75 Landmark Supreme Court Judgments: Part I | Celebrating 75 Years of India's Supreme Court
This year marks 75 years since the establishment of the Supreme Court. Since its inception, the Supreme Court has pronounced many landmark judgments that became the cornerstone for testing the fundamental rights violations under Part III of the Constitution. We look at the 75 significant judgments of the Supreme Court through a three-part series.Interpretation of Fundamental rights,...
This year marks 75 years since the establishment of the Supreme Court. Since its inception, the Supreme Court has pronounced many landmark judgments that became the cornerstone for testing the fundamental rights violations under Part III of the Constitution.
We look at the 75 significant judgments of the Supreme Court through a three-part series.
Interpretation of Fundamental rights, basic structure
In I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967), the court held that fundamental rights could be abridged or taken away by an amendment under Article 368 of the Constitution. This overruled two judgments in Sri Sankari Prasad Deo v. UOI & State of Bihar (1951) and Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan (1965) which had held that the power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution is absolute and unfettered and extend to amending Part III.
In Sankari Prasad, the Court had also held that 'law' in Article 13(2) did not include the amendments to the Constitution because they were in the exercise of constituent powers and therefore the constitutional amendments could not be held to be violative of Part III. This was reiterated in Sajjan Singh. However, in Golaknath the Court held that 'law' under Article 13 included amendment under Article 368. Soon after Golaknath, the 24th Constitution Amendment added Article 13(4) which stated that nothing in Article 13 shall apply to any amendment made under Article 368.
This was settled in Keshavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala (1973) in which the Supreme Court 13-judge bench held by 7-6 that the Constitution can be amended but its basic features, including Part III, must survive. It overruled Golaknath in terms of stating that constitutional amendment is not law within Article 13(2).
Application of basic structure- judicial review, independence of judiciary, power of amendment
The basic structure doctrine is said to evolve from case-to-case basis. For instance, in Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975), the Court held that the amendment made to Article 329A through sub-clauses (4) and (5) through the 39th Constitution Amendment which sought to place the election of the President, the Vice President, the Prime Minister and the Speaker of the Lok Sabha beyond judicial review was held to be unconstitutional. It held that judicial review is the basic feature of the Constitution.
Another case where the Court reiterated judicial review as a basic feature of the Constitution was I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors (2007). In this, the Supreme Court held that it is not permissible for the Parliament to immunize legislations from fundamental rights by inserting them into the 9th Schedule and thereof, from the judicial review of the court.
In Minerva Mills & Ors v. UOI (1980), the Constitution validity of the 42nd Amendment, 1976 was challenged for excluding judicial review for constitutional amendments. This was held to be violative of the basic structure. It was stated that the power of amendment under Article 368 is not unfettered and is limited by basic structure.
In 2015, in Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association & Ors v. UOI, the Supreme Court declared the National Judicial Commission (NJAC) unconstitutional for violating the Basic Structure of the Constitution of India. Through this, they declared the 99th Amendment and NJAC Act unconstitutional while Justice Chelameswar upheld it. Through the 99th Constitutional Amendment, Article 124A was added.
The NJAC was introduced to replace the Collegium System through which judges are appointed under Articles 124 (Supreme Court) and 217 (High Courts) respectively.
Article 124A(1) provided for the constitution and the composition of the NJAC. It was composed of the following: (a) the Chief Justice of India, Chairperson, ex officio; (b) two other senior Judges of the Supreme Court, next to the Chief Justice of India – Members, ex officio; (c) the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice – Member, ex officio; (d) two eminent persons, to be nominated – Members.
The majority judgment led by Justice JS Khehar observed: “ I have independently arrived at the conclusion, that clause (c) of Article 124A(1) is ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution, because of the inclusion of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice as an ex officio Member of the NJAC. Clause (c) of Article 124A(1), in my view, impinges upon the principles of "independence of the judiciary", as well as, "separation of powers". It has also been concluded by me, that clause (d) of Article 124A(1) which provides for the inclusion of two "eminent persons" as Members of the NJAC is ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution, for a variety of reasons. The same has also been held as violative of the "basic structure" of the Constitution.”
