Breaking: Kerala High Court Sets Aside Sessions Court Order Dropping Culpable Homicide Charges Against IAS Officer Sreeram Venkataraman

The Kerala High Court on Thursday set aside a Sessions Court order dropping culpable homicide charges against IAS Officer Sreeram Venkitaraman in the infamous road rage case.

The order was however upheld to the extent it discharged Venkittaraman under Sections 184 and 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, that relates to dangerous driving and drunken driving, and Section 3(2) of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property. 

Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas observed, 

"Driving vehicles after consuming alcohol can lead to temporary or partial impairment of cognitive faculties. This disability can lead to error in judgment relating to distance calculation, distinguishing objects, speed control and even other factors that are essential for safe driving. Blurred vision and reaction to sudden stimuli are also known consequences of alcohol consumption. Thus, when a motor vehicle is driven after consuming alcohol, road accidents become a predictable consequence. In such a scenario, attributing knowledge to the driver of the vehicle that death can be likely consequence of drunken driving is legally tenable". 

The case pertains to the alleged drunk driving case involving Venkittaraman (first accused) and his friend, Wafa Firoz (second accused), that had resulted in the death of a journalist, K.M. Basheer, in 2019. 

As regards the alleged offence of abetment against Firoz, the Court was of the view that there was

"not an iota of material to indicate that the 2nd accused (Firoz) had intentionally aided/instigated/conspired to commit the offence with 1st accused. Providing facility for driving a vehicle without anything more cannot amount to abetment. It is not enough that an act on part of alleged abettor happens to facilitate commission of crime. Intentional aiding and therefore, acting complicitly is the gist of offence of abetment under the third paragraph of Section 107, as observed by the Supreme Court in Sreeram v. State of U.P. ". 

The Court thus allowed the revision petition filed by Firoz, and discharged her for the offence under Section 188 of the Motor Vehicles Act that relates to 'punishment for abetment of certain offences' after taking note of the nature of materials collected by the investigation. 

The Case 

In 2019, a journalist K.M. Basheer was allegedly killed when a vehicle driven by Venkittaraman, ran over him at high speed, at Museum Junction in Thiruvananthapuram District of Kerala. It was alleged that Venkittaraman, who was accompanied by Firoz, was in an inebriated state, which led to the accident.

Initially, he attempted to wriggle out of the situation by alleging that he was not driving and that the driver was a lady seated beside him. However, eyewitnesses identified a male as the person behind the wheels.

The offences under Sections 304 and 201 IPC and Section 3(1)(2) of the Prevention of Damages to Public Property Act, 1984 (hereinafter, 'PDPP') apart from Sections 184, 185 and 188 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('MV Act') were thus alleged to have been committed by the accused. 

The doctors are said to have confirmed his inebriated state, however, later it was disclosed that there was an omission to conduct his blood test. The sample is said to have been collected only ten hours after the incident.

While Venkittaraman was suspended from service immediately following the incident, he was later reinstated as the District Collector of Alappuzha. It was pursuant to several protests that he was later removed from the post, and is presently the General Manager of SupplyCo.

The Additional Sessions Court I, Trivandrum, dropped the charges under Section 304 which provides punishment for culpable homicide and Section 201, which penalizes causing disappearance of evidence of offence or giving false information, had however maintained that the other charges under Sections 304 A (causing death by negligence) and 279 (rash and negligent driving) of the IPC and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act would stand. Venkittaraman had argued that there was no evidence regarding him having driven the vehicle in a drunken state.

The State Government had thus filed a Revision Petition challenging the order dropping the charges, averring that the statements of the witnesses had revealed that Venkitaraman was in an inebriated state at the time of the incident, and had been reluctant to give his blood sample with a view to destroy the evidence, and that he had made all effort in this regard to delay treatment when he was taken to the General Hospital on the day of the accident.

It was argued by the Public Prosecutor on behalf of the State that the investigation had adduced sufficient materials to frame a charge under Section 304 IPC and other offences alleged in the final report. It was argued that Venkittaraman, who is a highly influential IAS officer and a medical doctor by graduation, had manipulated and prevented a laboratory test from being conducted on him to analyze his blood sample until 10.30 A.M. knowing that the test would have revealed the alcoholic content in his blood. It was submitted that due to this delay, the presence of alcohol in his blood was not revealed, and that by itself could not be a reason to discharge the accused under section 304 IPC, particularly in light of the numerous oral and documentary evidence available.

It was added that while considering a discharge application, the court is not expected to consider the matter as if it is a mini-trial and that if there are prima facie materials to proceed against the accused for the offences alleged, the same would be sufficient. 

On behalf of Venkittaraman, however, it was argued that the order of the Sessions Judge did not call for any interference since it had independently addressed all the issues and concluded that there was no material to frame a charge under Section 304IPC and had relegated the matter to the Magistrate for framing charge under Section 304A IPC and other connected offences. It was further contended that, "except for the media projecting a case by targeting Venkittaraman, and the police playing into the hands of the media because of public pressure", there was nothing on record to frame a charge against him under Section 304IPC. 

