Appellate Court Should Give Benefit Of Doubt To Accused If A View Different From Trial Court's View Is Possible : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has observed that an appellate court should give the benefit of doubt to the accused persons if the evidence on record indicates the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that a plausible view, different from the one expressed by the courts below can be taken.Reversing the concurrent findings of guilt entered by the trial court...
The Supreme Court has observed that an appellate court should give the benefit of doubt to the accused persons if the evidence on record indicates the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that a plausible view, different from the one expressed by the courts below can be taken.
Reversing the concurrent findings of guilt entered by the trial court and the High Court against three persons in a 2007 murder case, a bench comprising Justices Abhay S Oka and Pankaj Mithal said :
"We are conscious of the fact that the appellate court should be slow in interfering with the conviction recorded by the courts below but where the evidence on record indicates the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that a plausible view, different from the one expressed by the courts below can be taken, the appellate court should not shy away in giving the benefit of doubt to the accused persons."
The Court was hearing the appeals filed by four persons who were convicted to life imprisonment under Section 302 r/w 34 IPC with a fine of Rs.5000/- each by the Fast Track Court, Jabalpur. The High Court affirmed the convition and sentence. During the course of the pendency of the appeal, one of the appellants passed away.
Background
The case of the prosecution was that on 08.06.2007 at around 08:45 PM, the victim named Pappu alias Rajendra Yadav was beaten and assaulted by all four accused with knife and other weapons such as sickle and kesia, resulting in the death of the victim, when he along with his friends Virendra Verma and Amit Jha was coming out of the Machchu Hotel. The information of the said incident was supplied to the brother and mother of the deceased victim by a person named Virendra Kumar, who was arrayed as PW 1. It was the prosecution story that when the mother and brother of the deceased victim reached the incident place, the deceased has given the 'dying declaration' accusing the present accused persons for beating and assaulting with a knife, thereafter, a FIR was registered with the police, and the deceased was taken to the hospital for treatment where he was declared dead.
Observation of the Court
The Supreme Court has observed the following observations: -
Dying Declaration cannot be accepted unless corroborated by cogent evidence:
It was observed by the court in para 7, that the prosecution is based upon the dying declaration of the deceased. After, having a detailed analysis of the prosecution story that the deceased was being beaten and assaulted by the accused persons near Machchu Hotel, and the dying declaration is in the shape of an answer to the question asked by the mother of the deceased as to what had happened? The Court in para 16 observed that:
“The brother and the mother of the deceased had rushed to the spot only after receiving information of the incident from PW-1 who after seeing the accused persons assaulting the deceased had gone to their house to inform of the incident. All this, obviously, could have consumed 15-25 minutes which means that by the time they reached the place of occurrence, the deceased could not have survived so as to make any declaration. There is no specific material piece of evidence to establish that the deceased was alive or in a position to speak when his brother & mother reached the spot. In these circumstances, the dying declaration cannot be ex facie accepted to be correct unless it stands corroborated by any other cogent evidence. There is no material to corroborate the said dying declaration.”
Relative Prosecution Witness can't be Relied upon Blindly:
The Court in para 9 noted that in addition to a dying declaration, a reliance on the testimony of the PW 13 named Rahul Yadav, is being placed by the prosecution to establish that appellants-accused were seen beating the deceased by the PW 13 on 08.06.2007 near Machchu Hotel between 08.30 pm to 09.00 pm, while he was returning from his friend's house. However, the court was not inclined with the version of PW 13, where in para 10 the court noted that “it has come in evidence that Rahul Yadav (PW-13) is a relative of the deceased Pappu Yadav and as such he is not a free and independent witness. He is likely to be an interested witness.” Thus, the court viewed that the testimony of PW 13 has to be considered with great circumspection and cannot be relied upon blindly without taking into account available corroborative evidence on record, if any.
Thereafter, after analysing the testimony of the PW 13, the court in para 12 noted that:
“The above witness was not found at the place of occurrence by the brother and mother of the deceased when they reached the place of occurrence immediately after the alleged incident had taken place or at the time when the deceased was lying on the road. They have not mentioned about his presence though he ought to have been there as he had tried to save the deceased. Even the deceased has not mentioned in his alleged dying declaration or the statement given to his brother and mother that someone tried to save him or that the above witness Rahul Yadav (PW-13) had come to his rescue but was made to run away. Additionally, even the FIR does not mention the presence of PW-13. All these factors cast a serious doubt as to presence of PW-13 and the conviction cannot be based on his testimony alone.”
Conclusion
After finding that the testimony supplied by PW 13 is unworthy of credit and the dying declaration of the deceased is not corroborated by other cogent evidence by the prosecution, the court ultimately gave the benefit of doubt to the appellant-accused and set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellants by granting them benefit of doubt, by setting them free and discharging their bail bond. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.
Case Title: JITENDRA KUMAR MISHRA @ JITTU V. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Citation : 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 21