In S.P. Gupta vs Union Of India & Anr (1981) (first judges case), the Supreme Court held that the word 'consultation' under Article 217 did not mean 'concurrence'. If it amounted to concurrence, then it would mean that the CJI opinion must prevail over the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Governor of the State meaning that the Central Government would be bound to accept it. It held that the President is the final authority in the appointment.
Although the court upheld the independence of the judiciary, it rejected the argument that because the power of appointment vests with the executive it impairs the independence of the judiciary.
This was overruled in Supreme Court Advocates-On-Record ... vs Union Of India (1993) (second-judges case), which is known to have introduced the present collegium system. The Court stated that 'consultation' means 'concurrence' and upheld the primacy of the final opinion of the CJI in the appointment of judges. It was laid down that the opinion of the CJI in the process of consultation for appointment to the superior courts must be formed “in consultation with two of his seniormost colleagues. Apart from that the Chief Justice of India must also consult the seniormost judge who comes from the same state (the State from where the candidate is being considered). This process of consultation shall also be followed while transferring any judge/CJI from one State to another.”
It also held that the basis for selection of appointment should not be on seniority. It should be based on merit alone. Through a Presidential Reference, the third-judge case, In The Supreme Court of India (In Re: Appointment & Transfer of Judges) (1998) (third judges case), the second-judges can be unanimously affirmed while holding that the CJI must consult four senior-most judges. The sole opinion of the CJI does not constitute 'consultation'
It added that the opinion must be in writing, the same goes for the CJ of the High Courts, and the opinion of all judges must be transmitted.
Reasonable classification, rule of law, the doctrine of arbitrariness to manifestly arbitrary
Classification test
In The State Of West Bengal vs Anwar All Sarkarhabib Mohamed (1952), the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 was challenged as violative of Article 14. The Act provided for speedier trial for certain offences and it laid down the procedure for trial which was different in several respects from that laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Court held that Section 5 of the Act contravened Article 14 as it did not lay down any basis for 'classification' which may be directed to be tried by the Special Court. It was left to the uncontrolled discretion of the State Government to direct any cases to be tried by the Special Court.
In this case, the court laid down the test for Article 14 (like should be treated like). The court stated that Article 14 does not take away from the State the power to classify persons for the purpose of legislation, but the classification must be 'rational' and to satisfy the test of rationality: the classification must be found on an intelligible differentia (1) and that differentia must have a rational relation tot he object sought to be achieved by the Act (2).
In E. P. Royappa vs State Of Tamil Nadu & Anr (1973), the Court stated that equality is antithetical to arbitrariness and evolved the doctrine of arbitrariness. It said: “In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Art. 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Art. 16. Arts. 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment.”
Rule of law
In Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. UOI (2018), the Supreme Court held that “lynching is an affront to the rule of law and the exalted values of the Constitution. We may say without any fear of contradiction that lynching by unruly mobs and barbaric violence arising out of incitement and instigation cannot be allowed to become the order of the day. Such vigilantism, be it for whatever purpose or borne out of whatever cause, has the effect of undermining the legal and formal institutions of the State and altering the constitutional order.”
The Court issued guidelines including extensive preventive, remedial, and punitive measures. The Court directed States to prepare a lynching/mob violence victim compensation scheme in light of Section 357A of the CrPC within a month from the judgment.
As per the guidelines, the state government shall designate a senior police officer, not below the rank of Superintendent of Police (SP), as a nodal officer who shall be assisted by one of the deputy superintendent of police (DSP) rank officers in taking measures to prevent incidents of mob violence and lynching. They must also constitute a special task force to procure intelligence reports about people who are likely to commit such crimes or who are involved in spreading hate speeches, provocative statements and fake news.
A similar interpretation of the rule of law and Article 14 was taken by the Supreme Court cancelling the remission granted to 11 convicts in the Bilkis Bano, sentenced to life imprisonment for multiple murders and gang rapes, including that of Bilkis Bano, during the 2002 communal riots in Gujarat. The court held that the principles of the rule of law encompass the principle of equal protection of law as enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. However, 'deprivation of liberty' of 11 convicts was justified as they had erroneously and contrary to law been set at liberty.