Firoz also filed another revision petition challenging the Sessions Court order on the ground that the only offence against her was that under Section 188 of the Motor Vehicles Act that provides for abetment of the offence under Section 184 and 185, and that the same would not stand in the instant case. It was argued that Section 188 of the MV Act would not be attracted merely because she was the owner of the vehicle driven by Venkittaraman, and that there were no materials to proceed against her for abetment of any offence. 

Findings of the Court

I. Whether the impugned Order is revisable 

The Court at the very outset determined the questioned as to whether the impugned order of the Sessions Court is revisable. The Court noted that an order discharging an accused for certain offences would terminate the proceedings against the accused for those offences. It observed that when the discharge, as in the present case, is in respect of the only offence triable exclusively by a Sessions Court, the proceedings against the accused in the Sessions Court come to an end, and such an order of discharge could not be said to be interlocutory in nature. 

"Thus no elaborate discussion is necessary to conclude that the upholding of the objection of the accused that an offence under section 304 IPC has not been committed has resulted in the termination of the proceedings before the Sessions Court," the Court observed while holding the impugned order to be revisable, and rejecting the preliminary objection as to its maintainability. 

II. Whether there are sufficient materials to proceed against the 1st accused Venkittaraman under Setions 304 and 201 IPC

The Court in this case perused Section 304IPC and observed that, 

"Rash or negligent driving on a public road with the knowledge of the dangerous character of his act, especially when he drives in an inebriated state, can fall in the category of culpable homicide, not amounting to murder, if the injured died as a result of the injuries". 

It was thus observed that a person doing an act of rash or negligent driving, if aware of the risk that a particular consequence is likely to result and that result occurs, he could be proceeded against both the act, as well as the result that ensued. 

The Court thus found the attribution of knowledge to the driver of the vehicle that death could be a likely consequence of drunken driving as legally tenable. 

The Court also noted that the doctor who had first examined Venkittaraman had written that there was the smell of alcohol. 

"However, curiously, the accused was not subjected to any medical test at the said hospital and instead, even after noting the absence of any serious injuries, the first accused was referred to the Medical College. Curiously again, the police officer accompanying the first accused permitted a friend of the first accused to transfer him in his private car apparently to the Medical College Hospital. However, the first accused never reached the Medical College Hospital and instead was taken to a private hospital called MIMS Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram where, as per the statement of CW29, the nurse attached to the said hospital, first accused avoided permitting her to take a blood test until 10.30 am under one pretext or the other. By the time the blood test was taken, the sample did not reveal the presence of alcohol," it was observed. 

The Court observed that in order to prove the guilt of an accused under Section 304IPC based on drunken driving and the resulting knowledge of the consequences, it would not be essential, in every case, for documentary evidence to prove the fact of drunkenness.

"If the circumstance of the case and the statement of the witnesses inspires the Court to come to a conclusion that the accused was driving the vehicle in a drunken state, in the absence of a statutory mandate for a medical report, the absence of such a report by itself need not deter the court from arriving at such a conclusion," it was observed. 

The Court however, noted that these were matters for trial. 

The Court further discerned from the factual circumstances that "an apparent attempt on the part of the first accused to wriggle out of a timely medical test cannot be wholly ignored", and arrived at the prima facie presumption that he was over-speeding and driving the vehicle after consuming alcohol and had even caused the destruction of evidence relating to the offence.

The Court observed that while absence of a medical report would be fatal for the offence under Section 185 of the M.V. Act, since the statute mandates the same, it could not be a reason for discharge under Section 304IPC if there were other materials to prima facie arrive at the conclusion that the accused was driving the vehicle after consuming alcohol. 

"On an appreciation of the above aspects arising in the case, it is evident that the materials brought out after investigation, if proven, can bring out the guilt of the first accused for the offence under section 304 and section 201 IPC. In such circumstances, the first accused cannot be discharged for the offence under section 304 and section 201 IPC. Resultantly, the discharge of the first accused for those two offences by the order impugned is improper and irregular," it was held.

The Court however, held that the Sessions Judge was justified in discharging the accused for the offence under section 185 of MV Act. As regards the offence under Section 3(2) of the PDPP Act, it was noted that commission of mischief in respect of public property was one of the main ingredients, which could not be found in the present case. The order of discharge of the first accused for the offence under section 3(2) of the PDPP Act was also accordingly, sustained. 

III. Whether there are materials to proceed against the 2nd accused, Wafa Firoz, for the offence under Section 188 of the MV Act

The Court perused Section 107 IPC that relates to abetment of an offence, and observed that in the present case, there were no materials to indicate that Firoz had intentionally aided, instigated or conspired with Venkittaraman to commit the offence. It therefore set aside the Sessions Court order refusing to discharge her. 

Public Prosecutor S.U. Nazar appeared on behalf of the State. Advocates S. Rajeev, V. Vinay, M.S. Aneer, Sarath K.P., and Prerith Philip Joseph appeared on behalf of the 1st accused Venkittaraman. Wafa Firoz was represented by Advocates G. Ranju Mohan, S. Suresh, M. Santhi, and Arya S. 

Case Title: State of Kerala v. Sreeram Venkitaraman and Wafa Najim @ Wafa Firoz v. State of Kerala

Citation: 2023 LiveLaw (Ker) 188

Click Here To Read/Download The Order