From Critique To Construct: The Role Of A Shadow Cabinet In India's Future
In July, former Odisha Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik, now the state's Leader of Opposition, drew up a shadow cabinet to scrutinise and take on the ruling BJP and its Chief Minister Mohan Majhi. The term Shadow Cabinet, despite its significant role in parliamentary systems, has not garnered extensive scholarly attention.
What is a shadow cabinet?
The term Shadow Cabinet means an alternative cabinet, one formed with the aim of monitoring government decisions and being ready to step into government roles.
Shadow Cabinets serve three primary functions: they provide a structured way for political parties to oppose the sitting government, present voters with an alternative team ready to take over governance if elected, and this system helps maintain a checks and balances process, ensuring that the government remains transparent and responsive to the populace's needs.
The concept of a "shadow government" originated in the United Kingdom during the early 20th century. Informal groups of politicians initiated the concept of the shadow Cabinet, and in 1836, Sir Robert Peel formally organised his former Cabinet members to oppose Lord Melbourne's government. Leaders like Asquith in Britain valued the Shadow Cabinet, while others, like Lloyd George in 1926, did not use it at all. It evolved into a formalised part of the parliamentary system, particularly under the British Labour Party, to ensure that the opposition was ready to govern if they won a majority. As the Labour Party rose as the official opposition party in 1922, it led to a more organised form of the Shadow Cabinet. During Winston Churchill's time in 1945, the Shadow Cabinet initially met informally over lunches and dinners every two weeks but had to become more disciplined as the government's workload increased.
This idea has since been adopted by other countries with parliamentary systems, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand. All these nations have been following the institutionalised system of a shadow cabinet. In the UK, every Prime Minister, going back to 1963, had held some portfolio in the shadow cabinet of their party (apart from the post of Leader of Opposition) before ascending to the post of PM. In India, we never considered this our priority. The Lack of formal institutionalisation of Shadow Cabinet during our initial years after independence may be attributed to a fragmented opposition; the situation is now different.
Why India Needs Shadow Cabinet?
Forming a shadow cabinet is not a new practice in India. The first shadow cabinet was established in Maharashtra in 2005 by the BJP and Shiv Sena against the Congress government. Several other states have since adopted this practice. For example, the Congress formed a shadow cabinet in Goa against the Pramod Sawant-led BJP government. States like Madhya Pradesh, Delhi, and Kerala have also formed shadow cabinets.
Until now, only states have formed shadow governments. However, the political landscape after the 2024 Lok Sabha elections suggests a strong case for introducing a de facto "shadow government" at the national level, led by Rahul Gandhi, the newly appointed Leader of the Opposition.
In India, cabinet ministers have a significant advantage during parliamentary debates. They receive extensive support from numerous bureaucrats who help them prepare their arguments. In contrast, the Opposition lacks a shadow minister with a dedicated team of experts, putting them at a disadvantage. Opposition members often do not know who will be debating against the cabinet minister, leading to ineffective participation.
As a result, parliamentary debates often devolve into unproductive stalling tactics, slogan shouting, and sometimes even walkouts. On occasion, the situation deteriorates further, with members hurling files, placards, and chairs and using profane language.
This chaotic environment allows the government to push through its agenda using ordinances or by leveraging its majority in the House. The number of Parliament sittings has drastically declined over the years, and state Assemblies exhibit similar issues. During the increasingly rare Parliament sessions, a random bill might be introduced. Bureaucrats, aware that substantial debate is unlikely, often produce subpar work, further undermining the legislative process.
Indian media often lacks in-depth research and operates under tight deadlines, relying heavily on government handouts. This dependency makes media outlets act as mouthpieces for the government. Television debates usually feature the same spokespersons, who mimic their parliamentary colleagues by shouting and creating confusion. Debates end in a manner that suits the political agenda of the media house's favoured party, regardless of the topic. These spokespersons, whose only qualifications seem to be loud voices and thick skins, defend their party on issues ranging from foreign policy to Deep fakes.
A solution to this problem is the formation of a shadow cabinet. This would enable each party to develop knowledgeable leaders who can engage in informed debates and hold the government accountable with their expertise. The public would see who might become ministers and how they compare with the incumbents. This system would also keep current ministers and bureaucrats alert and responsible.
A shadow cabinet shifts the focus from comparing the Prime Minister with the Leader of the Opposition to comparing the entire government cabinet with the shadow cabinet. In India's Westminster-style democracy, forming a shadow cabinet would enhance democratic strength and end the reliance on personality-driven or family-based election campaigns.
The concept of a shadow cabinet deserves serious discussion in India due to its three key benefits for parliamentary democracy.
First, a shadow cabinet holds the government accountable. Scrutinising government actions and challenging them in Parliament ensures that discussions focus on the merits of decisions rather than political rhetoric. For instance, during debates on the citizenship amendment bill and on the farm laws, the merits of the laws were not discussed. The government focused more on answering rhetoric than on discussing the merits of the laws. A shadow cabinet can bring nuance and expertise to these discussions, improving parliamentary discourse.
Second, a shadow cabinet enhances the opposition's relevance. Over the past decade, the opposition has struggled to exert pressure on the government, partly due to the Union government's overwhelming majority in Parliament. This has led to the opposition being overshadowed in public perception and lacking the resources the government has. A shadow cabinet would provide the opposition with an institutionalised platform to share their thoughts on government policies, giving them more visibility and a stronger voice.
Third, a shadow cabinet offers citizens an alternative government-in-waiting. It allows the opposition not only to scrutinise government actions but also to present alternative policies to the public. This approach addresses the recent trend in Indian politics where the opposition is seen merely as opposing the government without offering alternatives. By proposing and supporting beneficial policies, a shadow cabinet can demonstrate a clear and constructive role for the opposition, benefiting both the opposition and the citizens by providing a clearer vision of an alternative government.
The author argues that shadow cabinets prevent MPs from becoming well-rounded in all subjects and that expertise can be harmful since ministries do not operate in isolation. However, this criticism is unfounded. MPs with limited experience are not appointed as ministers, and the same applies to shadow cabinet members. For example, Shashi Tharoor's expertise in international affairs and nuanced understanding of global politics position him as the shadow Minister of External Affairs. MPs must demonstrate knowledge and experience to become shadow ministers. Shadow cabinets, like regular cabinets, undergo reshuffles, enabling MPs to gain expertise across various ministries.
In India's multi-party system, a common concern is the lack of a united opposition, but that has changed after the Lok Sabha elections of 2024; there is some unity present in the opposition I.N.D.I.A. alliance. Questions still arise about how a shadow government can function with a fragmented opposition and which party shadows which ministries. These issues are about organising the opposition, not the institutionalisation of shadow governments. Even with a shadow cabinet, differences may arise, similar to those within government coalitions. A united opposition benefits all parties, and none would typically leave the shadow cabinet.
The landmark judgment in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala established that parliamentary democracy is a basic element of the Indian Constitution. Thus, any practice that strengthens parliamentary democracy is essential to the Constitution. A shadow cabinet is constitutionally viable and desirable.
Institutionalising shadow cabinets will promote constructive opposition and responsible governance. Any government that adopts this practice will enhance its commitment to inclusive, transparent, and accountable governance, and it's ripe for the I.N.D.I.A. alliance to form the shadow cabinet.
Author: Vishal Vaibhav Singh and Sameer Goyal, students at National Law University Odisha. Views are personal.