In this case, the Gujarat Government granted remission on approval of the Central Government to the 11 convicts on 'good behaviour after they completed 14 years of imprisonment'. The court held that the State of Gujarat was not the "appropriate government" to decide the issue of remission as the trial was held in the State of Maharashtra. Since the Gujarat Government was found to be incompetent, the remission orders were held to be invalid.
Manifest arbitrariness
In Shayara Bano v UOI (2018), the Supreme Court by 3:2 declared triple talaq as unconstitutional. The main issue before the Court was whether the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 (pre-constitutional legislation) was a 'personal law' or had transformed into statutory law, and if it was a personal law which was protected by Article 25, could it be tested on the touchstone of fundamental rights.
The inquiry was therefore also whether personal laws are precluded from being the “laws in force”. The majority concluded that it was a law made by the legislature before the Constitution was enforced and therefore, it would fall squarely within the expression of “laws in force” in Article 13(3)(b) and therefore would be hit by Article 13(1) if found inconsistent with Part III.
Further, the court held that the practice of triple talaq was not protected by Article 25(1) which protects 'essential religious practice'.
Justice R.F. Nariman propounded the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness and held that the same could be used for declaring legislation including subordinate legislation unconstitutional. It explained that although earlier cases struck down legislation on grounds of 'arbitrary' the test cannot be loosely applied. Therefore, it said, legislation is manifestly arbitrary when it is “not fair, not reasonable, discriminatory, not transparent, capricious, biased, with favouritism, or nepotism and not in pursuit of promotion of healthy competition and equitable treatment.”
Therefore, Justice Nariman held: “form of Talaq is manifestly arbitrary in the sense that the marital tie can be broken capriciously and whimsically by a Muslim man without any attempt at reconciliation so as to save it.”
State under Article 12
A clear distinction between the test of classification and the doctrine of arbitrariness emerged from Ajay Hasia v.Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981), where the Court established a test to find out if an entity could be considered as the instrumentality or agency of the Government for Article 12 and therefore be subject to writ jurisdiction for violation of Part III.
Formal to substantive equality, intersectionality
Sex plus one
In Air India etc v. Nergesh Meerza & Ors (1981), the Air India Employees Service Regulations and Indian Airline Service Regulations were challenged for being discriminatory. As per the Regulations, the air hostesses had to retire from services on attaining the age of 35 years (unless discretionary retirement is extended to 45 years), based on marital status, or first pregnancy. These criteria did not apply to male counterparts. The court held the discretionary power to extend the service to be discriminatory. The provision on pregnancy was held to be unconstitutional for violating Article 14.
However, based on a comparison of the mode of recruitment, the classification, the promotional avenues and other matters, the Court held that air hostesses form an absolutely different category. In such cases, there cannot be an application of Article 14. It made a distinction between 'hostile discrimination' and 'reasonable classification' and held that only the latter is permitted under Article 14. Meaning hereby, that if equals and unequal are differently treated, there is no discrimination under Article 14. In cases where equals or persons similarly circumstanced are differently treated, the discrimination would attract Article 14 unless there is a 'reasonable basis' for the treatment.
Further, the court noted that Articles 15(1) and 16(2) prohibit discrimination only on 'one' ground. It does not prohibit the State from discriminating on the grounds of sex coupled with other considerations, which was the case here.
In Githa Hariharan & Anr v. RBI (1999), the petitioner challenged the validity of Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 as it considered the mother to be the natural guardian of the child 'after' the death of the father. In this, the mother had applied for relief bonds to the Reserve Bank of India to be held in the name of her son along with an intimation that she would act as a natural guardian for investments.
The application was sent back seeking the signature of the father or a certificate of guardianship to be produced in her favour. The court relying on international law jurisprudence on equality and anti-discrimination, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) held that a mother's right to act as the guardian does not stand obliterated during the lifetime of the father and to read the same on the statute otherwise would tantamount to a violent departure from the legislative intent.
