 of the Limitation Act as well, which is 3 years.”, the court added.
Based on the above premise, the appeal was allowed, and the execution application of the Plaintiff/Appellant is restored to the file of the Munsiff Court, Hiranagar (Trial court) for fresh consideration, in consonance with the view on limitation which has been decided above.
Counsel For Petitioner(s) Mr. Nitin Sangra, Adv. Mr. Riju Ghosh, Adv. Mrs. Pragya Baghel, AOR
Counsel For Respondent(s) Mr. Sunil Fernandes, Sr. Adv. Ms. Nupur Kumar, AOR Ms. Diksha Dadu, Adv.
Case Title: PURNI DEVI & ANR. VERSUS BABU RAM & ANR.
Citation : 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 273