Can ST Women Without Dissolution Decree Be Considered Under ST (Divorcee) Category For Public Employment: Rajasthan HC Refers To Larger Bench
Faced with a situation of two conflicting decisions by two division benches, the single bench of Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand at the Rajasthan High Court has referred the question of whether a Scheduled Tribe woman can be considered for appointment for a government post under the divorcee category without having decree of dissolution from the competent court before the last date of submission of...
Faced with a situation of two conflicting decisions by two division benches, the single bench of Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand at the Rajasthan High Court has referred the question of whether a Scheduled Tribe woman can be considered for appointment for a government post under the divorcee category without having decree of dissolution from the competent court before the last date of submission of the application form, to a larger bench.
The Court was hearing a petition seeking directions to the State Government to consider the petitioner for appointment as a Grade III Hindi Teacher under the ST (Divorcee) category.
It was the case of the petitioner that at the time of participation in the selection process, divorce of the petitioner had taken place but the decree to that effect was passed by a competent court after the cut-off date fixed in the post's advertisement for submitting the application form. It was argued that in the ST community, there was a custom of taking social divorce and no separate decree was required to be taken.
Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the division bench decision of Rajasthan Public Service Commission (“RPSC”) v Sunita Meena & Ors. (“Sunita Meena case”) in which the Court dealt with identical facts and allowed the petition while directing the State Government to consider the case of the petitioner for appointment on the concerned post by treating her in the ST (Divorcee) category.
Contrary to this, the counsel for the State Government and RPSC (“respondents”) submitted that the category of a candidate was supposed to be seen at the time of the last date of submission of the application form and in the present case, the petitioner did not have the decree of dissolution from the competent form at the time of submitting the application form, hence they were not entitled to be considered for appointment under the category of ST (Divorcee).
Respondents referred to another division bench decision of the Court, The Secretary, RPSC v Sangeeta Varhat which held the judgment passed in the Sunita Meena case to be per incuriam.
Considering arguments put forth by both the sides, the Court observed that the conflicting judgments relied upon by the counsels were given by benches of equal strength. And opined that in such a situation, the matter shall be referred to a larger bench.
“The Judicial decorum and legal propriety demand that where any Single Bench or Division Bench does not agree with the decision of the Bench of Co-ordinate jurisdiction, the matter shall be referred to the Larger Bench.”
The Court referred to the Supreme Court case of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community & Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. in which it was held that a bench of lesser quorum could not doubt the correctness of the view taken by a bench of larger quorum and in case of any doubt, it could invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter to be placed for hearing before a bench of larger quorum than the bench whose decision was into consideration.
Considering this position, the Court held,
“In the situation like the present one, where two conflicting views have been taken by two different Division Benches, this Court has no option except to refer the matter to a Special/Larger Bench, so that the controversy is put to rest, in accordance with law.”
Hence, the question was ordered to be placed before the Chief Justice for the constitution of a special/larger bench to answer the question.
Title: Manju Bai Meena v The State of Rajasthan & Ors. and other related petition
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (Raj) 273