Sex-based stereotypes in employment
The evolution of the doctrine of substantive equality and anti-stereotyping as a part of Articles 14 and 15(1) began with Anuj Garg v. Hotel Association of India (2008), in which the Supreme Court held that the bar on women against serving alcohol was permitted on sex-based stereotypes which are constitutionally impermissible. In this, Section 30 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914 was under challenge as it prohibited the employment of any man under the age of twenty-five years or any woman in any part of an establishment in which liquor or any other intoxicating drugs were consumed by the public.
The court held that although the law is pre-constitutional, its validity has to be tested in the cornerstone of Articles 14, 19, and 21. The Court stated that the legislation as those with “protective discrimination” aims and therefore strict scrutiny test should be employed while assessing its implications. Such legislation should be assessed not only on its 'proposed aims' but rather on the 'implications' and the 'effects'. It therefore held that the impugned legislation suffered from “incurable fixations of stereotype morality and conception of sexual role. The perspective thus arrived at it outmoded in content and stifling in means.”
To consider whether Section 30 of the Act which led to legislative interference to the autonomy in employment opportunities is justified, it applied the two-pronged test which is (a) the legislative interference should be justified in principle and (b) the same should be proportionate in measure. This approach was inspired by the European Court of Human Rights.
Sexuality, self-determination and rights of non-heterosexual couples and LGBTQIA+
This interpretation in Nergesh Meerza which was termed as 'sex plus' was later found to be a “formalistic” interpretation of Article 15. In Navtej Singh Johar , Justice Chandrachud stated that discrimination based on sex and another ground (sex plus) would very well fall within the purview of Article 15. Debunking the formalistic interpretation of Article 15, he opined: “This formalistic interpretation of Article 15 would render the constitutional guarantee against discrimination meaningless. For it would allow the State to claim that the discrimination was based on sex and another ground ('Sex plus') and hence outside the ambit of Article 15. Latent in the argument of the discrimination, are stereotypical notions of the differences between men and women which are then used to justify the discrimination. This narrow view of Article 15 strips the prohibition on discrimination of its essential content. This fails to take into account the intersectional nature of sex discrimination, which cannot be said to operate in isolation of other identities, especially from the socio-political and economic context.”
In Navtej Singh Johar, the current Chief Justice of India held that 'sex' under Article 15(1) is inclusive of sexual orientation and therefore, any discrimination based on sexual orientation is prohibited. The court in this case decriminalised non-consensual sex between same-sex adults.
The court also recognised concepts like transformative constitutionalism and constitutional morality which protects the constitutional rights of even the minuscule population against the popular public opinion. This judgment was reaffirmed after 5 years in Supriyo@Supriya v. UOI (2023), however, it fell short of recognising non-heterosexual marriages. The court clarified that the question of marriage was not examined in Navtej Singh Johar and that marriage is not an unqualified or fundamental right. The Court clarified that Navtej Singh Johar recognised the right to be in a relationship which does not accrue any socio-economic consequential benefits.
The Supreme Court in NALSA v. UOI (2014) recognised transgender persons as third gender. In NALSA, the court affirmed the right of self-determination of identity and recognised the historical and multiple discrimination faced by the transgender community in India. It referred to the international jurisprudence especially the Yogyakarta Principles on international human rights standards to be applied to gender identity and sexual orientation and held that the State must progressively realise the rights of the community. It also sought reservations for transgender persons and declared them as socially and educationally backward classes (SEBC) of citizens. The court had issued extensive guidelines also for the socio-economic rehabilitation of transgender persons. Pursuant to this, the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 was enacted.
Intersectional nature of gender-based violence
Intersectional gender-based violence discrimination was for the first time expressly recognised in 2021 in Patan Jamal Vali v. State of Andhra Pradesh, where a disabled woman belonging to the Scheduled Caste community was raped. The court recognised intersectional identities of a disabled woman from the Scheduled Caste community placed her in a uniquely disadvantageous position and affirmed the compounding effect of the multiple discrimination on sentencing the accused persons to life imprisonment.
Untouchability extends to gender-based exclusion
In Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State of Kerala (2018) struck down Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship Rules, 1965 allowed the exclusion of entry of women between the ages of 10-50 years in the Sabarimala Temple. While the court held that it violated Articles 14, 19, 21 and 25(1) (also held that a ban on entry was not an essential religious practice and did not fulfil the test of separate religious denomination), CJI stated that the practise constituted untouchability. He stated that gender-based exclusion which stigmatised women violated Article 17.
