Article 226 | High Court Should Not Reappreciate Evidence Led In Departmental Enquiry : Supreme Court

A bench of Justices Hima Kohli and Ahsanuddin Amanullah held: “The learned single judge held that the findings returned in the enquiry were without evidence, contrary to the record, and as the removal order based on the same was not reasoned, proceeded to quash the same. This course of action adopted by the learned single judge has been affirmed by the division bench."

The court added: “Surprisingly, despite noticing the aforesaid position in law relating to non-interference by the Appellate Court to re-assess the evidence led in an enquiry or to interfere on the ground that another view was possible on the material on record, the division bench went on to record that the learned single judge had rightly held that the enquiry proceedings were vitiated as they were based on no evidence and were perverse, without giving any reasons of its own as to how the learned single judge had arrived at such a conclusion, namely, that the enquiry was based on no evidence and the findings rendered therein were perverse. Upon detailed assistance from both sides on the factual prism, coupled with the materials on record, we are of the considered opinion that the judgments delivered by the learned single judge and the division bench are unsustainable.”

In this case, the single judge of the Rajasthan High Court quashed a removal order against the respondent who was removed from service for committing irregularities including embezzlement. A departmental enquiry had found him guilty.

The respondent was an Inspector (executive) and was later appointed as Assistant Registrar in 1973 on selection by the Rajasthan Public Service Commission (RPSC). He was to be considered for the promotion to Deputy Registrar. However, he was accused of permitting the construction of a godown without obtaining a technical opinion. He was reverted to the post of Inspector but allegedly he did not handover the charge. It was also alleged that he appointed himself as the administrator of Bharat Bus Transport Cooperative Society Limited sold 9 shops at a very low price and subsequently made irregular payments.

A departmental enquiry was initiated against him in 1979 and his appeal seeking promotion was dismissed. He was subsequently found unfit for promotion. The respondent challenged the suspension order before a single judge, which was prospectively stayed. In 1985, on completion of the inquiry, he was removed from his service. He again moved the high court, which quashed the removal order in 1991. But the court granted liberty to the appellant to conduct an enquiry after giving him a copy of the enquiry report and the opinion of RPSC. In 1993, a fresh enquiry found guilty of serious charges and partly found guilty on five counts.

In 1993, the single judge of the high court quashed his removal order and found fit for promotion of Deputy Registrar with consequential benefits. This was affirmed by division bench, which was challenged before Supreme Court.

The judgment authored by Justice Amanullah held that the scope of examination and interference under Article 226 of the Constitution is not like appeal. It referred to State of Andhra Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao (1963) wherein the court held: “The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.”

In Rama Rao, the court added: “But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

This reasoning was reiterated in State Bank of India v Ram Lal Bhaskar (2011).

In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao (1975), the court while referring to Rama Rao pointed out: “The High Court is not a court of appeal under Article 226 over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant…”

It added: “Second, where there is some evidence which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.”

In Union of India v. K G Soni (2006), the court held: “To put it differently, unless the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference.”

Based on a plethora of cases, the Supreme Court concluded that the single judge and the division bench of the Rajasthan High Court went on to re-appreciate the evidence.

The court pointed out that under Article 226, it is not impermissible for the court to reappraise the facts, however, there must be a level of infirmity greater than ordinary in a tribunal's order. It referred to Bharti Airtel Limited v. A S Raghavendra (2024), wherein the court stated: “As regards the power of the High Court to reappraise the facts, it cannot be said that the same is completely impermissible under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. However, there must be a level of infirmity greater than ordinary in a tribunal's order, which is facing judicial scrutiny before the High Court, to justify interference. We do not think such a situation prevailed in the present facts.”

Based on this, the Court stated: “The facts reveal that an earlier removal order was quashed, and a copy of the Enquiry Report alongwith the RPSC's opinion was supplied to the respondent. The respondent, thereafter, received an opportunity to submit a written representation, which he availed of. Further, he was afforded an opportunity of hearing as well. In this view, we are unable to find any violation of the principles of natural justice. Before the Enquiry Officer, 13 witnesses and 75 documents were exhibited on behalf of the Authority. 3 witnesses deposed in defence of the delinquent employee-respondent.”

It therefore concluded: “Considering the evidence on record, the Enquiry Officer by his report held certain charges levelled against the respondent to have been proved in full/part. Subsequently, a fresh Removal Order was passed, agreeing with the conclusions drawn by the enquiry officer. This Removal Order cannot be said to be based on 'no evidence'. On perusal thereof, we find that the Removal Order is reasoned as on the aspects where the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the Enquiry Officer's report, reasons therefor have been assigned. On the areas of agreement, the Removal Order bears discussion on the relevant evidence.”

The court also held: “It is well-settled that if the Disciplinary Authority accepts findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and proceeds to impose punishment basis the same, no elaborate reasons are required.”

The court however suggested that when disciplinary authorities impose a major punishment, it would be appropriate for their orders to better engage with the representation and submissions of the delinquent employee. Although in the present case, the court found it was a minor deficiency and therefore did not case any prejudice to the extent warranting judicial interdiction.

Case details: The State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Bhupendra Singh, Civil Appeal Nos.8546-8549 of 2024

Citation : 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 569