A reference was made to the Constituent Assembly Debates to show that Article 17 does not specify the meaning of untouchability and therefore, the same would be interpreted widely. However, Justice Indu Malhotra, who gave a lone dissenting opinion, opposed the arguments of CJI and stated that Article 17 was limited to caste-based exclusion. Reference against this judgment is pending before 9-judge bench.
Women's rights and affirmative action
Women in command posts in Army
In 2020 in The Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya & Ors, the Supreme Court paved the way for the women officers on the Short Service Commission to be considered for Permanent Commission in the Army regardless of their service. It held: “An absolute bar on women seeking criteria or common appointments would not comport with the guarantees of equality under Article 14. Implicit in the guarantee of equality is that where the action of the State does differentiate between two classes of persons, it does not differentiate them in an unreasonable or irrational manner.”
After this judgment, the Supreme Court in Lt Col Nitisha & Ors v. UOI (2021)noted that the evaluation deployed by the Army to implement its Babita Puniya judgment constituted 'systematic discrimination' against the women officers which is anthestia to substantive equality.
In this, petitioners contended that the Army denied them Permanent Commission despite the court's ruling by applying an arbitrary threshold for medical fitness and by not considering their credentials beyond the 5th or 10th year of service. It held: “The pattern of evaluation deployed by the Army, to implement the decision in Babita Puniya (supra) disproportionately affects women. This disproportionate impact is attributable to the structural discrimination against women, by dint of which the facially neutral criteria of selective ACR evaluation and fulfilling the medical criteria to be in SHAPE-1 at a belated stage, to secure PC disproportionately impacts them vis-à-vis their male counterparts. The pattern of evaluation, by excluding subsequent achievements of the petitioners and failing to account for the inherent patterns of discrimination that were produced as a consequence of casual grading and skewed incentive structures, has resulted in indirect and systemic discrimination. This discrimination has caused an economic and psychological harm and an affront to their dignity".
Right to reasonable accommodation in disability rights
In Vikas Kumar v. Union Public Service Commission (2021), the Supreme Court recognised the right to reasonable accommodation as a positive obligation of the State and private parties to provide additional support to persons with disabilities to facilitate their full and effective participation in society through the constitutional guarantees of equality and non-discrimination. It termed it as a substantive equality facilitator. The court, in this case, held that the judgment rendered that stipulating a limit of 50 percent disability in hearing impairment or visual impairment as a condition to be eligible for the post of a judicial officer is no longer a binding precedent after the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 was enforced.
Rape with 'child' wife amounts to rape
In a significant ruling in Independent Thought v. UOI (2017), the Supreme Court read down Exception 2 to Section 375 (rape) of the Indian Penal Code, which stated that sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife is not rape. The court added that sexual intercourse with a wife below 18 years will be rape and any distinction between 'child wife' and child is against the intent of social justice.
Abortion rights extend to marital rape
In X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Gov of NCT Delhi (2020), the Supreme Court held that all women are entitled to the fundamental right to safe and legal abortion. It also stated that a wife who conceives out of forced sex by their husband will be protected within the ambit of 'survivors of sexual assault or rape or incest” under Rule 3B(a) (mentions the categories of women who can seek termination of pregnancy in terms of 20-24 weeks) of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules. This essentially mentioned that the definition of 'rape' under the 1971 Act and Rules would include marital rape.
Reservation
In State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan (1951), the Supreme Court held that reservation of seats based on caste, religion, and race in State-aided or state-funded education institutions violated Article 29. This was overturned by inserting Article 15(4) through the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951.
B Venkataramana v. The State of Tamil Nadu (1951) held that Article 16(4) permitted Harijans and the backward Hindus to be considered as 'backward classes' and any other representation would be discriminatory based on the ground of caste. Both these two judgments are known to have viewed reservation as an exception to the principle of equal opportunity in Articles 15(1) and 16(1).
In Indra Sawhney v. UOI & Ors (1993), the Supreme Court upheld 27 percent for Other Backward Classes in central government services. It recognised caste as an indicator of backwardness and that further sub-classification of backward classes is permissible. This judgment become the foundation for the Court holding that sub-classification within Scheduled Caste is permissible in The State of Punjab & Ors v. Davinder Singh & Ors (2024) [21]. In Indra Sawhney, the Court proposed a 50 percent ceiling for reservation. But excluded 'creamy lawyer' (forward section of the backward class) from the reservation.
Reservation in promotion
Subsequent judgments deal with the issue of whether reservation in promotion was detrimental to efficiency. In General Management, Southern Railway v. Rangachari (1962), the majority held that although reservations in promotions are detrimental to efficiency, a substantive reading of Article 16(4) would allow that. It interpreted the phrase “matters relating to employment” under Article 16(1) to also include promotion. This was overruled in Indra Sawhney. Subsequently, the Constitution (Seventy-seventh Amendment) Act, 1995 included clause 4A into Article 16, permitting reservation for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in promotion.
Consequential seniority
In UOI v. Virpal Singh Chauhan(1995), the court was faced with the issue of whether a general candidate, who was promoted after the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe candidate, would regain his seniority over general candidates (catch-up rule). The court held that though the catch-up rule is not implicit in Article 16, it is a constitutionally valid practice to maintain efficiency. Through the Constitution (Eighty-fifth Amendment) Act, 2001, Article 16(4A) was amended to enable the State to provide reservation in promotion with consequential seniority.
Relaxation of qualifying marks
In Indra Sawhney, the court held that relaxation of qualifying marks in promotion would result in inefficiency of administration. This was specifically reiterated in S Vinod Kumar v. UOI (1996). However, a proviso to Article 335 by the Constitution (Eighty-second) Amendment Act, 2000 was introduced to overcome the judgments. It was held that lowering the standards of evaluation would not be inconsistent with the maintenance of efficiency.
Permissible percentage of reservation
While in Indra Sawhney, the court held that reservation cannot exceed 50 percent, the States were faced with the issue of whether unfilled seats of the reserved category could be carried forward to next year and whether it could be counted while calculating the total percentage of reservation seats in a given year (known as carry forward rule).
In T. Devadasan v. UOI (1964), the majority held that the carry forward rule would abrogate the equal opportunity principle and impair efficiency. However, Justice Subba Rao dissented. He argued that a harmonious reading of Articles 16, 46, and 335 is required. He held that “any provision” in Article 16(4) is wide enough to include the carry forward rule.
In NM Thomas v. State of Kerala (1976), the court finally took an expansive reading and stated that Article 16(4) cannot be treated as an exception to equality. Instead, it was “illustration of constitutionally sanctified classification”. In this case, Rule 13AA of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958, which relaxed the qualifying criteria for candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, was challenged.
By the Constitution (Eighty-first) Amendment Act, 2000, Article 16(4B) was introduced, which implemented the carry forward rule.
In 2022, the Supreme Court 3:2 majority upheld the validity of the 103rd Constitutional Amendment which introduced a 10% reservation for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) in education and public employment by inserting clause (6) in both Articles 15 and 16. In Janhit Abhiyan vs Union Of India, it held that reservation structured singularly on economic criteria does not violate the basic structure of the Constitution. The petitioners had relied on Indira Sawhney, stating that reservation cannot be given based on economic criteria.
However, the Court held that breach of 50% ceiling limit by EWS reservation does not violate basic structure.
Parts 2 and 3 will be published later.
25 judgments discussed in this part.
Minerva Mills & Ors v. UOI (1980) [4]
In The Supreme Court of India (In Re: Appointment & Transfer of Judges) (1998)
The State Of West Bengal vs Anwar All Sarkarhabib Mohamed (1952)
Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. UOI (2018)
Shayara Bano v UOI (2018)
Githa Hariharan & Anr v. RBI (1999)
Navtej Singh Johar v. UOI (2018)
Supriyo@Supriya v. UOI (2023)
NALSA v. UOI (2014)
Lt Col Nitisha & Ors v. UOI (2021)
X v. Principal Secretary, Health and Family Welfare Department, Gov of NCT Delhi (2020)
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. The State of Kerala (2018)
Indra Sawhney v. UOI & Ors (1993)